JORGE VYTIACO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner, Jorge Vytiaco, guilty of the crime of resistance and serious
disobedience in Case C.A.-G.R. No. 00528-R.

As a result of an incident which occurred in Aborlan,
Palawan, on March 12, 1959, the herein
petitioner, Jorge Vytiaco, was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Palawan in three criminal
cases, to wit:

1. Criminal Case No. 2350, People of the Philippines
vs. Jorge Vytiaco, for Grave Threats;

2. Criminal Case No. 2351, People of the Philippines
vs. Jorge Vytiaco, for Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority; and

3. Criminal Case No. 2356, People of the Philippines
vs. Jorge Vytiaco, for Disobedience to a Person in
Authority.

These cases were jointly tried by the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and in all the three cases herein petitioner was
found guilty as charged, and sentenced as
follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 2350, for grave threats, petitioner was
sentenced to suffer two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, to pay
a fine of P100.00, and to pay the costs.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 2351, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, petitioner was
sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of P400.00, and to pay the
costs.  The gun used by the accused was
ordered confiscated.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 2356, for dis­obedience to a person in
authority, peti­tioner was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, a fine of P100.00, and to pay the
costs.

Regarding the fines imposed on the ac­cused in the three cases,
subsidiary impri­sonment is to
be served in case of insolvency.

From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the abovementioned three cases were respectively docketed as CA-G. R. No. 00528-R, CA-G. R.
No. 00528-R.

On July 17, 1962,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as fol­lows:

“WHEREFORE, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2350 and 2356 for grave
threat and serious dis­obedience, respectively, the decision is re­versed and
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.  In
Criminal Case No. 2351, he is hereby held guilty, not of direct assault as held
by the lower court but of resistance and serious disobedience and is sentenced
to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor
and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary im­prisonment in case of
insolvency, plus the costs.”

In the Court of Appeals the three cases were docket­ed as CA-G.
R. Nos. 00527-R, 00528-R and 00529-R. 
It was in CA-G. R. Nos. 00527-R and 00529-R where the petitioner
was acquitted.  It is the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 00528-R that is now sought to be reviewed by
this Court.  Because the Court of Appeals
rendered only one decision for the three cases, those three cases are now
docketed in this Court as G. R. Nos. L-20246, L-20247 and L-20248. 
Actually, it is Case G.
R. No. L-20247 (which corresponds to CA-G. R. No. 00528-R) that is the subject of this
decision.

The petitioner contends that, based on the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals, the respondent Court of Appeals committed error in holding
him guilty of the crime of resistance and serious disobedience.  The facts as found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:^[1]

“The States’ evidence tends to show that at about noon of March
12, 1959, in the private market of Manuel Zambales
in Panacan, Aborlan, Rosalino Jagmis was informed by
his brother-in-law, Zambales, that the previous day a certain Eduardo created
trouble in the market, over­turning the tables. 
Jagmis got mad and start­ed talking in a loud
voice.  Appellant Jorge Vytiaco, who was passing by, heard Jagmis.  Ap­pellant told him to calm down.  Jagmis did not take
the remark good-naturedly.  He told ap­pellant
to mind his own business.  An exchange of
unfriendly words followed and the two in no time grabbed each other. Esteban Gapilango, a PC enlisted man who was in plainclothes and on
patrol duty, saw the two adversaries and se­parated them. Appellant ran away
but told Jag­mis to wait and he would get his
gun.  On the way, appellant met his
brother-in-law, Ramon Ramos, carrying a .22 caliber rifle and a .38 caliber
pistol. Someone apparently had relayed the tiff to appellant’s house. When Gapilango saw Ramos handing the pistol to appellant, he
approached to demand the surrender of the fire­arms.  He however, failed to get the weapons because
Ramos ran away with the rifle and appellant held him by the waist and tried to
snatch his service pistol in his back pocket. 
He tried to prevent appellant from gaining pos­session of the pistol and
while they were grap­pling, it went off. 
Gapilango lost his balance and appellant
succeeded in wresting the gun from him. 
With a revolver in each hand, his own and that of Gapilango,
appellant ordered the former and Jagmis, who followed
Gapilango, to raise their hands and not to advance or
he would shoot them. Gapilango did as ordered but
asked appel­lant to return to him his pistol, identifying himself as a PC
soldier.  Appellant refused to give the
gun back and did not recognize Gapi­lango’s
authority.  So Gapilango
sent somebody to call the PC detachment commander, Sgt. Pelu­cio
Buñag.  In the
meantime, one Jesus Lepasana arrived and Gapilango also requested him to help get his gun back from
appellant who already went home.  While Lepasana was talking to appellant, Sgt. Buñag
came.  He asked appellant for Gapilango’s
pistol and promised that he would try to amicably settle the case.  Appellant,
who was standing outside his house,
again declined to yield the gun and instead went inside and told the soldiers
to get it if they wanted it.  Later in
the afternoon, Capt. Pastor Escano, PC as­sistant provincial commander to
whom Sgt. Buñag reported the incident, went to
appellant’s house and talked to him.  The
revolver was re­turned to Capt. Escano by the vice
mayor of Aborlan to whom appellant surrendered it
earlier.

“Appellant offers this story: 
On the day in question, he went to Zambales‘
market to see a Mr. Murillo to have him sign some papers.  While conversing with Murillo, appellant
heard Jagmis angrily talking aloud.  Apellant, in a
manner of greeting Jagmis who was his friend, told
him to cool off as the weather was al­ready hot.  Jagmis resented the
remark and col­lared appellant. Surprised by Jagmis‘
reaction, appellant tried to free himself and protested that he had done Jagmis no wrong and that they were friends.  A companion of appellant and ano­ther man,
who turned out to be Gapilango, in­tervened and Jagmis released appellant. When appellant asked Jagmis why he collared him, he (appellant) having merely
intended his remark as a greeting to a friend, Jagmis
again grabbed him and said that appellant was a rich man and had no business interfering.  Appellant again remonstrated and told Jagmis not to treat him that way because they were
friends.  Jagmis‘
brother-in-law, Zambales, intervened and sepa­rated
the two.  Already peeved and embarrassed,
appellant prepared to defend himself if Jagmis would
charge again.  But as appellant happened
to look towards the road, he saw his brother-in-law carrying a rifle and a pistol.  So he ran out
and shouted at him to go home.  He was
followed by Gapilango and Jagmis.  Jagmis told Gapilango to get the guns. 
Gapilango drew his pistol and demanded the
surrender of the fire­arms. Appellant, sensing Gapilango
to be close behind, suddenly wheeled around and seeing the latter’s gun aimed
at him, grabbed it.  In the ensuing
struggle for its possession, it fired. Finally, appellant was able to wrest it
from Gapilango and with his own revolver which he got
from his brother-in-law, appellant pointed them at Gapilango
and Jagmis and warned them, while retreating, not to
go near him or he would shoot.  Mrs. Zambales
at this stage approached appellant and they
went home together.  A little later after
he had hidden the guns and while he was standing outside his house, Gapilango and Sgt. Buñag came.
Sgt. Buñag, without asking any question, collared him
and harshly demanded for Gapilango’s revolver.  Gapilango also held
him by the shirt.  Appellant asked Sgt. Buñag that they clear matters first. When he was released,
appellant went inside his house and told the soldiers to come inside if they wanted to get the pistol.  But the soldiers left instead.  Appellant then delivered Gapilango’s revolver to the vice mayor.

“It is now
urged that appellant’s conviction for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, i.e., upon Esteban Gapilango, a con­stabulary
soldier, was an error, the prosecution having failed utterly to show that appellant
knew that Gapilango was a soldier or an agent of a person
in authority when he disarmed him, which knowledge is essential for
conviction.  (U.S.
v. Alvear, 35 Phil. 625; Peo­ple v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1033.) We find the contention meritorious.
Indeed, nowhere in the testimony of any of the prosecution wit­nesses can it be
found that appellant knew or ought to have known at the time he seized Gapilango’s gun that the latter was a peace of­ficer.  Gapilango revealed
his identity to ap­pellant only after the latter had dispossessed him of his
gun and he was asking it back.  It is contended by the prosecution,
nonetheless, that appellant’s act in pointing the revolver at Gapilango even after he was informed that he (Gapilango) was a peace officer constitutes direct
assault.  The whole trouble started when
appellant was unjustifiably roughed up by Jagmis.
When appellant ran away, he was fol­lowed by Gapilango
and Jagmis. 
The fact that Gapilango had his gun in hand
was perhaps not without reason considering that appellant’s brother-in-law
appeared in the scene carrying firearms. 
Appellant was able to wrest Gapi­lango’s pistol. 
While retreating, he warned Gapilango,
together with Jagmis, not to ad­vance or he would
shoot.  At this particular moment when
appellant could understandably be under the
apprehension that his pursuers, one
of whom he still did not know to be a constabulary soldier, were still
after him, his act of pointing
the guns at them with warning
not to come forward is not properly an act of intimidation but rather of
self-protection; appellant thereby hoped to dis­courage them from committing
any rash action or violence against his person. 
Gapilango asked for the return of his gun, identifying himself.  Appellant did not give the gun back.  The
evidence does not show whether or not, af­ter knowing of Gapilango’s identity, appellant continued to point the gun
at him.  There is no question, however, that he thereafter went home.  Under the circumstance, it cannot be said with certainty that there was on
the part of appellant a palpable
intent or determination to defy a law officer and therefore his
failure to heed Gapilango’s order to return the re­volver
constitutes merely resistance and serious disobedience. (See U.S.
v. Tabiana and Canillas, 37
Phil. 515; People v. Lapitan, 58 Phil. 774; People v. Reyes, 40
O.G. (118) No. 15, 24.)

“As above shown, appellant also pointed a revolver at Rosalino Jagmis and threatened to
shoot him if he advanced. The trial court considered this as constituting grave threat.  Ap­pellant claims that when he saw his brother-in-law
carrying firearms, he ran towards him and told him to go home.  The prosecution, on the other hand, asserts
that when he ran away he told Jagmis to wait and he
would get his gun.  That appellant said
this seems doubtful in the light of Jagmis‘ own
statement that when ap­pellant ran away, he did not follow
the latter anymore because he thought that they were paci­fied already.  Mad
appellant really told Jagmis that he would get his
gun, the latter would not have the impression that the incident was already
closed.  The picture as we see it seems to be that when Jagmis
saw appellant’s brother-in-law carrying guns, Jagmis,
with Gapilango, went af­ter appellant to prevent him
from getting hold of the weapons. 
Appellant, who had just been subjected to unwarranted violence by Jagmis, on his part, thought that he would be at tacked
again.  Thus, it is not farfetched, as we
have observed above, that the purpose of appellant in pointing the gun at Jagmis was to
protect himself from what he thought was an impending aggression.  This is evident from appellant’s warning to Jagmis not to come near him while at the same time retreat­ing.  The essence of threat is intimidation.  Appellant’s act, in this particular case,
cannot be considered an act of intimidation.

“Appellant was also held guilty of grave disobedience in refusing
to return Gapilango’s pistol to Sgt. Buñag despite the latter’s order therefor.  The prosecution would like it to appear that
Sgt. Buñag did nothing but de­mand from appellant the
gun and that appellant, instead of obeying this lawful order, defied and
challenged him.  The defense, on the
other hand, would like us to believe that Sgt. Buñag
employed unnecessary violence in the perform­ance of his duty and therefore he
exceeded the limit of his authority and ceased to be a peace officer from that
moment and appellant was justified in disobeying him, nay even in repelling the
aggression.  (People v. Dumo, 400. O.G. (58) No. 9, 58). There is reason to be­lieve
the claim of appellant that Sgt. Buñag used
unnecessary force in demanding the return of the revolver. Appellant declared
that Sgt. Buñag, upon arriving at his house, collared
him and shook him violently and in a harsh tone said, ‘will you give me the
pistol or not?’ In his testimony, Sgt. Buñag stated
that when he arrived, he approached appellant, ‘touching his collar and tapping
his shoulder,’ and asked for Gapilango’s gun.  He also stated that ‘when I was holding his
collar’ appellant uttered angry words. 
In asing for the pistol, Sgt. Buñag did not have to ‘touch’ or ‘hold’ appellant’s
collar.  If by using adequate means to
repel the unlawful aggression of Sgt.
Buñag, appellant
would be merely acting in self-de­fense and therefore free from any criminal
liability (People v. Dumo, supra), then he could not
be guilty of disobedience in just declining to return the gun without using
force or violence.”

We find merit in the contention of petitioner.  We gather, from a reading of the decision of
the Court of Ap­peals, that the petitioner was acquitted of the charge of grave
threats against the person of Rosalino Jagmis upon the ground that when he pointed a gun at Jagmis his act did not constitute an act of intimidation,
which is an essential element in the crime of grave threats, but was simply an
act of self-defense, to prevent Jagmis and Es­teban Gapilango from getting nearer to him while he (pe­titioner)
was at the same time retreating.  The
Court of Appeals said:  “Appellant
was able to wrest Gapilango’s pistol.  While retreating, he warned Gapilango, together with
Jagmis, not to advance or he would shoot.  At this particular moment when appellant
could understandably be under the apprehension that his pursuers, one of whom
he still did not know to be a constabulary soldier, were still after him, his
act of pointing the guns at them with warning not to come forward is not
properly an act of intimidation but rather of self protection; appellant
thereby hoped to discourage them from committing any rush action or violence
against his person.” The Court of Ap­peals further said:  Appellant, who had just been subject­ed to
unwarranted violence by Jagmis, on his part, thought
that he would be attacked again.  Thus,
it is not far­fetched, as we have observed above, that the purpose of the
appellant in pointing the gun at Jagmis was to
protect himself from what he thought was an impending aggression.  This is evident from appellant’s warning to Jagmis not to come near him while at the same time
retreating.  The essence of threat is
intimidation. Appellant’s act, in this particular case, cannot be considered an
act of intimidation.”

The Court of Appeals found that the petitioner did not know that Gapilango was a soldier when he disarmed Gapilango.  This is
what the Court of Appeals said:  “Indeed,
nowhere in the testimony of any of the prosecution witnesses can it be found
that appellant knew or ought to have known at the time he seized Gapilango’s gun that the latter was a peace officer.  Gapilango revealed
his iden­tity to appellant only after the latter had dispossessed him of his gun and he was asking it back.”
The petition­er, at that particular moment, had two guns, one in each
hand – his own pistol and the pistol that he had wrested from Gapilango.  The Court of Appeals considered the
act of the petitioner of pointing the
guns at Jagmis and Ga­pilango as an act of
self-defense.  That is why the Court of
Appeals did not find the petitioner
guilty of grave threats against the person of Jagmis,
and of assault a­gainst Gapilango as an agent of a
person in authority.  But while the Court of Appeals had
declared that under those circumstances the petitioner had not committed the
crime of assault against an agent of a
person in authority he had, however, committed the crime of resistance and
serious disobedience against the agent of a person in authority.  The reason of the Court of Appeals in finding
that the petitioner had
committed the crime of resistance
and se­rious disobedience is because he did not return the gun of Gapilango after Gapilango had
identified himself as a
constabulary soldier.  In this connection,
this is what the Court of Appeals said: 
“At this particular moment when appellant could understandably be
under the apprehension that his pursuers, one of whom he still did not know to be a constabulary soldier,
were still after him, his act of pointing the gun at them with warning not to come forward is not properly an act of intimidation but rather of self protection;
appellant thereby hoped to discourage
them from committing any rush action or vio­lence against his person. Gapilango
asked for the return of his gun,
identifying himself. Appellant did not give the gun back.  The evidence does not show whether or not,
after knowing Gapilango’s identity, appellant
continued to point the gun at him.  There
is no question, however, that he thereafter went home.  Under the circumstance, it cannot be said
with certainty that there was on the part of appellant a palpable intent or
determination to defy a law officer and therefore his failure to heed Ga­pilango’s order to return the revolver constitutes
merely resistance and serious disobedience.”

It is urged by the petitioner that there is no po­sitive finding
by the Court of Appeals that in failing to obey Gapilango’s
demand for the return of his gun peti­tioner
intended to resist or seriously
disobey said Gapilango
in his capacity as an agent of a person in author­ity engaged in the
performance of his official duties.  The
petitioner maintains that the particular act for which the petitioner was held
guilty by the Court of Ap­peals – that is, his failure to return the gun – was
but one of a series of acts done in self-defense and/or un­der a mistake of
fact, one act following the other close­ly in point of time, all arising from
the same incident and each one performed under the same impulse.  The peti­tioner points out that Gapilango’s demand for the return of the gun and
petitioner’s refusal to deliver the same happened immediately after the
struggle for the gun and the warning made by petitioner to Gapilango
and Jagmis not to advance any farther or he would
shoot, and that was at a time when, as the Court of Appeals had found, the
petitioner was understandably under the apprehension that his pursuers were
still after him.

We find merit in the stand of the petitioner.  Let it be noted that, as the Court of Appeals
itself had found, the petitioner did not know that Gapilango
was a constabulary soldier at the time when he grabbed Gapilango’s
gun and at the time when he started pointing the guns at both Gapilango and Jagmis.  The Court of Appeals had found this act of
petitioner in pointing the guns at both Gapilango and
Jagmis as an act of self-protection.  As the petitioner was pointing the guns at Gapilango and Jagmis he was
retreating and at the same time warning them not to approach.  Under that circumstance We consider that the
refusal of the petitioner to return the gun to Gapi­lango
was but one of the series of acts on his part to protect himself.  Under that circumstance it cannot rea­sonably be said that he
meant to defy, or resist, or disobey an agent of a person in authority who was
in the per­formance of his official duties. 
What assurance had the petitioner at that precise moment, immediately
after he had a struggle with Gapilango for the
possession of the latter’s gun and while he was pointing that gun to Gapi­lango and Jagmis, that Gapilango was really a peace of­ficer?  The evidence shows that Gapilango
was in civilian clothes, he did not exhibit any badge – he simply identi­fied
himself verbally after the petitioner had wrested his gun from him.  The refusal of petitioner to return Gapi­lango’s gun was but a continuation of his efforts to
de­fend himself from whatever harm that could come from both Jagmis and Gapilango.  Under the circumstances, the petitioner had reason to believe that once he had
returned the gun to Gapilango, Gapilango
would use that gun against him.  His
refusal to return the gun was what any reasonable person would have done under
the situa­tion that the petitioner found himself.

We agree with the
petitioner that in the decision of the Court of Appeals there is no positive
finding that the petitioner intended to resist or seriously disobey an agent of
a person in authority while engaged in the per­formance of official
duties.  Likewise, there is no posi­tive finding that when the petitioner
refused to return Gapilango’s gun he believed that Gapilango was a consta­bulary soldier, and that the
petitioner knew that Gapi­lango was at the time performing his official
duties as a peace officer.  We accept the hyphotesis
offered by counsel for the petitioner
that the petitioner had
reason to suspect that Gapilango was helping
Jagmis, because right at the start of the incident
between Jagmis and the petitioner at the store of Ramon Zambales Gapilango
did not identify himself as a
peace officer and both of them pursued the petitioner from the store.

Before a person
can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in authority or the agent of such person it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused knew that the person he disobeyed
or resisted is a person in
authority or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in the performance of his
official duties.  What is punished as an
act of resistance or serious
disobedience under the Revised Penal Code is not the resistance or disobedience against a person in
authority or an agent of such person in
his capacity as a private individual but in his official
capacity as an authority under the law, or as agent of the law, while engaged in the performance of his
official duties.  The facts as
narrated in the decision of the Court of
Appeals engender in the mind a serious doubt as to whether or not the
petitioner had the intention to resist
and disobey a peace officer who was in the performance of his official
duty.  That doubt must be resolved in
favor of the petitioner.  Consequently, We hold that the Court
of Appeals erred when in case CA-G. R.
No. 00528-R it found the petitioner guilty of the crime of resistance
and serious disobedience as defined in Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review, insofar as it relates to
case CA-G. R. No. 00528-R which is now before this Court on appeal in case G.
R. No. L-20247, should be, as it is hereby reversed, and the petitioner is
thereby acquitted of the crime of resistance and serious disobedience of which
he was found guilty by the Court
of Appeals, with costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1] As quoted from the decision.