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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. MARCELO MENDOZA, APPELLANT.

G.R. Nos. 132923-24. June 06, 2002 June 6, 2002

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People versus Mendoza

The Case

This is the automatic review by the Supreme Court of the conviction of Marcelo Mendoza for two counts of rape, each qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, handed down by the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appear as appellee; Marcelo Mendoza appears as appellant. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: an accused may not be convicted of an offense graver than the one charged in the Information, and a conviction for rape must rest on evidence of the elements themselves, not on a witness's bare conclusion that she was raped.

Procedural History

Two Informations were filed against Marcelo Mendoza on May 31, 1996, each charging simple rape. When arraigned on June 18, 1996, assisted by counsel, he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, rendered its Decision on February 10, 1998, finding him guilty in both cases of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, sentencing him to death in each case, and ordering him to pay the victim 30,000 pesos as actual damages in each case. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court by automatic review, not by ordinary appeal. In his appellant's brief, Mendoza assigned two errors: that the trial court erred in imposing death despite Informations charging only simple rape, and that the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the complainant's testimony.

Facts

On June 25, 1995, Michelle Tolentino, then thirteen years old, went to the river with her aunt to wash clothes. Finishing at about two in the afternoon, she went ahead carrying some of the laundry home, passing through the coffee plantation of Ben Salazar. At a curve on the road she saw Marcelo Mendoza standing and watching her. He pulled her into the thickest part of the plantation. She struggled and pleaded, but he pressed her wrist so hard that it hurt, and brought her to a clearing several meters from the road. He divested her of her shorts and panty, tearing the middle portion of the shorts and damaging the garter of her panty, pinned her down, and had carnal knowledge of her. She shouted for help but no one heard, the place being far and isolated. He warned her not to tell anyone.

The incident was repeated on August 11, 1995, again inside the coffee plantation, and again, according to the prosecution, with intimidation and threats. Fearful that appellant might repeat the act, Michelle told her mother sometime in December 1995, gave her complaint statement the same day, and was referred for medical examination. Dr. Garcia dela Cruz testified that internal examination admitted two fingers and that there was resistance on the vaginal canal, an indication that Michelle had had sexual intercourse.

The defense presented Maria Gumban, a preacher of the Jesus Miracle Crusade, who testified that appellant attended religious services on both dates, and Joel Garcia, the complainant's brother-in-law, who testified that he heard the complainant's parents prod her to file a rape case so that appellant would pay money allegedly stolen by the complainant. Appellant testified that he was at religious services on both dates, that he knew the complainant as a neighbor, and that her parents were extorting money from him. The trial court believed the complainant and convicted him of qualified rape in both cases.

Issues

  • Whether or not the appellant may be convicted of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon when the Informations charged only simple rape and did not allege that circumstance.
  • Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant, Michelle Tolentino.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as referred to in the decision, defines rape and fixes its penalty; the Court notes that simple rape under this article is punishable with reclusion perpetua, and that the qualifying circumstance of a deadly weapon must be alleged to raise the penalty to death:

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

This provision supplies the elements of the crime of simple rape, which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code governs the application of indivisible penalties, and the Court cites it to explain why an aggravating circumstance cannot raise reclusion perpetua to death:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

Because reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot be appreciated to increase it to death.

Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, cited by the Court, requires that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

This provision is the textual anchor of the rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense graver than that charged.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of the appellant. Both Informations charged simple rape only, and neither alleged that the rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be categorically alleged in the Information; otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. To charge simple rape and convict of qualified rape punishable by death would deny the accused the right to be informed of the charge against him and, consequently, due process. The Court also examined the evidence and found that the appellant had merely kept the bolo by his side and held it only when he undressed himself. The crime of rape is not qualified by the use of a deadly weapon where, even as the accused carried a bolo in his waist, he never used the same to threaten the victim; what qualifies the offense is the use of a deadly weapon, not the mere overt act of being armed with one. The Court likewise held that the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot be appreciated to increase to death the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is a single indivisible penalty.

On the second issue, the Court affirmed the trial court's assessment of credibility as to the June 25, 1995 incident. Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of weight and substance. Michelle identified the appellant and credibly narrated how he forced her, and the physician's findings of penetration corroborated her testimony. The Court held that the absence of testimony that she bled, or that she rewashed the clothes she dropped in the struggle, did not negate the rape, and that her act of finishing her laundry did not destroy her credibility, since there is no uniform behavior expected of those who have undergone harrowing experiences.

As to the August 11, 1995 incident, however, the Court found the evidence insufficient. Michelle merely stated that the appellant had raped her on that date, without going into details or explaining exactly what he had done to her. Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue, which the court must determine based on the evidence offered; testimony to that effect is not evidence but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial. A witness is not competent to express an opinion, conclusion, or judgment thereon. Applying the guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, the Court held that the prosecution evidence must stand on its own strength and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense, and that the presumption of innocence must be upheld when the evidence falls short of the quantum required to support conviction. Accordingly, the appellant was acquitted in the second case.

On the civil award, the Court held that the complainant is entitled to 50,000 pesos as indemnity ex delicto and another 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and struck out the award of 30,000 pesos as actual damages because no proof was adduced to substantiate it.

Doctrine

An accused may not be held liable for an offense graver than that for which he or she was indicted. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be categorically alleged in the Information; otherwise, they cannot be appreciated, and a conviction for qualified rape cannot stand where the Information charged only simple rape. The crime of rape is not qualified by the use of a deadly weapon where the accused merely carried the weapon and never used it to threaten the victim; what qualifies the offense is the use of a deadly weapon, not the mere act of being armed. An aggravating circumstance cannot increase a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua. Finally, a conviction for rape must rest on evidence proving carnal knowledge and force or intimidation; a witness's bare statement that she was raped is a conclusion, not evidence, and the prosecution evidence must stand on its own strength.

Disposition

The appeal was partly granted: the appellant was convicted of simple rape in the first case and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, ordered to pay 50,000 pesos as indemnity ex delicto and 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and acquitted in the second case because the elements of rape were not proven.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the accused may not be held liable for an offense graver than that for which he or she was indicted, so a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional right to be informed of the charge, the distinction between being armed with a deadly weapon and using one, and the rule that a witness's conclusion is not evidence.