G.R. Nos. 143689-91. November 12, 2002
SIXTO M. BAYAS AND ERNESTO T. MATUDAY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and
their
counsel be unilaterally withdrawn before the commencement of the trial?
To this main issue, the answer is “No.” Stipulations freely and
voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless
for good cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to
stipulate facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the
stipulations, the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on
the mere pretext that they may be placed at a disadvantage during the
trial.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, praying for the setting aside of the April 28,
2000[1] and the
May 26, 2000[2]
Orders of the Sandiganbayan[3]
(SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 25280-82. The first Order denied
petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents,[4]
while the second denied reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
On May 6, 1999, three Informations[6]
were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and
Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as
amended; and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized
under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal
Code. They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and
municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Kabayan,
Province of Benguet.
During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners
pled
“not guilty.” The pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was
cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999, because the counsel for the
accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared.[7]
On November 5, 1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the
absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly “suffering from the flu.”
Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their
counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II
Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of
the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon
all other matters that still remained to be resolved.[8]
On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a “Joint
Stipulation of
Facts and Documents,” which had been duly signed by the two accused
(herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero. It is
reproduced hereunder:
“JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS
“COME NOW the accused, counsel for the accused and the
Prosecution, by and through the undersigned Special Prosecution Officer,
Office of the Special Prosecutor, unto the Honorable Court, most
respectfully aver: THAT –“1. After a conference the Defense and the Prosecution
admitted the following facts as follows:“a. Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor
and
accused Sixto Bayas was and [is] still the Municipal Treasurer and
designated Municipal Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the
period relevant to this case;“b. Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the
amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00.“2. The Prosecution and Defense jointly admit the following
documents as their respective documentary exhibits x x x ([with]
reservation to mark additional exhibits during the trial of the case) as
follows:
the
Prosecution
Common
Exhibits
for the
Defense
dated February
29, 1996
Dated September 25, 1996
entry of the office of the
Municipal Accountant
138 of the Sanguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Kabayan Benguet carried on August
15,
1996
the [S]tenographic Notes taken during the close door session of the
Sangguniang Bayan [,] Kabayan, Benguet
on August 15, 1996 at 1:50 P.M.
Statement of Investigation conducted on March 24, 1997
Criminal Cases Nos. 25280-25281
disbursement Voucher
No. 401-9505186 For the payment of Mobilization fee for the various
Projects at Kabayan, Benguet for P510,000.00
60915S-1 for P510,000.00 dated May 4, 1995 signed by both Accused Mayor
Matuday and Treasurer Bayas
of Check No. 60915 S-1
some accused Mayor Matuday at the Dorsal portion of Check No. 60915-S-1
Nos. 25282-25280
for P55,000.00 dated June 28, 1995 signed by Mayor Matuday and
Treasurer Bayas
of Check No. 609177Signature of
Yolanda Millanes
Mayor Matuday
disbursement Voucher for P55,000.00“3. The Defense shall present at least four witness while
the
Prosecution opts not to present any witness considering that Defense
admitted all the documentary evidence of the Prosecution.“Quezon City, December 10, 1999.
MOLINTAS
Ombudsman
BAYAS
On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again
scuttled due
to the absence of Atty. Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for
February 14, 2000. However, on February 7, 2000, he moved to withdraw as
counsel for the accused. His motion was granted by the anti-graft court
in an Order dated February 14, 2000. In the same Order, the pretrial
was rescheduled for March 31, 2000, to give the accused ample time to
employ a new counsel.
On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new
counsel,
Atty. Cecilia M. Cinco, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first,
Stipulation 1(b) which states that “Both the accused admit the
disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00”; and second,
Exhibits “1” to “8-a”. They invoked their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan justified its denial of petitioners’ Motion
to
Withdraw Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents in this wise:
“x x x. [For] the fact that there [was] express statement
from
Atty. Rogelio A. Cortes this morning that neither fraud nor any other
mistake of a serious character vitiated the consent of the parties when
they affixed their conformity to the stipulations of facts, the reason
put forth by the accused or movant’s counsel at this time, is that if
these stipulations were to remain, then the accused might as well not
present any evidence on the entire accusation against him as this will
already be supported by the evidence on record. While the court, indeed,
sees this as a possibility, that, by itself, is not a ground for
withdrawing any stipulation freely and knowingly made and given.”[10]
In the second assailed Order, the anti-graft court denied
reconsideration and reiterated its previous stand, as follows:
“x x x. The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less
or no
room for the accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside
a pre-trial order; in fact, an accused can plead guilty if he so
desires or make admissions as he deems appropriate and truthful, even if
in the mind of the new counsel, it gave very few opportunities to
present contesting evidence.”[11]
It then added that “the pre-trial order shall remain. The
admissions therein contained can be used in this case and for whatever
purpose the Rules on Evidence will allow.”
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues
for the Court’s consideration:
“I
Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents, considering the relevant facts and applicable laws and rules.“II
Whether or not the denial by respondent Sandiganbayan of
the
withdrawal of the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents would result
in manifest injustice and impairment of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.“III
Whether or not there is a law or rule which would bar
petitioners
from withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents from
the respondent Sandiganbayan.”[13]
Plainly put, the issue raised by petitioners is whether they
may be
allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Withdrawal from the Joint Stipulation
Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be
unilaterally
withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until
after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. We are
not persuaded.
Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of
stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases. The new Rules on
Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues
and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they
simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient
manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the
same time, help unclog court dockets.
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside
unless for good cause.[14] They should be enforced especially when they
are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public
policy.[15]
When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who
validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of
collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue
influence;[16] or
upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice
in a particular case.[17]
Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made
lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave
abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.[18]
Validity of the Joint Stipulations
While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations,
they,
however, do not allege that these were false or misleading or were
obtained through force or fraud. On the contrary, they do not dispute
the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake
vitiated their and their counsel’s consent to the signing of these
stipulations. They even admitted, in answer to its query, that they had
freely given their consent.
Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position,
petitioners lay the blame on the alleged incompetence of their former
counsel. They claim that, in agreeing to the Joint Stipulation, he
failed to consider their legal interests.
To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake
must be
one of fact — not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of
fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining
it.[19]
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by
the
action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes,
the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the
acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the
simple negligence committed by the counsel.[20]
Presumption of Innocence
In their effort to withdraw from the Joint Stipulation,
petitioners
argue that the two questioned items impair their constitutional right
to be presumed innocent, violate their right against self-incrimination,
and deny them due process in the sense that the trial would be a
“useless formality, an idle ceremony.”[21]
Other than by generalized argumentation, petitioners have not
convinced us that the aforementioned constitutional rights would be
violated. True, the old Rules of Court frowned upon stipulations of
facts in criminal cases because of a perceived danger — that by the
mere expedient of stipulating with the defense counsel the elements of
the crime charged, the prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[22]
However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to
stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. [23]
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been
established in
our jurisprudence. In a case involving illegal possession of
firearms,[24]
the prosecution and the defense stipulated the fact that the accused
had been found in possession of a gun without the required permit or
license. In People v. Bocar,[25]
the Court considered as valid the admission by the accused of the
existence of certain affidavits and exhibits, which the prosecution had
presented to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter contained
therein. In People v. Hernandez,[26]
which involved illegal recruitment, the Court upheld the joint
stipulation that the accused had not been licensed or authorized by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency to recruit workers for overseas
jobs.
There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts
in
criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is consistent with the
doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that “x x x everyone has a right to
waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right and without detriment to the community at large.”[27]
In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the
prosecution
and petitioners was a waiver of the right to present evidence on the
facts and the documents freely admitted by them. There could have been
no impairment of petitioners’ right to be presumed innocent, right to
due process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was
voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Necessity of a Pretrial Order
Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires
the
issuance of a pretrial order to make pretrial stipulations binding. We
do not agree.
Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:
“Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All
agreements or
admissions made or entered [into] during the pre-trial conference shall
be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court.”[28]
Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to
be
binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1)
the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed
by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned
in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make
the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary
merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to
enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by
the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated.[29]
Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of
the disadvantage.[30] If the
accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by
parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a
fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation
should be
binding. It must be noted that the SBN could not fully act on the
matter, not through its fault, but because of the continued absence of
petitioners’ counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended
completion of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon
the Joint Stipulation because he was absent. Also, the pretrial
conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the
attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the
conference.
Therefore, under these circumstances, the SBN cannot be
faulted for
its failure to approve expressly the stipulations. It had the
opportunity to rule on the matter only when the accused, through their
new counsel, Atty. Cecilia L. Cinco, moved to withdraw their
stipulations. In its first assailed Order, the SBN upheld their
validity, thereby effectively approving the submitted Joint Stipulation
of Facts and Documents. The assent of the court to agreements of the
parties, assisted by their counsel, is assumed until they indicate a
dissent.[31] Thus,
the
stipulations freely made by the latter are to be respected as their true
will and intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case,
especially if the anti-graft court has not struck them down for being
violative of the law.
Role of Lawyers in Pretrials
Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the
case at
its early stage. It is therefore important that the parties take active
roles in the proceedings. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that
if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at
the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of
cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.[32]
Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full
disclosure of
their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They
should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure
the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by
their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as
in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that
they signed and that their clients fully assented to.[33]
The records reveal that the parties were the ones who
volunteered
to make the Joint Stipulation of the facts of the case. Thus, the
anti-graft court can rightfully expect that both parties arrived upon it
with fairness and honesty. Therefore, petitioners may not assail it on
the mere ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a
disadvantage. Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal
by the simple expedient of passing the blame on the previous counsel,
who had supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client.
If we allow parties to renege on stipulations they validly
entered
into during the course of pretrial proceedings, there would be no end to
litigations.[34]
Lawyers can
wiggle in and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged.
Lawyers should remember, however, that they are not merely
representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the
court. As such, one of their duties — assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice[35] — is more significant than that of acquitting
their client,[36]
rightly or wrongly.
We stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules
of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.[37] They
should
realize that the earlier they dispose of their cases, especially at the
pretrial stage, the better for them. In doing so, they can now
concentrate and work more efficiently on their other cases.[38]
Grave Abuse of Discretion
As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a
stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the court.
Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed
on appeal.[39]
There is
“grave abuse of discretion” where “a power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law.”[40]
Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the
Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the
stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into. Also, no
bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-graft court for
failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was
due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued
absence of petitioners’ counsel.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona,
and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 27.
[2] Id.,
pp. 28-29.
[3]
First Division.
Signed by Justice Francis E. Garchitorena (Division chairman) and
Justices Catalino R. Castañeda Jr. and Gregory S. Ong (members).
[4]
Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[5]
Id., pp. 49-52.
[6]
Records, pp. 224-229.
[7]
Sandiganbayan Order dated October 15, 1999; records, p. 77.
[8]
Sandiganbayan Order dated November 5, 1999; id., p. 67.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[10]
Assailed Order dated April 28, 2000; rollo, p. 27-A.
[11]
Assailed Order dated May 26, 2000, p.1; id., p. 28.
[12]
The case was deemed
submitted for decision on May 10, 2001, upon this Court’s receipt of
petitioners’ Memorandum, which was signed by Attys. Rogelio A. Cortes
and Cecilia L. Cinco of the “CRC Law Firm.” Respondents’ Memorandum,
filed on April 25, 2001, was signed by Attys. Rodrigo V. Coquia and
Ireneo M. Paldeng of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman.
[13]
Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 128. Original in upper case.
[14]
National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Scheiber, 169 NW
272, October 25, 1918.
[15]
Esch v. Forster, 168 So. 229, January 20, 1936.
[16] 83
CJS 90 (1953).
[17]
Woods v. First National Bank of Chicago, 41 NE2d 235, April 20, 1942.
[18]
Ibid.
[19] 83
CJS 91 (1953).
[20]
Villa Rhecar Bus v. De La Cruz, 157 SCRA 13, January 7, 1988; Legarda v.
CA, 280 SCRA 642, October 16, 1997.
[21]
Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 24; rollo, p. 140.
[22]
People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, July 30, 1996.
[23]
Section 1, Rule 118:
“SECTION 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases.- In all
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a
pre-trial conference to consider the following:
‘x x x x x x x x x
‘(b) stipulation of facts;
‘x x x x x x x x x.’”
[24]
See People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164, August 30, 1967.
[25] 27
SCRA 512, March 28, 1969.
[26]
260 SCRA 25, July 30, 1996.
[27]
Herrera, Remedial
Law, Volume IV, 2001 ed., pp. 667-668, citing People v. Donato, 198 SCRA
130, 154, June 5, 1991; People v. Hernandez, supra.
[28]
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[29]
Schreiber v. Rickert, 50 NE 2d 879, October 13, 1943.
[30]
See Dequito v. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504, September 4, 1975.
[31]
McLeod v. Hyman, 116 A. 535, February 6, 1922.
[32]
Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[33]
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rickenbaker, 146 F. 2d 751, December 15, 1944.
[34]
Gacutana-Fraile v. Domingo, 348 SCRA 414, December 15, 2000.
[35]
Muñoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190, September 28, 1973.
[36]
City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunado, 288 SCRA 190, March 27, 1998.
[37]
Far Esatern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30, October
1, 1998.
[38] J.
Bellosillo, Effective Pre-trial Technique, 1990 ed., p. 199.
[39]
Supra, note 17.
[40]
Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 142738, December 14,
2001.