G.R. Nos. 15788-89. March 30, 1962
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, TERESA ILUSORIO, AND MANUEL SISON, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. HON. GUILLERMO SANTOS, AS JUDGE, COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, AND SANTIAGO PANGILINAN, ET AL.…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
joint. decision rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations (Judge
Guillenno A. Santos presiding) in its cases Nos. 116 and 167, which
were instituted by the respondents-tenants of petitioners Potenciano
and Teresa Ilusorio against said landholders and their overseer, Manuel
Sison. The court below ordered the classification of the tenant’s
landholdings as second class riceland ; directed the liquidation of the
harvests on the 75-25 share basis from 1951-52 agricultural year
onwards; and ordered the landholders to pay the tenants P8,154.83 as
deficiency in the liquidation of the harvests, with a further sum of
P3,948.33 as reimbursement for irrigation fees, all with legal interest
from September 13, 1957; plus P1,000 attorneys’ fees.
It appears from the record that eighteen (18) tenants (respondents
herein) had been working irrigated ricelands owned by the petitioners
Ilusorio, located in Barrio Bantog, San Miguel, Bulacan. Prior to 1954,
only one crop used to be planted and harvested per calendar year, from
May or June to January From 1954 onward, two crops were planted yearly:
one crop, called dayatan, was planted in May and harvested in October of the same year and the other, termed kalaanan, planted in October and harvested in February of the succeeding year. In the production of the dayatan
crop, the tenants did not perform 5 of the ten items enumerated in
section 38 of Republic Act No. 1199 (i.e., gathering and bundling of
the reaped harvest, piling of bundles into small stacks, preparation of
the place for stacking the harvest, gathering and transporting of the
small stacks, and piling them into a big stack for threshing), because
the harvest having been made in October, the rice had to be threshed
immediately to avoid its rotting due to rains and wet. The kalaanan crop was divided 55 per cent for the tenants and 45 per cent for the landholders; while the dayatan crop was divided in the starting year (1954) at 80-20 in favor of the tenant; in 1955 at 75-25; and in 1956, at 70-30.
In September of 1957, the respondent-tenants petitioned the Court of
Agrarian Relations for a reliquidation of their crop shares since
1951-1952. After hearing the evidence submitted, the court found the
lands to be second class ricelands, and that the crops thereof should
have been apportioned on the basis of 75% for the tenant and 25% for
the landholder; that consequently, the tenants had been “short-shared”
by 12-1%/2% of net produce between 1951-1952 to 1953-54, and by 7-1%/2%
thereafter; that the tenants had likewise been made to bear a larger
proportion of the irrigation fees than what was proper; and rendered
judgment as stated at the beginning of this opinion.
The petitioners-landholders appealed.
The first five errors assigned revolve on the correctness of the
lower court’s classification of the lands worked by the tenants as
second-class. This finding was based on the average production of the
land per hectare or cavan of seed (40 cavans or less) computed on
thirteen (13) actual crops, from 1951-1952 to 1958-1959, each crop
being computed as one agricultural year (Sec. 33, R.A. 1199). The
landholders contend that the method of computation is erroneous in that
(1) the crops used as basis were not proved to be normal crops, nor the
average an “average normal production”; and (2) that an agricultural
year should consist of a 10-month period, so that if two crops are
raised during such period, both should be taken together in computing
production for the corresponding agricultural year.
We find the argument of the landholders not tenable. The court’s
computation of the average yield of the lands in question being based
on actual crops harvested, it is to be presumed, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, that such crops were normal crops. The mere fact
that the tenants’ harvests varied from one crop to another is not
sufficient to declare them abnormal; for the law itself, in basing the
classification of tjie land on the normal average yield for the three
preceding agricultural years (Sec. 8, Act 4054, and Sec. 33, R.A.
1199), assumes that such yield will be variable. The presumption is
“that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature”
[Rule 123, sec. 69 (z)], and the burden of proof to show abnormality is
on the one claiming it; in this case, the landowners, but they have
failed to submit adequate evidence in support of their claim that the
crops taken into account by the court below were, affected by abnormal
or unusual factors. The lower court; was likewise justified in making
the inference that the average yield for the three years preceding the
1951-1952 crop was the same as the average for the three years
following it there being no evidence to the contrary.
As to what constitutes the “agricultural year”, the same is defined by Republic Act No. 1199 as follows [Section 5 (c)]:
“Agricultural year is the period of time necessary
for the raising of seasonal agricultural products, including the
preparation of the land, and the sowing, planting and harvesting of the
crop: Provided, however, That in the case of coconuts, citrus,
coffee, ramie, and other crops where more than one harvest is obtained
from one planting, the words “agricultural year” shall mean the period
of time from the preparation of land to the first harvest and
thereafter from harvest to harvest. In both cases, the period of time
may be shorter or longer than a calendar year.”
It is easy to see that “agricultural year” bears no relation to any
fixed length of time, being solely predicated on the interval between
the preparation of the land, and planting of the seed, up to the
harvesting of the crop, whether such interval be shorter or longer than
the calendar year. No error was, therefore, incurred in the appealed decision in considering every crop period as one agricultural
year, for the purpose of computing the average yield. It is to be
observed that the raising of two harvests in one calendar year on
irrigated ricelands was by no means unusual or unknown in the Islands
when the Rice Tenancy Acts were enacted, and the failure of these laws
to specially provide for such situations serves merely to emphasize the
correctness of the trial court’s views that each crop period is to be
deemed an independent agricultural year. At any rate, section 56 of
Republic Act 1199 specifically provides that—
“Sec. 56. Doubts to be Solved in Favor of the Tenant—In
the interpretation and enforcement of this Act and other laws as well
as the stipulations between the landholder and the tenant, the courts
and administrative officials shall solve all grave doubts in favor of the tenant.”
We must agree with the court below that since Republic Act 1199
establishes a particular manner for determining whether land is first
or second-class, no other method is acceptable. Hence the opinion of
the provincial land tax assessor that the petitioners’ lands are
first-class carries no weight. As to the giving of credence to the
evidence for the tenants against the testimony and reports of the
petitioners’ overseer, this Court is by lew concluded by the trial
court’s appreciation of the facts, it being supported by substantial
evidence.
The same can be said of the tenants’ ACCFA loan applications, which
the Court considered inflated for the purpose of obtaining greater
loans. Since the landholders were not misled by these applications, no
estoppel in their favor can be predicated thereon.
On the sixth assignment of error, we find no merit in the contention
that the court of origin erred in holding permanently that petitioners’
lands were second-class. The latter finding, based as it is on the
average yield of the three previous agricultural years, was nowhere
declared permanent or immutable, and does not preclude the petitioners
from seeking a reclassification of their land in the future, whenever
they should be able to prove the corresponding increase in yield for
any subsequent triennial period.
That in the harvesting of dayatan crops the tenants admit not having
performed the bundling of the harvest and its piling, first into small
stacks and later into a big stack, prior to threshing (Error VII), was
duly explained by the need of immediate threshing, because the dayatan
crop is harvested during October, in the rainy season, and delay would
result in the rotting of the palay. Hence, failure to perform such
operations was justified and may not be used to reduce the tenants’
shares.
As to the division of the irrigation fees (Error VIII), petitioners
complain that the court below applied the rule of Republic Act 1199,
section 29 (that the fees should be divided in proportion to respective
shares in the harvest), even to the crop years 1951 to 1954, which were
governed by Public Act 4054, (as amended by Republic Act 34). According
to petitioners, that law imposed the burden of the fees upon the
tenant. This view is not correct. Republic Act No. 34 provides that—
“expenses for the maintenance of irrigation systems within the respective areas shall be for the account of the tenant, but amortizations for the cost of construction of the system itself shall be for the account of the landlord.”
It is plain, therefore, that the entire fees charged by the
Penaranda Irrigation System cannot be charged exclusively to the
tenants. In the absence of specific figures, the division of the
irrigation charges in proportion to the benefits derived from the
harvest is in accord with justice and equity.
The imposition of attorney’s fees against the petitioner landholders
lies in the discretion of the court under Article 2208, No. 11, of the
New Civil Code, and is authorized under Section 55 of Republic Act
1199, which applies to tenancy relations those provisions of existing
laws not inconsistent with said Republic Act.
As to the defense of prescription of the claim for reliquidation of
crop prior to 1954, because of the 3-year limitation provided by the
law, suffice it to say that extractive prescription is a defense that
is waived if not pleaded in due time, and petitioners may not invoke it
for the first time on appeal.
Finding no error in the decision appealed from, we hereby affirm the same. Costs against petitioners Ilusorio.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, and Dizon, JJ., took no part.