BRIG. GEN. (RET.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Ramiscal versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, brought by Brigadier General Jose Ramiscal, Junior, the former President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System, against the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to nullify the resolutions of the anti-graft court that refused to quash the criminal informations against him and that found probable cause for the offenses of estafa through falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019. The case matters because it fixes the narrow scope of a trial court's review of the Ombudsman's probable cause determination, and it teaches when a public officer may be held criminally liable for signing anomalous deeds of sale.

Procedural History

The matter began with a fact-finding investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman, which produced a Joint Resolution and later a Memorandum recommending charges against the petitioner. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation, and several informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan and raffled to its different divisions. In the Fourth Division, the petitioner filed an urgent motion for a hearing to determine probable cause and to consolidate all the cases, which the Sandiganbayan denied, while ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest. After the petitioner posted bail, he moved to dismiss the cases for lack of probable cause, and that motion was likewise denied. He then filed a motion to quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, splitting of a continuing crime, and abatement by double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash and later denied his motion for reconsideration. When arraigned, the petitioner refused to enter a plea, so the court entered a plea of not guilty for him. He then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

In 1998, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted a joint inquiry into coup rumors and alleged anomalies in the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System. Its report described a scheme in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna, and Iloilo City: each purchase was covered by two deeds of sale. One was a unilateral deed signed only by the sellers, and the other was a bilateral deed signed by both the sellers and the System as buyer. The unilateral deeds, which reflected the lower consideration, were the ones registered with the Register of Deeds, while the bilateral deeds, which reflected the much higher consideration, were kept in the vaults of the System. The discrepancy in the purchase prices totaled about seven hundred three million pesos.

Acting on the committee's recommendation to prosecute the petitioner as past President of the System who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale, the Ombudsman investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation. An initial panel recommended dismissal of the complaint against the petitioner in light of the ruling in Arias versus Sandiganbayan, but the Ombudsman did not act on that recommendation and instead directed another panel to review the case. That panel issued a Memorandum recommending that the petitioner be charged, finding that his claim of mere reliance on the legal staff was untenable, that he knew of the unilateral deeds because they were registered and titles were issued on the basis thereof, and that his participation ran from conceptualization until payment. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

Ultimately, only five informations for estafa through falsification and five for violation of Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019 were initially filed, due to the lack of prosecutors to handle the voluminous cases. Two of these were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan: one for violation of Section 3, paragraph e, involving a parcel of land in Tanauan, Batangas, where the bilateral deed stated a price of one million five hundred thirty-one thousand five hundred sixty-four pesos while the unilateral deed stated only two hundred twenty-seven thousand four hundred sixty pesos, and the other for estafa through falsification of public documents arising from the same transaction.

Issues

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause and in not dismissing the informations.
• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not quashing the informations notwithstanding that it had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not quashing the information for estafa through falsification on the ground that the facts charged were an essential part of one continuing crime of estafa separately charged in other cases pending in its other divisions.
• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not quashing the information for violation of Republic Act Number 3019 on the ground that it was abated by the estafa through falsification case, thus violating the rule on double jeopardy.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to existing causes for suspension, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

This is the provision under which the petitioner was charged in one of the informations, and its elements of undue injury and evident bad faith frame the probable cause inquiry.

Rule 112, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, on the duty of the investigating prosecutor after the preliminary investigation, provides:

Section 5. Investigation of cases. x x x If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he or another prosecutor, as the case may be, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

This provision anchors the rule that probable cause is a matter of executive determination, which the courts review only for grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. The determination of probable cause is a function of the executive branch, and the courts do not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of that discretion absent a showing of grave abuse. The trial court's task is not to conduct its own full-blown trial of the evidence but to satisfy itself that the finding is supported by the record.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The informations alleged that the petitioner, a high-ranking public official, committed the offenses in relation to his office, and the amounts involved and the nature of the charges placed them within the anti-graft court's jurisdiction.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that the estafa through falsification charge was part of one continuing crime that should have been filed as a single information. Each transaction involving a distinct parcel of land and a distinct deed constituted a separate offense, and the filing of separate informations for separate transactions was proper.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the information for violation of Republic Act Number 3019 was not abated by the estafa through falsification case. The two offenses have different elements, and the facts alleged in one are not identical to the facts alleged in the other. There being no identity of offenses, the rule on double jeopardy did not apply.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the determination of probable cause is an executive function lodged in the Ombudsman, and courts will not substitute their judgment for the Ombudsman's absent grave abuse of discretion. Second, a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction will fail where the information alleges that the offense was committed in relation to the public office of the accused and the charges fall within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Third, separate transactions give rise to separate offenses, and the filing of separate informations for each transaction does not amount to splitting a continuing crime. Fourth, double jeopardy requires identity of offenses, and where the elements of the two charges differ, the second charge is not abated. These rules tie back to Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019, which requires undue injury or unwarranted benefit through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and to Rule 112, Section 5, which makes probable cause a matter of the prosecutor's sworn certification.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, allowing the criminal cases to proceed against the petitioner.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that probable cause is the Ombudsman's call, and the courts will not disturb it absent grave abuse of discretion. Examiners like to use this case to test the separation of powers between the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, and to test the elements of double jeopardy where the charges arise from the same transaction but have different elements.