G.R. Nos. 24340-44. July 18, 1967
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; TELEPHONE ENGINEERING & SERVICE CO.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Original action for prohibition started by Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company[1]
to stop Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina from reopening and taking
further proceedings in PSC Cases 61-5270, 61-5271, 61-5280, 61-2111 and
62-4169. Ground: The decision in said cases – jointly heard –
had become final and executory, and the Public
Service Commission[2]
already “lost its jurisdiction thereon”.
The cases below were:
PSC Case 61-5270 – for authority to revise PLDT rates;
PSC Case 61-5271 – for authority to increase PLDT’s
authorized capital from in P25,000,000.00 to P60,000,000.00;
PSC Case 61-5280 – for authority to revise PLDT’s
rules and regulations applicable to the services being provided by PLDT;
PSC Case 61-2111 – for authority to reissue 52,000 shares of PLDT
preferred stock to utilize the proceeds thereof, in financing its expansion and
improvement program; and
PSC Case 62-4169 – for approval of the expansion program of PLDT at
an estimated cost of P105,000,000.00.
Notice, issued and published, directed parties interested to
appear at the hearing; otherwise, their right to be heard would be deemed
waived.
A number of oppositors appeared. Respondent Telectronic
System, Inc.[3]
entered its opposition in PSC Cases 61-5270 and 62-4169.
The other principal respondents did not appear at the trial.
On July 31, 1963, after almost two years of joint public
hearings, the PSC, thru Chairman Enrique Medina and two Associate
Commissioners, Francisco A. Perfecto and Gregorio C. Panganiban,
rendered judgment approving the expansion program subject to conditions, and
the increase of rates projected in the application, but not exceeding 47% for
business telephones and 40% for residential and other telephones, over and
above the then existing schedule of rates, which increase “may” take
effect on January 1, 1965, also subject to conditions.
On August 15, 1963,
PLDT moved to reconsider. Its prayer –
(1) To set aside the finding that PLDT has no valid franchise and
authority to operate local services in Manila
and suburbs, and the requirements relative to such finding;
(2) To set aside the PSC-imposed conditions, and the rate
limitations of 47% for business telephones and 40% for residential and other
telephones set forth in the judgment; and
(3) To expressly approve the applications in PSC Cases 61-5271,
61-5280, and 61-2111.
On January 9, 1964, the Commission [Commissioners Alex F. de
Guzman, Josias K. Guinto,
Gregorio C. Panganiban and Jose A. Fornier taking part] rendered an amended decision: (a) approving the expansion program and
authorizing increase of rates by 47% for business services and 40% for
residential services – both without recital of the conditions imposed in
the original decision; (b) approving the applications in PSC Cases 61-5271,
61-2111 and 62-4169;[4]
and (c) granting a provisional certificate of public convenience and necessity
upon the terms therein specified.
Telectronics did not appeal.
The decision of January
9, 1964 became final.
On December 28, 1964,
respondents Telectronics and Telephone Engineering
& Service Co.[5]
filed in Case 61-5270 and the other related cases, a petition “to suspend
the effectivity of increased rates.” Their
theory: The conditions in the original
decision of July 31, 1963
were not eliminated, expressly or impliedly, by the amending January 9, 1964 decision. Alleging that PLDT has failed to remove all
faulty installations and to connect 5,000 telephones within the required period
or that at least PSC records do not show compliance thereof by PLDT, Telectronics and Tesco prayed
that the effectivity of the increased rates be suspended
until PLDT complies.
On January 11, 1965, PLDT registered its opposition to the
petition just mentioned upon the grounds that:
(1) the conditions in the original decision are no longer contained in
the amended January 9, 1964 decision; (2) at the time PLDT’s
motion to reconsider the decision was resolved (January 9, 1964), it was
impossible to comply with the condition of installing telephones because the
deadline therefor [December 31, 1963] had long
expired; and (3) PLDT, nonetheless, did install more than 5,000 telephones and
continues to do so.
On January 26, 1965,
Araneta University,[6] Telectronics and Tesco filed in
said cases, a joint petition “for a reexamination of the amount of
the increase in rates” to be charged by PLDT. Appearing as telephone subscribers, they
allege that subsequent to the July 31, 1963 original decision “certain
facts and circumstances were brought out disclosing or tending to disclose,
that PLDT has acquired and/or is about to acquire, telephone equipment and
material from its sister or associated companies abroad, at excessive or
exorbitant prices, although the same, or compatible equipment,
may be acquired from other sources, including domestic sources, at much less
cost and under more favorable terms”; and that because of this, PLDT can
carry out its improvement and expansion program at a lesser burden to its
subscribers. They reiterated the prayer
for suspension, and asked that, after hearing, the increased rates originally
authorized be lowered “to a more equitable, reasonable and justifiable
level.”
On February 5, 1965, PLDT opposed the petition just described,
because: (1) the petition seeks to
revive a case which is already final and executory,
and the decision thereunder has already gone into
effect since January 1, 1965; (2) the petition is upon the same grounds urged
by the same parties in PLDT’s application [PSC Case
64-5437][7]
for the approval of its financing agreement with Export Credits Insurance
Corporation [ECIC] and are matters still pending resolution by PSC; and (3) the
petition is premature, patently unmeritorious and groundless.
On February 16, 1965,
PLDT moved to dismiss the petition of December
28, 1964, for the suspension of the effectivity
of rates, filed by Telectronics and Tesco. Reasons: (a) that actually, from July 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963, PLDT has installed 9,482 telephones,
and from January 1 to December 31,
1964, a total of 16,776 telephones; and (b) that a similar petition
filed by one Ramon G. Umali was dismissed on January 18, 1965, not merely because Umali
moved to dismiss it, but also for the reason that, as PSC said, “the rate
increases were authorized in a final decision on the merits on January 9, 1964, effective from January 1, 1965”.
On February 22, 1965,
PSC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss just recited, because it
raises points evidentiary in character.
PSC, however, stated that the denial is without prejudice to raising the
same questions at the proper time.
PSC set the two petitions – December 28, 1964, by Telectronics
and Tesco; and January 26, 1965, by Araneta, Telectronics and Tesco – for
hearing on March 10, 1965.
On March 3, 1965, PLDT filed a motion to reconsider the February
22, 1965 order and “for immediate resolution of grounds to dismiss” Telectronics and Tesco’s petition
dated December 28, 1964 and the other petition of January 26, 1965, filed by Araneta, Telectronics and Tesco. PLDT claims
that its motion to dismiss of February 16, 1965 is planted not only on factual
averments, but also on purely legal grounds, namely, the finality of the
January 9, 1964 decision, the dismissal by PSC of a similar petition (Umali’s), and the elimination in said January 9, 1964
decision of the conditions imposed in the original decision of July 31, 1963.
The PSC order [signed by respondent Medina]
of March 5, 1965, denying
the motion for reconsideration, stated:
“The fact that the decision rendered by this Commission on
July 31, 1963 as amended by the majority opinion of January 9, 1964, is final
with respect to the merits of the case, does not deprive the undersigned of his
supervisory powers to determine whether any of the conditions imposed in said
decision had been violated or ignored by the public utility concerned or
whether said public utility is or is not rendering adequate, sufficient and
satisfactory service.
Furthermore, Section 16 (m) of the Public Service Law gives the
Commission ample powers to amend, modify or even to revoke any order or
certificate of public convenience granted, whenever the circumstances have
materially changed.”
This order was received by the PLDT on March 12, 1965.
Hence, the present petition for prohibition filed on March 25, 1965.
Upon respondents’ separate returns to the petition, and after
oral arguments and memoranda, the case for prohibition was submitted to this
Court for decision.
Since then, supervening incidents occurred.
On November 7, 1966,
Telectronics and Tesco
moved in the PSC to dismiss their petition of December 28, 1964 to suspend the effectivity
of increased rates. They state that PLDT
has substantially complied with the conditions prescribed in the July 31, 1963 decision, and that
because PLDT has shown good faith in rendering adequate service, “the
rates as authorized in the decision of July
31, 1963 as amended by that of January 9, 1964, can no longer be suspended or reexamined
under the same proceedings”.
Thereafter [by petition which bears date of October 27, 1966], Telectronics and Tesco registered
in PSC a motion to dismiss their petition of January 26, 1965 for rate
reexamination, insofar as they are concerned.
They there aver that the compromise agreement filed in the case of
Lozano vs. PSC, et al. (L-25979) already included “provisions regarding
purchases by PLDT” of its equipment and supplies (which agreement was
referred by this Court to PSC, approved by the latter on July 22, 1965, and was
the basis of the dismissal by this Court of the Lozano case). They allege that the compromise agreement
“prescribed the factors to be considered and the methods to be adopted by
the PLDT in making purchases of equipment and supplies, including provisions
for competitive bidding therein specified.” Movants
then believed that the rate reexamination proceedings have become moot, and
felt satisfied that public interest has been served.
On November 18, 1966,
PSC issued an order, which reads:
“Upon motion of counsel for the petitioners, without objection on
the part of the respondent, the petition filed in this case is considered
withdrawn and the case dismissed without prejudice”.[8]
With the foregoing backdrop, we grapple with the problems posited
by the prohibition case now before us.
1. Forefront amongst these is Araneta’s
insistence that PSC suspend the effectivity of PLDT
rates. The theory relied upon is that
the conditions in the July 31, 1963
decision have not yet been met.
Tersely stated, the key question is this: Are the conditions in the July 31, 1963 original decision taken
away by the January 9, 1964
amended decision?
This requires but a comparison of the two decisions. So comparing, it will not be difficult to
arrive at the conclusion that the conditions previously imposed are no longer
tacked to the amended decision.
To fully project the marked difference between the two PSC
decisions, we set them out in parallel columns:
|
|
And then, as we retrace the proceedings below, we find that the
thrust of petitioner’s motion to reconsider the decision of July 31, 1963, is precisely to eliminate
the conditions therein which, for emphasis, we have just underscored. Those conditions were deleted in the amended
decision of January 9, 1964. Decisive of PSC’s
intent to eliminate them, is the fact that, whereas the original decision
provides that “the new rates [not to exceed 47% and
40%) herein authorized may take effect from January 1, 1965, subject to
the following conditions”, the amended decision made a specific
pronouncement for “the new rates [definitely fixed at 47%
and 40%) to take effect from January 1, 1965″. The plain import of the phrase “to take
effect” is that no obstacle stands in the way of rate effectivity,
no condition precedent is exacted of PLDT to enable it to implement the rates.
True it is that in the first portion of the amendatory decision
of January 9, 1964 the
Commissioners stated that they “hereby maintain with minor modifications,
the decision dated July 31, 1963”. The term “minor modifications”
could yet be the subject of guesswork, conjecture. But we need not shake meaning from this. For, that same amendatory decision concludes
with the emphatic statement that the same “(5) HEREBY MODIFIES AND AMENDS
the decision of the Commission dated July
31, 1963 accordingly“.
This consideration is convincing enough to warrant a conclusion that the
new decision supplants the old.
A striking fact is that the amendments in the new decision are
not piddling; they are meaningful, important.
In writing out a new dispositive portion, the
Commissioners could not have simply deleted the conditions in the old, if their
intention was to reincorporate them. The
absence therein of those conditions forecloses a speculative approach to the
intent and meaning of the amended decision.
Virtually crossed out, such conditions cannot now be scissored
from the original decision and pasted to the amended.
We rule that the amended judgment on the merits – January 9, 1964
– is the final repository of the conclusions reached by the Public Service
Commission, is meant to replace that of July 31, 1963,[10]
and that, accordingly, the conditions required in the original decision of July
31, 1963 were eliminated from the amended decision of January 9, 1964.
2. Our attention, however,
was drawn to a Memorandum dated February
22, 1965 – more than one year after the amended decision of January 9, 1964 – textually reproduced
as follows:
“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
February 22, 1965
MEMORANDUM
To Serve as Guide –
Gentlemen:
In a decision dated July
31, 1963, Commissioners Perfecto, Panganiban
and myself, among other things said:
(a) that the PLDT must connect not less than 5,000 new telephones
in 1963, and 10,000 in 1965;
(b) and in order to avoid discrimination, all new telephone
connections or transfers should be undertaken only upon prior approval of the
Public Service Commission;
(c) furthermore, PLDT was ordered to show cause why the penalties
provided by the law for operating without first obtaining a certificate of public
convenience should not be imposed.
For the guidance of my office, I want to know your opinion whether
or not in the order granting the motion for reconsideration, you intended to
reconsider or remove such requirements or you consider them in force until now.
(Sgd.) ENRIQUE MEDINA
Commissioner
The order granting the reconsideration did not discuss said three
(3) points because we did not intend to reconsider or to remove them from the
final order.
Hence, they should be enforced and PLDT compelled to adhere to
said three requirements.
(Sgd.)
JOSIAS K. GUINTO (Sgd.) FRANCISCO A. PERFECTO
Associate Commissioner Associate
Commissioner
(Sgd.) ALEX F.
DE GUZMAN (Sgd.) GREGORIO C. PANGANIBAN
Associate Commissioner Associate
Commissioner
(Sgd.)
JOSE A. FORNIER
Associate
Commissioner”
We note that this Memorandum of February 22, 1965 – to serve as guide – was written at a
time when the amended decision of January
9, 1964 had long become final.
If for this fact alone, we are wholly unprepared, at this late date, to
lend an attentive ear to the opinion expressed in that memorandum.
More to this. Said
memorandum does not partake of the nature of a nunc
pro tunc order.[11]
The language of a decision should suffice to give the meaning the
decision-makers intend to convey. A fair
notion of justice will not permit a material elaboration of a decision –
which has become final – by the authors thereof. We are to be guided solely by the decision,
as it is written.
What could prevent another set of Commissioners from appending
another opinion as to the meaning of the amended decision, written in so clear
a language? Were this to be allowed, instability of written opinions
results. And, judges may bandy their
judgments about from time to time, recast them as they please. The baneful effect is that a decision in
terminated proceedings becomes subject to the winds of change; a decision,
whose main purpose is to end controversies, can instead ignite other needless
lawsuits. So basic is our respect for
final judgments that no further amendments or corrections of substance – not
merely clerical errors, misprisions or omissions – may be authorized, no matter
how flagrant and glaring they may be. A
judgment long final, cannot be made to speak a different language. Illuminating is the following lifted from II
Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 197-198:[12]
“x x x The
general power to correct clerical errors and omissions does not authorize the
court to repair its own inaction, to make the record and judgment say what the
court did not adjudge, although it had a clear right to do so. The court cannot, under the guise of
correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it never made or
rendered, or add something to either which was not originally included
although it might – and should have so ordered and adjudged in the first
instance. It cannot thus repair its own laches and omissions to do what it could legally and
properly have done at the right time. A
court’s mistake in leaving out of its decision something which it ought to have
put in, and something in issue of which it intended but failed to dispose, is a
judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by
adding to the entered judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the
entry conform to the actual judgment entered”.
Indeed, there is no need to expand on the meaning of the amended
decision herein. Its language, we
repeat, is plain. What was granted, was
expressly set forth therein. To assure
stability of judgments, they must be taken at their face value. Words employed therein are to be construed as
any right thinking reader would accept them as their meaning. Writers of opinions should make sure that
they say what they mean. From them,
precision is not merely desired. It is
demanded. Because, if later on they
would want to turn out meanings distinct from what was unambiguously written,
the law will stop them, disauthorize them to take
back what has already been said, or substitute another, or add new material
matter thereto.
It is in this context that we hold that the memorandum heretofore
transcribed, is null and void, without force and effect, and did not operate to
vary the terms of the amended judgment.
And, PSC may not suspend the rates thus fixed.[13]
Prohibition to stop proceedings for the suspension of rates is
the remedy.
3. Araneta seeks reexamination of the
rates approved by the Commission. Araneta avers that PLDT can carry out its improvement and
expansion program at less onerous terms to the subscribers.
But Araneta [University] was not a
party to the rate-fixing case or to any of the other proceedings below. These rate-fixing and allied cases terminated
with the final judgment of January 9,
1964. Not being a party, it
could not have moved to reconsider said decision.[14]
Nor could it have appealed from that decision – it had no standing in that
case.[15]
Even if we treat Araneta’s reexamination petition as
one for reconsideration, the time therefor has long
passed.[16]
4. On top of all these is the fact that the amended judgment has
reached the stage of finality before Araneta sought
reexamination of rates.[17]
On this point, it may be well to take a look at the historical
background of the present statute. The
old Public Service Law, Public Act 3108, provides in Section 28 thereof, that
the Public Service Commission “at any time, may order
a rehearing to extend, revoke, or modify any order made by it”. An examination of jurisprudence under the
legal provisions just cited is quite revealing.
This Court has held that “[f]inality must
be written on Public Service Commission cases just as public policy demands
that it be written on judicial controversies”.[18]
That was later clarified by this Court to mean that “once a question has
been definitely decided and the decision has become final, that same question
cannot again be raised between the same parties”.[19]
And in another case, we made it abundantly clear that: “Public interest requires that
proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta
movere prescribes that what has already been
terminated should not be disturbed”.[20]
As a corollary, a record of a case once closed, should not be reopened to
permit presentation of evidence which could have been offered before the close
of the record.[21]
That final judgments of PSC should command respect is
well-exemplified in the present case.
Here, PLDT has entered into financial arrangements in no small amounts
for the expansion of its telephone service.
And this, in natural reliance upon a final decision. Paraphrasing the language of this Court in Ariaga vs. Javellana, 92 Phil.
330, 338, to uproot the decision, suspend the rates, and return PLDT’s position to where it was before the cases herein
involved were decided, “would be most unfair and unjust as it would be
tantamount to ignoring the big investment already made” by PLDT and
“would be tantamount to a punishment” which PLDT “does not
deserve”. Serious consequences that
might ensue from a contrary rule, are not difficult to perceive. The flow of operations may be disturbed. The program of expansion may suffer from a
bottleneck. Inefficiency or inadequacy
of service may result. Oppositors to a given final decision, may yet constitute a
wrecking crew of a public utility company.
They may even bring about its financial ruin. In the end, the consumers are prejudiced.
5. We are not to deny the power of
the Public Service Commission to amend, modify or revoke or establish rates in
lieu of those set forth in the final decision.
The statute on this point, is quite clear. Sections 16 [c] and [m], and 20 of the Public
Service Act amply justify such power.
These statutory precepts read:
“SEC. 16. Proceedings of the Commission,
upon notice and hearing. – The Commission shall have power, upon proper
notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of
this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:
x x x
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges,
classifications or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in
its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within
thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the
concerns operating in the territory affected:
x x x.
x x x
(m) To amend, modify or
revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act,
whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate
was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed.
x x x
SEC. 20. Acts requiring
the approval of the Commission. – Subject to established limitations and
exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any
public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the
approval and authorization of the Commission previously had –
(a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry
into effect any individual or joint rates, commutation, mileage or other
special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary. The Commission shall approve only those that
are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public
services and other parties concerned, giving them a reasonable opportunity to
be heard, and the burden of the proof to show that the proposed rates or
regulations are just and reasonable shall be upon the public service proposing
the same.[22]
x x x
The reexamination herein sought by Araneta,
perforce seeks the fixing of new and different rates.
We part from the premise that, by reason of the final judgment of
January 9, 1964, the current
rates are being enforced. These rates
were arrived at after PSC had considered the factors in rate-making, following
a protracted hearing. These rates are
meant to be in force not for a day or a week.
We are quite certain that said rates were fixed in the expectation that
they are to stay till conditions warrant a change.
Now to change once more the recently changed rates, a number of
elements need again be considered. The
new rates to be fixed should allow PLDT to economically and efficiently manage
its business, such that its revenues adequately meet its operating expenses and
fixed charges; should afford it a fair return upon its capital; should give it
sufficient leeway to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise
money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duty.[23]
Upon the other hand, the party primarily interested in an
adequate and efficient service is the public, the persons to use and pay for
the service. Such service does not necessarily
mean reduced rates. It could be quite
the contrary. So it is, that, at bottom,
a just rate must be founded upon conditions which are fair and reasonable both
to the public utility and the public itself.[24]
Stated in another way, it is not merely PLDT, not merely Araneta, but the consuming public as a whole, who stand to
be affected by any change of rate Araneta now
proposes.
6. Araneta, in effect, institutes a fresh
petition – for new rates, different from those already established. Such petition is a proceeding separate and
distinct from those concluded by the final judgment of PSC of January 9, 1964. The records of the finished cases are
closed. Consequently, Araneta’s petition for new rates should be instituted as a new
proceeding. This is but
consistent with orderly procedure. And
such a step is proper, if only to avoid confusion, promote expediency, and
canalize attention to the substance of the new petition for change of existing
rates. It has been truly said that
“[w]here the matters involved can be made the subject of new proceedings,
the dismissal of a petition for rehearing decides nothing adversely to the
petitioner”.[25]
We, accordingly, hold that to reexamine the existing rates for
telephone services charged by petitioner, a new case must be filed under
separate docket in the Public Service Commission.
7. It thus becomes necessary that, for Araneta’s
petition to be cognizable, opportunity must be afforded the consumers to have a
say on the merits of the petition, the public utility to object to the same,
and the competitors to protect their interests.[26]
It is for this reason that the law (Secs. 16 and 20,
Public Service Act) has appropriately provided that in a rate-fixing case, proper
or reasonable notice be given. The familiar method of notice by publication must
be complied with. This is not to say
that the Public Service Commission is constricted by this manner of issuing
notice. In addition, other forms of
notice may, in the Commission’s discretion, be required. And this, to the end that all parties to
public utility rate proceedings receive reasonable notice thereof to enable
them to prepare and present their respective sides in the controversy.[27]
We hold that the Public Service Commission may not reduce or
increase rates established in a judgment that has become final, without proper
notice; and that a Commission order reducing or increasing said rates without
such notice is void.[28]
8. As we look in retrospect at Araneta’s
petition for reexamination, we find: (1)
that Araneta was not a party to the original
proceedings below and has no standing therein; (2) that it was belatedly filed
in those cases which are closed; (3) that no provision was made for bringing in
as parties thereto PLDT’s competitors; and (4) that
the public – the subscribers most concerned – were not appropriately
notified. These are compelling reasons
which justify this Court to hold that the Public Service Commission did not
acquire jurisdiction to entertain and hear the petition aforesaid.
Prohibition again is the proper remedy.
9. One last question remains:
Was the petition for prohibition prematurely filed before this Court?
It is well to recall here that on February 16, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for suspension of rates.
This motion was planted, inter alia,
upon the ground that the judgment increasing rates was final. The Commission overruled said motion on February 22, 1965. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider dated March 3, 1965 suffered the same
fate. Respondent Medina’s resolution of
March 5, 1965 on this point invoked the Commission’s power, on mere motion,
“to amend, modify or even to revoke any order” of the Commission – in
the same proceedings where the rates were fixed – in spite of the fact that
such order has acquired the status of finality.
On the question of the Commission’s power, respondent Commissioner
stood firm; he confirmed his stand in his return to the present petition for
prohibition before this Court.
Coming now to the petition for reexamination of rates. Here, as in the petition for suspension,
petitioner urged in its opposition that reexamination could not be had in the
same proceedings for the reason, amongst others, that judgment thereon had
become final. What is more, in the
motion of March 3, 1965
referred to in the preceding paragraph, PLDT also sought “immediate
resolution of grounds to dismiss” both the suspension and reexamination
petitions. The order of March 5, as
aforesaid, shunted aside this motion, instead set the petitions for
hearing. Since the issue of the Commission’s
power was thus squarely met and decided by respondent Commissioner, there is no
necessity to reopen that question.[29]
In the circumstances, to require petitioner to further press the
dismissal of the petition for reexamination of rates, would be but an act of
supererogation. Surely enough, the law does
not exact useless ceremony.
Prohibition is proper.
For the reasons given, the prayer for prohibition is
granted, the corresponding writ will issue, and respondent Enrique Medina,
Commissioner of the Public Service Commission, is hereby ordered to desist
from further hearing Araneta University’s petition
herein involved for suspension and reexamination of rates, as filed in PSC
Cases Nos. 61-5270, 61-5271, 61-5280, 61-2111, 62-4169.
No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro and Angeles and
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J, on leave, took no part.
Fernando, J., did not take
part.
[1]
Hereinafter referred to as PLDT.
[2]
Hereinafter called PSC.
[3]
Hereinafter referred to as Telectronics.
[4]
PSC Case 62-4169 is the application for approval of PLDT’s
expansion program, which was already granted in the original decision and
expressly reiterated in the first portion of the amended decision. What PLDT prayed to be expressly approved,
but was omitted, was PSC Case 61-5280, its application for authority to revise
its rules and regulations.
[5]
Hereinafter referred to as Tesco.
[6]
Hereinafter referred to as Araneta.
[7]
This case is not one of those herein involved.
[8]
It would seem that the words “the petition filed in this case” are
intended to refer to the petitions for suspension and reexamination insofar as
Telectronics and Tesco are
concerned. The rate suspension and
reexamination questions remain, because Araneta has
not withdrawn its petition.
[9]
Underscoring ours.
[10]
Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, L-16250, June 30, 1964.
[11]
“We do not think that the action suggested would be legally
justified. It would entail a substantial
amendment of the decision of June 23,
1959, which has long become final and in fact partially
executed. A decision which has become
final and executory can no longer be amended or
corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes, and however
erroneous it may be, cannot be disobeyed; otherwise litigations would be
endless and no questions could be considered finally settled. The amendment sought by appellant involves
not merely clerical errors but the very substance of the controversy. And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance
of a ‘nunc pro tunc‘ order
such as that sought in this case. The
purpose of an order ‘nunc pro tunc’
is to make a present record of an order which the court made at a previous
term, but which was not then recorded.
It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made, but
by inadvertence has not been entered. In
the instant case there was no order previously made by the court and therefore
there is nothing now to be recorded.” Maramba vs.
Lozano, L-21533, June 29, 1967.
[12]
Citing Robles vs. Timario, L-13911, April 28, 1960; Ablaza
vs. Sycip, L-12125, November 23, 1960; Macasantos
vs. Fermin, L-13726, May 31, 1961. See: Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, 917; Galvez
vs. PLDT, L-16370, October 31,
1961. See also: I Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., pp. 269-274.
[13]
“It is manifest that the law, from which the Commission derives its
powers, confers upon the Commission no discretion to suspend the effectivity of the orders, continuing existing service or
prescribing rates. Otherwise, it would
have added [in Section 33, Public Service Act] after the words ‘shall be
immediately operative’, the expression ‘unless the Commission provides
otherwise’, or some words of like import.” Manila Electric Co. vs. Medina,
L-24406, June 29, 1965.
[14]
Del Rosario vs. Vergara, L-11643, April 28, 1958.
[15]
Lirio vs. Philippine Power and Development
Co., 89 Phil. 504, 507-508.
[16]
Section 34, Public Service Act, reads:
“SEC. 34. Any interested party may request the
reconsideration of any order, ruling, or decision of the Commission by means of
a petition filed not later than fifteen days after the date of the notice of
the order, ruling or decision in question.
The grounds on which the request for reconsideration is based shall be
clearly and specifically stated in the petition. Copies of said petition shall be served on
all parties interested in the matter. It
shall be the duty of the Commission to call a hearing on said petition
immediately, with notice to the parties, and after hearing to decide the same
promptly, either denying the petition or revoking or modifying the order,
ruling or decision under consideration”.
[17]
Section 1, Rule 44, Rules of Court, reads:
“SEC. 1. How appeal taken. – An appeal
from a final award, order or decision of the Public Service Commission, the
Patent Office, the Agricultural Inventions Board, the Court of Tax Appeals, and
the General Auditing Office, shall be perfected by filing with said bodies a
notice of appeal and with the Supreme Court twelve (12) copies of a petition
for review of the award, order or ruling complained of, within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice of such award, order or decision”.
[18]
Manila Electric Co. vs. PSC, 61 Phil. 456, 458, citing Philippine
Shipowners‘ Association vs. Cui, 48 Phil. 377;
Napa Valley Electric Co. vs. Railroad Corns., 251 U.S. 366.
[19]
Manila Electric Co. vs. PSC, 63 Phil. 107, 111.
[20]
Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615,
618.
[21]
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission vs. The Peoples Natural Gas
Company, 55 FUR (N.S) 214, 215, citing Public Utility Commission vs. Edison
Light & P. Co., [1941] 22 Pa PUC 774, 41 PUR (N.S.) 41.
[22]
Underscoring supplied.
[23]
Bluefield Water Works vs. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679,
692-693, 67 L. ed. 1176, 1182-1183. See also: In re Gassaway
Development Co., PUR 1915 D, 551, 554; Re Huntington Water Corporation, PUR
1922 C, 636, 642; C. H. Meade Coal Co. vs. Appalachian Power Co., PUR
1923 E, 221, 226; Re United Fuel Gas Co., PUR 1925 B, 705, 741.
[24]
Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility
Commissioner, 42 Phil. 621, 624, 631.
[25]
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission vs. The Peoples Natural Gas
Company, supra, citing Pittsburgh vs. Public Utility
Commission, [1941] 145 Pa Super Ct 580, 40 PUR (N.S.) 191, 20 A (2d) 869.
[26]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc., 48 Phil. 900, 906; Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, L-19850, January
30, 1964.
[27]
Re Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, 31 PUR (N.S.) 229, 235.
[28]
“A Commission order reducing rates without the statutory notice and
hearing is void notwithstanding the provisions of a former rate order reserving
jurisdiction to issue further orders upon the evidence in the record or upon
such evidence and supplementary evidence as may be added thereto”. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company
vs. Alabama Public Service Commission, 8 PUR (N.S.) 165, at headnote 2.
[29]
Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara, 44
Phil. 580, 587.