PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICTORIO NEBRIA Y CABANADA ALIAS “TORIO,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In a consolidated decision^[1]
dated June 24, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 8,
acquitted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8679-97 for Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, but convicted him in Criminal Case No. 8678-97 for
Rape. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim of the rape in
the amount of P50,000.

Separate informations for rape and kidnapping and serious illegal
detention were both filed on October 21, 1997. In Criminal Case No. 8678-97, the information for rape alleged:

That on or about and sometime January, 1992 and many times
thereafter, at sitio Tulogan, barangay Portulin, municipality of Pangantucan,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, prompted by lewd design, thru force and
intimidation on the person of IVY ABINES,^[2]
a thirteen (13) year-old-minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally remove the dress and panty of IVY ABINES; place himself on top
insert his penis into the vagina and have sexual intercourse with IVY ABINES a
13 year-old-minor against her will, to the damage and prejudice of IVY ABINES
in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.^[3]

In Criminal Case No. 8679-97, the information for Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal detention alleged:

That on or about and sometime [in] the month of February 1994 at
sitio Tulogan, barangay Portulin, municipality of Pangantucan, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with SERGIA NEBRIA who is still at large,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap IVY ABINES, a fifteen (15) year-old-minor
detaining said minor at Pinuyak, Lala, Lanao del Norte for a period of almost
three (3) years, against her will; to the damage and prejudice of the victim in
such amount as may be allowed by law.^[4]

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Per agreement of the parties,
the cases were tried jointly.^[5]

As summarized by the trial court, the prosecution evidence
against the accused, now appellant Victorio Nebria, showed the following:

Private complainant Ivy Abines is the daughter of Azucina^[6]
Abines who is the live-in partner of the accused.

Ivy Abines testified in the evening, during the first week of
January 1992, which she remembered to be a Saturday, she was in their house
already lying down on the floor ready to sleep. Their house was in sitio Tulogan, barangay Portulin, Pangantucan,
Bukidnon. Besides the accused, her
companions were her younger sister Ester and Benyjun Nebria, who is the young
son of the accused with her mother. Ester was also lying on the floor at her left side and to her right
Benyjun Nebria, son of the accused with her mother and still a baby, and next
to him was the accused. Being a
Saturday, her mother who sells vegetable[s] for a living at the market place in
the poblacion was not at home; it was customary for her to go to the poblacion
every Saturday morning and would return home on Monday. All the house occupants [sleep] in one,
common space because there was no separate bedroom. A kerosene lamp, its light greatly reduced, was at a small altar.

Ivy testified that she was not yet asleep at 9:00 o’clock. The accused went over to her and at once
removed her skirt and panty. Too scared
to scream, she tried to close her thighs together, but accused forced his knee
in between and succeeded in penetrating her vagina with his penis. He threatened to kill her if she would
reveal what had happened. Thereafter,
accused returned to his place. But at
about 10:00 o’clock that same evening, accused raped her again. Ivy did not report the incident to her mother
upon her return [on Monday].

Since, then, accused repeatedly sexually abuse Ivy specially
because her mother was always away. The
constant sexual violation resulted in her pregnancy.

Ivy became aware she was pregnant in August 1994. Upon learning about Ivy’s pregnancy and the
author thereof, her mother, accompanied by the accused, brought her to Lala,
Lanao del Norte. She was made to stay
with the aunt of the accused, Sergia Nebria, a spinster. Ivy’s mother had lied to her that their
going to Lanao was only for a brief vacation. In fact, she was brought there so that her brothers and sisters [would]
not know about her condition. Two days
after their arrival, however, her mother and the accused went back to
Pangantucan, leaving her behind.

Ivy delivered a baby boy on 19 October 1994. She name[d] him Ricky Abines. His Birth Certificate (Exhibit A) states
[that] Ricky’s father was “unknown”.

On 21 January 1997, Ivy’s mother fetched her from Lanao. Sergia Nebria refused to allow Ivy to take
Ricky with her. But with the assistance
of the DSWD, Ivy was later able to have [her] son back with her.

Ivy went to live with her sister in San Fernando, Bukidnon, who,
upon learning the truth about what happened, assisted Ivy in the filing of the
instant cases against the accused.

Ester Abines, 15 years old and the younger sister of Ivy,
corroborated her sister in the alleged rape the accused committed. At that time she was only nine years
old. She told the court that she was
just a foot away from Ivy and although she was under a blanket she actually saw
everything the accused did to her sister. Her blanket was very thin and there was a small light coming from a
kerosene lamp at the altar.^[7]

Appellant consistently claimed innocence of the charges against
him. His defense, as summed up by the
trial court, is as follows:

In his defense, accused made much of the fact that he could not
have committed the crime as charged on January 1992, in sitio Tulogan, barangay
Portulin, because during said period he and his family, including private
complainant, [were] living in Vismin Village, Poblacion, Pangantucan. He had a house there. It was only on 27 July 1993, when he was
able to buy a small house and lot from a certain Danilo Garcia located in sitio
Tulogan that he transferred there. Accused showed to the court a deed of sale dated 27 July 1993, executed
by Danilo Garcia. Said Danilo Garcia
testified in court affirming the truth of the execution of the deed of sale
(Exhibit “2”). Said document was
prepared by Sitio Leader Angeles Patoy who was also presented by the defense to
affirm its due execution. In the same
year Patoy listed accused and the members of his household in the Census List
of his sitio. (See [two-page list] marked Exhibit “1” and “1-A”; the name of accused
encircled, labelled Exhibit “1-B”).

Azucina Abines, the mother of Ivy, testified [on] behalf of the
accused, affirming the defense’s claim that in 1992, she and her children Ivy
and Ester were living with the accused in Vismin Village in the poblacion of
Pangantucan, not in sitio Tulogan, barangay Portulin. She further testified that in 1994, she brought Ivy with her for
a vacation in Maranding, Lala, Lanao. When they were already there, Ivy decided to stay behind in order to
find a job. Missing her daughter’s
absence, Azucina returned to Lanao in January 1997 to get Ivy. To her surprise, she saw that Ivy already
has a small child. When asked who the
father was, Ivy simply replied that the boy has no father. Azucina brought back Ivy to Pangantucan, and
after a week Ivy went to live with her sister in Halapitan, San Fernando,
Bukidnon.

Azucina further testified on the motive behind the filing of cases
against her live-in partner. In 1985,
she and her husband Mauricio Abines separated, and she lived with herein
accused. In the first week of September 1997, her children, including Ivy,
visited her in Pangantucan. They told
her it was time for her and their father to be together again because they have
already filed a case against Victorio Nebria. Of course she did not agree. Disturbed by the information her children gave her, Azucina followed her
children to San Fernando after a week. She pleaded to them not to proceed with prosecuting Nebria because they
would only be fighting among themselves.^[8]

Upon termination of trial, the court decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered –

(1) Finding accused Victorio Nebria in Criminal Case No. 8678-97
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape as charged, and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to indemnify his victim
Ivy Abines the sum of P50,000.00.

(2) Finding accused Victorio Nebria in Criminal Case No. 8679-97
not guilty by reason of insufficient evidence.

SO ORDERED.^[9]

Hence, the instant appeal is only in regard to Crim. Case No.
8678-97, for rape. Before us, appellant
now assigns the following errors:

I. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFEN[SE] WITNESSES.^[10]

In fine, the assigned errors in this appeal focus on the
credibility of witnesses, for the prosecution as well as for the defense. But the ultimate issue is whether the guilt
of appellant for rape has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant contends that complainant’s conduct from January 1992
to January 1997 strongly manifested the falsity of her claim that appellant had
raped her. According to appellant,
private complainant continued to live a normal life in the house of appellant
without even attempting to run away from home in order to forget the memory of
having been raped. Appellant also
points to the victim’s failure to reveal to her mother or to anyone, for that
matter, the alleged rape that happened in January 1992 despite no apparent
continuing threat to her life from appellant.

Furthermore, he stresses that complainant did not even mention in
her testimony that appellant removed his pants and underwear and inserted his
penis in her genitalia. Neither was
there mention that when appellant went to bed, he already had nothing on to
cover his private parts. According to
appellant, the testimony of complainant that he succeeded in penetrating her as
found by the trial court is nothing but a conjecture.^[11]

Appellant adds that he could not have raped Ivy Abines at Sitio
Tulogan because at the time the alleged rape was committed, he and the members
of his household, including Ivy, were residing in Vismin Village.^[12]

Finally, appellant imputes ill motive against Ivy in filing the
charges against him. According to
appellant, Ivy did not tell the truth, as she was a willing tool for her
sister, Analiza Candole, in filing the case against him in order for her mother
and father to be together again.^[13]

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses should be respected, it being the settled doctrine of
long standing. The fact that it took
Ivy Abines two years to report the rape committed against her does not affect
the veracity of her testimony as people react differently to a given type of
situation, according to the OSG. It
asks for a modification of the decision to include moral damages.^[14]

On the issue of the credibility of witnesses, time and again we
have consistently held that the trial court’s findings are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance which could alter the result of
the case if considered correctly.^[15] For the trial judge is in the best position
to rule on the credibility of witnesses, since he occupies the vantage point
for observing first hand their conduct, demeanor and deportment in court.^[16]

We have painstakingly examined the records of this case,
particularly the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and the
defense. But we are constrained to
state that we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court.

Appellant wants to discredit the testimony of the victim, Ivy
Abines, by contraposing her conduct that he says belies the alleged rape. Her failure to ask for help, and her not
running away from home, could only mean that she was not raped, according to
appellant. This argument we find
tenuous and unconvincing. It must be
borne in mind that people react differently to different situations. There is no standard human reaction when one
is faced with an experience that is so traumatic as to make a person suffer in
silence the onslaught on her honor rather than reveal her story.^[17] A young barrio lass of 13 could have been
cowed into silence, even resignation, by the very fact that the one who abused
her is someone whom she looks up with great respect, since he is the common-law
husband of her own mother. The daily
sustenance of the family depends mainly on appellant, although her mother helps
provide for their daily needs. His
moral ascendancy over the person of his victim is enough to silence her. Note that the victim’s schooling was only
grade two, ^[18]
though she was already a teenager. Given her personal circumstances, her fear that he would actualize his
threats to kill Ivy and her sister Ester if they dared tell anyone,^[19]
about Ivy’s rape, is simply overwhelming.

The delay in filing the criminal charges by the victim is
explained by the fact that she was under constant watch by appellant. He continued to abuse her until she was
brought to appellant’s aunt, Sergia Nebria, with whom Ivy stayed at Pinuyak,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Ivy testified
that when appellant found out that she was pregnant, she was unceremoniously
brought to the house of appellant’s aunt, where she stayed from 1994 to 1996.^[20]
It is noteworthy that appellant maneuvered to have the complainant taken away
to stay with his relative. Two months
later, specifically on October 19, 1994,^[21]
she gave birth to a child whose father was not identified.

Appellant faults the prosecution for failing to provide testimony
as to how or when he removed his underpants and inserted his penis into the
private parts of the victim. But on
record, complainant categorically testified that in the evening of that fateful
Saturday of January 1992, appellant went over to her sleeping space in their
family shack, removed her skirt and panty, and likewise took off his pants and
briefs. Thereafter, appellant placed
himself on top of Ivy and inserted his penis inside her vagina. He then made the pumping motion.^[22]
Appellant’s defense tried to confuse Ivy but she withstood the grueling
cross-examination, which only highlighted her candor and spontaneity. Ivy testified, thus:

Q:   The accused removed your
skirt and panty, am I correct?

A:    Yes, Sir.

Q: After removing your skirt and panty the accused also removed his
pants and brief?

A:    Yes, Sir.

Q:   And of course on that
very Saturday evening you did not want to be raped, am I correct?

A:    I did not want.

Q:   So in order not to be
raped you held your two legs closely so that you will not be raped, am I
correct?

A:    Yes, Sir.

Q:   When your two legs were
already closed with each other that was the time the accused made a pumping
motion?

A:    He separated my two
legs.

Q:   With the [use] of his
hands?

A:    He separated my two legs
apart using his legs.

Q:   The accused did not use
his hand in separating your legs because he was holding your hands with his two
hands, am I correct?

A:    Yes, he held my hands
with his two hands so that I cannot move.^[23]

When a woman cries rape, more so if she is a minor, she says all
that is needed to prove that the crime has been committed and if her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.^[24]
Ivy’s positive identification of appellant as the satyr who ravaged her twice
in the evening of January 1992 and many times thereafter, stands the test of
reason and credibility. There were no
inconsistencies in her testimony. In
contrast, appellant could only come up with bare denials. His negative testimony cannot be given more
weight than the positive and straightforward testimony of complainant. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by
Ester’s equally candid declaration on the witness stand. Ester, Ivy’s younger sibling, testified on
how she saw appellant undress Ivy and himself, then placed himself on top of
Ivy, and thereafter made the pumping motion indicative of sexual
intercourse. Ester saw how her sister
tried to resist by kicking appellant but to no avail.^[25]
And when appellant’s lust was consummated, Ester bore witness to Ivy’s muted
tears of anguish.^[26]

Equally unconvincing is appellant’s alibi. His contention, that he could not have
committed the crime as they were residing at Vismin Village at the time of the
alleged rape and not in Portulin, is contrary to Ivy’s testimony. Appellant presented Angeles Patoy, the sitio leader of Portulin, who testified
that appellant started to live in Portulin only in July 1993.^[27]
She testified, inter alia, that she
included at that time appellant’s family in a list that contained the name of
the sitio residents.^[28] This list, according to Angeles, attested to
the truth of appellant’s claim that he became a resident of Portulin only in
July 1993. However, it is worth noting
that this list is nothing more than sheets of paper detached from the pages of
a notebook. The entry does not even
state the actual date, month, and year when appellant and the rest of his
family became residents of the sitio. There is even a discrepancy in the ink of
the pen used in the entries for 1993-1994.^[29]
All these telltale marks do not lend credence to the contents of this private
document, which could be easily concocted.

Lastly, appellant imputes ill motive against complainant and her
sister, Analiza Candole. He claims that
Ivy was just a willing “tool” so that she could cause the ruin of her mother’s
relationship with appellant and ultimately for Ivy’s parents to get back
together. This line of defense deserves
scant consideration. It is incredible
for a young barrio lass who had very limited education, handicapped
(cross-eyed) at that, to be so cunning and bold as to spin a tale of
defloration, merely upon the influence of her older sister, Analiza. Moreover, no older sibling would expose a
kid sister and the entire family to a scandal so disdained by society upon a
flimsy reason that they wanted her parents to get back together. Ivy’s parents have been separated since she
was five.^[30]
By the time she was 13, complainant had been with the appellant for eight long
years. Trust, if not affection, had
been reposed upon him by the victim. But that trust, it turned out, was violated because of appellant’s lust.

Ivy and her older sister spoke out against appellant, in our
view, to vindicate her honor and to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her. The circumstances in this
case show no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the rape victim and
her sister to falsely testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him
in the commission of a crime. The
logical conclusion is that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and
credence.^[31]

We note that the complainant’s own mother chose to take the
cudgels for appellant. This matter is
not hard to explain or understand. Witness Azucina Abines partly relied upon her common-law husband for
family support. He helped bring food on
the table for her children. Between
complainant who is her child and appellant who is her live-in partner, she had
a difficult option other than the status quo, of suffering in silence but avoiding a second family
break-up. Azucina had to testify for
the defense of her long-time paramour if only to publicly keep up a brave front
and lessen, if not ride out, a family crisis. But her testimony in his favor does not, in our view, erase the horror
that appellant’s grave offense has inflicted on everyone. Nor does her testimony overcome the
evidentiary weight and value of complainant’s positive testimony to which we
accord full faith and credit.

To conclude, we are in full agreement with the judgment of the
trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. We also sustain the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant,
considering that the rape was committed in 1992, prior to the effectivity of RA
7659,^[32]
the Death Penalty Law of 1993.

However, a modification in the award of damages is in order. The amount of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto has been granted but the
trial court failed to give moral damages to the complainant. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, another
sum of P50,000 should be awarded as moral damages without need of proof
other than the commission of the rape. Considering the tender age of the victim, the repeated abuses that she
suffered, and the need to protect the young from sexual exploitation, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 should also be awarded.

WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, in Criminal
Case No. 8678-97 for Rape is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant VICTORIO NEBRIA Y CABANADA is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the victim the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 12-16.

^[2]
Also spelled as Iveie Abines elsewhere in the Records; See TSN, January 12,
1999, p. 2.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 4.

^[4]
Id. at 12-13; the original copy of
the Information is not found in the Records of the case.

^[5]
Records, p. 35.

^[6]
Also spelled as Azucena elsewhere in the Records; See TSN, February 24, 1999,
p. 2.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.

^[8]
Id. at 14-15.

^[9]
Id. at 16.

^[10]
Id. at 42.

^[11]
Id. at 48-49.

^[12]
Id. at 51.

^[13]
Id. at 54.

^[14]
Id. at 74-76.

^[15]
People vs. Abutin, 259 SCRA 500, 508
(1996).

^[16]
People vs.
Romero, G.R. Nos. 137037-38, August 5, 2002, p. 9.

^[17]
People vs. Lucban, 322 SCRA 313, 319-320 (2000).

^[18]
TSN, January 12, 1999, p. 6; TSN, January 20, 1999, p. 3.

^[19]
Id. at 8; Id. at 18.

^[20]
TSN, January 12, 1999, pp. 13-15.

^[21]
Id. at 15.

^[22]
Id. at 7-8.

^[23]
TSN, January 20, 1999, p. 4.

^[24]
People vs. Loriega, 326 SCRA 675, 690 (2000).

^[25]
TSN, January 20, 1999, pp. 17-18.

^[26]
Id. at 21.

^[27]
TSN, February 3, 1999, p. 7.

^[28]
Id. at 4-5.

^[29]
Id. at 8-11.

^[30]
TSN, January 12, 1999, pp. 5-6.

^[31]
See People vs. Cula, 329 SCRA 101, 114
(2000).

^[32]
SEC. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

x x x

SEC. 28. This Act
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation. The
publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the approval hereof.

Approved, December 13, 1993.