ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
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Cayetano versus Commission on Elections
The Case
This is a case about who counts the votes in a plebiscite, and how far the Supreme Court will look behind the count. Congressman Alan Peter Cayetano, representing Taguig and Pateros, brought two consolidated petitions for certiorari against the Commission on Elections and two private respondents, Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista, residents and registered voters of Taguig. He asked the Court to strike down the Commission's resolution confirming that the people of Taguig had ratified the conversion of their municipality into a highly urbanized city under Republic Act Number 8487, and the later order declaring that resolution final and executory. The case matters because it draws the boundary between a question of law that certiorari may reach and a question of fact that belongs to the Commission on Elections, and because it restates the Commission's constitutional primacy over plebiscites.
Procedural History
The private respondents filed with the Commission on Elections a petition to annul the announced results of the Taguig plebiscite, with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The Commission treated it as an election protest and docketed it as an election protest case, raffled to its Second Division. Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction over a plebiscite contest. The Second Division granted the motion and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and the Commission en banc affirmed.
The private respondents then went to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court reversed the Commission and held that the controversy fell within the Commission's jurisdiction, and it directed the Commission to reinstate the petition and decide it without delay. Cayetano's motion for reconsideration was denied. On remand, the Second Division constituted revision committees, the revision and recount proceeded, and final reports were submitted. But the Second Division could not muster the required number of votes, so under its Rules of Procedure the case was elevated to the Commission en banc, which granted the petition and confirmed the ratification and approval of the conversion. Cayetano then filed the first petition for certiorari in this Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Commission later declared its resolution final and executory and recorded it in its Book of Entry of Judgments, and Cayetano filed the second petition challenging that order and entry. The Court consolidated the two petitions.
Facts
On April 25, 1998, the Commission on Elections conducted a plebiscite in Taguig on the conversion of the municipality into a highly urbanized city, as mandated by Republic Act Number 8487. The voters were asked whether they approved the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig.
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers, without completing the canvass of sixty-four other election returns, declared that the negative votes had won. On order of the Commission en banc, the Board reconvened and completed the canvass, and again the negative votes prevailed. Alleging fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of votes, the private respondents sought annulment of the results with a prayer for revision and recount.
After the Supreme Court ordered the Commission to reinstate and decide the petition, the revision and recount were carried out and the committees submitted their final reports. The Commission en banc then issued its resolution of December 8, 2004, declaring and confirming the ratification and approval of the conversion, on the finding that twenty-one thousand one hundred five affirmative votes represented the majority and the highest votes obtained in the plebiscite. Cayetano assailed that resolution, and later the order of January 28, 2005 declaring it final and executory and the entry of judgment recorded the same day.
Issues
- Whether or not the Commission on Elections acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in confirming the ratification and approval of the conversion of Taguig into a highly urbanized city.
- Whether or not the alleged incomplete revision of the plebiscite ballots and the claimed irregularities, frauds, and anomalies in the revision proceedings may be resolved in a petition for certiorari.
- Whether or not the Commission on Elections erred in declaring its resolution final and executory and in recording it in its Book of Entry of Judgments.
Applicable Provisions
Section 2, paragraph 1, Article Nine, Part C of the Constitution provides:
The Commission on Elections shall enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
This is the source of the Commission's jurisdiction over the plebiscite controversy, which the Court had already affirmed in the earlier petition.
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
This confines the Court's review to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not to a re-examination of the evidence.
Section 5, paragraph b, Rule 3 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure provides:
When sitting in Divisions, two Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum to transact business. The concurrence of at least two Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained, the case shall be automatically elevated to the Commission en banc for decision or resolution.
This explains why the case was decided by the Commission en banc rather than by the Second Division.
Section 13, paragraph a, Rule 18 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure provides:
In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty days from its promulgation.
This is the basis for the order declaring the December 8, 2004 resolution final and executory.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion. The matters raised by the petitioner, namely the alleged incomplete canvass during the revision and the claimed irregularities, frauds, and anomalies, are factual in nature. They require an examination of the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence taken in the revision proceedings, which the Court cannot undertake in a special civil action for certiorari. Still, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court reviewed the evidence and found that the petitioner erred in asserting that the revision yielded fifteen thousand eight hundred two affirmative votes and twelve thousand six hundred two negative votes. The Commission had considered not only the canvassing report but also the physical count of the ballots, the returns of the uncontested precincts, and the appreciation of the contested ballots, arriving at twenty-one thousand one hundred five affirmative votes against nineteen thousand four hundred sixty negative votes. Those factual findings, supported by evidence, are accorded not only respect but finality, because the conduct of a plebiscite and the determination of its result have always been the business of the Commission and not the regular courts, and because its acts enjoy the presumption of regularity.
On the second issue, the Court held that the alleged incompleteness of the revision and the claimed irregularities cannot be resolved in a petition for certiorari, since Section 1 of Rule 65 confines the Court to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.
On the third issue, the Court upheld the order declaring the resolution final and executory and the recording of the entry of judgment, there being no grave abuse of discretion in the Commission's acts.
Doctrine
First, the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over a controversy involving the conduct of a plebiscite, because the Constitution authorizes it to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
Second, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 reaches only issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Questions that are factual in nature, such as the completeness of a revision and the existence of irregularities in the appreciation of ballots, are beyond its scope.
Third, the factual findings of the Commission on Elections on the conduct of a plebiscite and the determination of its result, supported by evidence, are accorded not only respect but finality, because the appreciation of ballots is best left to the Commission, which has indisputable expertise in election and related laws, and whose acts enjoy the presumption of regularity.
Disposition
The petitions were dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner, so the Commission on Elections and the private respondents prevailed and the conversion of Taguig into a highly urbanized city stood confirmed.
Remember This
Remember the line that the conduct of a plebiscite and the determination of its result have always been the business of the Commission on Elections and not the regular courts. Examiners use this case to test the limits of certiorari against factual findings of the Commission and the finality accorded to its findings in plebiscite contests.