PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Court is again faced with the delicate task of balancing the constitutionally protected right of an accused to due process of law and the interest of the State in repressing acts of public officers that constitute graft and corrupt practices. In executing such a delicate task, the Court is armed with the rules of procedure it promulgated to facilitate the fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. While the Court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, may allow the relaxation of the rules in the interest of substantial justice, it cannot be done at the expense of the substantive rights of the accused.

The rules on the sufficiency of allegations in the Information and the admissibility and probative weight of evidence, in so far as they may cause injury to the substantive rights of the accused, cannot be casually brushed aside by the invocation of substantial justice and public interest. This is especially true in this case, considering that the prosecution has, at its disposal, the vast resources of the State.

The Case

These consolidated criminal cases involve 10 Informations filed against former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda), viz.:

Criminal Case No. 17287
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about [October 19,] 1968, and for some time thereafter, until June 6, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have direct and indirect financial or pecuniary interest in and participated in the management of Maler Establishment, a company which she and her spouse Ferdinand E. Marcos purchased from the Swiss Bank Corporation and in which she was prohibited by the Constitution from having an interest, by having the sole and full right of disposal of 50% of the assets of said company during their lifetime; by appointing one Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the said company and as administrator and manager of all the assets held by it and ratifying all the decisions and circumstances the aforenamed persons have induced to protect the interest of the accused and her spouse; by transmitting instructions to the company under the name and signature “John Lewis”; by opening and maintaining bank accounts with the Swiss Bank Corporation; and by subsequently transforming the company into the Maler Foundation, changing its attorneys to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. and by causing the registration of its articles of incorporation; and by transferring the management of the assets of Maler Foundation to Suntrust Investment Co., S.A.^[1]

Criminal Case No. 17288
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about [August 26,] 1970, and thereafter until August 3, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have a direct and indirect financial or pecuniary interest in, and participated in the management of the Trinidad Foundation, a company created in Liechtenstein and with domicile in Triesenberg, Switzerland, in which she was prohibited by the Constitution from having any interest during her term of office, by, among others, performing the following acts: providing the capital of [CHF] 100,000 for said Foundation which had the object of investment and the administration of its assets and the utilization of its capital and interest; designating herself as its first beneficiary during her lifetime and her children after her death; executing a Mandator-Mandatory Agreement between her and one Markus Geel, C. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller; by subsequently ordering the Board of Trustees of said Foundation to remit to Bank Hofman, AG, Zurich in favor of Fides Trust Company, for the account “Reference Dido” all the assets, securities, time deposits, [and] balances held by the aforesaid Foundation as a final distribution thereof preparatory to its liquidation; and finally causing the dissolution and liquidation of said Foundation.^[2]

Criminal Case No. 17289
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about [June 22,] 1971, and thereafter until August 6, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and indirect financial or pecuniary interest in, and participated in the management of the Rayby Foundation, Vaduz, a company created in Vaduz, Switzerland and in which she was prohibited by the Constitution from having any interest during her term of office, by, among others, performing the following acts: ordering that the capitalization of the aforesaid Foundation and the cost of establishing it be debited against the account of Trinidad Foundation, a company which the accused herself established and of which she is the first beneficiary; designating herself as the first and only beneficiary of said Rayby Foundation; ordering the Board of Trustees of said Foundation, including Walter Fessler, Peter Ritter, Ernst Scheller as members, to transfer to the Trinidad Foundation, for their account with Credit Swisse, Zurich, any assets, balance, etc. presently held by the Rayby Foundation, which was to be liquidated after effecting said transfer; by further approving the accounts and all additional statements and releasing the executives and officers thereof from responsibility in the management of said company; and finally by causing the dissolution of aforesaid Foundation.^[3]

Criminal Case No. 17290
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about [May 13,] 1981, and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and indirect financial or pecuniary interest in and participated in the management of the Palmy Foundation, a company created in Vaduz and in which she was prohibited by the Constitution from having any interest during her term of office, by, among others, causing the deposit/ registration of the deed of foundation and statutes/ articles pursuant to the legal regulations; [and] appointing one Dr. Ivo Beck & Limag Management &Administration Stock Corporation as members of the Board of Trustees of aforesaid Foundation with authority to sign in twos and being the beneficial owner of the assets of said Foundation deposited under Account No. 391528.^[4]

Criminal Case No. 17291
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about [August 3,] 1982, and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally intervene directly in opening, managing, and/or administering business ventures using government resources, in which she was prohibited by the Constitution during her term of office from having an interest or participating in their management, by securing and heavily recommending the approval by then Central Bank Governor Jaime Laya of the [USD] 25 [m]illion loan being applied for by the Asian Reliability Corporation, a private Corporation with offices [in] Taguig, Metro Manila, for its semiconductor related projects, which loan was guaranteed by the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation.^[5]

Criminal Case No. 19225
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended)

That [on] or about the year 1980, or immediately prior and subsequent thereto, in Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, a public officer, being then the Minister of then Ministry of Human Settlement and Environmental Management, and a member of the Batasang Pambansa, did then and there, [willfully] and unlawfully, acquire financial pecuniary interest in Asian Reliability Company, Inc., and Dynetics, private entities, then headed by Vicente B. Chuidan by becoming part owners thereof wherein she is prohibited by law and the Constitution from having any interest.^[6]

Criminal Case No. 22867
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to Article IX, Section 8 and Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about the period [June 11,] 1971 to 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Minister of Human Settlements and, as such Cabinet Member, constitutionally prohibited from participating in the management of any business and from intervening in any matter before any office for her pecuniary interest, while in the performance and taking advantage of her official administrative functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and/or indirect financial or pecuniary interest and participate in the management and administration of the Vibur Foundation, also previously known as the Azio Foundation and the Verso Foundation, which Foundation the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand Marcos used or utilized as a conduit in the funneling [sic] or transferring of ill-gotten wealth or monies, by opening and maintaining bank account or accounts with the Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt (SKA), or Credit Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC), or in other banks outside of the Philippines, in the Foundation’s name for the benefit of the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and their children, which monies amounting to [USD] 3,597,544.00 as of [December 31,] 1991 in the account of the said Foundation, having been illegally, unlawfully, irregularly or illegitimately acquired or obtained by the accused and her late husband beyond their lawful income of [USD] 957,487.75 for the years 1965 to 1985 as reflected in their income tax returns, or some of said monies, were then ordered or caused by the accused to be remitted to the Central Bank of the Philippines to be used to purchased [sic] or be invested in or caused to be converted to high-interest yielding private issues of Dollar Treasury Notes of the Central Bank, with accused intervening in the investment placements of the Central Bank for the pecuniary benefit of said Foundation, herself and her family, to the damage and prejudice of the Government service.^[7] (Citation omitted)

Criminal Case No. 22868
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to [Article IX, Section 8] and [Article VIII, Section 11] of the 1973 Constitution)

That on [sic] about the period 1971 to August 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Minister of Human Settlements and, as such Cabinet Member, constitutionally prohibited from participating in the management of any business and from intervening in any matter before any office for her pecuniary interest, while in the performance and taking advantage of her official and administrative functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and/or indirect financial or pecuniary interest and participate in the management and administration of the Aguamina Foundation, also previously known as the Rosalys Foundation, which Foundation the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand Marcos used or utilized as a conduit in the funnelling [sic] or transferring of ill-gotten wealth or monies, by opening and maintaining bank account or accounts with the Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt (SKA), or Credit Swiss Bank or Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC), or in other banks outside of the Philippines, in the Foundation’s name for the benefit of the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and their children, which monies amounting to [USD] 80,566,483.00 as of [August 30,] 1991 in the account of said Foundation, having been illegally, unlawfully, irregularly or illegitimately acquired or obtained by the accused and her late husband beyond their lawful income of [USD] 957,487.75 for the years 1965 to 1985 as reflected in their income tax returns, of which [USD] 10.3 million was deposited to SBC General Account No. 51960 and received as bribes, facilitation fees, kickbacks or commissions from Japanese corporations or suppliers of roaders and graders for infrastructure projects, or some of said monies, were then ordered by accused to be remitted to the Central Bank of the Philippines to be used to purchase or be invested in or caused to be converted to high-interest yielding private issues of Dollar Treasury Notes of the Central Bank, with accused intervening in the investment placements of the Central Bank [for] the pecuniary benefit of said Foundation, herself and her family, to the damage and prejudice of the Government service.^[8] (Citation omitted)

Criminal Case No. 22869
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to [Article IX, Section 8] and [Article VIII, Section III, of the 1973 Constitution)

That on or about the period March 1968 to 1986, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Minister of Human Settlements and, as such Cabinet Member, constitutionally prohibited from participating in the management of any business and from intervening in any matter before any office for her pecuniary interest, while in the performance and taking advantage of her official administrative functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and/or indirect financial or pecuniary interest and participate in the management and administration of the Avertina Foundation, basically comprising the consolidation of [two] sets of Swiss bank accounts of [two] groups of foundations the first of which was also previously known as the Xandy Foundation and the Wintrop Foundation [(Wintrop)] and the second of which was previously known as the Charis Foundation, Scolari Foundation, Valamo Foundation and the Spinus Foundation, which Foundation the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand Marcos used or utilized as a conduit in the funnelling [sic] or transferring of ill-gotten wealth or monies, by opening and maintaining bank account or accounts with the Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt (SKA), or Credit Swiss Bank, or Bank Hoffman or Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) or in other banks outside the Philippines, in the Foundation’s name for the benefit of the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and their children, which monies amounting to [USD] 231,366,894.00 as of [December 31,] 1989 under the account Category NES in the account of the said Foundation, having been illegally, unlawfully, irregularly or illegitimately acquired or obtained by the accused and her late husband beyond their lawful income of [USD] 957,487.75 for the years 1965 to 1985 as reflected in their income tax returns, or some of said monies, were then ordered by the accused to be remitted to the Central Bank of the Philippines to be used to purchase or be invested in or caused to be converted to high-interest yielding private issues of Dollar Treasury Notes of the Central Bank, with accused intervening in the investment placements of the Central Bank for the pecuniary benefit of said Foundation, herself and her family, and further, with the accused: using an alias, “Jane Ryan”, to open a SKA bank account and conceal her identity; signing a Contract for the Opening of a Current Account and/or Safe Custody Account as a depositor with SKA on [March 21,] 1968, with specific instructions to mail regularly all correspondence and statements pertaining to the said account to P.O. Box 4539, Manila; instructing Mr. Markus Geel the creation of a Foundation in Liechtenstein, approving the By-laws of the foundation and appointing Mr. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller as trustees; designating the beneficiaries of the said Foundation on [February 13,] 1970 in Manila; providing the capital of the Foundation amounting to [CHF] 100,000; and issuing a written order to the board of Wintrop to liquidate the Foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hoffman, among others, for the benefit of the respondent and her late husband, to the damage and prejudice of the Government service.^[9] (Citation omitted)

Criminal Case No. 22870
(For violation of Section 3(h) of [Republic Act] No. 3019, as amended[,] in relation to [Article IX, Section 8] and [Article VIII, Section 11] of the 1973 Constitution)

That on [sic] about the period 1976 to 1986, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Minister of Human Settlements and, as such Cabinet Member, constitutionally prohibited from participating in the management of any business and from intervening in any matter before any office for her pecuniary interest, while in the performance and taking advantage of her official administrative functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally have a direct and/or indirect financial or pecuniary interest and participate in the management and administration of the various establishments, which establishments the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand Marcos used or utilized as conduits in the funnelling [sic] or transferring of ill-gotten wealth or monies, by opening and maintaining bank account or accounts with the Banque Paribas, formerly known as the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, for the benefit of the accused and her late husband then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and their children, which monies at said bank: [USD] 13,577,32].66 deposited for the account of Pretorien Establishment as of [November 10,] 1978; [USD] 9,201,240.91 deposited for the account of Gladiator Establishment, formerly known as Bullseye, as of [November 10,] 1978; [USD] 3,601,446.01 deposited for the account of Cesar Establishment, formerly known as Gardenia, as of [November 10,] 1978; [USD] 1,811,426.61 deposited for the account of ESG Establishment as of [November 10,] 1978, among other establishments, having been illegally, unlawfully, irregularly or illegitimately acquired or obtained by the accused and her late husband beyond their lawful income of [USD] 957,487.75 for the years 1965 to 1985 as reflected in their income tax returns, or some of said monies, were then ordered by accused to be remitted to the Central Bank of the Philippines to be used to purchase or be invested in or caused to be converted to high-interest yielding private issues of Dollar Treasury Notes of the Central Bank, with accused intervening in the investment placements of the Central Bank for the pecuniary benefit of said Foundation, herself and her family, and further, with the accused; utilizing the Establishments Bullseye, Mabari, Gladiator and Volubilis as fiduciary agents with respect to her and her late husband’s accounts; applying to pen account No. 073 043 P with Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Buisse) S.A. in Geneva and filed on [October 3,] 1980 through S. Cattaui and Ph. Siegenthaler; and executing a Power of Attorney dated [September 29,] 1980 in favor of her deceased husband, showing that then President Ferdinand E. Marcos could also withdraw or do anything with respect to the accused’s secret Swiss accounts, for the benefit of the respondent and her late husband, to the damage and prejudice of the Government service.^[10] (Citation omitted)

As aptly summarized by the Sandiganbayan (SBN), the foregoing cases may be classified into three groups:

1. Criminal Case Nos. 17287 (Maler Foundation), 17288 (Trinidad Foundation), 17289 (Rayby Foundation), 17290 (Palmy Foundation), and 17291 (Asian Reliability Corporation, Inc. [ARCI] Loan), which were all filed on December 16, 1991; 
2. Criminal Case No. 19225 (ARCI) filed on December 21, 1993; and
3. Criminal Case Nos. 22867 (Azio-Verzo-Vibur Foundation), 22868 (Rosalys-Aguamina Foundations), 22869 (Avertina-Xandy/Wintrop-Charis/Scolari/Valamo/Spinus Foundations), and 22870 (Pretorien-Gladiator-Cesar-ESG Foundations), which were all filed on August 17, 1995. The prosecution subsequently filed Amended Informations, all dated August 2, 1999, which were admitted on October 8, 2001.^[11]

Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291 and Criminal Case No. 19225 were originally raffled to the Third Division of the SBN, and the trials on these cases were consolidated on June 14, 2002. On January 2, 2003, Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870, originally assigned to the Fourth Division of the SBN, were consolidated with Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291 and Criminal Case No. 19225, which were then pending with the Third Division. However, due to the inhibition of Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, Chairperson of the Third Division, all these consolidated cases were again re-raffled and assigned to the Fourth Division. When Justice Gregory Ong (Justice Ong), Chairperson of the Fourth Division, recused himself from participating in these cases following the directive of the Supreme Court (SC), these consolidated cases altogether ended up with the Fifth Division.

Antecedents

I. Proceedings Prior to Consolidation of All Cases

A. Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291

On December 23, 1991, or six days after the filing of the Informations, Imelda personally surrendered before the court and posted bail to secure her temporary liberty during the pendency of these cases. Her arraignment was set on January 7, 1992.^[12]

On January 5, 1992, Imelda filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that: (1) the criminal actions in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17289 have prescribed; (2) the offense allegedly committed in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17290 took place in Switzerland; thus, the court lacks jurisdiction under the territoriality principle; and (3) the Information in Criminal Case No. 17290 does not charge an offense.^[13]

Notwithstanding the filing of the Motion to Quash, the arraignment proceeded as schedules, whereby Imelda pleaded “not guilty” to the charges. The Pre-Trial Conference was set from March 9, 1992 to March 11, 1992.^[14]

On March 1, 1992, Imelda filed a Waiver of Pre-Trial and Appearance, which the SBN noted in an April 1, 1992 Minute Resolution.^[15] On March 9, 1992, the prosecution filed a Motion for Consolidation of these cases with the forfeiture case against Imelda titled, “Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,” docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 pending before the First Division. Consequently, the Pre-Trial Conference set on said date was deferred. In an April 20, 1992 Resolution, the prosecution’s move for consolidation was eventually denied. Its Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a June 22, 1992 Resolution.^[16]

During a hearing on July 5, 1993, Imelda raised an alleged defect in the Informations. Thus, she was given a period of 10 days to file a Motion to Quash.^[17]

On July 12, 1993, the prosecution filed an Omnibus Motion to: (a) withdraw waiver of pre-trial; (b) set the case for pre-trial; (c) set aside the Order allowing Imelda to submit Motion to Quash, which was granted in the July 15, 1993 Order, setting the cases for Pre-Trial Conference on August 19, 1993. However, due to the voluminous documents to be marked by the prosecution and Imelda’s manifestation to file a motion for production of documents and photocopy documents of the prosecution, the Pre-Trial Conference was set to continue on August 30, 1993.^[18]

Imelda then filed a Motion for Production, Inspection, and Photocopying of Documents on August 25, 1993. It was set for hearing on August 27, 1993, where the prosecution committed that it would make the proper manifestation during the scheduled continuation of Pre-Trial Conference on its readiness to produce the subject documents. However, as jointly moved by the parties, the proceeding on said date did not push through and was reset to September 23, 1993. On the latter date, the SBN granted Imelda access to the documents or exhibits of the prosecution during office hours for the purpose of examining and photocopying the same. Imelda also manifested her intent to file a motion to quash. However, due to the voluminous records of the cases, Imelda filed an Urgent Motion praying that the 30-day period given to her within which to file a motion to quash be held in abeyance until after the exhibits have been marked, which was granted in an October 8, 1993 Minute Resolution.^[19]

On January 12, 1994, Imelda filed five Motions to Quash, to which the prosecution filed a Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Quash. On October 16, 1995, Imelda filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion to Quash, attaching her Supplemental Motion to Quash. In an August 9, 1996 Resolution, both the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental Motion to Quash were denied. Imelda moved for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit. This prompted Imelda to file a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 137687-91, elevating the matter for the resolution of the SC. However, in a December 12, 2001 Resolution, the SC dismissed Imelda’s Petition, and this became final on January 3, 2002.^[20]

Meanwhile, the Pre-Trial Conference continued on March 15, 1999, where the parties agreed to submit a joint stipulation of facts upon which the pre-trial order shall be based. However, the parties failed to submit a joint stipulation of facts despite the lapse of the given time. Thus, in a June 21, 1999 Minute Resolution, the Pre-Trial Conference was terminated. The cases then proceeded to trial, and the prosecution presented its witnesses.^[21]

On September 4, 2002, the prosecution filed a Motion for Consolidation of Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870 (then with the Fourth Division) with Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291 and Criminal Case No. 19225 (originally raffled to the Third Division). Said Motion was denied by the Third Division in a September 19, 2002 Resolution, but the same was reconsidered on January 2, 2003. Hence, the cases were consolidated at the Third Division.^[22]

B. Criminal Case No. 19225

While this case was filed as early as December 21, 1993, Imelda was not immediately arraigned. Arraignment was held in abeyance pending reinvestigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. On March 5, 1999, the prosecution was ordered to show cause within 10 days why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The prosecution then filed its Compliance on April 27, 1999, explaining that the reinvestigation was already completed, and the Memorandum was submitted for approval of the Ombudsman.^[23]

On August 6, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 19225 on the ground that it is identical to Criminal Case No. 17291. However, this was denied in a June 14, 2002 Resolution of the Third Division, directing its consolidation with Criminal Case No. 17291 and further setting the Pre-Trial Conference in Criminal Case No. 19225 on July 16, 2002.^[24]

During the said conference, the parties were enjoined to come up with a joint stipulation of facts within 30 days. The Pre-Trial Conference was reset to September 10, 2002. On September 9, 2002, Imelda filed a Manifestation and Motion with the prosecution’s conformity waiving the submission of a joint stipulation of facts, thus terminating the Pre-Trial Conference. Trial then ensued in Criminal Case No. 19225 to coincide with the hearing in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291.^[25]

C. Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870

These cases were filed on August 17, 1995, but four years later, the prosecution filed separate Amended Informations, all dated August 2, 1999, which were admitted on October 8, 2001. Imelda then posted bond on October 16, 2001 to secure her temporary liberty. On August 14, 2002, she was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to all the charges. On even date, the Pre-Trial Conference ensued and was terminated. The parties failed to come up with any stipulation. From then on, the cases were consolidated with Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291 and Criminal Case No. 19225 at the Third Division.^[26]

II. Proceedings Subsequent to Consolidation of All Cases

As mentioned, after the Chairperson of the Third Division inhibited, the consolidated cases were transferred to the Fourth Division. The proceedings were stayed upon a June 21, 2004 Order of the Fourth Division, while awaiting the resolution of the prosecution’s Petition for Certiorari before the SC assailing the denial by Justice Ong, Chairperson of the Fourth Division, of its Motion for Inhibition. On May 5, 2006, the SC directed Justice Ong to recuse himself from participating in the consolidated cases. Upon re-raffle, the consolidated cases ended up with the Fifth Division, and trial was ordered to resume on August 4, 2006.^[27]

At this point, Imelda was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 19225. Hence, on September 14, 2006, she was arraigned, and she pleaded “not guilty” to the charged offense. On September 25, 2006, Imelda filed a Waiver of Appearance, which the SBN approved on October 16, 2006. Both parties later moved for several postponements. Thus, the trial only resumed on December 6, 2006. The prosecution continued its presentation of witnesses from 2007 to 2015. On December 3, 2015, the prosecution filed its Consolidated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the SBN resolved to admit, there being no opposition from Imelda.^[28]

Meanwhile, the defense did not present any witness. On March 8, 2017, Imelda filed her Formal Offer of Evidence consisting of Exhibits “1” to “3,” which the SBN admitted over the objection of the prosecution. The prosecution and defense filed their Memoranda on August 29, 2017 and September 19, 2017, respectively, and the consolidated cases were deemed submitted for resolution.^[29]

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

(1) Ms. Lourdes Magno (Magno), Records Officer III of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

Magno testified that she had in her custody at the PCGG the authenticated documents sent by the Swiss authorities representing the Swiss assets and bank accounts of Imelda and former President Ferdinand Marcos (President Marcos; collectively, Marcoses), which were marked by the prosecution as Exhibits “D” to “K” and series. Magno likewise identified her signatures in the certifications of the photocopies of said documents.^[30]

(2) Mr. Nestor J. Ballasillo (Ballasillo), Assistant Solicitor General of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

Ballasillo declared that he was a member of Task Force Humongous, created by then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (Atty. Chavez), which was tasked to work closely with the PCGG to study the documents sent to the Philippine government by Peter Cosandey (Cosandey), Chief Magistrate of Canton, Zurich, Switzerland. He explained that aside from the Swiss documents, Task Force Humongous was also provided with documents recovered from Malacañang, Central Bank, and other sources.^[31]

(3) Atty. Chavez, former Solicitor General from March 16, 1987 to February 6, 1992

Atty. Chavez testified that he organized and led Task Force Humongous to gather documents and information that were necessary in the filing of criminal and civil cases against the Marcoses. In the process, he received from Ambassador Luis Ascalon (Ambassador Ascalon) voluminous Swiss documents attached as annexes to the Certificate of Authentication executed by Ma. Fe Pangilinan-Klingert (Consul General Klingert), Philippine Consul to Switzerland. These documents were transmitted to Ambassador Ascalon via diplomatic pouch. He also stated that he conferred on numerous occasions with Cosandey, who was designated by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court to act as the sole Investigating Magistrate for the discovery, freezing, and recovery of the assets of the Marcoses in Switzerland.^[32]

Allegedly, the documents furnished to Task Force Humongous reveal that the Trinidad, Rayby, Palmy, Maler, Avertina, Xandy, Wintrop, Charis, Vibur-Avertina, Azio-Verso-Vibur, Scolari, Valamo, Spinus, and Aguamina Foundations had been established by the Marcoses in Switzerland, with a common design to administer, manage, promote, and participate in the operations thereof.^[33] As regards the local company ARCI, Atty. Chavez claimed that while this was not registered in the name of the Marcoses, the PCGG documents show that they were the beneficial owners.^[34]

(4) Ambassador Ascalon, former Chargé d’affairs and later Ambassador to Switzerland from March 16, 1987 to April 21, 1992

Ambassador Ascalon testified that he acted as the conduit between the Philippine authorities and Swiss government. He participated in the process of transmitting some documents pertaining to the alleged Swiss accounts of the Marcoses.^[35]

(5) Mr. Jaime Laya (Laya), former Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank)

According to Laya, during his incumbency as the Governor of the Central Bank, the country was experiencing an acute dollar crisis. This prompted him to seek the assistance of the Marcoses. After receiving former President Marcos’ advice, the Central Bank received USD 200 million from two Swiss Banks, with no indication of who the principals were.^[36]

(6) Mr. Cesar Virata (Virata), former Chairperson and member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee) from January 31, 1977 to February 26, 1986; former Minister of Finance from February 1970 to February 1986; and former Prime Minister of the Philippines from July 1981 to March 1986

According to Virata, ARCI’s foreign loan in 1981 was USD 25 million, approved for the purpose of financing its capital requirements for five electronic projects. However, these projects did not materialize because the funds were used for other purposes, with the alleged involvement of former President Marcos.^[37]

(7) Mr. Victor Macalinag (Macalinag), Officer-in-Charge from January 11, 1985 to February 28, 1991 and Presidential/Chief Executive Officer and Board Member from March 1, 1991 to August 31, 2001 of Philguarantee and its successor, Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)

Macalinag corroborated Virata’s statements.^[38]

(8) Guillermo Soliven (Soliven), former Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank

Soliven’s testimony was dispensed with after Imelda’s counsel agreed to stipulate on the documents on January 22, 2015.^[39]

Evidence for the Defense

On July 14, 2016, the parties stipulated on the authenticity and existence of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the cross-examination of Assistant Solicitor General Cesar del Rosario in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732-39, 91-101879-92, and 91-101959-69 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Imelda R. Marcos et al.” before Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. These were marked as Exhibits “1” to “3.”^[40]

Ruling of the SBN

A. Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291

The SBN ruled that Imelda is guilty in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17290. It found that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution. It explained that it is undisputed that Imelda held the alleged government positions. Pertinently, the SBN noted that the documents and testimonies presented by the prosecution showed that she has a direct or indirect financial interest in the foundations and has participated in the management of the same. Further, it observed that the evidence points to her role in organizing, coordinating, and directing the affairs of the foundations through their agents, attorneys, and administrators/managers. In coming up with this conclusion, the SBN deemed it proper to relax technical rules in view of the public interest involved in these cases.^[41]

As regards Criminal Case No. 17291, in relation to the ARCI Loan, Imelda was acquitted clue to insufficiency of evidence. The SBN found that proof of management and control points to former President Marcos, instead of Imelda.^[42]

B. Criminal Case No. 19225

Imelda was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 19225. The SBN held that the specific provision of the 1973 Constitution or law allegedly violated in relation to Republic Act No. 3019 was not stated in the Information.^[43]

C. Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870

With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22869, the SBN found Imelda guilty. In finding that Imelda had prohibited pecuniary interest in Criminal Case Nos. 22867 and 22869, the SBN considered the letters of the Marcoses to Credit Suisse and Mr. Markus Geel (Geel), as well as the declaration of Dr. Ivo Beck that the beneficiaries of the Avertina accounts were the Marcoses. Meanwhile, for Criminal Case No. 22868, the SBN considered circumstantial evidence.

Meanwhile, as to Criminal Case No. 22870, Imelda was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The SBN ruled that the prosecution failed to prove Imelda’s participation in the management of the foundations. Specifically, it observed that the evidence lacked material details showing a link to Imelda.^[44]

Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed November 9, 2018 Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Imelda R. Marcos:

(a)	GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of [Republic Act] No. 3019, Section 3(h) in relation to Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution in Criminal [Case] Nos. 17287, 17288, 17289, 172890 [sic], 22867, 22868, and 22869 whereby she is sentenced, in each of these cases, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from [six] years and [one] month as minimum to [11] years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office. As regards the civil aspect consisting of forfeiture of the assets and accounts of the foundations subject of these cases, the Court defers to the disposition thereof in the forfeiture proceedings separately instituted against the accused;
(b)	ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 19225, for failure of the Information therein to charge an offense; [and]
(c)	ACQUITTED in Criminal [Case] Nos. 17291 and 22870, for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.^[45] (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The Court emphasizes that these cases do not deal with the character of the assets in the subject foundations. We do not determine whether they may be considered ill-gotten wealth as defined under Executive Order Nos. 1^[46] and 2,^[47] the PCGG Rules and Regulations, and jurisprudence. That issue is the subject of separate forfeiture proceedings instituted by the Republic.^[48] The only issue in these cases is whether accused-appellant is guilty of holding a financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, which interest is prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

Based on the parties’ submissions, the pertinent sub-issues are:

1. Whether accused-appellant availed of the wrong mode of appeal;
2. Whether accused-appellant’s rights to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases were violated;
3. Whether accused-appellant was charged with and convicted of violating a non-existing law; and
4. Whether the prosecution duly established accused-appellant’s guilt for the offenses charged.

Ruling of the Court

Contrary to the People’s contention, accused-appellant availed of the correct mode of appeal. The proper remedy to assail her conviction is through a notice of appeal, and not a petition for review on certiorari as posited by the People.

The 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the SBN (2018 SBN Rules) provides as follows:

RULE XI
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND PINAL ORDERS

SECTION 1. Methods of Review. —

(a) In General. — The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal filed with the Sandiganbayan and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In People v. Talaue,^[49] the Court emphasized that the 2018 SBN Rules were issued pursuant to the Court’s exclusive power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. The Court distinguished the modes of review for SBN judgments and final orders, thus:

In promulgating said Rules, this Court merely distinguished between the modes of review of the judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In the former, the facts are tried by the Sandiganbayan in the first instance and the accused is entitled to appeal the factual findings of said court via notice of appeal. In the latter, the facts had already been tried by the lower courts. Therefore, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, just like those of the Court of Appeals when it affirms the factual findings of the lower courts, are given great weight and are generally conclusive upon this Court. That being the case, only questions of law may be raised in appeals to this Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases, via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.^[50]

The Court further clarified that the Rules of Court can only apply in a suppletory manner and cannot supplant the procedure in the 2018 SBN Rules since the latter specifically provides for the modes of review of judgments and final orders of the SBN.^[51] Similarly, the procedure provided in Presidential Decree No. 1606^[52] and its amendatory laws cannot prevail over the 2018 SBN Rules, as the Constitution vested upon the Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

The 2018 SBN Rules took effect on November 16, 2018.^[53] Accused-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on December 3, 2018,^[54] or during the effectivity of the 2018 SBN Rules. As the cases were decided by the SBN in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the accused-appellant correctly filed a Notice of Appeal.

The Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial. Under Article III, Section 14(2):

Section 14.
. . . .

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

This must not be confused with the right of an accused to a speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The right to a speedy trial is invoked against courts in a criminal prosecution.

The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them. Jurisprudence clarifies the guidelines in determining whether the rights to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases have been violated. In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,^[55] We discussed that the determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised. Further, an alleged violation of said right must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.^[56]

Here, particularly with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291, while the pertinent Informations were filed on December 16, 1991, the accused-appellant filed several Motions to Quash, as well as a Motion for Production, Inspection, and Photocopying of Documents. The Decision on the denial of the Motions to Quash only became final on January 3, 2002. To repeat, Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291, Criminal Case No. 19225, and Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870 were consolidated on January 2, 2003 in the Third Division. From then on, due to the inhibition of Justice Legaspi, Chairperson of the Third Division, all these consolidated cases were re-raffled and assigned to the Fourth Division. On May 5, 2006, the SC directed Justice Ong, Chairperson of the Fourth Division, to recuse himself from participating in the consolidated cases. Upon re-raffle, the consolidated cases ended up with the Fifth Division, and trial was ordered to resume on August 4, 2006. Under SC Circular No. 38-98, We exclude delays resulting from orders of inhibition in the running of the periods.

Further, there are other factors that must also be considered, such as the volume of evidence presented by the prosecution that must be weighed, and the numerous postponements initiated by accused-appellant. More importantly, accused-appellant did not file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural period but raised the supposed inordinate delay only after the SBN’s adverse Decision. Thus, even assuming that there has been any delay, following Cagang v. Sandiganbayan and the more recent case of Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),^[57] accused-appellant is deemed to have already waived her rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition.

Going to the charges filed against accused-appellant, the Informations accused her of violating Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, which reads as follows:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

. . . .

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract[,] or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,^[58] the Court laid down the elements of the offense and clarified the two modes by which a public officer may violate Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019:

The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the crime of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;
2. [They have] a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; [and]
3. [They] either[:] 
   1. [intervene] or [take] part in [their] official capacity in connection with such interest; or 
   2. [are] prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.

There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in connection with [their] pecuniary interest in any business, contract[,] or transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part in [their] official capacity. The second mode is when [they are] prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.^[59]

The first mode of committing the offense, or unlawful intervention, has the following elements:

1. The accused is a public officer;
2. [They have] a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. [They intervene] or [take] part in [their] official capacity in connection with such interest.^[60]

Meanwhile, the second mode of committing the offense, or possession of prohibited interest, has the following elements:

1. The accused is a public officer;
2. [They have] a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; and
3. [They are] prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.^[61]

Jurisprudence has clarified that the first mode contemplates actual intervention in the business, contract, or transaction in which the public officer has a financial or pecuniary interest.^[62] This is in keeping with the raison d’etre of the law, i.e., to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority, and power.^[63] In contrast, the second mode requires possession of a financial or pecuniary interest that is prohibited by the Constitution or by law.^[64] As such, a constitutional or legal prohibition is a key element of the second mode.

In this case, accused-appellant’s conviction is based on the second mode of violating Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019. The cited constitutional prohibition is in Article IX, Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads as follows:

SECTION 8. The Prime Minister and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provisions of Sections [10] and [11] of Article [VIII] hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or participate in the management of any business, or practice any profession. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2332 (1984), such provision was eventually renumbered and amended to read as follows:

SECTION 7. The Prime Minister and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provisions of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or take part in the management of any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualifications as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

According to the SBN, accused-appellant participated in the management of the subject foundations—a financial or pecuniary interest prohibited under Article IX, Section 7 (then Section 8) of the 1973 Constitution.^[65] Thus, she was found guilty of violating Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 in seven criminal cases.

On this score, accused-appellant argues that she was convicted of violating a non-existing law.^[66] She claims that the March 25, 1986 Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution, excluded Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, which is the basis of the charges against her.^[67] The repeal of the 1973 Constitution supposedly deprived the SBN of its jurisdiction to punish persons who may have violated the 1973 Constitution.^[68] Such contentions are unmeritorious.

As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law deprives courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with violating said law. An exception to such rule is when a new law reenacts the act penalized under the repealed law. Such reenactment has the effect of continuing the law in force without any interruption. In Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,^[69] the Court laid down the rules on repeal, which read as follows:

As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.

. . . .

Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter is simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect “neutralizes” the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption. The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by [them] under the old law, will neither preclude the accused’s prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try [their] case.^[70]

Here, Article II, Section 6 of the Freedom Constitution expressly retained the prohibitions applicable to cabinet members:

SECTION 6. The President, the Vice-President, and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the disabilities provided for in Section 8, Article VII, and in Sections 6 and 7, Article IX, respectively, of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. (Emphasis supplied)

The prohibitions were again reenacted in Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the constitutional prohibition allegedly violated by accused-appellant was continuously reenacted up to the present Constitution. Such reenactments neutralized the repeal of the 1973 Constitution and had the effect of maintaining the prohibition without any interruption. Accordingly, the charges against accused-appellant were not affected by the repeal of the 1973 Constitution.

Before delving into the evidence presented by the prosecution, We first take note of the disparity between the basis of accused-appellant’s conviction and the allegations in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17287, 17288, 17289, and 17290.

Specifically, accused-appellant was convicted of violating the constitutional prohibition applicable to cabinet members. However, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17287, 17288, 17289, and 17290 charged accused-appellant in her capacity as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The Informations state that accused-appellant committed the offense as “a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, and committing the offense in relation to her office[.]”^[71]

Of the charges where accused-appellant was adjudged guilty, only the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 22867, 22868, and 22869 charged her in relation to her actions as a cabinet member, thus:

Notably, under the 1973 Constitution, cabinet members are prohibited from participating in the management of any business. No similar prohibition is imposed on the members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, merely prohibits specific financial interests and employment to intervene in certain causes or matters, thus:

SECTION 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned and controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

It is settled that the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the Information read to the accused during arraignment, and the accused may only be convicted of the crime charged and proved.^[72] This is pursuant to the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.^[73]

As accused-appellant was charged in her capacity as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and for violating the constitutional proscriptions applicable to such position, she cannot be convicted of violating the constitutional prohibition applicable to cabinet members. To hold otherwise would be to violate her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.