🎧 Case Brief Lecture

IMELDA R. MARCOS, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. Nos. 115132-34. August 09, 1995 August 9, 1995

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Marcos versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Imelda Marcos against the First Division of the Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines. She asks the Supreme Court to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying her motions for leave to travel abroad for medical diagnosis and treatment. The case matters because it is the leading ruling on how a trial court should weigh an accused's constitutional rights to life, health, and liberty against the State's authority to prosecute and to hold an accused to the jurisdiction of its courts. It also teaches the proper use of expert opinion in judicial proceedings and the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence.

Procedural History

Petitioner Imelda Marcos was the accused in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, she was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan and sentenced to imprisonment, with perpetual disqualification from public office. She filed a motion for reconsideration, which remained pending. While these matters were pending, she filed several motions for leave to travel abroad. The Sandiganbayan denied these motions in a resolution dated February 18, 1994, and denied her motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 19, 1994. She then filed this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

After her conviction in two criminal cases, Imelda Marcos filed a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad on December 24, 1993, seeking diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in the People's Republic of China. She claimed she had a serious and life threatening medical condition requiring facilities not available in the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion because she failed to give notice to the prosecution and because the date she requested, December 29, 1993, was too close for the court to inform itself of the basis of the motion. On December 29, 1993, she filed an urgent ex parte motion for permission to travel abroad in another criminal case, supported by medical reports prepared by her physician and cardiologist, Dr. Roberto Anastacio, and other doctors at the Makati Medical Center. On January 4, 1994, she filed another motion for leave to travel abroad in the two cases where she had been convicted, this time to places including the United States and Europe, for treatment of hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior myocardial infarction.

The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Francis Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio Patacsil of the Philippine Heart Center and asked for an expert opinion on coronary medicine, particularly on whether her condition was life threatening, what sophisticated biochemical tests were necessary, whether these tests were available in the Philippines, and whether the level of expertise in the Philippines was adequate. A committee of cardiologists was formed to study her medical records. The Presidential Commission on Good Government interposed no objection on humanitarian grounds, while the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed the motions, contending that the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated and that her conviction might motivate her not to return.

A hearing was held on January 7, 1994, where Dr. Anastacio testified. Petitioner's counsel asked the court to include additional questions for the committee and to include the list of medicines she was taking. These requests were granted. A supplement to the motion was later filed with additional documents, including letters from doctors abroad and offers of treatment from China. On January 20, 1994, the Sandiganbayan received the committee's report, which contained findings contrary to the conclusions of petitioner's physicians. Dr. Ramon Abarquez, Jr. testified on the report on January 26, 1994. On February 11, 1994, the court heard the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Anastacio and the testimony of Dr. Jorge Garcia, a heart surgeon from Washington, D.C. On February 18, 1994, the court denied petitioner's motions, finding that the imperative necessity to undertake a trip abroad for diagnosis and treatment had not been established. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching a clinical summary and letters from Vice President Joseph Estrada and twenty four members of the House of Representatives offering to guarantee her return. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration on April 19, 1994, and warned against attempts to influence its resolutions. Hence, this petition.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request to travel abroad for medical treatment.
  • Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily in seeking the opinion of a committee of cardiologists from the Philippine Heart Center and in relying on their findings instead of those of petitioner's attending physicians.
  • Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated petitioner's constitutional rights to life, health, and liberty in denying her motions to travel abroad.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any specific constitutional or statutory provision verbatim. It refers to the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act Number 3019, particularly Section 3(g), under which petitioner was convicted, and to the constitutional rights to life, health, and liberty invoked by petitioner. Since no provision is quoted in the text, no blockquote is supplied.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Court ruled that the respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician, and the court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician. The subject lay beyond its competence, and since the grant of the request depended on the verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a serious and life threatening medical condition, the respondent court followed the only prudent course available of seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field. The Court noted that even in their own field of expertise, courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, and there is no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not act arbitrarily in relying on the committee's findings. The question before the Sandiganbayan was not whether petitioner was suffering from a serious and life threatening medical condition, but whether on the basis of the reports attached to her motions there was evidence to show that she was suffering from such ailments and that there was need for diagnostic tests which could only be performed abroad. Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine petitioner personally. The Court also found that petitioner was estopped from questioning the procedure adopted by the court because her counsel did not object when informed of the referral and instead participated in the proceedings by requesting additional questions and cross examining Dr. Abarquez.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not trifle with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, health, and liberty. The Court emphasized that considering the fact that she was facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision was still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country, and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. The Court noted that petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad on three different occasions, but her later conviction in two cases dictated the need for greater caution. The Court also observed that the best proof that she was not in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death was the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat in the House of Representatives and won.

Doctrine

A person facing criminal charges does not have an absolute right to leave the country. The burden is on the accused to prove that because of danger to health if not to life, there is necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. The trial court may seek the opinion of experts in a field beyond its competence, provided that the information is disclosed to the parties and they are given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. A party who acquiesces in a procedure adopted by the court and participates in it without objection is estopped from later questioning that procedure. The right to life, health, and liberty is not absolute and must be balanced against the State's right to prosecute and enforce the judgments of its courts.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's motions to travel abroad.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that an accused has no absolute right to travel abroad, and the burden is on her to prove the imperative necessity of medical treatment abroad. Examiners like to use this case to test the balance between constitutional rights and the State's right to prosecute, as well as the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence in procedural matters.