PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELEUTERIO DIMAPILIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Dimapilis

The Case

This is People versus Dimapilis, a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Eleuterio Dimapilis for three counts of rape against his stepdaughter, Sharon Salas, committed at knife point in September 1994, February 1996, and May 1996. The trial court convicted him on all three counts and imposed the death penalty in each. The case matters to the reviewee for two reasons: it is a working lesson on the sufficiency of an information that alleges only the approximate time of the offense, and it is a study in how the Supreme Court weighs the clear and candid testimony of a child against the bare denial of the accused.

Procedural History

Three separate informations for rape were filed against the accused before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136. The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered its decision on 18 February 1997, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape on three counts, sentencing him to death for each count, and ordering him to pay moral damages of 100,000 pesos, exemplary damages of 50,000 pesos, and the costs of suit. Because the death penalty was imposed, the records were elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. On appeal, the accused raised a lone assignment of error, assailing his conviction and the penalties and damages awarded against him.

Facts

Sharon Salas was born on 13 February 1983. After her parents separated, her mother lived with the accused as common-law partners, and Sharon and her siblings came to live with them. Sharon was the eldest of five children. She called the accused papa, and he was, in the words of the trial court, supposed to be a substitute father to them.

Sharon testified to a series of sexual abuses. In June 1993, in Santa Ana, Manila, the accused sent her sisters out of the house, threatened her with a knife, made her undress, inserted his finger into her vagina, and tried to insert his penis. In February 1994, at FTI, Taguig, while her sisters bathed in the rain, he again threatened her with a knife, made her undress, fingered her, and rubbed his penis against her vagina. These two incidents lay outside the jurisdiction of the Makati court and were not among the charges tried. The three incidents within Makati were these: in September 1994, at Batute Street, Makati, at about one in the afternoon while her siblings played in the backyard, the accused, knife in hand, made her undress and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, and she saw white liquid come out of his penis. In February 1996, at PNR, San Antonio Village, Makati, at about two in the afternoon, he abused her again in the same manner, threatening to kill her if she resisted. In May 1996, at the same place, at about three in the afternoon, he molested her again while her siblings played outside. She did not shout for help because the accused pointed a knife at her and threatened to kill her.

Sharon first reported the abuse to her mother, who dismissed it as mere lambing, or affection. On 19 May 1996 she told her grandmother, Violeta Benjamin, who brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation the next day. She was medically examined, and the medico-legal officer found a healed superficial hymenal laceration at the three o'clock position, which she testified could be caused by the penetration of the tip of the penis into the hymen and was compatible with the commission of the offense. The accused denied the charges, claiming he was driving his jeepney during the alleged incidents, and suggested that the complaint was prompted by a grudge on the part of the grandmother. The mother testified for the defense, denying the charges and claiming she was always at home.

Issues

• Whether or not the informations were defective for failing to allege the specific dates of the commission of the three counts of rape.
• Whether or not the accused was properly apprised of the charges against him and validly entered his plea.
• Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the three counts of rape charged.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

This provision governs the accused's claim that the informations were defective, because it requires only the approximate time of the commission of the offense.

Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

This provision supplies the test for the sufficiency of the allegations of time in the three informations.

Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

This provision bars the accused from raising the defect for the first time on appeal, since he entered his plea without objection.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the informations were not defective. An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In the crime of rape, the time of its commission is not a material ingredient of the offense. The informations alleged the approximate time, namely September 1994, February 1996, and May 1996, and so substantially complied with the rule that the act may be alleged as near to the actual date as the information will permit.

On the second issue, the Court held that the accused was properly apprised of the charges. It added that it was too late to question the form or substance of the informations, because he entered his plea at arraignment without objecting to their sufficiency, and Section 8 of Rule 117 deems such failure a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the complaint was not brought at the instance of the victim, since her sworn statements and her testimony in open court showed that she herself narrated the incidents to the investigators.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the conviction. It found that the victim's testimony in open court gave a detailed account of the rape incidents, delivered in a manner better than what can generally be expected of a young and innocent girl of thirteen years of age, and that this clear and candid testimony, taken with the medical findings, established the charges beyond reasonable doubt against the accused's bare denial.

Doctrine

An information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of commission, and the place of commission. The precise time need not be alleged unless time is a material ingredient of the offense, and in rape it is not. Any objection to the sufficiency of the information must be raised before the accused pleads, or it is waived under Section 8 of Rule 117, save for the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy. Finally, the clear and candid testimony of a child victim, consistent with the medical evidence, may prevail over the accused's bare denial.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Eleuterio Dimapilis for three counts of rape and the penalties and damages imposed upon him by the trial court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: in rape, time is not a material ingredient of the offense, so the information need only allege the approximate date, and any objection to its sufficiency is waived if not raised before plea. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of an information under Sections 6 and 11 of Rule 110, and the waiver rule under Section 8 of Rule 117.