CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Conchita Carpio Morales versus Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Junior

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Supreme Court by the Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio Morales, against the Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Junior. The Ombudsman assails the appellate court's temporary restraining order and later writ of preliminary injunction, both of which stopped her from implementing a six-month preventive suspension she had imposed on Binay, Junior and other Makati City officials pending administrative and criminal investigation. The case matters because it forces the Court to fix the constitutional and statutory boundaries between the Ombudsman's disciplinary power and the Judiciary's power to enjoin, and because it became the vehicle for the Court to abandon the long-standing condonation doctrine.

Procedural History

A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Junior and other Makati City officials. The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators, which later filed administrative and criminal complaints. On March 10, 2015, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order for six months without pay and directed the Department of the Interior and Local Government to implement it. Binay, Junior went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the suspension order and asking for injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals granted a temporary restraining order on March 16, 2015, and later issued a writ of preliminary injunction on April 6, 2015, both anchored on the condonation doctrine. Binay, Junior also filed a petition for contempt against the implementing officials, and the appellate court directed the Ombudsman to comment on it. Before the appellate court could hear oral arguments, the Ombudsman went directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari and prohibition, and later filed a supplemental petition after the writ of preliminary injunction issued. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments and received the parties' memoranda.

Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman accusing Binay, Junior and other Makati City officials of plunder and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The Ombudsman created a Special Panel of Investigators, which on March 5, 2015 filed six administrative cases for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and six criminal cases.

The complaint alleged that during Binay, Junior's first term as Mayor, he issued notices of award and executed contracts for Phases Three, Four, and Five of the project without the required publication and without an architectural design, and approved the release of funds. During his second term, he approved further releases of funds for the remaining balances of the Phase Five contract and the contract for architectural services.

On March 10, 2015, the Ombudsman issued the preventive suspension order, finding that the evidence of guilt was strong and that the charges, if proven, warranted removal from service, and that the officials' positions gave them access to public records and allowed them to influence witnesses. The order was served on March 11, 2015. On March 16, 2015, the Department of the Interior and Local Government implemented it by posting a copy on the wall of the Makati City Hall, and the Vice Mayor took his oath as Acting Mayor. At noon that same day, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order.

Issues

• Whether or not the Ombudsman's direct petition before the Supreme Court, without first moving for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, is her plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari challenging the preventive suspension order.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the injunctive relief based on the condonation doctrine.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals' directive for the Ombudsman to comment on the petition for contempt is improper and illegal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of Republic Act Number 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

This provision is the textual anchor of the Ombudsman's argument that no court may enjoin her investigation, and the Court dissects it into two parts to resolve the jurisdictional question.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This fixes the requirement of no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, which the Court applies to justify the Ombudsman's direct resort to the Supreme Court.

Section 2 of the same Rule provides:

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This supplies the parallel requirement for the petition for prohibition, which the Court treats together with certiorari.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the direct petition was justified. While a motion for reconsideration is generally a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that must precede certiorari or prohibition, the Court recognized exceptions, including where the issue is purely of law or where public interest is involved, and where there is urgent necessity for resolution. The Court found that the case tested the constitutional and statutory limits of the powers of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, and involved a question of transcendental public importance, so the Ombudsman's direct resort was proper.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari. It read the first paragraph of Section 14 as a prohibition against any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation, and the second paragraph as barring any court except the Supreme Court from hearing an appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, on a pure question of law. A preventive suspension order is not a decision or finding on the merits, so the appellate court could take cognizance of a petition challenging it on grave abuse of discretion.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Section 14 expressly forbids any court from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman, unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside her jurisdiction, and no such evidence was shown.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in relying on the condonation doctrine. The Court abandoned the doctrine, holding that it has no basis in the Constitution or in law, and that a public officer's re-election does not wipe out administrative liability for acts committed during a prior term.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the directive for the Ombudsman to comment on the petition for contempt was improper, because the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer who may not be subjected to contempt proceedings in the course of her official functions.

Doctrine

First, under Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act, no court may issue a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside her jurisdiction. Second, the prohibition on courts hearing appeals or applications for remedy against the Ombudsman's decision or findings, except the Supreme Court on a pure question of law, does not bar a petition for certiorari challenging a preventive suspension order, which is not a decision or finding on the merits. Third, the condonation doctrine is abandoned: re-election to public office does not condone administrative offenses committed during a prior term, and the doctrine has no constitutional or statutory footing. Fourth, the Ombudsman, as an impeachable officer, may not be subjected to contempt proceedings for acts done in the exercise of her official functions.

Disposition

The petition was partly granted: the Court set aside the temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals, upheld the preventive suspension order, and declared the condonation doctrine abandoned.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: re-election does not condone administrative liability, and no court may enjoin an Ombudsman investigation absent prima facie proof that the matter lies outside her jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the scope of Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act, the requisites of certiorari and prohibition, and the abandonment of the condonation doctrine.