DUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FELICIANA OLALIA, EROLINA ALAY-AY, AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 71…

Kapunan versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a consolidated special civil action concerning Eduardo Kapunan, Junior and Oscar Legaspi, who were charged with the kidnapping and murder of Kilusang Mayo Uno Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay in November 1986. The petitioners sought to escape prosecution by invoking the amnesty granted by President Fidel Ramos under Proclamation Number 347 to rebels, insurgents, and other persons who committed crimes in furtherance of political ends. The case matters because it clarifies the scope and application of presidential amnesty proclamations, and whether a grant of amnesty automatically extinguishes criminal liability or must first be established before the trial court.

Procedural History

On 12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana Olalia and Perolina Alay-ay filed a letter-complaint with the Department of Justice against Kapunan, Legaspi, and other officers for the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. Then Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas created a panel of investigators. Kapunan and Legaspi each filed motions to dismiss, claiming amnesty under Proclamation Number 347. The panel treated these as counter-affidavits and, in a resolution dated 18 March 1998, recommended the filing of two informations for murder against Kapunan, Legaspi, and others. The panel refused to consider the amnesty defense, finding that the killings were not committed in furtherance of political belief because no rebellion had yet been launched against the Corazon Aquino government at the time.

Kapunan and Legaspi appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who dismissed their appeal in a letter-resolution dated 28 July 1998, ruling that the amnesty did not extinguish their criminal liability. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on 9 February 1999. Kapunan filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, and Legaspi filed a separate petition. In a Joint Decision dated 29 December 1999, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice. The appellate court refused to rule on the applicability of amnesty, holding that this involved evaluation of evidence not within its jurisdiction in a petition for certiorari. Their motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 22 May 2001.

Kapunan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, and Legaspi also filed a petition for review. The Court consolidated the two petitions.

Facts

On 13 November 1986, the bodies of Rolando Olalia, Chairman of the Kilusang Mayo Uno, and his driver Leonor Alay-ay were found riddled with bullets. The double murders stirred considerable public anger given Olalia's high profile. On 12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana Olalia and Perolina Alay-ay filed a letter-complaint before the Department of Justice charging Kapunan, Legaspi, and other officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police for the complex crime of kidnapping with murder.

The panel of investigators found that Olalia and Alay-ay were seized on the night of 12 November 1986 along Julia Vargas Avenue in Pasig. They were brought to a safehouse in Cubao, then to a secluded area in Antipolo where they were shot dead. The alleged perpetrators belonged to a team of members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The panel found probable cause against Kapunan and Legaspi as co-conspirators. Kapunan was alleged to have created the counter-intelligence and special project team and ordered the transfer of agents, and after a news item about the vehicle used in the abduction, he ordered two men to clean up the mess and instructed the finance officer to extend financial support. Legaspi was alleged to have been present at the safehouse when Olalia and Alay-ay arrived, and later planned the sending abroad of the agents suspected of involvement, giving Almario 80,000 pesos to send Sabalza abroad.

Kapunan and Legaspi both claimed amnesty under Proclamation Number 347. The panel refused to consider the amnesty defense, finding that the documents failed to show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes for which amnesty was applied for, and that the killings were not committed in furtherance of political belief because no rebellion had yet been launched against the Corazon Aquino government at that time.

Issues

• Whether or not the grant of amnesty under Proclamation Number 347 extinguished the criminal liability of Kapunan and Legaspi for the Olalia-Alay-ay killings.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to rule on the applicability of amnesty to the petitioners and on the issue of whether the double murder was committed in pursuit of political belief.
• Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause and in not considering the amnesty defense.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Proclamation Number 347 provides:

Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefore and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before thirty (30) days following the publication of this Proclamation in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, in pursuit of political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d' etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection or coup d' etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion or insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes) 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War: Provided, that the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.

This provision is the basis of the petitioners' claim that their criminal liability was extinguished, but the Court must determine whether the killings fall within its coverage.

Section 1 of Proclamation Number 348, as amended by Section 1 of Proclamation Number 377, provides:

Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all personnel of the AFP and PNP who shall apply therefore and who have or may have committed, as of the date of this Proclamation, acts or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other special laws, in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with counter-insurgency operations; Provided, that such acts or omissions do not constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity or robbery of any form; and Provided, That the acts were not committed for personal ends.

This provision is relevant because the Court of Appeals raised the question of whether the petitioners are covered by Proclamation Number 347 or Proclamation Number 348, and the exceptions to coverage differ.

Section 3 of Administrative Order Number 1-94, as amended, provides:

Section 3. Crimes/Acts Not Covered. - Amnesty shall not be extended for the crimes committed for personal ends, and the crimes enumerated hereunder: (a) Under Proclamation No. 347. - i. Rape ii. Other Crimes Against Chastity (b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. - Serious human rights violations, including but not limited to: i. Torture ii. Extra-legal execution iii. Arson iv. Massacre v. Rape vi. Other crimes against chastity vii. Robbery of any form

This provision clarifies that certain crimes are excluded from amnesty, and the Court must determine whether the Olalia-Alay-ay killings fall under these exceptions.

Ruling

The Court resolved the issues in order. First, on whether the grant of amnesty extinguished criminal liability, the Court held that the grant of amnesty does not automatically extinguish criminal liability. The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to instant exoneration from criminal prosecution without first proving in court that the amnesty granted to them is not within the exceptions provided for in the proclamations. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether the petitioners are covered by Proclamation Number 347 or Proclamation Number 348, and whether the crimes constitute serious human rights violations such as extra-legal execution, involves questions of fact that must be established by competent evidence. The Court quoted the Court of Appeals:

Clearly from the foregoing, Proclamation No. 347 or Proclamation No. 348 could not be applied automatically in favor of petitioners and they are not entitled to instant exoneration from criminal prosecution without first proving in court that the amnesty granted to them is not within the exceptions provided for in the Proclamations.

Second, on whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to rule on the applicability of amnesty, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err. The Court ruled that the matter involves evaluation of evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. The Court held that the determination of whether the murders were committed in pursuit of political belief, whether they were committed for personal ends, and whether they were disclosed in the amnesty application are questions of fact that must be resolved by the trial court.

Third, on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion was committed. The Court ruled that as a rule, it refrains from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in determining probable cause. The Court found that the findings of probable cause by the Investigating Panel and the Secretary of Justice do not possess inherent flaws, and the petitioners did not offer any argument disputing such findings of fact or probable cause. Instead, they focused on the amnesty issue.

Doctrine

A grant of amnesty does not automatically extinguish criminal liability. The grantee must first prove before the trial court that the crime for which amnesty was granted is covered by the amnesty proclamation and does not fall within its exceptions. The determination of whether a crime was committed in pursuit of political belief, or whether it constitutes a serious human rights violation such as extra-legal execution, is a question of fact that must be established by competent evidence in the trial court. Courts will not interfere with the Secretary of Justice's findings of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. The coverage of Proclamation Number 347 and Proclamation Number 348 differs not only on the group or classification of persons to which they may apply but also on the nature of the offenses covered. Under Proclamation Number 347, amnesty does not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends. Under Proclamation Number 348, amnesty does not cover serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or robbery of any form.

Disposition

The petitions were dismissed. The Court affirmed the Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 December 1999 and its Resolution dated 22 May 2001, and upheld the letter-resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 28 July 1998 and 9 February 1999.

Remember This

Amnesty is not a automatic shield; the grantee must prove before the trial court that the crime is covered by the amnesty and does not fall within its exceptions. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between Proclamation Number 347 and Proclamation Number 348, and the rule that probable cause findings of the Secretary of Justice are not disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion.