DANTE GUEVARRA, AUGUSTUS F. CESAR AND ADRIANO SALVADOR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENAIDA P. PIA AND CRESENCIANO…

Guevarra versus the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Dante Guevarra, Augustus Cesar, and Adriano Salvador against the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, the People of the Philippines, and the private complainants Zenaida Pia and Cresenciano Gatchalian. The petitioners were administrators of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, and they were among the accused in a series of graft cases filed under Republic Act No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan had earlier dismissed thirteen of those cases, then later set aside its own dismissal and reinstated them. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to strike down that reinstatement as grave abuse of discretion. The case matters because it fixes the rule on the finality of a dismissal that is itself void, and because it reminds us that the State, no less than the accused, is entitled to due process.

Procedural History

The matter began with a complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by two faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines against the university's president and several administrators. An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan and docketed as a single criminal case, raffled to its Second Division. On motion of the Special Prosecutor, that Information was later withdrawn, and seventeen separate Informations were filed in its place. The graft court, acting on the Manifestation and Motion of the Special Prosecutor, issued an Order on January 26, 1998 dismissing thirteen of those criminal cases. The Special Prosecutor then filed a motion for partial reconsideration three days beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. On April 6, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution granting that motion, setting aside the dismissal, and ordering the thirteen cases reinstated against the petitioners. From that Resolution, the petitioners went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

Cresenciano Gatchalian and Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the university's administrators, including Dr. Zenaida Olonan as President, Dr. Dante Guevarra as Vice-President for Administration and Finance, Atty. Augustus Cesar as Administrative Officer V, and Adriano Salvador as Acting Chief of the Accounting Office. The charges arose from questionable transactions of the university, which a special audit team of the Commission on Audit had also examined in a special audit report. An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan, but on motion of the Special Prosecutor it was withdrawn and replaced by seventeen separate Informations for violation of Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act No. 3019.

The Ombudsman's review produced conflicting recommendations. A graft investigation officer recommended dismissal, but the Ombudsman adopted the recommendation of a special prosecution officer to charge seventeen counts. A retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, Alfredo Marigomen, was then asked to review the matter, and he recommended that petitioner Olonan be dropped as an accused in thirteen of the cases, that her inclusion in three others remain undisturbed, and that one entire case be dismissed. The Special Prosecutor, however, presented this report to the graft court as if it recommended dismissal of the thirteen cases against all the accused.

Relying on that Manifestation and Motion, the Sandiganbayan issued its Order of January 26, 1998 dismissing thirteen criminal cases. The Special Prosecutor objected in open court, and later moved for partial reconsideration, but filed the motion three days late. The graft court granted it anyway, explaining that it had erred, since the Marigomen report never recommended dismissal as against the petitioners, and that it was acting in the interest of substantial justice. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the thirteen criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of a motion for reconsideration filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period.
• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration on the basis solely of the grounds cited by the prosecution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as invoked by the petitioners, governs the period to appeal from orders of the Sandiganbayan:

Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. — Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the decision, order or resolution would not be appealable to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, the same shall be final and executory. In case of appeal, the period shall be fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision, order or resolution.

This provision fixes the fifteen-day period whose lapse, the petitioners argue, made the January 26, 1998 Order final and beyond recall.

Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also cited by the petitioners, provides:

Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees, and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

This provision supplies the parallel fifteen-day period for elevating the matter to the Supreme Court, which the petitioners say the People likewise failed to observe.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners are correct in principle: an order of the Sandiganbayan dismissing criminal cases becomes final and executory upon the lapse of fifteen days from notice, and is then beyond the graft court's power to review, modify, or set aside. But the Court drew a decisive distinction. If the Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null and void. A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force, or efficacy for any purpose; in contemplation of law, it is non-existent, and it may simply be ignored.

Applying that rule, the Court found that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it issued the January 26, 1998 Order. The Marigomen report, on which the dismissal rested, never resolved the retention or dismissal of the thirteen cases against the petitioners, because that question was not referred to him. He recommended only that petitioner Olonan be dropped from the thirteen cases, that her inclusion in three others remain undisturbed, and that one entire case be dismissed. The graft court dismissed the thirteen cases over the objection of the Special Prosecutor, on the erroneous perception that the report recommended dismissal against the petitioners, and in doing so deprived the People of the Philippines of its right to due process. The dismissal being void, it could be rectified even after the fifteen-day period, and the graft court's rectification was not grave abuse of discretion.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with law. It stressed that the State, like the accused, is entitled to due process of law, and that justice must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. The Court also faulted the Special Prosecutor for stating in his Manifestation and Motion that the report recommended dismissal of the thirteen cases against all the accused, without specifying that the recommendation pertained only to petitioner Olonan; he should have been more precise and forthright so as not to mislead the graft court.

Doctrine

A candidate should retain these rules. First, an order of the Sandiganbayan dismissing a criminal case becomes final and executory after fifteen days from notice, and may no longer be modified or set aside. Second, that rule presupposes a valid order. A dismissal issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is null and void, produces no legal effect, and may be resisted or rectified at any time, even after the reglementary period has lapsed. Third, the State is entitled to due process no less than the accused, so the scales of justice must balance between them. Fourth, the prosecution must be precise and forthright in its manifestations, lest it mislead the court.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated April 6, 1999 was affirmed, with no costs. The thirteen criminal cases stood reinstated against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a void order is non-existent in contemplation of law and may be rectified even after the fifteen-day period lapses, for the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused. Examiners use this case to test finality of judgments, the concept of a void order, and the balance of due process between the People and the accused.