PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RONITO BOLLER ALIAS OBAT, DIANITO BOLLER ALIAS NONOY AND FRANCISCO BOLLER ALIAS BAYANI, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Boller

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted three brothers, Ronito Boller, known as Obat, Dianito Boller, known as Nonoy, and Francisco Boller, known as Bayani, for the shooting deaths of three men in a coconut plantation in Gandara, Samar. The accused were charged with three counts of murder, tried jointly, convicted in each count, and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua. The case matters to the bar candidate because it is a compact review of four recurring examination topics: the requisites of a dying declaration, the standards for the defense of alibi, the proof required for treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and the rule that conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. It also illustrates how the Supreme Court may reduce a conviction from murder to homicide when a qualifying circumstance is not proved, and how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is then applied.

Procedural History

The three accused were charged on December 22, 1995 under three separate informations for murder, one for each victim. When arraigned, each accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. The three cases were then consolidated and tried jointly before the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 31. On May 16, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment finding all three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua in each count, ordering them to indemnify jointly and severally the surviving heirs of each victim in the amount of 50,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising three assigned errors: that the trial court wrongly treated the statement of Lolito de la Cruz as a dying declaration, that it wrongly appreciated treachery, and that their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

At eight o'clock in the morning of October 27, 1995, Jacinto Orquin and his brother Jesus Orquin, their father Arsenio Orquin, and their uncle Lolito de la Cruz were working at their copra kiln in Barangay Hinayagan, Gandara, Samar. They heard dogs barking, so Jacinto went outside. He saw the three accused about three meters away, all pointing firearms at the copra kiln: Obat held an M-14, Bayani held a shotgun, and Nonoy held a Garand. Jacinto ran. The accused opened fire at the kiln, hitting Arsenio, Jesus, and Lolito. As Jacinto fled across the river he heard Jesus cry out, "Entoy, don't leave me, I will die!" He returned, brought his brother to the river bank, covered him with cogon grass, and ran on. He met Roberto Tolin and told him that the accused had shot his brother, father, and uncle, and asked him to go to the kiln to save them.

Meanwhile, Lolito de la Cruz, wounded, was brought to the house of Claro Arterio. Nixon de la Cruz reported this to Barangay Captain Gutardo Berbis, who instructed Kagawad Pedro Sumagdon to proceed there with pen and paper to record any statement Lolito would make. Sumagdon asked Lolito why he was wounded, and Lolito answered that he was shot by Obat Boller, Nonoy Boller, and Bayani Boller. Sumagdon wrote the statement down, and it was witnessed and heard by Roberto Tolin and Ponciano Orquin. The written statement, entitled "Ante-Mortem," was signed by Sumagdon, Tolin, and Orquin, but not by Lolito, who could not move his right hand. Lolito was carried on a hammock toward Bu-aw for treatment but died before reaching the hospital. Autopsies on all three victims confirmed that each died of irreversible shock secondary to hemorrhage from gunshot wounds.

For their defense, the accused offered alibi and denial. Ronito claimed he was working in the farm of Luz Villocero from morning until five in the afternoon, and she corroborated him. Dianito claimed he was on duty at a camp as a member of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit from six in the morning to six in the afternoon, and his duty partner Narciso Selajes corroborated him. Francisco claimed he was repairing the nipa roof of Zosimo Suarello's house that day. The trial court rejected these defenses, and the accused appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the statement of Lolito de la Cruz identifying his assailants is admissible as a dying declaration despite not being signed by him and not being written in his exact words.
• Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi can prevail over the dying declaration and the positive identification of the accused.
• Whether or not conspiracy was established among the three accused.

Applicable Provisions

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes homicide, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

This is the provision under which the Court ultimately convicted the accused, after finding that treachery was not proved and that the killing was therefore not murder.

Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on preventive imprisonment, was applied by the trial court in crediting the period of detention, and provides:

Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases: 1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

This provision bears on the credit given for the period the accused were detained before judgment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that all four requisites of a dying declaration concurred: the declaration concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death, having sustained fatal wounds, pleaded to be brought to a hospital, and died before reaching it; he was competent as a witness; and the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide in which he was the victim. The Court rejected the argument that the declaration was inadmissible because Sumagdon wrote it in his own words and did not have Lolito sign it. The Rules do not require the witness to repeat the exact words of the victim; it is enough that he testifies to the substance of what was said. A dying declaration may be oral or written, and an unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the witness who took it down.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the killing itself, and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. Finding nothing in the records to show the exact manner of the killing, the Court refused to surmise that treachery attended it.

On the third issue, the Court held that alibi must be viewed with caution, if not suspicion, because it is inherently unreliable and easy to fabricate. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove they were elsewhere when the crime was committed; they must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene at the time of its commission. The accused failed to discharge this burden, and in any event they were positively identified by Lolito de la Cruz and Jacinto Orquin. Alibi cannot prevail over the dying declaration and the positive identification.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the acts of the accused showed a common purpose, interest, and design, establishing a conspiracy among them. Hence the act of one is the act of all, and each accused is equally guilty of the crime as the others. The crime is therefore homicide, not murder, punishable by reclusion temporal under Article 249. In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court fixed the penalty at eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In addition to civil indemnity, the Court held the accused liable for moral damages of 50,000 pesos for each victim, which needs no proof other than the fact of death.

Doctrine

A dying declaration is admissible when four requisites concur: it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death when he made it; he was competent as a witness; and it is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant is the victim. The declaration may be oral or written; if oral, the witness who heard it may testify to its substance without reproducing the exact words, and an unsigned written declaration may serve as a memorandum for the witness who took it down.

Treachery is a qualifying circumstance that cannot be presumed; it must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the killing itself, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Where treachery is not proved, the killing is homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder.

Alibi is a weak defense, viewed with caution, and succeeds only when the accused shows it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of the crime. It cannot prevail over positive identification and a valid dying declaration. Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused show a common purpose, interest, and design; once established, the act of one is the act of all, and each conspirator is equally liable.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision with modifications: the accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of homicide, each sentenced in each count to the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of each victim 50,000 pesos as moral damages and 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

Remember the four requisites of a dying declaration and the rule that an unsigned declaration, taken down by another in his own words, is still admissible if the witness testifies to its substance. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between murder and homicide when treachery is not proved, and the rule that conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all.