ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE; HERMINI…

Villegas versus Subido

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition and injunction filed by the Mayor of the City of Manila against the Commissioner of Civil Service. The Mayor asks the Supreme Court to stop the Commissioner from taking over the investigation and discipline of Manila policemen and of appointive city employees in the competitive service. The case matters because it is the classic ruling on repeal by implication: a general law on the civil service does not silently repeal the special laws that govern particular offices, and the Commissioner's power is appellate, not original.

Procedural History

The City Mayor filed two separate actions for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction directly with the Supreme Court. The first concerned policemen under Republic Act 557. The second concerned competitive employees of the City of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction in both cases. The two cases were jointly heard and submitted, and the Court rendered a single decision on them.

Facts

On January 4, 1965, the Commissioner of Civil Service issued Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 1965. It declared that Republic Act 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959, had impliedly repealed Republic Act 557, which fixed the procedure for removing and suspending policemen. All provincial boards, city and municipal councils were ordered to stop investigating administrative charges against provincial guards and city and municipal policemen, to submit within thirty days a list of pending police cases, and thereafter to investigate police cases only under Republic Act 2260.

On January 13, 1965, the Commissioner issued Memorandum Circular No. 3, series of 1965. It declared that Republic Act 2260 had impliedly repealed Section 22 of Republic Act 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, on the suspension and removal of appointive city officers and employees not appointed by the President. The City Mayor was ordered to stop deciding administrative cases of Manila officers and employees in the competitive service, to submit within thirty days a list of pending disciplinary cases, and thereafter to investigate them under Republic Act 2260.

Because the Vice-Mayor of Manila, as Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board, was prepared to comply with the circulars, the City Mayor brought the two actions. The sole issue presented was whether Republic Act 2260 had impliedly repealed Republic Act 557 and Section 22 of Republic Act 409, so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend, and separate policemen and competitive employees of the City of Manila.

Issues

• Whether or not Republic Act 2260 impliedly repealed Republic Act 557 and Section 22 of Republic Act 409.
• Whether or not the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction to remove, suspend, and separate policemen and competitive employees of the City of Manila.
• Whether or not the power of the City Council and the City Mayor to decide disciplinary cases subsists side by side with the Commissioner's authority under Republic Act 2260.

Applicable Provisions

Section 22 of Republic Act 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, provides:

Appointive City officers or employees not appointed by the President of the Philippines shall be suspended and removed by the Mayor, subject to appeal to the Office of the President, whose decision shall be final.

This is the special law the Commissioner claims to have been repealed, and it is the source of the Mayor's power to remove and suspend.

Section 16, paragraph i, of Republic Act 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959, provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline.

This is the general law invoked by the Commissioner, and its saving clause, "Except as otherwise provided by law," is the key to the case.

Section 1 of Republic Act 557 provides:

The trial of the case shall be finished within a reasonable time, and the investigating body shall decide the case within fifteen days from the time the case is submitted for decision.

This shows the legislative intent of speedy disposition of police disciplinary cases, which the Court notes in its closing remarks.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no implied repeal. It laid down the rule that repeal by implication is not favored, and that if two laws can be reasonably reconciled, the construction will be against repeal. Republic Act 557 has not been expressly repealed, and Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16, paragraph i, is not inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against policemen, nor with the power of the City Mayor under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified service.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Commissioner has no original and exclusive jurisdiction. The Commissioner's final authority to pass upon removal, suspension, and separation presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the matter. That power is moreover subject to the express limitation in Section 16, paragraph i, namely the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law." The Court distinguished the earlier Ang-angco versus Castillo ruling, explaining that its statement was qualified by that same saving clause, and that in the present case the power of the City Council and the City Mayor is clearly granted by special laws.

On the third issue, the Court held that the special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila, Republic Acts 557 and 409, subsist side by side with Republic Act 2260, which is a general law. Since Section 16, paragraph i, confers reviewing or appellate powers on the Commissioner, its only effect on Section 22 of Republic Act 409 is to bring the appeal from the decisions of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service instead of to the Office of the President. Republic Act 557 itself expressly provides for appeal from the decision of the City Council to the Commissioner.

The Court added a practical caveat. The system under Republic Act 557 suffers from unnecessary delays, and Congress clearly intended prompt and speedy disposition of police cases. A remedy against the refusal or failure of the investigating body to act within the reasonable time allowed may lie in a proper case.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. Repeal by implication is not favored; where two laws can be reasonably reconciled, the construction is against repeal. A general law does not impliedly repeal a special law on the same subject; they subsist side by side. The Commissioner of Civil Service's authority under Section 16, paragraph i, of Republic Act 2260 is appellate or reviewing, not original and exclusive, and it presupposes the power of another official to decide the case in the first instance. The saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law" excludes from the Commissioner's power those instances where the power of removal is conferred by law on another body alone, with no appeal therefrom. Finally, an appeal to the Civil Service Commissioner is an administrative remedy that must be exhausted before suing in court.

Disposition

The petitions for prohibition were granted, and the preliminary injunction issued in both cases was made permanent, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: repeal by implication is not favored, and the Commissioner's power is appellate, not original. Examiners use this case to test the general law versus special law rule, the meaning of the saving clause in Section 16, paragraph i, of the Civil Service Act, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.