G.R. Nos. 130517-21. July 16, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CANDIDO SOLOMON Y MARQUEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
KAPUNAN, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch 16,[1] finding appellant
Candido Solomon y Marquez guilty of five (5) counts of rape and imposing upon
him five (5) death penalties.
Except as to the date of commission of the crime, the five (5) complaints
filed in these cases are similarly worded. The complaint filed in Criminal Case
No. 14114 reads:
That on or about June 16, 1995, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by
means of threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of his own step-daughter, the undersigned
CHARLYN FERNANDEZ y ANGELES, 15 years of age, against her will.Contrary to law.[2]
The complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 14115 to 14118 allege that the crime of
rape was perpetrated against the same complainant four more times on July 5,
1995,[3] July 10, 1995,[4] August 3, 1995,[5] and August 12, 1995.[6]
Upon arraignment, the accused, herein appellant Candido Solomon y Marquez,
pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape.[7]
Complainant Charlyn Fernandez[8] was
born on October 22, 1982 to spouses Felizardo and Julia Fernandez. The couple
had five other children with ages ranging from eleven to twenty-five years. In
1985, the couple separated.
Soon thereafter, Charlyn’s mother started living together with appellant. At
the time of Charlyn’s testimony, Julia had borne appellant five children: Pilar
(7), twins Fernando and Angeline (5), Valentino (3), Robert (1), and Carding (5
months). Pilar and Fernando have passed away.
During the time material to these cases, Charlyn was living with appellant,
Julia, the couple’s three surviving children, and Charlyn’s full-blood siblings,
Felizardo, Jr. and Joven. They lived in a one-room nipa house with stairs
leading to the lumber floor where the family slept. Their nearest neighbor lived
around 300 meters away.
Charlyn was at home when the first alleged rape took place at around 1:00
p.m. on June 16, 1995. She and her half-brothers, three year-old Valentino and
one year-old Robert, were sleeping when she felt someone on top of her. That
person turned out to be appellant. He was holding her right shoulder as his left
hand removed her panty, having first succeeded in peeling off her shorts while
she slept. Charlyn struggled and kicked. Frightened, she cried and repeatedly
shouted, “No ma ya Pang!” (“Pang, do not do it!”)
After taking off Charlyn’s panty, appellant knelt near Charlyn’s feet and
inserted his right index finger into Charlyn’s vagina, pushing and pulling it
(“ta tucha-tucha”) inside her for some time. Charlyn tried to stand up but
appellant pushed her down. He assured her that he would “not inflict” pain on
her. After removing his shorts and briefs, appellant spread Charlyn’s legs and
inserted his penis into her vagina. He told Charlyn, “No man alboroto. Si man
alboroto tu, ay mata yo contigo.” (“Do not make any noise. If you will make
noise, I will kill you.”) Charlyn felt appellant’s penis inside her vagina and
experienced pain as appellant moved “up and down.” Charlyn pushed and kicked him
but he proved too heavy for her. It was the first time Charlyn experienced
sexual intercourse and her vagina bled.
Charlyn did not know if appellant ejaculated but he stood up, put on his
briefs and shorts, and went out of the house. Charlyn sat up and cried. Her
brothers, who awoke as appellant inserted his finger into her sex organ, were
also crying.
The second rape took place less than a month later, on July 5, 1995, at about
1:00 p.m. Charlyn was again sleeping on the floor with her brothers Valentino
and Robert when she felt someone on top of her. Appellant was trying to remove
her shorts and panty with his left hand. His other hand held her forearm.
Charlyn pushed and kicked him but he pressed her down. He warned her, “Do not
keep on moving because [I] will choke [you].” Charlyn cried, “Pang, no ma ya
Pang!” Appellant knelt by her feet and removed his shorts and briefs with
one hand and pressed her down with the other. Charlyn cried and tried to stand
up. Appellant then lay on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
While Charlyn did not see appellant’s penis, she felt its size inside her. As
appellant performed the sexual act, Charlyn again cried out, “No ma ya,
Pang!” Appellant answered, “Do not keep on moving because I will not
inflict any pain on you.” After completing the sex act, appellant sat beside
Charlyn and put on his briefs. Charlyn sat by the corner and cried. Appellant
warned her not to report the incident to her mother otherwise he would kill all
of them. He then went out of the house. Charlyn’s brothers remained sleeping and
did not witness what happened.
The third rape occurred on July 10, 1995. Charlyn was at home putting her
brothers Valentino and Robert to sleep when appellant arrived and asked Charlyn
for a cake of soap. After Charlyn handed him one, appellant left and Charlyn
went to sleep on the floor beside her brothers. About thirty minutes later,
Charlyn felt someone on top of her. Appellant had returned and was pressing her
arm with his hand. His foot also pressed against hers. She cried, “No ma ya,
Pang! You are always doing it to me.” Appellant released her arm and used
the hand he was holding it with to remove Charlyn’s panty. He knelt by her feet
and removed his shorts and briefs. His right hand pressed Charlyn down to
prevent her from standing. Appellant then began to mount her as Charlyn cried
and tried to push him away. Despite her struggles, appellant succeeded in
inserting his penis into Charlyn’s vagina. He told her not to push him as he was
not inflicting pain upon her. Charlyn felt pain as appellant performed “up and
down” motions. She cried, “No ma ya, Pang.” Afterwards, appellant stood up, got
dressed, and went out of the house. Charlyn sat up and cried.
Robert and Valentino were awake when the incident took place.
The horrors Charlyn underwent in the hands of appellant did not end that day.
Appellant would have his way with Charlyn two more times.
Charlyn and her brothers were sleeping on the floor of their house in the
afternoon of August 3, 1995. At around 4:00 p.m., Charlyn was again startled to
find her stepfather on top of her. She kicked him, not wanting to be raped
again. She pushed him away and cried to no avail. His left hand removed her
panty as his other hand pressed down on her, preventing her from standing up.
Appellant removed his shorts and briefs. He placed himself on top of her,
inserted his penis into her vagina, and moved up and down. Charlyn felt her
vagina ache. She tried to push him away but he was too heavy for her. Satisfied,
appellant stood up and walked away. Her brothers again witnessed what happened.
On August 12, 1995, Charlyn again was left to care for her brothers Valentino
and Robert. Charlyn was in the midst of slumber when appellant mounted her. He
told her not to make any noise so as not to awaken her brothers. Charlyn
shouted, “No ma ya, Pang!” Appellant held her two arms and pressed her against
the floor. He knelt up and removed his short and briefs as his other hand
pressed down her chest, preventing her from standing up. He removed her shorts
and panty, inserted his penis into her vagina, and moved up and down. She cried
as she felt pain in her vagina. Thereafter, he stood up, got dressed and left
her lying in tears. This time, her brothers had not awakened to see Charlyn
raped.
On each occasion that she was raped, Charlyn’s mother was in the market,
selling tuba. She did not tell her mother about the rapes because she was afraid
that appellant would carry out his threat to kill them should she report the
incidents.[9]
Charlyn, on the witness stand, said she could recall the exact dates when she
was raped since she made an effort to remember them. She also remembered the
time the rapes occurred because she and her brothers usually took their naps at
the same time in the afternoon.[10]
Unable to bear appellant’s molestations any longer, Charlyn left home for
Tugbungan in September 1995. Charlyn asked Julia’s permission to work as a maid
in the home of Dr. Allan Navarro, a cousin of Julia.
Charlyn revealed to her Kuya Allan that appellant raped her. Allan, in turn,
told Julia about the sexual abuse that Charlyn suffered in the hands of
appellant. On March 15, 1996, Julia visited Charlyn and confronted her. The
latter admitted that appellant indeed raped her.
Subsequently, Julia reported the alleged rape incidents to Barangay Captain
Bing Ungab, who in turn reported the matter to the police. In the afternoon of
April 15, 1996, the police fetched Charlyn and appellant and brought them to the
police station, where Charlyn executed a written statement.[11] She also submitted to a physical
examination, which revealed that she was seven months pregnant. The police then
brought Charlyn to the Department of Social Welfare and Development, where she
stayed for a month.
Charlyn noticed that her belly was bulging sometime in March 1996 while she
was staying with Allan Navarro. Subsequently, Charlyn delivered a baby boy at
the Zamboanga Medical Center. She gave the baby to Luis Acejaas, her brother’s
employer, because she could not afford to buy milk for him. She was sure that
appellant sired her baby because he was the only one who ever had sexual
intercourse with her.
Charlyn, before the rape incidents, had been closer to appellant than to her
own father. She called him “Papa” and described him as a “good stepfather” to
her. She said she had no idea why he raped her.[12] She denied that she filed the complaint
because her pregnancy had become evident.[13]
Charlyn’s mother Julia testified she and her husband Felizardo separated in
1985. That same year, appellant asked Julia’s father permission to live with
Julia. Julia and appellant did not marry because appellant himself was married.
Appellant and his wife had nine (9) children of their own. Appellant was a tuba
gatherer. To complement appellant’s occupation, Julia engaged in the sale of the
native liquor two kilometers away from their house in Cawit. She would start
selling tuba in the morning and return home between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. everyday.
When Allan informed her of Charlyn’s pregnancy, Julia confronted her
daughter. Charlyn told her that it was her “stepfather” who impregnated her.
Julia brought Charlyn to her sister Lydia’s house. Charlyn confided to Lydia
that she was pregnant with appellant’s child.
At home in Cawit, Julia asked appellant why he impregnated Charlyn. Appellant
cried and asked her forgiveness. He explained that things “simply happen” and
pleaded that they settle the matter. Julia told him she “could not do anything
because there is a law.” Apprehensive of what Charlyn’s brother might do to
appellant, Julia decided to complain to the barangay captain, who encouraged her
to settle the matter among them. Nevertheless, the barangay captain still
reported the matter to the police.[14]
Inspector Diosdado Apias testified on the investigation conducted after the
police brought appellant to the police station.[15] He confirmed that a certain kagawad
accompanied Charlyn and Julia to the police, that Charlyn signed the complaint,
that PO2 Imlan referred the case to SPO2 Concepcion for investigation, and that
the police took appellant into custody.[16]
Dr. Rodolfo Valmoria, PNP Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police, conducted Charlyn’s physical examination. He prepared Medico-Legal
Report No. M-134-96[17] dated April 16,
1996 stating:
FINDINGS:
Absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and gaping, labia minora
dark brown in color and presenting in between is a fleshy type hymen with deep
healed lacerations at 7, 8, 11, 2 and 3 o’clock positions and shallow healed at
9 o’clock position. Vaginal canal narrow, easily admits examining index finger.
Abdomen distended, fundic level 6 fingers above the umbilicus. Fetal heart beat
appreciable at left middle quadrant of the abdomen, 2 inches left of the
umbilicus, 126/minute. Breasts hemispherical in shape, congested, no secretions
noted. Areolae and nipples dark brown in color.Urethral, vaginal and cervical smears neg for grm neg diplo, no pus cells,
neg for sperm cell, bacilli many.CONCLUSION:
Subject is of non-virgin state physically.
Pregnancy compatible 7-8
months.
Testifying in court, Dr. Valmoria stated that the various hymenal lacerations
indicated that the subject had engaged in “several sexual contact[s].” He
estimated the subject’s last menstrual period to be either August or September
1995.[18] Dr. Valmoria did not find any
external physical injuries on Charlyn’s body.[19]
The defense presented appellant, 55, as its only witness. Candido Marquez
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Charlyn on several occasions but
claimed that he “did not force” himself on Charlyn.
One time, appellant intentionally touched Charlyn’s breast as he got the baby
Charlyn was carrying. Charlyn did not protest. He repeated the act on several
other occasions but each time Charlyn did not get mad and just smiled at him.
Appellant realized that she would not complain should he initiate sexual
relations with her.
On June 16, 1995, at around 10:00 p.m., appellant was drying copra at the
coconut kiln with Charlyn and Felizardo, Jr. Junior was at a distance, piling
coconut husks when Charlyn picked up an old galvanized iron sheet and placed it
on top of an old truck. Appellant was watching her over the coconut pile when
Charlyn called him. He did not mind her at first. Charlyn then got the radio
from Junior, brought it to the truck, and turned down the volume. She invited
him to come to her, “Pang, aqui ya lang kita hunto dormi.” (“Pang, we’ll sleep
here together.”) By then, Junior was sleeping on a pile of coconut husks. When
appellant went to Charlyn, she said, “Pang, aqui lang kita dos.” (“Pang, we’ll
stay here together.”) He lay down beside her in a supine position. She turned to
him and placed her left leg (tanday) over his private part (na demiyo pututoy).
Ten minutes later, she started moving her leg upward. Appellant started to
entertain “second thought[s]” as his penis hardened. Since Charlyn did not
complain when he touched her before, appellant took a chance and asked her to
remove her shorts. Charlyn obliged. Appellant then unzipped his shorts. They
engaged in sexual intercourse for around twelve minutes “in a side view
position,” facing each other.
Appellant and Charlyn again had sexual intercourse in Upper Cawit on July 5,
1995, at around 10:30 a.m. Appellant was then peeling coconuts with Charlyn and
her brother Jovit. Thirsty, appellant told Jovit to fetch water. Charlyn then
got a sack, spread it on the ground, and lay down. After ten minutes, appellant
got tired and sat down beside her. Charlyn touched his left side with her left
hand. It occurred to him that Charlyn again wanted to experience what happened
between them by the coconut kiln so they had sexual intercourse.
Appellant and Charlyn engaged in their third sexual encounter on July 10,
1996 while in the house of a certain Pendong. Appellant arrived at around 11:00
a.m. and instructed Charlyn to cook the fish he had brought home. After taking
their lunch, Valentino, Robert and Angeline went down the house to play.
Appellant and Charlyn were seated on the bench when she asked him what time her
mother would arrive. He told her that she would come home late in the afternoon.
Appellant then touched Charlyn’s breast. Charlyn simply smiled and did not
protest. Appellant told her to close the door and asked her if she would like to
have sex with him. She replied by closing the main door. Upon appellant’s
invitation, Charlyn entered the room. Appellant and Charlyn kissed. She obliged
when appellant asked her to remove her shorts. Appellant also started to
undress. As they were lying down, she embraced him and opened her legs.
Appellant continued to kiss Charlyn as they engaged in coitus, her legs on the
back of his thighs. Charlyn moved her head “just like in the movies” as
appellant caressed her. Like their first coitus, it was Charlyn who experienced
orgasm first. “Considering [appellant’s] age,” they had sex for only twelve
minutes.
The fourth sexual intercourse occurred on the third of August 1995. Appellant
arrived home at 4:00 p.m. and found Charlyn seated on the floor, folding
clothes. She asked if appellant wanted to change his shorts. Charlyn looked
intently at him as he took off his shorts. Appellant reached for the new pair of
shorts held by Charlyn, but she pulled it back jokingly. He thought that there
was “malice” in her because pulling back the shorts forced him to sit down
beside her. Appellant asked her why she did that but Charlyn just smiled. She
held his shoulder and lay down. Appellant told her to remove her skirt and the
girl complied. He told her that since she was willing to remove her skirt,
surely, she could also remove her panty. Again, she obliged. Appellant took off
his briefs and they engaged in sexual intercourse. She moved her head around and
emitted a sound that manifested pleasure. Charlyn “ejaculated” first; her sex
organ was wet. She and appellant had sex for ten minutes only because he was in
a hurry and had to go somewhere else. He said he did not need to intimidate her
because he had been “using her already.”
On August 12, 1995, at 10:00 a.m., Valentino and Robert were in the river,
more or less 200 meters away from Pendong’s house. Charlyn came into the house.
She had just returned from the river where she washed the clothes and took a
bath. She went inside the room and removed her clothes. Appellant looked at her
and remarked, “Why are you already burlisque (sic)?” Charlyn just smiled and the
two exchanged looks. Appellant approached her and placed his arm around her.
Charlyn was looking at appellant as if she wanted to be kissed and appellant
kissed her. She did not resist. Appellant told her to lie down as he removed his
shorts. Fearing that the children might come up the house any time, appellant
left his briefs clinging to his leg. She held the back of his head and they had
sexual intercourse. Once again, he noticed that she “ejaculated” ahead of him
because when he touched her private part, it was “slippery.”[20]
On rebuttal, Charlyn refuted appellant’s testimony that she had sex with him
at the tapahan.[21] She claimed that she
and her siblings never slept there. Charlyn reiterated that appellant forced her
to have sexual intercourse and denied that she had an orgasm. She said that she
did not know what an orgasm was.[22]
The defense presented appellant on sur-rebuttal. He maintained that the house
where he allegedly raped Charlyn was demolished in 1992, before the supposed
rapes took place.[23]
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CANDIDO SOLOMON y MARQUEZ GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crimes of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
committed against his stepdaughter, Charlyn Fernandez y Angeles, and sentences
him as follows:
- In Criminal Case No. 14114, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties, in the manner provided by law;- In Criminal Case No. 14115, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties, in the manner provided by law;- In Criminal Case No. 14116, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties, in the manner provided by law;- In Criminal Case No. 14117, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties, in the manner provided by law;- In Criminal Case No. 14118, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and its accessory
penalties, in the manner provided by law; and- To pay the offended party, Charlyn Fernandez y Angeles, moral damages of
P50,000.00 in each of the five cases or a total of P250,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in each of the five (5) cases or a total of
P175,000.00, and to pay the costs.Let the complete records of these cases be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment as provided by law.SO ORDERED.[24]
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty because
the prosecution evidence is insufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. He cites various reasons for this conclusion. First,
it is highly improbable that the five rapes were committed in such an identical
manner. Moreover, her failure to escape after the first assault indicates that
she consented to the sexual intercourse. Second, if indeed the victim struggled,
kicked and pushed appellant during the assaults while she was in a supine
position, it is “incredible” that she “did not sustain external injuries.”
Third, it is inconsistent with human experience that the victim’s brothers would
either just sleep through the rapes or just watch what was happening without
putting up a defense for their half-sister. Fourth, the victim’s delay of nine
months in reporting the crimes rendered the charge of rape doubtful. Finally,
there was no threat or intimidation in the commission of the alleged crimes.
Complainant’s admission that appellant did not have a weapon and that he was
“kind” to her “only shows that no amount of force or intimidation was employed”
by him and that complainant consented to the sexual intercourse.
Appellant’s contentions boil down to the issue of credibility. As a rule,
this Court does not disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It gives
these great weight and respect since the trial court had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. Thus, where there is no
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the
case, there is no reason to accord a contrary treatment to the credibility of
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.[25]
In this case, the trial court stamped full faith and credence on the
complainant as a witness and on her testimony. The trial court found “no reason
to doubt her candor and sincerity, and the credibility of her testimony that she
was raped by her stepfather.”[26]
Indeed, a rural girl barely thirteen years of age,[27] who reached only the third grade,[28] who associated bomba films with war
pictures,[29] and who had no idea where
babies come from[30] could not have the
guile to accuse appellant, whom she described as a “good stepfather,” of rape.
The defense did not successfully establish any motive on her part to impute such
grave crimes upon appellant. In the face of this omission by the defense, her
testimony should be accorded full credence.[31] in another rape case involving a victim
who was twelve years and six months old, the Court said:
x x x the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence (People v. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]).
Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages
of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the
matter about which they testified were not true (People v. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432
[1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of the trial court’s observation on the
segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs – almost illiterate,
having attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to
go to a neighbor’s house to watch television, yet one who values her virginity
which like a “mirror, once dropped and broken . . . can no longer be pieced
together . . . not ever,” this being “true among the Filipino folks [to which]
complainant belonged, poor and helpless, everything is entrusted to God.”[32]
Complainant’s credibility cannot therefore be doubted. Her straightforward
revelation of her sexual ordeal shows no other intention than to obtain justice
for the wrong committed by appellant against her. Indeed, her mother first
objected to the filing of charges against appellant. Complainant also knew that
appellant might be sentenced to death. Notwithstanding that knowledge, and over
her mother’s initial objections, she testified against him, praying that the
death sentence be meted upon appellant. What he did to her, she said, she would
“carr[y] forever.”[33]
That complainant’s testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped,
i.e., she was asleep when appellant would start to sexually abuse her, was
“uniform” or “identical,” does not diminish her credibility. Indeed, it is
easily explained by the daily routine that appellant’s second family had
adopted. By his own admission, appellant was a coconut farm worker who had all
the opportunity to be alone with the complainant once his common-law wife had
left to sell tuba. Men are creatures of habit and are bound to adopt a course of
action that has proven to be successful. As appellant was able to fulfill his
lustful designs upon complainant the first time, it comes as no surprise that he
would repeat the horrific acts when the circumstances obtaining in the first
rape again presented themselves
Complainant’s youth partly accounts for her failure to escape appellant’s
lust. A young girl like complainant cannot be expected to have the intelligence
to defy what she may have perceived as the substitute parental authority that
appellant wielded over her. That complainant had to bear more sexual assaults
from appellant before she mustered enough courage to escape his bestiality does
not imply that she willingly submitted to his desires. Neither was she expected
to follow the ordinary course that other women in the same situation would have
taken. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident. Verily, under emotional stress, the human mind is not
expected to follow a predictable path.[34]
That the prosecution did not prove that complainant suffered external
injuries is easy to explain. Complainant’s physical examination was conducted
around eight (8) months after the last rape incident; hence, scratches,
abrasions or hematomas were no longer manifest on complainant’s body.
Appellant’s observation of the “incredible” behavior displayed by
complainant’s two half-brothers, his own sons, who witnessed the sexual assaults
thrice and slept through them twice, has no merit. The two boys were mere
toddlers who would have no idea that their father was committing rape before
their very eyes. Neither could they be expected to defend their twelve-year old
half-sister against their own father. As the Solicitor General keenly observed:
No legal conclusion may be made from the fact that at certain times
complainant’s younger brothers were awakened and witnessed the rapes and, at
other times, they did not. In People v. Faigano x x x the Court observed that
the fact that the victim’s 4-month old son and 3-year old niece were not
awakened during the rape is simply normal because of their tender age. It noted
that “[o]ne may suppose that children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are
not easily disturbed by the gyrations and exertions of adults in the night.”
That they did not come to the aid of their sister nor relate to their kin what
they saw was hardly surprising. To be sure, these children had no inkling that
what they were witnessing was a hideous crime against the chastity and the
person of their sister. The concept of rape is beyond the comprehension of these
children. With their limited knowledge, it is safe to infer that what they only
knew then was that their sister was crying and their stepfather was making her
cry. Whether they knew she needed their assistance at that moment was not only
difficult to determine, but also impossible to expect. Their failure to relate
the incident to anybody was hardly surprising, since it was only Charlyn
Fernandez who was with them most of the time. In fact, she had to stop schooling
to take care of them (TSN, January 9, 1997 [2:00 p.m.], p. 28). Their mother
usually arrived home late in the day, at times, did not even spend the night
with them. Even if these children [had] fantastic memories, they [had]
practically no one to relate to other than Charlyn Fernandez herself.[35]
The prosecution’s failure to present the two toddlers as corroborative
witnesses is not fatal to its cause. Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the prosecutor. The defense, therefore, may not dictate to the prosecution
the choice of its witnesses.[36]
Moreover, the children may be disqualified as witnesses by reason of their
mental capacity or immaturity.[37] In any
case, the sole testimony of the victim is sufficient basis for conviction in
rape, a crime usually committed in seclusion.[38]
It is inaccurate for appellant to claim that complainant reported her
repeated defilement only after nine months. The undisputed prosecution evidence
is that complainant revealed that appellant had raped her to Dr. Allan Navarro
in September 1995, less than a month from her last rape on August 15, 1995. At
any rate, her hesitation may be attributed to her age, the moral ascendancy of
the accused over her, and his threats against her.[39] In this case, note should be taken of the
following circumstances vis-à -vis the complainant’s alleged delay in reporting
the crimes: she was a rural lass a few months short of thirteen years of age;
she had limited education; her fear that her mother would get mad at her should
she reveal her sexual molestation by appellant; she considered the culprit as
her stepfather to whom she was closer than her own father; and, finally, his
threats to kill everyone in the family should she report the repeated commission
of the crime of rape against her
Appellant also makes capital of complainant’s admission that when the crimes
were committed he was not carrying a weapon with which to intimidate her. She
also said that he was kind to her.
Article 335, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, states in
part:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:1. By using force or intimidation;
x x x x x x x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent of the
victim;
x x x x x x x x x.
Rape may thus be committed with the use of either force or intimidation. In
this case, each of the five complaints alleges that the crime was committed “by
means of threats and intimidation.” There was, therefore, no need to prove the
use of force. What the prosecution needed to prove was the presence of
sufficient intimidation to cow complainant to submit to appellant’s lustful
desires.
The prosecution successfully established that appellant employed intimidation
when he had sexual intercourse with complainant on June 16, 1995. As appellant
inserted his penis into complainant’s vagina, he warned her, “No man alboroto.
Si man alboroto tu, ay mata yo contigo.” (Do not make any noise. If you will
make noise, I will kill you.)[40]
Intimidation was also present when appellant had carnal knowledge of
complainant on July 5, 1995. As appellant was removing complainant’s panty, she
pushed and kicked him. Complainant’s struggling prompted appellant to warn her
not to keep on moving, otherwise he would choke her.[41]
On the other three occasions, appellant used his weight to press against
complainant and render her resistance futile. There is no evidence that
appellant uttered any threatening words or that he brandished any weapon.
Apparently, appellant employed force rather than intimidation to subdue
complainant into submission on those three occasions.
The trial court appears to have considered the “overbearing moral influence”
that appellant exercised over complainant as a substitute for intimidation.[42] In People vs. Alberto Chua,[43] however, this Court held that the moral
ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the
conclusion that intimidation was present. Neither do threats against the victim
not to report the rape, by themselves, constitute sufficient intimidation.
There is nothing in Chenny’s testimony that shows how appellant intimidated
her into giving him her body. Intimidation breaks down the victim’s moral
resistance and makes her submit to the evil in order to escape what she
conceives to be a greater evil. There is no proof of what greater evil Chenny
had to escape that made her submit to her father’s carnal desires. The mere fact
that appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral ascendancy over his
daughter cannot ipso facto lead this Court to conclude that there was
intimidation. There must be some evidence of the intimidation employed on the
victim as to indubitably show how vitiated the victim’s consent was to the
violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is committed against or without the
consent of the victim. The very first time appellant violated Chenny, he did not
use any weapon to threaten her into submission. Neither did appellant threaten
her with blackmail or words of terror. He warned her not to tell her mother
because if she did, heir mother will surely kill him and she will land in jail
and no one will take care of Chenny and her younger brothers and sisters. These
words of doom may give the reason why Chenny did not report the incident or
incidents to her mother, her aunt or other people; but they do not show how they
brainwashed her into giving in to appellant’s lustful desires. The doomsday
scenario is not per se sufficient to establish the psychological terror that
made the girl submit to her father. The court cannot rely on presumptions of
moral ascendancy, for in this new century where more change, it could well be
that in certain cases, the traditional moral ascendancy of a parent over
children is a myth. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and should not
prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Force or intimidation
is an element of the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the victim did not resist her defloration due to the moral
ascendancy of the accused.
As the prosecution alleged but failed to prove that appellant employed
intimidation in the rapes that transpired on July 10, August 3 and 12, 1995, he
must be acquitted of such charges.
As regards the rapes occurring on June 16 and July 5, 1995, the penalty of
death imposed for said crime by the trial court is reduced to reclusion
perpetua in each case.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the information must clearly
allege and the evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
twin conditions of minority of the victim and her relationship to the accused.
This requirement rests on the constitutional principle that an accused is
entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
As such, he can only be convicted of the crime alleged in the complaint or
information and duly proven during trial.[44]
The complaints in this case erroneously allege that appellant was her
“stepfather.” The word “step,” when used as a prefix in conjunction with a
degree of relationship, indicates relationship by affinity.[45] A stepdaughter is thus the “daughter of
one’s legal spouse by a previous marriage.”[46] Corollarily, as used in the law defining
and penalizing the crime of rape, a “stepfather” is the legal husband of the
victim’s mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the victim
is the offspring.[47]
The allegation that appellant was complainant’s stepfather is belied by Julia
Fernandez’s testimony that she was not married to appellant and that she was
only living in with him.[48] Appellant
also testified that he was married to a certain Arsenia Noblesala.[49] Appellant was therefore but a common-law
spouse to Julia. While a common-law husband is subject to punishment by death
for raping his common-law wife’s daughter, the death penalty cannot be imposed
on appellant because the relationship alleged in the complaints is different
from that actually proven.[50] Appellant
may only be found liable for the crime of “simple” rape, which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua.[51]
Moral damages are automatically awarded in rape cases involving young girls
between thirteen and nineteen years of age without need of any proof[52] considering the immeasurable havoc
wrought on their feminine psyche[53] by
the crime.
The trial court failed to award civil indemnity in complainant’s favor. Civil
indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is automatically
imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the
commission of the rape.[54]
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 14114, referring to the
crime committed on June 16, 1995, appellant Candido Solomon y Marquez is found
GUILTY of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay complainant Charlyn
Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 14115, referring to the crime committed on July 5, 1995,
appellant is found GUILTY of rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay
complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case Nos. 14116, 14117 and 14118, appellant is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave. Panganiban, J.,
abroad on official business.
[1] Presided by Judge Jesus C. Carbon,
Jr.
[2] Records, Criminal Case No.
14114, p. 1.
[3] Records, Criminal
Case No. 14115, p. 1.
[4] Records,
Criminal Case No. 14116, p. 1.
[5]
Records, Criminal Case No. 14117, p. 1.
[6] Records, Criminal Case No. 14118, p. 1.
[7] Records, Criminal Case No. 14114,
p. 21.
[8] Sometimes referred to as
“Charlene” in the transcript of stenographic notes.
[9] TSN, January 8, 1997, pp. 3-62.
[10] TSN, January 9, 1997, a.m. session, p.
42.
[11] Exhibit “B.”
[12] TSN, January 9, 1997, a.m. session, pp.
4-34.
[13] TSN, January 9, 1997, p.m.
session, p. 47.
[14] TSN, January 10,
1997, pp. 2-19.
[15] The
investigating police officer, SPO2 Hermogenes D. Concepcion, before whom Charlyn
and Julia executed sworn statements on 17 April 1996, could not e resented as a
witness as he was terminally ill of cancer.
[16] TSN, January 10, 1997, pp. 3-6.
[17] Exhibit “J.”
[18] TSN, January 9, 1997, p. 8.
[19] Id., at 16.
[20] TSN, January 14, 1997, a.m. session, pp.
2-44.
[21] TSN, January 14, 1997,
p.m. session, p. 36.
[22] Id., at
38-39.
[23] TSN, January 15, 1997, p.
3.
[24] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[25] People vs. Dizon, 339 SCRA 740 (2001).
[26] RTC Decision, p. 20.
[27] TSN, January 8, 1997, p. 3.
[28] TSN, Id., at 5.
[29] TSN, January 9, 1997, a.m. session, p.
46.
[30] TSN, January 9, 1997, p.m.
session, p. 34.
[31] People vs.
Sagun, 303 SCRA 382 (1999).
[32]
People vs. Turco, Jr., 337 SCRA 714 (2001).
[33] TSN, January 8, 1997, p.29.
[34] People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 (1996).
[35] Rollo, pp. 192-193.
[36] People v. Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638
(1998).
[37] Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.- The
following persons cannot be witnesses:xxx
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
[38] People vs. Antonio, 336 SCRA 366
(2000).
[39] People vs. Villanos, 337
SCRA 78 (2000).
[40] TSN, January 8,
1997, p. 20.
[41] Id., at 35.
[42] Rollo, p. 135, citing People vs.
Mabunga, 215 SCRA 695 (1992).
[43]
G.R. No. 137841, October 1, 2001.
[44] People vs. Arves, 343 SCRA 123 (2000).
[45] People vs. Dela Cuesta, 342 SCRA
166 (2000).
[46] People vs. Amadore,
G.R. Nos. 140669-75 & 140691, April 20, 2001.
[47] People vs. Torio, 318 SCRA 345 (1999).
[48] TSN, January 10, 1997, p. 4.
[49] TSN, January 14, 1997, p. 4.
[50] People vs. Manggasin, 306 SCRA
228 (1999).
[51] Revised Penal Code,
Article 335, as amended by Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659.
[52] People vs. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999).
[53] People vs. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382
(1999).
[54] People vs. Larena, 309
SCRA 305 (1999).