REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II AND IMELDA R. MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.

Republic versus Marcos

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda R. Marcos, arising from the probate of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Republic asks the Supreme Court to set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed its petition on the ground that it had taken the wrong mode of appeal. The case matters for two reasons: it is a clean lesson on the correct mode of appeal from orders in special proceedings, and it is the leading modern statement on the testator's prerogative to choose his executor and on what "moral turpitude" means for purposes of disqualification under the Rules of Court.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, sitting as a probate court, issued an order on January 11, 1996 allowing and admitting the will to probate and directing the issuance of letters testamentary in solidum to the two respondents as named executors, upon the filing of a bond of 50,000 pesos. The Republic filed a motion for partial reconsideration, questioning the grant of letters testamentary to the respondents. Respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that the will was lost and that its existence and validity had not been proven. The trial court denied both motions in an order dated April 26, 1996.

The Republic then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The First Division of the Supreme Court issued a resolution on February 5, 1997 referring the petition and all other pleadings to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action it may deem appropriate, noting that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction concurrent with the Supreme Court and that no special and important reason had been cited for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the case in the first instance.

The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated March 13, 1997, dismissed the petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, citing the rule that an appeal taken by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. The Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 27, 1997. Hence the present petition before the Supreme Court.

Facts

On January 11, 1996, the probate court allowed the last will and testament of Ferdinand E. Marcos to probate, finding that it had been duly executed in accordance with law. The order directed that, upon the filing of a bond of 50,000 pesos, letters testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II as the executors named in the will. Pending the filing of the bond and their oath, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was authorized to continue as Special Administrator of the estate.

The Republic moved for partial reconsideration, objecting to the grant of letters testamentary to the respondents. It argued that the respondents should be disqualified as executors because they lacked integrity and because they had been convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude. Respondent Imelda Marcos also moved for reconsideration, claiming that the will was lost. Ferdinand Marcos II filed a compliance stating that he had posted the required bond and taken his oath as executor. The trial court denied both motions, observing that the testamentary privilege of a decedent must be accorded the utmost respect and that the matter of the competency of the oppositors had already been settled in its earlier orders.

On the merits, the trial court had found no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate the allegation of want of integrity against the named executors. On review, the Supreme Court noted that the two convictions against Imelda Marcos had already been reversed by the Court itself. As for Ferdinand Marcos II, the eight tax cases against him involved four charges for failure to file income tax returns and four charges for non-payment of deficiency taxes; the Court of Appeals acquitted him of the non-payment charges and sustained his conviction only on the failure-to-file charges, imposing a fine, and that decision was still on appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on technical grounds despite the Supreme Court's resolution referring it for decision on the merits.
• Whether or not the respondents Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos II should be disqualified to act and serve as executors of the will.
• Whether or not the probate court erred in admitting the will to probate and issuing letters testamentary to the respondents based on the evidence of the Republic alone.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph (c) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. - No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

This is the provision the Court construes in deciding whether the respondents may be disqualified as executors.

Section 1 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. - An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will;

This is the provision the Court cites to show that the proper remedy of the Republic was an appeal to the Court of Appeals, not a direct petition to the Supreme Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court's referral resolution gave the Court of Appeals discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper, including dismissing it. The Court stressed that the determination of whether the respondents should be disqualified as executors is a question of fact, so the proper remedy was an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 109, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The direct resort to the Supreme Court also violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court quoted its own circular:

An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondents were not shown to be incompetent. The choice of executor is a precious prerogative of the testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property as he wishes, and the courts will not disqualify the person selected in the will except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency. The trial court found no evidence to substantiate the allegation of want of integrity, and an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the probate court's action unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. The convictions against Imelda Marcos had been reversed. As for Ferdinand Marcos II, his conviction for failure to file income tax returns was still on appeal, and in any event such failure is not a crime involving moral turpitude, because the mere omission is a violation regardless of fraudulent intent or willfulness. The Court defined moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties a man owes his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty.

On the third issue, the Court found no merit, as the probate court had extensively considered every legal facet of the validity of the will before issuing its orders.

Doctrine

First, the choice of executor is a precious prerogative of the testator, and after a will is admitted to probate the court will not name a better executor nor disqualify the person selected except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency under Rule 78. Second, the probate court has the duty and discretion to determine whether a person is unfit to serve as executor, and its findings will not be disturbed absent positive error or gross abuse of discretion. Third, failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude, because the mere omission is a violation regardless of fraudulent intent or willfulness. Fourth, an appeal taken by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed, and a direct resort to the Supreme Court from a probate order allowing a will violates the hierarchy of courts.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition were affirmed; the respondents prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the choice of executor is a precious prerogative of the testator, curtailed only upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency. Examiners use this case on the correct mode of appeal in special proceedings, on the hierarchy of courts, and on whether failure to file an income tax return involves moral turpitude.