THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PABLEO CABELTES Y ABANG, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Pableo Cabeltes y Abang was convicted in the Criminal Circuit
Court of Misamis Oriental under four separate inform­ations for parricide,
murder and two frustrated murders, all committed on the same occasion, and
thereupon, imposed the extreme penalty of death, each for the crime of
parricide and murder, and 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal, each for the two frustrated
murders.  The aggravating circumstances
of (1) the crime having been committed by means of fire, (2) recidivism, (3)
dwelling, (4) nighttime, (5) evident premeditation, and (6) treachery were
found by the trial court to have concurred in the com­mission of parricide, as
well as in that of murder, except that in the latter crime, that of evident
premeditation or treachery was found as the qualifying circumstance, the other
not so treated was then considered as merely aggravating.  In the two frustrated murders, the qualifying
circumstance was that of evident premeditation, aggravated by nighttime, dwel­ling
and recidivism.

From the judgment of conviction as above indicated, appeal was
taken to this Court, appellant assigning errors against the trial court as
follows:

“1.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
CONDITIONS WERE FAVORABLE FOR RECOGNITION OF APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT OF THE
VICTIMS IN THE INSTANT CASES;

“2.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGED ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENTS (EXHIBIT “H” and EXHIBIT
“H-1”) OF WITNESSES MERLIQUITA CABELTES AND CORAZON CABELTES AS PARTS
OF THE RES GESTAE;

“3.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES CORAZON CABELTES AND MERLIQUITA CABELTES, WERE
MADE IN A POSITIVE, CATE­GORICAL AND STRAIGHT-FORWARD MANNER;

“4.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE OMISSIONS OR VARIATIONS IN THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES CORAZON CABELTES
AND MERLIQUITA CABELTES ARE IN­SUBSTANTIAL OR MINOR;

“5.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR CONDITIONS EXISTING, WHICH SHOW THE PROBABILITY
THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE INSTANT CASES MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE
COMPLAINANT WITNESSES AND OR EITHER OF THE DECEASED VICTIMS;

“6.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE PROSECUTION IN THE INSTANT CASES FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

“7.  THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT
FROM THE CRIMES CHARGED.” (p. 116, Rollo).

The “Statement of Facts”, in Appellee’s Brief is more
extensive, complete and thorough than appellant’s version which is limited to
the bare fact of the two victims, Ignacio Cabeltes and his son Welson Cabeltes,
having died, and the other two victims, Corazon Cabeltes, Ignacio’s wife, and
Merliquita Cabeltes, daughter of Ignacio and Corazon, missing death only by
timely medical intervention, with appellant not disputing the facts as narrated
in the People’s Brief, except only as he denies being the malefactor, his
defense being that of alibi.  We have,
therefore, merely to quote from Appellee’s Brief for a recital of the facts
attendant to the commission of the crime charged the following:

“At about 10:00 o’clock p. m. of February 13, 1973, the peace
and quiet of the Cabeltes family was grossly and permanently
shattered.  As Ignacio Cabeltes and his
wife, Corazon, and children Merliquita and Welson, slept in their residence in
Sitio Boyogan, Barrio of Duca, Medina, Misamis Oriental, Pableo Cabeltes,
Ignacio’s son by his first marriage, unlawfully and clandestinely intruded into
the Cabeltes residence.  (pp. 73-79,
tsn.).

“Inside his father’s house, he commenced attacking the
sleeping members of his father’s second family. 
He stabbed Welson Cabeltes, his younger half-brother, then Corazon
Cabeltes, his step-mother, and then, Merliquita Cabeltes, his youngest
half-sister, all of whom were in a completely helpless state, as they were
asleep when he surreptitiously entered their house.  After his bloody attacks, Pableo gathered
clothes inside the house and made a bonfire out of them, and seemingly
dissatisfied with this, he went down and set fire to the wooden enclosure that
surrounded the house.  The father’s house,
in consequence, burned to the ground, causing the inexorable death of the
critically injured Welson, and Ignacio, who being a criple (since
1971), caused by appellant, p. 75, tsn.) could not get down to safety from the
burning house.  (pp. 73-79, tsn.)

“Corazon Cabeltes, although wounded, had managed to stumble
out of their house and reach the house of Constancio Dahuya, a neighbor, who
was awakened by Corazon’s cry, “Constancio, please help because I was
stabbed by Pableo Cabeltes.” (p. 79, t.s.n., June 25, 1973) Merliquita
Cabeltes, although wounded like her mother, was able to follow her mother to
Dahuya’s house.  On arrival, she told
Dahuya, “Nong, we were stabbed by Pableo Cabeltes.” (pp. 33, t.s.n.,
June 25, 1973) And from Dahuya’s house, the two saw their own house burn
completely to the ground.  (pp. 33 and
83, t.s.n., June 25, 1973)

“Before Pableo Cabeltes performed his acts above, he had
confided to Timoteo Neri, a family friend, his fear that his half-brother
Welson “will inherit the house.” (pp. 128-129, t.s.n.) Pableo further
confided to Neri that he had asked his father, Ignacio, to transfer to him the
latte’s house and lot, which he had proposed to his father to be used as
collateral for a bank loan he wanted to secure, so that he could redeem his
mortgaged land in Samay, Mananum, Medina, Oriental Misamis.  And if his father would refuse, Pableo told
Neri, he would “kill Welson and all the others living in that house, then
burn the house so there will be no witness.” (pp. 130, 131, t.s.n.)

“The appellant’s oldest brother, Pedro, revealed that
“Pableo Cabeltes had ill feelings (were) caused by several reasons:  (1) Pableo could no longer inherit their
father’s house because of the birth of their half-brother Welson and
half-sister Merliquita; (2) he and his father had re­fused Pableo’s request to
mortgage their father’s house and lot as security for a loan that Pableo sought
to get in order to redeem his own mortgaged land situated in Samay, Mananum,
Medina; and (3) their father had “some money.” (pp. 155-156, t.s.n.)
Pedro also declared that “everytime Pableo Cabeltes asks money from my
father and he was refused he would drive my father away from the house.”
(p. 158, t.s.n.)

“Ignacio and Welson Cabeltes’ bodies were carbonized by the
burning of their house.  (p. 5,
t.s.n.  The examining doctor “could
not identify anymore whether there were wounds,” and as a consequence, the
death certificates covering their deaths indicated the cause of death as
“dehydration severe burn.” (Exhs. “A” and “B”,
pp. 55-56, Rec., L-38246).

“Corazon Cabeltes had sustained the following wounds:

“FISCAL PELAEZ:

Q.   What were those stab
wounds? (Corazon Cabeltes was brought forward to the Doctor).

A.    1. Stab wound on the
right arm posterior aspect of the forearm, right,

2. Another
stab wound on the bicep on the anterior part of the forearm,

3.
Stab wound on the right axilla cutting the proximal part of the pectoralis
major,

4. Stab wound on the sternum, on the right side, just below the
junction of the right clavicle and sernum,

5. Stab wound on the 1 ft. arm thru and thru which is on the
proximal third of the posterior arm,

6. Lacerated wound on the left small finger.

Q.   Are those the only
injuries you treated?

A.    Yes, sir.

Q.   What kind of injuries are
they?

A.    They are stab wounds and
lacerated wounds.

Q.   What could have caused
these wounds?

A.    They could have been
caused by a sharp weapon like a knife or dagger.” (p. 11, t.s.n.)

Merliquita Cabeltes had suffered the following wounds:

“FISCAL PELAEZ:

Q.   You also examined Miss
Merliquita Cabeltes?

A.    Yes, sir.

Q.   Please inform this Court
based on this medical certificate the injuries sustained by Merliquita
Cabeltes?

A.   When I examined her
there was a big stab wound on the left side of the abdomen just above the left
kidney area perforating the big intestine and the mysentery where the small
intestines are attached, perforating the small intestine.  It was thru and thru 3″ apart – the two
perforations (witness pointing to the incisions on the body of Merliquita
Cabeltes) which has not healed properly. 
Another stab wound on right scapular region at the back (witness
pointing to the scar).

COURT: (Explaining)

Q.   Another perforated there?

Q.   The weapon stopped when
it hit the scapular bone.

COURT:

      Proceed.

FISCAL PELAEZ:

Q.   What had caused these
three wounds?

A.    Also a sharp weapon –
maybe a knife or dagger.” (p. 14, t.s.n.)

“The foregoing injuries would have caused death to the victims
were it not for timely medical attendance. 
(pp. 12-15, t.s.n.)

“Pableo Cabeltes had a previous conviction, for homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2963, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Pableo
Cabeltes,” of the Misamis Oriental Court of First Instance.  (Exh. “G”).” (pp. 9-14, Brief
for the Appellee, P. 137, Rollo).

Appellant’s main assignments of error all converge on the one
common object of trying to show the incredibility of the testimony of the state
witnesses pointing to him as the killer of the two slain victims and the
assailant of the other two near-death victims. 
Appellant would also inject the probability that the crimes charged have
been committed by the complainants and the deceased victims among themselves,
or against each other, unable to point to another suspect even as he comes forth
with his defense of alibi, claiming, corrolarily, that he has not been
sufficiently identified as the villain.

The question of appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the
heinous crimes committed in one single occasion may, indeed, be said to be the principal
and decisive issue as raised by appellant. 
For there can be no question as to the dastardly and heinous crimes
having been committed, resulting in the death of father and son, the frustrated
killing of mother and daughter, and the burning to the ground of the family
dwelling.  Only the author of these
spine-tingling offenses remain to be determined.

The testimony of the two frustrated murder victims, Corazon
Cabeltes and her 12-year old daughter Merliquita Cabeltes which points with
unerring firmness to appellant as the culprit merits full faith and
credence.  Corazon is the stepmother and
Merliquita is the half-sister of appellant. 
While these relatives of appellant live in a separate house with Ignacio
Cabeltes, husband and father respectively of Corazon and Merliquita, and father
also of appellant with the first wife of Ignacio, appellant’s house is in a
neighboring sitio of that where the victim’s house was located, in the
municipality of Medina, Misamis Oriental. 
The familiarity of the state witnesses and appellant with each other is
thus beyond any doubt.  Verily, close and
intimate relationships should deter an uncertain, much less a false,
identification of the appellant as the killer and attacker by his own
half-sister and step-mother, knowing as they do that such identi­fication would
surely send a close kin to the execution chamber.

The attack was with a knife or dagger.  The victims who testified identifying
appellant as the knife-wielder had thus a close face-to-face view of their assailant
who made no effort to hide his identity, for he wore no mask or used any­thing
else for a similar purpose.  Appellant
actually touched Merliquita, and even warned her “not to say
anything,” as he might have seen signs of terror on her face and therefore
likely to shout in her fear and terror of appellant’s ghastly deed.  After the stabbing, appellant gathered
clothes hanging inside the house and set them on fire, before going down the
house.  On reaching the ground, he also
set fire on the wooden fence enclosing the lower portion of the house, thus
razing the whole house completely to the ground.  With all the moment it took appellant to
perform all these heinous and devilish acts, enough time was afforded the state
witnesses to know beyond mistake the identity of the seemingly crazed
perpetrator, aided by the light of a kerosene lamp burning in the sala, as two
other lamps were similarly lighted in the two bedrooms of the house.

The accuracy of the identification of appellant by the aforenamed
witnesses is further shown by their horrified utter­ances when they saw
Constancio Dahuya to whose house they forthwith fled for refuge first, by
Corazon:  “Help, I was stabbed by
Pableo Cabeltes,” followed by Merliquita: 
“Nong, we were stabbed by Pableo Cabeltes.” These were the
state­ments held as res gestae by the court a quo,
not the extra­judicial statements (Exhibits H and H-1) given by the aforenamed
witnesses which appellant tried, unnecessarily and for no useful purpose, to
assail as not constituting res gestae utter­ances, because of the
lapse of time since the startling occur­rence has taken place to the time the
affidavits were taken down.  That the
words uttered to Constancio Dahuya are clearly part of the res gestae,
the witnesses being then in a state of shock when they made the utterances,
cannot be disputed.  Constancio Dahuya,
an impartial witness, gave testimony attest­ing to the res gestae
nature of the utterances quoted above. 
Appellant’s object of attack as not constituting res gestae
utterances are the abovementioned extra-judicial statements of the witnesses
(Exhibits H and H-1).  These statements
were never held as part of the res gestae by the trial
court.  The empti­ness of appellant’s
argument in this regard is characteristic of the other arguments he had
advanced to destroy the credibility of the star witnesses for the prosecution,
based on what he claims to be inconsistencies, variance and contradictions in
their testimony.

In raising the issue of credibility, appellant unavoid­ably comes
to grip with the well-settled rule that the assess­ment of the trial court of
the witnesses’ credibility is generally and almost invariably given full weight
and respect by the reviewing court which is not given the opportunity to
observe the witnesses’ manner of, and demeanor in, testifying on the
stand.  We find absolutely no cause in
the present case to depart from this rule. 
The alleged inconsistencies are, as contended by the Solicitor General,
on inconsequential details that do not discredit testimony, especially when the
supposed inconsistencies consist of variance between said tes­timony and
affidavits executed by the witnesses out of court (Exhibits H and H-1).  For the incompleteness and lack of accuracy
of affidavits are well-known.  (People vs.
Tiongson, 47 SCRA 279.)

In the instant case, appellant cites the supposed incon­sistency
committed by Corazon Cabeltes for having testified that there were three (3)
lighted lamps inside their house when the incident took place, but that in her
affidavit taken during the preliminary investigation, she mentioned only one
lamp.  The observation as to the usual
incompleteness and inaccuracy of affidavits clearly applies with utmost aptness
in the instance just adverted to.  It
should equally apply when appellant cites as another case of inconsistency the
testimony of Corazon that “when she was attacked by appellant, she imme­diately
ran away, yet by the number of wounds she suffered, it shows that she had
really made a struggle against the assailant,” (p. 10, Appellant’s
Brief).  Clearly, no inconsistency of any
moment or importance is perceived from the testimony of the state witnesses of
such kind as to affect their credibility.

The same could be said with another instance of incon­sistency as
pointed to by appellant when he stated: 
“This wit­ness (referring to Corazon Cabeltes) also testified that
she quarrelled with her husband, Ignacio Cabeltes, because the appellant always
asked money from the latter, yet she also declared that her husband never gave
money to the appellant” (p. 11, Appellant’s Brief).  Again, the complete absence of any
inconsistency is manifest, for appellant may have asked money, but it does not
necessarily mean that because he asked, his father gave money.

With the other examples of what appellant claims to be
inconsistencies in the testimony of the state witnesses, in his attempt to
impugn their credibility, being of the same brand as those already adverted to,
We need only state that the Solicitor General was quite correct in observing
that “the alleged inconsistencies, however, do not discredit the
testimonies alluded to, for they refer to inconsequential matters, but do not,
in actuality, touch upon the basic aspects of the who, the how
and the when, of the crimes committed” (p. 20, Appellee’s Brief).

The suggestion of appellant of the probability that the crimes
charged were committed by the deceased victims and the complaining witnesses
among themselves or against each other is too absurd and preposterous to merit
any serious consider­ation. 
Nevertheless, anent this point, We consider worthwhile quoting from
Appellee’s Brief (p. 21), the following:

“Appellant would paint a picture where the mother and her two
children, one a 13-year old boy (Welson) and the other, a 12-year old daughter
(Merliquita) were capa­ble of coldbloodedly murdering the victim, Ignacio, a
crippled old man, their own husband and father, respectively.  This hypothetical presentation, however, goes
against the grain of experience.  The
defense was unable to extract anything that would support the kind of picture
it now draws.  The evidence, on the
contrary, sup­ports the trial court’s findings. 
The previous conviction that the appellant had, for homicide, is
but eloquent proof of his capability to commit the crimes charged.  Consider this with his proven jealousy of his
father’s second family, and there can be no other conclusion but that the trial
court made a correct assessment of the evi­dence.”

The corroborative testimony of no less than appellant’s
full-blooded brother, Pedro Cabeltes, and other impartial witnesses, Timoteo
Neri and Constancio Dahuya, fortifies the testimony of the eye-witnesses,
Corazon and Merliquita Cabeltes, with respect to the identity of appellant as
the perpetrator of the crimes charged. 
This makes his defense of alibi simply futile and of no avail (People
vs. Ompad, et. al., 26 SCRA 750; People vs. Basuel, 47 SCRA 207), as he must
have so realized, for in this appeal, he no longer pressed this defense to gain
his acquittal.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court is constrained to
hold that appellant’s guilt for the crimes charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and, accordingly, to affirm in toto the penalty
imposed by the court a quo as fully in accordance with law and
the evidence.  Costs against appel­lant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, Acting C.J. and
Abad Santos, JJ., no part.

Makasiar and Aquino,
JJ., in the result.