THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. TIBURCIO BALBAR, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

On August 20, 1960
defendant-appellee Tiburcio
Balbar allegedly entered the room where schoolteacher
Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes.  Without warning and right after complainant had
finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his arms around
her and kissed her on the eye.  Shocked,
complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away and
tried to flee.  Defendant allegedly
brought out his “daga” (a local
dagger) and pursued complainant, catching up with her before she was able to
get out of the room.  Defendant embraced
her again, at the same time holding on to his “daga“.  They both fell to the floor, as a result of
which complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct
Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of Lascivious­ness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, the latter charge upon written
complaint filed
by the offended party, duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court.

The
information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in
Authority is hereunder quoted:

“The undersigned
Assistant Provin­cial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority,
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipa­lity of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Phi­lippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the
performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor,
by then and
there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to embrace
and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. 
That the crime was com­mitted with the aggravating circumstances of
having committed it inside the school building and during school classes.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

The information for Acts
of Lasciviousness reads:

“At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled
case, the undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed
as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio
of Cumba, Muni­cipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the
deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and felo­niously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of
Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself
close to her, embracing and kissing her against her will and by means of force,
and as a consequence
thereof said
offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused
her pain and tenderness on the right side of the trunk on the
posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may re­quire 3 to 4 days to
heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance that the
same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

The
accused filed separate motions to quash, con­tending that “(a) with respect to
Criminal Case No. 823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a
sufficient cause of action and that it charges two of­fenses in a single
complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of
Lasciviousness, x x x that
the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint charges
two offenses.” On August 16, 1962, over the
opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations.  Said the court:

“After reading the informations in
both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the acts committed by
the ac­cused as alleged in the two informations
constitute one offense.

“As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No.
841, the grounds alleged in support thereof are:  (1) that the accused would be placed in
double jeopardy; and (2) that the criminal complaint charges two of­fenses.  Without discussing the merits of these
grounds above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal
Case No. 841 should be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense
charged therein is already absorbed in the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
823.”

Thus,
the dispositive portion of the order reads:

“WHEREFORE, it is the
opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823 which
charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the
reason that the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace. And, as to the
information in Criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on
the ground that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal Case No.
823.”

From
this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.

Stated differently in the
rationale of its order, the court
a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the following ground:  That “while the offense is designated as
direct assault, nevertheless the main allegations of the information may at
most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important element of the crime of direct
assault is conspicuously absent
in the information.  This essential
element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in
authority.  x x
x This being the case and since x x
x sufficient allegations are contained in the
information in question to hold the accused responsible for the offense, the
Court believes that the information is
sufficient in substance to at least constitute unjust vexation or
physical injuries.”

Direct assault is
committed “by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, x x x shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.”  (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of
law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1978), “teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article
148.” This special classification is obviously intended to give teachers
protection, dignity, and respect while in
the performance of their official duties. 
The
lower court,
however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the
information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority.  This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher.  The information suffi­ciently alleges that
the accused knew that fact, since she
was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties.  He therefore knew that she was a person in
authority, as she was so by specific provision of law.  It matters not that such knowledge on his
part is not expressly alleged, complainant’s status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse
non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).  This article applies
to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil
or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254)
for reasons of expediency, policy and
necessity.

With respect to the
dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo.  Although
it is true that the same acts
may constitute more than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an
examination of the events which gave rise to the filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of
Acts of Lasciviousness does not appear to have been committed at all.

“It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule
specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to the
provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code.  What constitutes
lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case.  It may be quite easy to
determine in a
parti­cular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious, and it may
be extremely diffi­cult in another
case to say just
where the line of demarcation lies
between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ar­dent lover.”
(U.S. vs.
Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25).

The presence or absence
of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environ­mental circumstances.  In the
instant case, considering the manner,
place and time under which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in
the information itself, lewd designs can hardly be attributed to accused.  The
factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom
in the presence of complainant’s
students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion
that the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his con­duct was lewd or
lascivious.  It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but this of
itself would not necessarily bring the case within the provision of
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

Wherefore, the order of
the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set aside and this case is
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness,
the same is here­by affirmed.  No pronouncement
as to costs.

Dizon, Bengzon,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J., on official leave.