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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.ERNESTO ALVAREZ @ “GADAY”, APPELLANT.

G.R. Nos. 140388-91. November 11, 2003 November 11, 2003

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People versus Alvarez

The Case

This is the automatic review by the Supreme Court of the conviction of Ernesto Alvarez, known as Gaday, for the rape of a fifteen-year-old girl, referred to in the record as AAA. The accused was the live-in partner of the victim's grandmother. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a study in the credibility of a child witness whose demeanor on the stand seemed strange, and in the weight of denial and alibi against positive identification. Second, and more important for the Bar, it is a clean illustration of the rule that a qualifying circumstance which raises the penalty to death must be alleged in the information, and of the narrower rule that the common-law spouse contemplated by the Death Penalty Law is the common-law spouse of the victim's parent, not of the victim's grandparent.

Procedural History

Four separate informations for rape were filed against the accused before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, covering alleged incidents in January 1994, February 1995, June 1995, and June 1997. He pleaded not guilty to all four. After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 28, 1999. It convicted him in the June 1997 case, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay the victim 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity. It acquitted him in the other three cases because there was no evidence as to how the alleged crimes were committed. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Facts

On the night of June 18, 1997, at about eight in the evening, AAA was asleep on the floor of their house on a hill in Davao City, beside her two younger siblings. Her mother had left earlier to buy sugar and coffee. The victim was suddenly awakened by someone who mounted her and covered her mouth with a handkerchief. She opened her eyes and saw the accused, her grandmother's live-in partner, on top of her. He was armed with a bolo. He ordered her to remove her shorts and cut her panty with the bolo. He then had carnal knowledge of her against her will, and she felt excruciating pain. Before leaving, he threatened to kill her and her relatives if she told anyone.

When her mother returned at about nine thirty in the evening, she found the door open and the rope that bound the bamboo door to the door jamb cut. When she asked her daughter about it, the girl burst into tears and said she had been raped by the accused. The mother sought the help of an uncle of the victim and of a barangay official, and they complained to the authorities. The accused was arrested that same night in his house, about one hundred meters from the victim's house. The next day the victim was examined by a physician, who found a four-month-old hymenal laceration and no spermatozoa.

The accused denied the charge and put up alibi. He claimed that on that night the victim's mother had a drinking session with them and left late, at about nine in the evening. He said the victim's mother hated him because of his cohabitation with her own mother. The victim's grandmother corroborated the drinking session and testified that she heard her granddaughter's screams and went to the house, but did not believe the girl's accusation. The trial court gave credence to the victim and disregarded the defenses of denial and alibi.

Issues

  • Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of rape despite his claim that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty even though the information alleged no qualifying circumstance.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11 of Republic Act Number 7659, the Death Penalty Law, provides:

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act Number 7659, provides that the crime of rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

This is the provision the trial court misapplied, because the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim's grandmother, not of her parent, and because the information never pleaded the circumstance at all.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court affirmed the conviction. It held that where the question is the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial court are accorded the highest respect and even finality, absent palpable mistake, because the trial court has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying. The victim positively identified the accused, a man she had known for years and who lived in her neighborhood. Against positive identification, denial and alibi cannot prevail. Alibi requires proof not only that the accused was elsewhere, but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene; here the two houses were only about one hundred meters apart, as even the defense witness, the victim's grandmother, admitted.

The Court also rejected the attack on the victim's demeanor. Although she appeared unaffected and even smiled at times, and could not readily recall her mother's birth year, the records showed that she had the mental capacity of a feeble-minded child. The Court held that errorless recollection of a traumatic and agonizing incident cannot be expected of a witness recounting an experience as humiliating and painful as rape. What was decisive was that she identified the accused as her rapist. The Court likewise held that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude a finding of rape, and the absence of spermatozoa does not negate its commission, because neither is an indispensable element of the crime.

On the second issue, the Court ruled for the accused. The information alleged no qualifying circumstance. The Court reiterated the rule that qualifying circumstances which increase the penalty by degree rather than merely the period of the penalty must be properly pleaded in the information, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. Failure to do so is a denial of due process, and one charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of rape in its qualified form. The Court also corrected the trial court's reading of the law, holding that what the provision contemplates is the common-law spouse of the victim's parent, and the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim's grandparent. The erroneous allegation in the information that the victim was eleven years old, when she was in fact fifteen, had no bearing on his culpability or on the penalty, since he was convicted on account of having had sexual intercourse with her against her will.

Doctrine

First, the credibility of a witness is a matter best left to the trial court, whose findings are respected absent palpable mistake, because it alone observes the witness's demeanor. A victim's odd behavior and minor lapses do not destroy credibility, and the absence of fresh lacerations or of spermatozoa does not negate rape, since neither is an element of the crime. Second, denial and alibi are weak defenses that must be buttressed by strong evidence of innocence, and alibi fails unless the accused proves it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Third, and central to this case, a qualifying circumstance that raises the penalty to death must be specifically alleged in the information, in keeping with the accused's right to be informed of the charges; one charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of qualified rape. Fourth, under the Death Penalty Law, the common-law spouse contemplated is the common-law spouse of the victim's parent, not of the victim's grandparent.

Disposition

The conviction was affirmed with modification: the accused was found guilty only of simple rape, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the victim 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity and 50,000 pesos as moral damages.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that one charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of qualified rape, because the qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the common-law spouse of the victim's parent and the common-law spouse of the victim's grandparent, and the rule that moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of pleading or proof.