G.R. Nos. 148917-18. November 21, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ABSOLON YONTO Y UTOM, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, finding accused-appellant
Absolon Yonto y Utom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
sentencing him in each case to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the
offended party, Jennibeth Cristal y Villarimo, the total amount of P150,000.00
as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 20550-MN, the information alleged:
“That on or about [the] 19th day of July 1998, in the Municipality
of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the stepfather of Jennibeth
Cristal y Villarimo, a minor 14 years [of] age, while armed with a bolo, with
lewd design and exercising ascendancy over said Jennibeth Cristal y Villarimo
and by means of force, violence, and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, did then and there have sexual intercourse with Jennibeth Cristal
y Villarimo against her will and without her consent.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”[2]
In Criminal Case No. 20551-MN, the information alleged:
“That on or about [the] 13th day of June 1998 in the Municipality
of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the stepfather of Jennibeth
Cristal y Villarimo, a minor 14 years [of] age, while armed with a bolo, with
lewd design and exercising ascendancy over said Jennibeth Cristal y Villarimo
and by means of force, violence, and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, did then and there have sexual intercourse with Jennibeth Cristal
y Villarimo against her will and without her consent.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3]
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,
whereupon the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented two witnesses whose testimonies are as
follows:
Complainant Jennibeth Cristal y Villarimo, 15 years old at the
time she took the witness stand, testified that she was born on May 12,
1984. Her testimony is corroborated by
the Certification of the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of the
Province of Pangasinan.[4] As
her parents were separated, Jennibeth stayed with her mother Elma Villarimo,
who lived in common-law relationship with accused-appellant. At the time material to this case,
Jennibeth’s mother was working as a domestic helper in Taiwan, while her father
worked “on board a ship.” Complainant
stayed with accused-appellant and the latter’s two children, Arlene and Amy, by
Jennibeth’s mother at 203 Block 1, Hernandez Street, Barangay Catmon, Malabon,
Metro Manila.
Jennibeth testified that at about 3:00 a.m. of June 13, 1998,
while she was asleep on the floor with Arlene and Amy, she was awakened by
accused-appellant who was undressing her. Accused-appellant poked a bolo (itak)
at her neck, threatening to kill her if she made any noise. He fondled her private parts, mashed and
sucked her breasts and then forced his penis into her vagina. Jennibeth resisted by moving her body and
kicking him, but accused-appellant pinned her legs down. After accused-appellant had consummated the
act, Jennibeth felt something wet and slippery coming from his penis. Thereafter, accused-appellant stood up and
went in front of the house.
At about 1:00 a.m. of July 19, 1998, Jennibeth said she was again
awakened as she felt accused-appellant removing her shorts and panty. As before, accused-appellant pointed a bolo
at her neck and threatened to kill her if she did not submit to his
desire. He raised Jennibeth’s brassiere
and sucked her breasts. He then pushed
his penis into her vagina and performed the sexual act. Jennibeth resisted by kicking
accused-appellant, but he proved too strong for her. Accused-appellant threatened to kill Jennibeth and her mother and
other relatives if she told anyone what had been done to her.
In February 1999, Jennibeth said, she mustered enough courage to
tell her maternal aunt, Jonelyn Balbuena, what had happened to her. On February 22, 1999, she went to the
barangay hall of Catmon, Malabon, where they made a report, and then proceeded
to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for medical examination. The next day, February 23, 1999, they went to the Malabon Police
Station and there gave a sworn statement.[5]
Dr. Emmanuel N. Reyes of the Crime Laboratory of Camp Crame,
Quezon City examined the complainant and thereafter issued a report, which
reads as follows:
“FINDINGS:
general
and extragenital:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
subject. Breasts are conical with
brownish areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
genital:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora [is] full, convex and coaptated with the brownish
labia minora presenting in between. On
separating, the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healed
lacerations at 3, 4 and 9 o’clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction
of the examining index finger. Vaginal
canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of physical
trauma.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative
diplococci and for spermatozoa.”[6]
Dr. Reyes testified that the complainant was a non-virgin and
that the healed hymenal lacerations she sustained could have been caused by
forcible sexual intercourse.[7]
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant Absolon
Yonto and his sister Trinidad Maglahos.
Accused-appellant Absolon Yonto y Utom, 38 years old, is the
common-law spouse of Elma Villarimo, complainant’s mother. He claimed that he was lawfully married to
Elma, by whom he had three children: Arlene, Amy, and another one who died in infancy. He said that Elma left for Taiwan in 1996
and returned to the country on August 27, 1997. In November 1997, she left for
the second time for Taiwan and returned in October 1999.
Accused-appellant’s defense is alibi. He claimed that on the dates in question, he was at the Carvic
Motors, a taxi service company, located at 890 G. Araneta Street, Quezon City,
where he worked as a mechanic from Monday through Sunday, his shift being from
10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. of the following day; that he had three companions
during his shift, namely, Zoilo Dicdican, Jess Dicdican, and Pedring Karen; and
that his presence in the work place was recorded in an attendance logbook kept
by the company. He maintained that it
was impossible for him to have raped complainant considering that his house had
an area of only 4 x 8 meters, was without any room or partition and
accommodated 16 persons, including himself, sleeping together therein. The occupants of the house, aside from him,
were the following: his brother, his sister-in-law Susan Villarimo and husband
Allan Panghinahon and their son Hermis, Pilar Villarimo, who is the wife of his
brother-in-law, his sister Trinidad Maglahos, his cousin Sammy Utom, his two
children by Elma Villarimo (Arlene and Amy), his “stepdaughter” Jennibeth
(herein complainant), his brother-in-law Boboy Maglahos, a guest named Rizal
Biyal, his niece Mylene Maglahos, his sister-in-law Jonas Maglahos and his
nephew Ponpon Maglahos.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that the complaints in these
cases were filed by his wife Elma because she resented the fact that he kept
for himself the P3,000.00 remittance she sent every month, without
giving any part of it to their children and other relatives. He also said that Elma wrote him a letter
telling him that she was angry over what had happened and wanted to leave him
for another man. He said that in fact
it was Elma’s cousin, Mario Delyenos, who had molested complainant. According to accused-appellant, he learned
about the rape of complainant by Delyenos from his 10-year old daughter, Arlene,
when the latter visited him in Malabon. He added that Arlene was prevented from testifying in court on this
matter because Elma took her to Iloilo.[8]
Trinidad Maglahos, sister of accused-appellant, testified that
complainant Jennibeth lived in the house of accused-appellant because she was
the latter’s stepdaughter. She claimed that her brother was married to
complainant’s mother. In June and July
of 1998, Trinidad said she lived in an extension of accused-appellant’s house
located at a dumpsite in Pilapil, Catmon, Malabon. Her brother’s house had an area of only about 4 x 5 meters, while
her house, which could accommodate six persons, was about one-third the size of
accused-appellant’s house. According to
her, their houses were made of wooden patches (tagpi-tagpi) and were separated only by a piece of plywood board
which allowed conversation from the other side to be overheard. She said that nine persons stayed in
accused-appellant’s house. At night,
complainant slept between accused-appellant’s children, Arlene and Amy, while
her sister Delia Pialan slept beside Amy.
Trinidad stated that in the early morning of July 19, 1998, when
the second rape was allegedly committed, she heard no noise from
accused-appellant’s house. She said
that Arlene appeared before the trial court on May 18, 2000 presumably to
testify in favor of accused-appellant, but the hearing was postponed due to
floods and that Arlene never had the chance to testify thereafter because Elma
took her to Iloilo.[9]
On June 25, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Absolon
Yonto y Utom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the cases and to
pay Jennibeth V. Cristal the total amount ofP150,000.00 as civil
indemnity,P100,000.00 as moral damages and [the] costs of suit.
“SO ORDERED.”[10]
Hence, this appeal.
First. Conviction or acquittal in a rape case
more often than not depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant’s testimony because, by the very nature of this crime, it is
usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence.[11]
It is settled that the lone testimony of the complainant herself is competent
to establish guilt if it is credible, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[12] In
these cases, complainant’s testimony was straightforward, frank, categorical
and spontaneous. She said:
Pros. Aliposa (witness)
Q At 3:00 o’clock in the
early morning of June 13, 1998, what were you doing?
A I was sleeping, sir.
Q What happened while you
were sleeping?
A I was sleeping when I
felt my shorts and my panty were being removed, sir.
Q When you felt your panty
and shorts were being removed, what was your reaction?
A I [was] awakened, sir.
Q When you were awakened,
what did you observe, if any?
A When I was awakened, my
stepfather poked a bolo [at] my neck, sir.
Q What did your stepfather
do when you were poked a bolo at your neck?
A After he pointed the
bolo at my neck, he told me not to report the matter, otherwise, he will kill
my other sisters and my relatives, sir.
Q When he uttered this
threat, was your panty and shorts removed?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next after
he uttered those words?
A He put down the bolo and
he took off his shorts and brief, sir.
Q What did he do after he
removed his shorts and brief?
A After that, he fingered
me, then he mashed my breast and sucked it, sir.
Q By the way, what was
fingered?
A My sex organ, sir.
Q And what did he do next
after he fingered you, and mashed your breast?
A Then he inserted his
organ to my sex organ, sir.
Q Was he able to penetrate
his organ right away?
A Not immediately, sir.
Q Why?
A Because at that time, I
was still a virgin, sir.
Q What did he do when he
was not able to penetrate his penis [into] your vagina?
A He was forcing to
penetrate his organ, sir.
Q What was your reaction
when he was trying to penetrate his organ into your vagina?
A I was trying to stop him
but he [did] not want to listen to me, he insisted on what he was doing, sir.
Q How did you try to
prevent him [from] penetrat[ing] your vagina?
A I was kicking, I was
resisting by kicking but he pinned my legs, sir.
Q Was your resistance [by]
kicking successful?
A No, sir. I was not able to stop him, sir.
Q What was he able to do
when you resisted?
A He was able to penetrate
his organ [in]to my organ, sir.
Q After he penetrated into
your vagina, what did he do next?
A The rape against me was
finished, sir.
Court (witness)
Q What did he do after he
penetrated his penis into your vagina?
A He pushed and pulled his
organ into my vagina, Your Honor.
Court
Proceed.
Pros. Aliposa (witness)
Q While he was [doing] this
movement, push and pull, where were his hands?
A His two hands were both
on my hands, sir.
Q While he was having
sexual intercourse [with] you, can you recall if he was talking to you?
A Yes, sir, he was
threatening me.
Q What was his threat while
he was having sexual intercourse with you?
A He told me not to report
the matter, otherwise, he will kill us, sir.
Q Can you recall how long
this sexual intercourse lasted?
A About thirty
minutes/half an hour, sir.
Q Did you observe if there
was ejaculation on the part of the accused?
A I observed that it is
wet and slippery, sir.
Q What happened after
accused had sexual intercourse with you?
A After that, he went in
front of our house, he did not sleep anymore, he was watching me, sir.
Q By the way, while accused
was having sexual intercourse with you, where were your other two sisters?
A They were sleeping, sir.
Court (witness)
Q In what portion of your
house did this rape take place?
A In the room, it was on
the floor of that room but I was at a distance from my sisters, Your Honor.
Q How far are you from your
sisters?
A My sisters were lying
together and they were about one meter away from me, Your Honor.
Q Did you notice whether
they were awakened?
A No, Your Honor.
Court
Proceed.
Pros. Aliposa (witness)
Q Was this sexual assault
repeated?
A Yes, sir.
Q When?
A July 19, sir.
Q What year?
A 1998, sir.
Q What time was that?
A 1:00 o’clock in the
morning, sir.
Q What happened at that
1:00 o’clock in the early morning of July 19, 1998?
A I was then sleeping,
sir.
Court (witness)
Q Same place?
A Yes, Your Honor, I was
also sleeping at that time, in the same house, same place, Your Honor.
Q While sleeping, what
happened?
A I was sleeping at that
time when he took off my shorts and panty and I [was] awakened, Your
Honor. After that, he again pointed a
bolo [at] my neck and threatened me not to report the matter and if he learned
that I reported it, he would kill me, Your Honor.
Court
Proceed.
Pros. Aliposa (witness)
Q After uttering those
words, what did he do next?
A He raised my bra and
sucked my breast, sir.
Q What else did he do while
sucking your breast?
A After that, he inserted
his organ and made push and pull movements, sir.
Q While accused was having
sexual intercourse with you, was he conversing with you?
A He was repeating his
threats, sir.
Q What threat was he
uttering?
A He told me not to report
to [anyone], otherwise, he will kill me, sir. He threatened to kill my mother and relatives also, sir.
Court (witness)
Q What did you do this
time?
A I was trying to stop him
by kicking him but I was not successful because he is no match for me (sic),
Your Honor.[13]
Despite rigorous cross-examination, complainant stood pat on her
claim that she had been raped by accused-appellant.[14]
She positively identified accused-appellant as the one who had raped her.[15]
Police officers SPO1 Ronald Payawal and PO3 Henry Terrano, in their joint sworn
statement, also declared that complainant pointed to accused-appellant without
hesitation as her assailant during a confrontation in the Malabon Police
Station on February 22, 1999.[16]
In contrast, the bare and self-serving statements of
accused-appellant suffer from the following flaws:
(1) Accused-appellant
testified that he was in Quezon City on the dates in question working at the
Carvic Motors in the graveyard shift from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. of the
following day and that his presence in his work place was recorded in a logbook
kept by the company. He said the
logbook could be shown to the court by issuing a subpoena to the manager of
Carvic Motors, Ruben Ebuen. However,
Ruben Ebuen was not presented by the defense to corroborate his story. The logbook, which could probably have
substantiated accused-appellant’s claim, was never presented before the court
despite the opportunity of the defense to do so. Nor were accused-appellant’s co-workers in the night shift
presented to corroborate his alibi. To
the contrary, the positive identification by complainant of accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime effectively negates his uncorroborated defenses
of denial and alibi.[17]
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, these defenses are deemed
to be negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[18]
Nor was there proof that it was impossible for accused-appellant to negotiate
the distance from his work place in Quezon City to his house in Malabon where
the rapes happened. To successfully establish an alibi, not only
must accused-appellant prove that he was in another place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was impossible for him to be at the
crime scene at the appointed time. This, accused-appellant failed to prove. Essentially a weak defense for being easily susceptible of
concoction, an alibi becomes weaker when the same is not corroborated.[19]
Denial, like alibi, is likewise an intrinsically weak defense
which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to
merit credibility.[20]
Between the positive declarations of a prosecution witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence.[21]
(2) Trinidad Maglahos testified that she knew the sleeping
arrangements of the nine persons who lived in accused-appellant’s house. She said complainant slept between Arlene
and Amy (daughters of the accused-appellant), while her sister, Delia Pialan,
slept beside Amy. She said that
considering the proximity of the place where she was sleeping and the place
where the accused-appellant and the complainant were sleeping, she could have
heard some noise from accused-appellant’s house if anything unusual had
happened.
But complainant was silenced by accused-appellant’s threat. Accused-appellant had a bolo which he used
to cow complainant into submission. Complainant was rendered helpless. Her mother was in Taiwan, while Arlene, 10, and Amy, 11, were fast
asleep, not to mention the fact that they were too young to be even aware of
what their father had been doing to complainant.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that the small
area of his house (4 x 8 meters) and the number of persons (16) occupying the
same at the time of the alleged incidents rendered it impossible for him to
have raped complainant in their house without being detected. He avers that the prosecution should have
presented “the complainant’s siblings who are potential eyewitnesses” to prove
its accusations.
The contention has no merit. True, the complainant was sleeping between Arlene and Amy, the daughters
of accused-appellant, whom he referred to as “complainant’s siblings.” Their
testimonies, however, would be surplusage as complainant’s testimony that
accused-appellant had raped her was corroborated by the medical findings
concerning her hymenal lacerations. Indeed, even if the two children said the rapes did not occur, their
testimonies could not prevail over that of complainant, who said that she made
no outcry when she was being raped because accused-appellant poked a bolo at
her.
Indeed, we have disregarded an accused-appellant’s defense of
impossibility of the commission of rape because of the presence of other family
members sleeping side by side at the time of its commission. The members of the family may not even be
awakened by a sexual assault happening in their midst because they are
accustomed to having several persons beside them who move and change positions
while asleep. Lust is no respecter of
time and place; it can be committed even in unlikely places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where
there are other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family
are also sleeping, and even in places which to many would appear unlikely or
high risk venues for its commission.[22]
Third. Accused-appellant
contends that the hymenal lacerations shown in the medical report do not prove
that he was the person with whom complainant had sexual intercourse.
We find no merit in this contention. The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be
credible. Indeed, its finding is corroborated by the medical report showing
that complainant sustained healed hymenal lacerations on her private
parts. We have held that a medical
finding that complainant sustained lacerations on her hymen, when taken
together with the finding of credibility on the part of the complainant, is more
than sufficient to establish the essential requisite of carnal knowledge in
rape.[23]
Fourth. Accused-appellant
argues that the filing of criminal charges in these cases were instigated by
his wife’s family who resented the fact that he had kept the money which his
wife had been sending to him every month. In fact, accused-appellant claimed, his wife Elma wanted to separate
from him because of what she had heard from her relatives.
This contention has no basis. On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that, after all, there
was no letter from his wife, complainant’s mother, threatening to separate from
him.[24]
Indeed, a young girl, like complainant, is not likely to bring false charges of
rape against a parent, or someone treated as such, and go through the shame and
scandal of a public trial, unless out of a desire to vindicate her honor.[25]
Nor would complainant’s mother, Elma, likely induce her daughter to file
baseless charges against her husband merely because he had been keeping the
money she had been sending for himself alone.
Fifth. Accused-appellant
argues that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the death penalty
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the allegation in the
information that he is the stepfather of complainant in the sense that he and
complainant’s mother were legally married.
The Solicitor General recommends the affirmance of the trial
court’s decision and the imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant
on the ground that the qualifying circumstance of relationship, i.e., that accused-appellant is the
stepfather of the complainant, was sufficiently proven by the testimony of
accused-appellant as well as that of his sister, Trinidad Maglahos. He contends that accused-appellant’s
admission that he and the complainant’s mother were lawfully married met the
required quantum of proof and that, in fact, even complainant referred to him
as her “stepfather” and “the second husband of her mother.”
Accused-appellant replies that there is no documentary evidence
to show that he and complainant’s mother are legally married.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, if the crime of
rape is committed with the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances, i.e., the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the penalty shall be death. The circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender must be alleged in the information and
duly proven during the trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty,
otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape and the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.[26]
In these cases, the qualifying circumstance of minority was
alleged in the two informations and proven during the trial. The fact that the complainant was then 14
years old when she was raped by the accused-appellant on the dates in question
was sufficiently established by her testimony that she was born on May 12, 1984
and by the Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Pangasinan, indicating that her date of birth was May 12, 1984.[27]
In rape cases, the complainant’s testimony as to her date of birth is
sufficient evidence to establish the qualifying circumstance of minority.[28]
In some cases,[29]
aside from the complainant’s testimony, the Court also considered the testimony
of the complainant’s mother and, in another case,[30]
the half-sister of the complainant. In
other cases,[31]
the proof of the complainant’s minority was based only on the testimony of her
mother. These testimonies meet the
requisite quantum of evidence even if no other documentary evidence was
presented. The birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or, as in these cases, the Certification from the Office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pangasinan, which constituted independent
proofs of the minority of the complainant, serve no other purpose than to
corroborate the testimonies of the competent witnesses and the categorical
finding of the trial court concerning complainant’s age.[32]
But the alleged relationship of accused-appellant and complainant
has not been proven. A
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a valid marriage between the
complainant’s mother and the accused.[33] In
these cases, the evidence shows that accused-appellant and complainant’s mother
are not legally married but only live together in a common-law
relationship. That complainant referred
to accused-appellant as her “stepfather” and “the second husband of her
mother,” or that accused-appellant himself admitted that he and complainant’s
mother were “married” and that the complainant is his “stepdaughter”[34]
did not conclusively prove his marriage to the complainant’s mother. The prosecution should have presented the
certificate of marriage to prove the existence of a valid marriage between
accused-appellant and the complainant’s mother.[35]
The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 20550-MN and 20551-MN
alleged that the accused-appellant committed the rape “while armed with a
bolo.” The evidence shows that on June
13, 1998 and July 19, 1998, accused-appellant threatened to kill complainant
with a bolo if she did not submit to his sexual desire. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, when the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63 of the Penal Code provides that where the penalty prescribed
by law is composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the
penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be reclusion perpetua since there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances.
Sixth. The trial court
awarded to complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00
as moral damages in view of the imposition of the death penalty for the two
counts of rape.
As the imposed penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua, accordingly,
the amount of civil indemnity for the two counts of rape awarded to the
complainant should be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for
each count of rape or the total of P100,000.00. [36]
The amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a
total amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages was correctly awarded by
the trial court. This award is to be
given even if there is neither allegation nor evidence of the trauma
constituting the basis of such award as the same is necessarily included in a
charge of rape.[37]
Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded pursuant to our
ruling in People vs. Catubig[38]
that the said damages are justified pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil code
if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the qualifying circumstance of the use
of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the rapes subject of these
cases, exemplary damages may be awarded to the offended party. Thus, an award of P25,000.00 in each
case, or the total amount of P50,000.00, as exemplary damages should
also be given to the complainant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon, Metro Manila, insofar as it finds accused-appellant
Absolon Yonto y Utom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the death sentences imposed by the trial
court are reduced to reclusion perpetua. In addition, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the offended
party, Jennibeth Cristal y Villarimo, the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages for the two counts of rape.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
[1]
Per Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
[2]
RTC Records, p. 1.
[3]
Id., p. 5.
[4]
Exh. E; RTC Records, p. 47.
[5]
TSN (Jennibeth Cristal), pp. 2-13, July 15, 1999; Salaysay of Jennibeth Cristal, dated February 23, 1998, Exh. A; RTC
Records, p. 37.
[6]
Exh. C; RTC Records, p. 41.
[7]
TSN (Dr. Emmanuel Reyes), pp. 2-4, November 11, 1999.
[8]
TSN (Absolon Yonto y Utom), pp. 3-15, January 24, 2000.
[9]
TSN (Trinidad Maglahos), pp.2-8, July 18, 2000.
[10]
Rollo, p. 15; RTC Decision, p.6.
[11]
People v. Padilla, 355 SCRA
741 (2001); People v. Burlat,
352 SCRA 566 (2001); People v.
Pecayo, Sr., 348 SCRA 95 (2000).
[12]
People v. Velasquez, G.R. Nos.
142561-62, February 15, 2002; People
v. Bulos, G.R. No. 123542, June 26, 2001; People v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos.
138439-41, June 25, 2001; People v.
Dela Peña, 354 SCRA 186 (2001); People
v. Navida, 346 SCRA 821 (2000); People v. Tagaylo, 345 SCRA
284 (2000); People v. Turco, Jr.,
337 SCRA 714 (2000); People v. Geromo,
321 SCRA 355 (1999); People v.
Villaraza, 339 SCRA 666 (2000).
[13]
TSN (Jennibeth Cristal), pp. 4-9, July 15, 1999.
[14]
Id., pp. 12-13.
[15]
Id., p. 11.
[16] Pinagsamang Salaysay of SPO1 Ronald
Payawal and PO3 Henry Terrano, dated February 23, 1999, Exh. D; RTC Records, p.
42.
[17]
People v. Tagaylo, 345
SCRA 284 (2000); People v.
Quiñanola, 306 SCRA 710 (1999); People v. Bajar, 281 SCRA 262
(1997).
[18]
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 140676,
July 31, 2002; People v. Salvador, G.R.
No. 142873, July 9, 2002.
[19]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 135027,
July 3, 2002; People v. Alvarado, G.R.
No. 145730, March 19, 2002; People
v. Villaraza, 339 SCRA 666 (2000); People v. Baid, 336 SCRA 656
(2000).
[20]
People v. Napiot, 311 SCRA 772
(1999).
[21]
People v. Brondial, 343 SCRA
600 (2000); People v. Acala,
307 SCRA 330 (1999).
[22]
People v. Serrano, 353 SCRA
161 (2001); People v. Brondial,
343 SCRA 600 (2000); People v.
Mendez, 335 SCRA 147 (2000); People
v. Sancha, 324 SCRA 646 (2000); People
v. Geromo, 321 SCRA 355 (1999); People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA
559 (1998).
[23]
People v. Nicolas, 324
SCRA 748 (2000).
[24]
TSN, January 24, 2000, p. 14.
[25]
People v. Matugas, G.R. Nos.
139698-726, February 20, 2002; People
v. Pajo, 348 SCRA 492 (2000); People
v. Batoon, 317 SCRA 545 (1999); People
v. Marabillas, 303 SCRA 352 (1999).
[26]
People v. Ariola, G.R. Nos.
142602-05, October 3, 2001; People
v. Fraga, 330 SCRA 669 (2000); People
v. Panique, 316 SCRA 757 (1999); People v. Lim, 312 SCRA 550
(1999); People v. Acala,
307 SCRA 330 (1999); People v.
Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 (1999).
[27]
Exh. E.
[28]
People v. Llanita, G.R. No.
134101, September 5, 2001; People
v. Velasco, 353 SCRA 138 (2001); People v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362
(1999).
[29]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 135027,
July 3, 2002; People v. Padilla,
355 SCRA 741 (2001); People v.
Pagdayawon, 351 SCRA 643 (2001).
[30]
People v. Bali-Balita, 340
SCRA 450 (2000).
[31]
People v. Canon, G.R. No. 141123, July 23, 2002; People v. Daganio, G.R. No. 137385,
January 23, 2002; People v.
Dela Cruz, 338 SCRA 582 (2000).
[32]
People v. Manlod, G.R. Nos. 142901-02,
July 23, 2002; People v. Capili, G.R.
No. 142747, March 12, 2002; People v.
Pagdayawon, 351 SCRA 643 (2001); People
v. Balgos, 323 SCRA 372 (2000); People
v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362 (1999).
[33]
People v. Alcoreza, G.R. Nos.
135452-53, October 5, 2001; People
v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 132044, October 5, 2001; People v. Villaraza, 339 SCRA 666
(2000).
[34]
TSN, pp. 7-8, January 24, 2000.
[35]
People v. Alcoreza, G.R. Nos.
135452-53, October 5, 2001.
[36]
People v. Fraga, 330 SCRA
669 (2000); People v. Panique,
316 SCRA 757 (1999); People v.
Acala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999); People
v. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 (1999); People v. Manggasin, 306 SCRA
228 (1999).
[37]
People v. Prades, 293 SCRA
411 (1998); People v. Fraga,
330 SCRA 669 (2000).
[38]
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001.