PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Gutierrez

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Manuel Gutierrez, a criminal case that began as a prosecution for double murder and attempted murder and ended, on automatic review by the Supreme Court, as a conviction for two counts of homicide and one count of less serious physical injuries. The accused admitted the killings from the witness stand, so the case is not about guilt in the ordinary sense. It matters because it teaches, with unusual clarity, three things a Bar candidate must command: that a plea of guilt does not by itself admit the aggravating circumstances alleged in the Information; that treachery must be proved as fully as the crime itself and cannot be presumed; and that the legal meaning of a month, for purposes of classifying physical injuries, is thirty days.

Procedural History

The accused was charged in three separate Informations with double murder for the deaths of Lorelie de la Cruz and Rializa Trabel, and with attempted murder for the wounding of Lilian Trabel. He first pleaded not guilty, but after the prosecution had presented its first witness he changed his plea to guilty. The trial court, the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, satisfied itself that he understood the meaning and consequences of his plea, then continued receiving the prosecution's evidence to determine the proper penalty. The trial court convicted him of two counts of murder and one count of serious physical injuries, sentenced him to death twice, and ordered indemnity. Because the penalty of death was imposed, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The accused did not deny his guilt; he challenged only the appreciation of treachery and the classification of the injury to Lilian Trabel.

Facts

On 20 June 1999, in the family compound at Tibag, Baliuag, Bulacan, Venus Ramos was visiting her sister Analiza de la Cruz. Their sister Lorelie de la Cruz lived next door in the family's two-storey ancestral home with their cousin, the accused Manuel Gutierrez. At around two thirty in the afternoon, while watching television, Venus heard noise from the second floor of the old family home. She rushed upstairs and saw the accused stabbing Lorelie from behind, holding on to her hair. Terrified, Venus retreated and ran downstairs, then toward the gate of the compound to seek help. Looking back, she saw the accused also stabbing her cousin Rializa Trabel.

Lilian Trabel, Rializa's mother, testified that Rializa was roused from sleep by noise from a neighbor's house and darted through the main door. As mother and daughter were about to step out, they met the accused, already in a belligerent mood. Without a word he stabbed Rializa, who could only shout, "Jojo, huwag!" He then turned on Lilian and stabbed her on the head with a kitchen knife. She ran back inside and locked the door, calling for her daughter but getting no response. Lilian survived; Rializa and Lorelie died before they could receive medical attention.

The accused was arrested a few hours later. Before accepting his plea of guilt, the trial court inquired whether he fully understood its meaning and consequences; he maintained the plea, explaining that he desperately wanted to give his relatives serenity and peace of mind. The trial court found treachery in both killings and treated the wounding of Lilian as serious physical injuries because her wounds required one month to heal.

Issues

• Whether or not a plea of guilt to the charges alleged in the Information amounts to a judicial admission of the aggravating circumstances alleged therein, such that treachery may be taken against the accused without proof.
• Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Lorelie de la Cruz.
• Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Rializa Trabel.
• Whether or not the wounding of Lilian Trabel, with a healing period of one month, constitutes serious physical injuries or less serious physical injuries.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, on the duty of the court when a plea of guilty is entered in a capital offense, provides:

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability.

This is the textual anchor of the ruling: because the prosecution must prove the precise degree of culpability, a bare plea cannot supply the aggravating circumstances.

Article 263, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, on serious physical injuries, provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

The threshold of more than thirty days is what the trial court misapplied when it treated a one-month healing period as serious physical injuries.

Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, on less serious physical injuries, provides:

Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

This is the correct classification for Lilian Trabel, whose one-month healing period falls within the ten-to-thirty-day range.

Article 13 of the Civil Code, on the computation of months, provides:

When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.

This converts the one-month healing period into exactly thirty days, which is not more than thirty days, and so excludes serious physical injuries.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court rejected the Solicitor General's argument that a plea of guilt is a judicial confession of all the material facts alleged in the Information, calling it already passé. A formal plea of guilt is insufficient to sustain a conviction of an aggravated crime, because an accused untutored in the ways of the judicial system cannot be assumed to comprehend a highly technical term like treachery. The Court stressed that the rule requiring proof in capital offenses would be rendered nugatory if liability for an aggravated crime rested on a presumptive rule. Hence, although the accused pleaded guilty, treachery may not be taken against him if the evidence failed to establish it.

On the second issue, the Court held that treachery did not attend the killing of Lorelie. To sustain treachery, two conditions must concur: the means, method and form of execution gave the victim no opportunity to defend herself or retaliate, and that mode was deliberately and consciously adopted to eliminate or diminish the risk of defense. Treachery may not be deduced from presumptions; its elements must be fully established as the crime itself. Venus Ramos did not see how the stabbing began, how it developed, or how the victim succumbed; she witnessed only a portion of the assault. Absent particulars on how the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated.

On the third issue, the Court likewise found no treachery in the killing of Rializa. The meeting between the accused and Rializa was purely accidental, the attack the product of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than a deliberate, conscious and willful act. Where the meeting is casual and the attack impulsive or devoid of plan, there is no treachery even if the attack is sudden and unexpected; the mode of attack must have been deliberately thought of, not sprung from the unexpected turn of events.

On the fourth issue, the Court corrected the trial court's classification. Under Article 263, paragraph 4, serious physical injuries require incapacity for more than thirty days; under Article 265, less serious physical injuries cover incapacity or medical attendance of ten days or more. Reading Article 13 of the Civil Code, one month means thirty days, which is not more than thirty days. The wounding of Lilian Trabel is therefore less serious physical injuries. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed a straight penalty of two months. With treachery eliminated, the killings were homicide, not murder, and the penalty for each was fixed within the ranges of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.

Doctrine

• A plea of guilt admits only the act charged and the facts alleged in the Information; it does not admit the aggravating circumstances alleged, which must be proved by the prosecution, especially in capital offenses where Section 3 of Rule 116 requires proof of the precise degree of culpability.
• Treachery requires two conditions: the mode of execution left the victim no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and that mode was deliberately and consciously adopted. It cannot be presumed; its elements must be proved as fully as the crime itself.
• Where the meeting between the accused and the victim is casual and the attack impulsive, there is no treachery even if the attack is sudden and unexpected.
• For physical injuries, the legal month is thirty days under Article 13 of the Civil Code; a healing period of one month is therefore not more than thirty days and falls under Article 265, less serious physical injuries, not Article 263, paragraph 4.

Disposition

The trial court's decision was modified: the accused was convicted of two counts of homicide and one count of less serious physical injuries, sentenced accordingly, and ordered to pay each set of heirs fifty thousand pesos as death indemnity and fifty thousand pesos as moral damages, with the award of actual damages to Lilian Trabel deleted.

Remember This

A plea of guilt admits the act, not the aggravating circumstances; treachery must be proved, never presumed. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of treachery, the effect of a plea of guilty in capital offenses, and the thirty-day rule in classifying physical injuries.