DOMICIANO SOCO, PETITIONER, VS. MERCANTILE CORPORATION OF DAVAO AND THE HONORABLE AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, MINISTRY OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari to annul the order dated October 25, 1979 of the former Deputy
Minister of Labor in Case No. ROXI-C-209-79 and Case
No. LR-30-79, which affirmed the order dated May 31, 1979 of the Regional
Director, granting the application of private respondent Mercantile Corporation
of Davao (MERCO), for clearance to terminate
petitioner Domiciano Soco
and dismissing the latter’s complaint for unfair labor practice.

Private respondent is engaged in the sale and distribution of ice
cream in Davao
City.  Petitioner who was employed as driver of MERCO’s delivery van, was the President of the MERCO
Employees Labor Union (MELU), an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW).  In the last week of January, 1979, the personnel officer of
private respondent conducted an investigation due to reports that petitioner was
carrying on his union (MELU) activities during his working hours for the purpose
of transferring his Union’s affiliation from the FFW to the Southern
Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) and for this purpose he was even
utilizing the company vehicle of MERCO, in violation of the Company’s
Rule No. 19(a) which prescribes a penalty of suspension of 15 days for the first
offense and dismissal for succeeding offenses.

It appears that on January 25, 1979, petitioner was ordered to
deliver ice cream to the Imperial Hotel and Maguindanao Hotel at C.M. Recto Avenue and to Your Goody
Mart at Anda Street, all in Davao City, but he deviated from the usual route and went to
Kiosk No. 4 on San Pedro Street to talk to Bartolome Calago, a co-employee,
but who was then off-duty.  The personnel officer of MERCO advised
petitioner to report to his office to explain his unauthorized deviation in
connection with said incident but petitioner did not comply.  On
January 30,
1979, MERCO wrote the FFW to which MELU was
affiliated and wherein petitioner Dominador Soco was the President asking for a grievance conference to
be scheduled not later than February
13, 1979.  When petitioner manifested his unwillingness
to attend the grievance conference in his belief that such is not necessary, FFW
relayed this information to MERCO.  Due to the refusal of
petitioner to submit himself to a formal conference,
MERCO, in a memorandum dated February
13, 1979 suspended petitioner for five (5) days, effective February 15, 1979, for violation of
Company Rule No. 19(a).  Then a report of this action taken
was filed with the Ministry of Labor.

On February 13,
1979, at 10:30 A.M.,
petitioner was instructed to deliver ice cream to the New City
Commercial Corporation at R. Magsaysay Avenue and Gempesaw Store at Gempesaw Street, Davao City.  After
making these deliveries, petitioner then proceeded to the Office of SPEL Union
at the Puericulture
Center building located on
Alvarez Street. 
John Ferrazzini, Manager of MERCO saw the
company vehicle parked along the street.  After verifying that
petitioner was the driver of the MERCO Ford Fierra
van, he then called for Rogelio Galagar, Secretary of the
MELU and another employee and in their presence, the MERCO manager took out the
rotor of the van.  Later that morning, when petitioner came out of
the building he was unable to start the engine of the vehicle and he called for
company assistance.  An officer of MERCO advised herein petitioner
to report to his office because of the said incident in order to explain his
unauthorized deviation but petitioner did not do so.  On February 14, 1979, respondent MERCO
wrote the FFW to which MELU was affiliated and the petitioner
herein was the President, for a grievance conference on February 15, 1979, but this was reset
to February 21, 1979 to
afford FFW sufficient time to notify petitioner Domiciano Soco. 
On February 20,
1979, FFW informed MERCO that the requested grievance conference
would not be held because petitioner Domiciano Soco finds it unnecessary to do so.

On his part, petitioner filed on February 14, 1979 a complaint for unfair labor practice
against MERCO, docketed by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor,
Davao
City, as LRD Case No. LR-30-79.  Petitioner alleged therein that the
five (5) days suspension imposed on him by respondent Company, was on account of
his union activities.

On February 21,
1979, petitioner was placed on preventive suspension pending the
approval of MERCO’s application for clearance to
terminate the services of the former.  This application was
filed with the Ministry of Labor on February 22, 1979 and docketed therein as LRD Case No.
ROXI-C-209-79.  MERCO’s application for clearance to terminate was opposed
by petitioner even as MERCO filed its Answer to the complaint against it for
unfair labor practice, on March 7,
1979.

The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly as agreed to by
the contending parties.  In an order dated May 21, 1979, the Regional Director granted
private respondent’s application to terminate the employment of
petitioner.  He upheld the preventive suspension imposed by MERCO
on herein petitioner and dismissed the latter’s complaint for unfair labor
practice.  Said order was then appealed by herein petitioner but
the Deputy Minister of Labor, on October 25, 1979, affirmed the
appealed order.  The dismissal of petitioner’s appeal led to
the filing of the instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioner assails the action taken by the respondent Deputy
Minister of Labor as done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction.  Petitioner contends that Policy
Instruction No. 6 of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) indicates
that the Regional Director has no jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair labor
practice cases because the exclusive original jurisdiction over such labor cases
belongs to the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office of the MOLE. 
Petitioner avers, that such cases, therefore, should be first resolved by
the Labor Arbiter and not the Regional Director.

This contention is undeserving of the Court’s
favor.

The fact appears that at the initial hearing conducted on March 7,
1979 by the Regional Director, it was agreed upon by the parties to consolidate
the two cases being litigated considering that both cases concern the same
parties and the issues involved are interrelated (Decision of the Regional
Director, p. 20, Rollo). 
Petitioner obviously accepted the jurisdiction of the Regional Director
by presenting his evidence.  By having asked for affirmative
relief, without challenging the Regional Director’s power to hear and try his
complaint for unfair labor practice, he cannot rightfully now challenge the
resolution made in said cases by the same Director, based on the latter’s
alleged lack of jurisdiction.

In the case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, it has been stated that “after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it
is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.”
Therein, We stated that the Court “frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction when adverse.”

In Ching vs.
Ramolete, 51 SCRA 14, this view was reiterated, and We quote:

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“Having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure an
affirmative relief against his opponents, petitioner may not now be allowed to
repudiate or question the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain such
relief.  While jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any
time, sound public policy bars petitioner from doing so after having
procured that jurisdiction himself, speculating on the fortunes of
litigation.”

Petitioner avers that respondent Minister of Labor erred in
affirming the findings of the Regional Director that he violated Company Rule
No. 19(a) twice and his dismissal was, therefore, unwarranted. 
This issue raised by petitioner relates to questions of fact. 
It has been held, however, in numerous cases, that as a general
rule, the findings of fact of the trial court or quasi-judicial bodies
are binding on this Court.  This principle should be applied
in the instant cases, considering that the findings of respondent Deputy
Minister of Labor are supported by the evidence he appreciated.  As
a matter of fact, the petitioner was caught for the second time by no less that
the Manager of respondent’s company, in actual violation of the rule prohibiting
the use of the company vehicle for private purposes.

Lastly, petitioner asserts that in affirming his dismissal, the
Deputy Minister of Labor violated the constitutional provision of the security
of tenure of employees and that assuming that he indeed violated the company
rule, the fact remains that the damage caused by him, if any, to the company, is
only very minimal which should not warrant the imposition of a penalty of
dismissal.  Petitioner submits that he has been employed in the
company for eighteen (18) years.  Petitioner avers that the damage
inflicted on MERCO by his activities due to his misuse of the company vehicle
during working hours did not hamper the smooth business
operations of MERCO.

However, what should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an
employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary
measures in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be
complied with.  A rule prohibiting employees from using company
vehicles for private purpose without authority from management is, from our
viewpoint, a reasonable one.  This regulation cannot be faulted by
petitioner because this is proper and necessary even if only for an
orderly conduct of MERCO’s business. 
From the evidence presented, petitioner twice used the company
vehicle in pursuing his own personal interests, on company time and deviating
from his authorized route, all without permission.  To cap off his
infractions, petitioners stubbornly declined even to satisfy MERCO’s request for an explanation or to attend a
grievance conference to discuss his violations.  Certainly,
to condone petitioner’s own conduct will erode the discipline that an employer
should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and
regulations by its other employees.  Otherwise, the
rules necessary and proper for the operation of its business, would be gradually
rendered ineffectual, ignored, and eventually become meaningless.

The Court agrees fully with the comment made by the
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, that —

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“The filing by petitioner of the complaint for Unfair Labor practice
case on February 14, 1979
was brought about by the fact that he was caught for the second time on
February 13, 1979 violating
Company Rule 19(a).  It was more of an anticipatory move on
the part of petitioner.” (Rollo, pp.
82-83)

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioner has, as he
says, been employed with petitioner Company for eighteen (18)
years.  On this singular consideration, the Court deems it
proper to afford some equitable relief to petitioner due to the past services
rendered by him to MERCO.  Thus, it is but appropriate that
petitioner should be given by respondent MERCO, separation pay, equivalent
to one month salary for every year of his service to said
Company.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but respondent
Mercantile Corporation of Davao (MERCO) is,
nevertheless, ordered to grant the petitioner herein separation pay,
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of his service.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.