G.R. Nos. 109430-43. December 28, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS AND ESTATE/HEIRS OF THE LATE FERDINAND E. MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari (with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order) is the
resolution of public respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) dated 28
October 1992[1]
which lifted its order of default of 6 April 1989 against private respondent
Imelda R. Marcos in connection with the now well-known “ill-gotten
wealth” cases pending before said court as well as the resolution of 6
January 1993[2]
denying the motion to reconsider the order of 28 October 1992.
The Republic of the Philippines states assiduously that private
respondent moved to regain her standing in court only on 8 July 1992, thereby
incurring unreasonable delay, as demonstrated by the following
circumstances: (a) The late Ferdinand
E. Marcos died on 28 September 1989 and after his interment his widow, private
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, was reasonably expected to regain her composure to
enable her to attend to her cases; (b) She was exonerated in the racketeering
case before the Southern District Court of New York on 2 July 1990 so that much
of what public respondent considered as “abnormal burden” had
“simply vanished or faded away;” and, (c) Upon her return to the
Philippines in November 1991, she had every opportunity to personally take care
of her cases being then fully aware of their pendency since 1987. From the moment she arrived, due diligence
and reasonable promptness should have impelled her to take concrete steps in
this regard; instead, she ran for the highest office of the land hoping that
should she be successful in her bid all the cases against her would be rendered
moot.
Petitioner likewise disputes the finding of the Sandiganbayan
that private respondent has prima
facie meritorious defenses. Petitioner further claims that res
judicata has set in because the ruling in Imelda R. Marcos v. Presiding Justice Garchitorena,[3] has definitely settled the validity of the default order against private
respondent.
We find no grave abuse in the exercise of public respondent’s
discretion under review.
First. Prefatorily, we shall resolve the
claim of petitioner that the Imelda
R. Marcos v. Presiding Justice Garchitorena cases have finally resolved the issue of whether the order of
default was valid. It must be stressed
that the resolution in said cases is conclusive only with respect to the
default order for failure of the Marcoses to file their answer within sixty
(60) days from 10 November 1988, the date the alias summonses were served. In other words, the central issue in those
cases was whether there was valid service of summonses upon them in Hawaii.
In the case at bench, we are asked to rule on the propriety of
the grounds and circumstances set forth by private respondent to justify her
failure to file her answers, which the Sandiganbayan considered as meritorious when it lifted the default order
on 28 October 1992. As the causes of
action are different, res
judicata cannot be invoked.
Second. Sec. 3, Rule 18, of the Rules of
Court provides that “[a] party declared in default may at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious
defense x x x x” It is settled that whether the default order should be
maintained under the circumstances attending a particular case, or whether it
should be set aside, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.[4]
Absent any grave abuse, this Court will not interfere in the exercise of that
discretion by the trial court. As a
matter of fact, every presumption is in favor of the correctness of its action.[5]
While Sec. 3 of Rule 18 is explicit that the reglementary period
for filing the motion to lift the order of default is at any time after discovery and before
judgment, it is to
the party’s advantage that such motion is filed promptly and without
unnecessary delay[6]
because this is a factor taken into account in granting the prayer. In this regard, petitioner asserts that
there was inordinate delay on the part of private respondent in filing her
motion. Be that as it may, the records
disclose that almost all of the “ill-gotten wealth” cases against
private respondent and her family have not even reached the pre-trial stage
such that no real injury against the interest of the State will result with the
lifting of the default order. Besides,
as will hereafter be shown, the peculiar circumstances of the present case justify
the questioned resolutions of public respondent.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the failure of
private respondent to properly respond to the various complaints pending before
it was due to fraud, accident and excusable neglect. At the time the complaints were instituted against private
respondent, circumstances occurred which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which her rights were impaired. Thus, private respondent and her family were
effectively barred by the government from returning to the Philippines. She was likewise burdened with numerous
civil and criminal suits in the United States for alleged violation of the
so-called RICO Act. Moreover, the
deteriorating health of her husband aggravated the problems confronting
her. Corollarily, the complexities of
her legal battles necessitated extensive preparation but which she could not
undertake as she was barred from coming back to the country. The claim of petitioner that she ran for the
presidency for the purpose of
rendering academic the cases against her in the event she succeeded is
conjectural and speculative and deserves scant consideration.
Third. Equally
important as the evidence on fraud, accident and excusable neglect is that
private respondent has shown, prima facie at least according to public
respondent, that she has meritorious defenses the tenability of which remains
to be ascertained during the trial. The
proffered defenses are: (a) She neither
took advantage nor abused her late husband’s position to acquire funds and other
assets for her own personal benefit and aggrandizement; (b) Subject funds and
assets were legally acquired by her and her husband using legitimately-sourced
private funds; (c) Subject transactions were all entered at arm’s length and
did not, under any circumstances, cause prejudice nor damage to petitioner and
the Filipino people; and, (d) Subject funds and assets were merely entrusted to
the individuals and/or corporations concerned.
Fourth. Aside from
the foregoing considerations, the most elementary sense of fairness and
liberality appears to have
prompted the Sandiganbayan to lift the order of default. Significantly, it is the avowed policy of
the law to accord both parties every opportunity to pursue and defend their
cases in the open and relegate technicality to the background in the interest
of substantial justice. After all,
petitioner had applied, on several occasions, for leave to file amended or
expanded complaints which applications were invariably granted, notwithstanding
the resulting delay. Perhaps, it is now
the turn of private respondent to be the recipient of and enjoy the same
procedural liberality if not compassion.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion
committed by public respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in the issuance
of the assailed resolution of 28 October 1992 lifting the order of default, as
well as the resolution of 6 January 1993 denying the reconsideration thereof,
the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., (Chairman), see
concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., see dissenting
opinion.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 27–54.
[2]
Id., pp. 55-60.
[3]
G.R. Nos. 90110-43.
[4]
Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, G.R. No. 66183, 4 May 1988, 161 SCRA 45; Claridad
v. Santos, No. L-29594, 27 January
1993, 120 SCRA 148; Pacweld
Steel Corporation v. Asian Steel Corporation, No. L-26325, 15 November 1982, 188 SCRA 229.
[5]
lbid.
[6]
See Philippine National Bank v. de Leon, G.R. No. 62370, 30 January
1990, 181 SCRA 583.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
I regret that I cannot join the majority in the well-written ponencia
of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. I respectfully submit that the instant petition is impressed with
sufficient merit and should be given due course.
Under the circumstances outlined by the petitioner, respondent
Sandiganbayan extended beyond reasonable bounds “procedural liberality if
not compassion” to lift an order of default long after its validity had
been sustained by this Court. As I see
it, the failure of the private respondent to file an answer was not due to
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect.
Respondent Imelda Marcos’ own comment recites the following Antecedent
Facts:
“Private respondent Imelda R. Marcos and her late husband
Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with others, were original defendants in Civil
Cases Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 24, 27, 30, 32, 34, 38, and 138 of the
Sandiganbayan, Second Division, which the Petitioner filed on various dates in
1987.
At that time, respondent Imelda R. Marcos and her husband were on
forced exile in Hawaii.
On motion of Petitioner, respondent Court authorized the issuance
of alias summons to be served on said respondents then residing in Hawaii. When the Philippine Consul General Gomez and
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo Dela Cruz could not serve personally the
summonses, they effected the service by leaving copies of said summonses and
the civil complaints at the gate of the residence of said respondents.
Insofar as said officials are concerned, the summonses were thus
served on said respondents on November 10, 1988. As stated in said writs, they had sixty days from said date
within which to file their answers to the civil complaints aforesaid, or up to January
9, 1989.
During the critical period from November 10, 1988
to January 9, 1989, respondent Imelda R. Marcos and
her late husband failed to answer the complaints filed against them. On February 9, 1989, Petitioner filed a
motion to declare defendants in default to which Atty. Rafael R. Recto by way
of ‘Special Appearance and Manifestation,’ dated February 16, 1989, interposed
for defendants an objection on the ground that the Court had not acquired
jurisdiction over said defendants because the alias summonses were not properly
served in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated April 6, 1989, respondent Court declared the
defendant Marcoses in default. Said
Defendants appealed the said resolution to this Honorable Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 90110-43.
On September 28, 1989, the late Ferdinand E. Marcos died in Hawaii.
On February 22, 1990, this Honorable Supreme Court issued a
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 90110-43 holding as valid and effective the substituted
service of alias summonses authorized by respondent Court and served out by the
Honorable Assistant Solicitor General, and likewise holding as valid the
resolution of respondent Court issued on April 6, 1989 declaring defendants in
default.
After several requests to be allowed to return to the Philippines,
private respondent Imelda R. Marcos was able to return to the Philippines in
November 1991.
She run as candidate for President in the May 11, 1992 elections,
but she lost.
On July 8, 1992, she filed a motion to lift the Order of Default of
April 6, 1989 issued against her in the aforesaid civil cases, which have not
yet been decided on their merits, even up to now.
On August 12, 1992, Petitioner filed its opposition thereto. On August 18, 1992, private respondent filed
her reply. Petitioner filed a Rejoinder
on October 1, 1992 and private respondent filed her Sur-rejoinder on October
20, 1992.
On October 28, 1992, respondent Court, holding that private
respondent had been prevented from filing her answer to the civil complaints
against her due to accident, fraud, and excusable neglect and that she had prima
facie meritorious defenses, issued a Resolution (Annex A, Petition)
granting private respondent’s motion to set aside the Order of Default dated
April 6, 1989.
On November 17, 1992, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
(Annex “C”, Petition) of said Resolution. Private respondent filed her opposition thereto (Annex D,
Petition).
On January 6, 1993, respondent issued a Resolution (Annex B,
Petition), denying the said motion for reconsideration filed by
Petitioner.”
It is clear then that Mrs. Marcos was, as early as 16 February
1989, already represented by a well-known lawyer, Atty. Rafael Recto, who filed
a Special Appearance and Manifestation to object to the motion to declare her
in default. Note that the objection was
based on lack of jurisdiction over her person due to invalid service of
summons. Instead of filing a motion to
lift the order of default of 6 April 1989, Mrs. Marcos came to this Court in
G.R. Nos. 90110-43. On 22 February
1990, this Court dismissed the petition and sustained the validity of
the service of alias summonses on her and of the order of default. Mrs. Marcos did nothing after the finality
of the resolution. She should have
immediately filed a motion to lift the order of default but she did not. Even after her return to the Philippines in
November 1991, she did nothing to relieve herself of the default order. Instead, she got involved in politics by
filing a certificate of candidacy for the Presidency and by campaigning
vigorously in the May 1992 synchronized elections. It was only on 8 July 1992, after her defeat, that she thought of
filing a motion to lift the order of default.
From her conduct, one can hardly see any indication that her
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
neglect. Rather, what one can easily
see is an invidious contempt of our judicial processes or gross negligence
which merits no compassion from the Court. If a litigant losses a right for sleeping on it under the maxim vigilantibus
et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, then with good reason may it be said
that he should not be given equitable relief under rules of procedure which he
disdains or which he fails to take advantage of by gross negligence. The Sandiganbayan thus acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it set aside its own order of default after it had
been sustained by the highest Court of the land and after Mrs. Marcos had
allowed years and unhampered opportunities to seek the lifting of the default
order to pass by.
I vote to grant the instant petition.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
CONCURRING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. I am also gratified that the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) in its Resolution dated 28 October 1992 lifted its order of default
of 6 April 1989 issued against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos in the
“ill-gotten wealth” cases pending before said court. In 1990, in a dissenting opinion in G.R.
Nos. 90110-43 entitled “Spouses Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
vs. Hon. Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, et. al.,” I expressed
strong disapproval of such order of default. I would like to reproduce herein pertinent parts of that dissenting
opinion which have been obviously followed by the Sandiganbayan in a change of
heart and is apropos to the present case.
“To my mind, the real issue is, after the petitioners had been
validly served with summons, and in the light of their continuing and
persistent pleas to return to the Philippines in order to defend themselves in
the cases to which they have been summoned – but which the Philippine
Government has repeatedly denied – can petitioners be validly declared in
default for their failure to file answer in said cases?
It is my view that petitioners should not be declared in
default. Consistent with my dissenting
opinion in G.R. Nos. 88079 and 88211, upholding the constitutional and human
right of every Filipino to return to his country, I submit that petitioners
have the same constitutional and human right to return and defend themselves
personally in the cases to which they have been summoned by the
Sandiganbayan. In addition, Rule 138,
Section 34, Rules of Court, provides:
‘Sec. 34. By whom
litigation conducted. – In the court of
a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (emphasis supplied)’
To the extent then that petitioners’ declared default is based on
failure to answer within the period stated in the alias summons, the
same must be set aside, given the fact that petitioners have been denied the
basic constitutional and human right to return to the country to properly
answer and face these cases.
In succinct but dialogue form, the situation at bar may be
described thus:
‘Sandiganbayan: You (addressing extra-territorially the
Marcoses) have been charged with ill-gotten wealth in several cases filed with
us by the Phil. government. You are
hereby summoned to answer these complaints.
Petitioners: We are coming to personally answer
and defend ourselves in these cases.
Phil. Government: You cannot come. You can only be represented by your lawyers or agents.
Petitioners: But we want to come as we are in the
best position to answer and defend ourselves.
Sandiganbayan: You
cannot; you are now in default.
Petitioners: Wait a minute; let us discuss this
matter further.
Sandiganbayan: The
default stands. We will proceed with or
without your lawyers or agents.’
It is to me of little moment that the Sandiganbayan cases involved
are civil and not criminal in nature. An almost lifetime of experience in litigation is the best witness to
the indispensability of party’s presence (aside from his lawyer, in case he has
the assistance of counsel) in order to litigate with any reasonable opportunity
of success. An answer, true enough, may
be prepared by remote control, with counsel and client separated thousands of
miles apart, with the luxury of a given or extended period to prepare. But in the actual trial of
cases, especially during the cross-examination of adverse party’s witnesses –
where the truth must be determined – every counsel worth his salt must have the
assistance and presence of his client on the spot, for the client invariably
knows the facts far better than his counsel. In short, even in civil cases, the presence of party (as distinguished
from his lawyer alone) is essential to due process.
There are other aspects of litigation that require parties’
presence, which we need not dwell on lengthily here. It suffices, I believe, to point out that due process demands
that abundant opportunity be given to anyone who is brought to court to
adequately prepare his answer and defense. The name of the game, in other words, is fairplay not foulplay. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from
the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his
back.
Today, it is the Marcoses; tomorrow, it may be another; and the
next tomorrow, it may still be another. Whoever they may be, let the courts of the land be impeccably impartial
and accord to everyone an equal dose of due process, in short, fairplay. Those who may have suffered under the past
regime will say that the standard of justice we advocate was denied to them by
said regime. We do not question the
validity of their own experience; but this Court exists to see to it that we
dispense justice today not in terms of what it could have been in the past, but
in accordance with what is RIGHT.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to – 1) lift the orders of default issued by
the Sandiganbayan in all the cases pending therein, to which petitioners have
been summoned extra-territorially; and 2)
to suspend further proceedings therein, as to petitioners, until such
time as surviving petitioner Imelda R. Marcos has the opportunity to personally
defend petitioners in said cases.”