PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HADJI BASSER MAONGCO Y JAIYAIRY, AND ZALDY SAKILAN Y HATAIE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

In three informations which initiated Criminal Cases Nos.
92-108125, 92-108126 and 92-108127 on July 10, 1992 before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 47, herein accused-appellants Hadji Basser Maongco y
Jaiyairy and Zaldy Sakilan y Hataie were both charged with double murder for
the killing of the brothers Magsaysay and Mohammad Uddin, and with illegal
possession of firearms punished under Presidential Decree No. 1866, which were
allegedly committed as follows:

(1) Criminal Case No.
92-108125

“That on or about May 19, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one MAGSAYSAY UDDIN by then and there shooting him
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.”

(2) Criminal Case No. 92-108126

“That on or about May 19, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one MOHAMMAD UDDIN by then and there shooting him on
the different parts of his body with a gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.”

(3) Criminal Case No. 92-108127

“That on or about June 21, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in their possession and under their custody and control One (1)
pc. M16 Colt SN 4880830, One (1) pc. M16 Baby Elisco SN 163410, One (1) pc.
Cal. .38, Squire(s) Bingham, Assorted Magazines, ammunitions of different
calibers, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor
from the corresponding authorities.”^[1]

After joint trial of the three cases, the lower court concluded
that proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been established by the
prosecution against herein appellants for the murder of the Uddin
brothers. It, however, absolved
appellants from the charge of illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case
No. 92-108127 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.^[2]

This appellate review is consequently only with regard to the
conviction of appellants for double murder, for purposes of which we summarize
hereunder the pertinent evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense. Preliminarily, however, we
have to interject some observations on the decision of the court below.

In its decision of twenty-seven pages, textually single-spaced,
the trial court devotes the first ten pages to the antecedent and preliminary
proceedings taken in these cases, principally with regard to the issuance of a
search warrant and its resolution of the objections thereto. In the next fifteen pages, there is first a narration of the several sworn
statements and other documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, from
Exhibits A to P-2, including the “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” of alleged eyewitness Alvino D. Bagayo (Exhibits D and
D-1) who, however, was never presented at the trial. These are followed by an enumeration of the documentary evidence
for the defense (Exhibits 1 to 5-A); a reproduction of the postmortem examination
report on the cadaver of the victims, and the full text of the investigation
report submitted to the Criminal Investigation Service Command of the
Philippine National Police on July 17, 1992; and, finally, a list of the
firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to the search warrant.

Curiously, on such skeletal underpinning, the lower court
forthwith held as follows:

“After a thorough review of the evidence adduced in these cases,
the Court finds and so holds that the guilt of both accused for the killing of
Magsaysay & Mohammad Uddin on May 18, 1992 along R. Hidalgo Street in
Quiapo, Manila, had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Both accused had been positively identified
by prosecution witness Rex Magallanes, who testified that after going out of
Bulaklak Restaurant in R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila, in the evening of May 18,
1992, upon hearing multiple shots, he sought a place to hide (in) and he saw
two persons dead near the yellow owner type jeep and two persons carrying
armalite – firearms – who passed by him at a distance of about 1 1/2 meters
away from the place (where) he was hiding, whom he identified in Court to be
the two accused in this case. The
positive identification of the accused by prosecution witness Rex Magallanes
was corroborated by (H)udjaima Uddin, widow of the late Mohammad Uddin, who
testified that she saw accused Hadji Basser Maongco sho(o)t her husband.

“The Court also finds sufficiently established that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime as shown by the concerted actions of the
accused during and after the incident, as well as by the nature and extent of
the gunshot wounds inflicted upon the victims. The fragments (Exh. ‘X’) recovered from the victims which are of cal.
.22 further strengthens the conclusion that the victims were killed by armalite
rifles described by prosecution witness Rex Magallanes to be the firearm held
by the accused when he saw them near the dead bodies of the victims.

“The Court finds to be without merit the defense of alibi set up by
the accused. It is fundamental that
positive identification of the accused cannot be overturned by the defense of
alibi, especially so, in this case, that there is no physical impossibility for
the accused to be at the scene of the crime.

“It appears undisputed that the family of Magsaysay Uddin spent a
total of P53,998.00 while the family of victim Mohammad Uddin spent a total of
P108,218.00, for funeral and burial expenses.”^[3]

Evidently, there is here, not only a compelling need, but an
exigent judicial duty to review and analyze the testimonial evidence presented at
the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 92-108125 and 92-108126 for the murder of
the victims, which the court below regrettably failed to do and which we will
now undertake.

As recounted by Rex Magallanes, a tricycle driver who was the
principal witness for the prosecution, he was walking along R. Hidalgo Street
in Quiapo, Manila at around 11:30 P.M. on May 19, 1992 on his way to get a ride
at Quezon Boulevard for San Francisco del Monte, where he resides, when a burst
of automatic gunfire suddenly erupted nearby. He instinctively sought cover at a concrete wall from which he saw, at a
distance of only a few feet, two armed men in civilian clothes who were
furiously firing a hail of bullets at the occupants of a stalled owner-type
jeep.^[4]

After the fusillade of gunfire ceased, a passenger of the jeep
lay dead on the road pavement, while the driver sat slumped at the steering
wheel. The gunmen then fled towards an
alley and disappeared from sight. Shaken by the horrible event, Magallanes forthwith went home. The following morning, he came to know of
the identities of the slain men through newspaper reports. The victims, it turned out, were the
brothers Magsaysay and Mohammad Uddin, both of whom were in the active service
as integral members of the Philippine National Police at the time of their
demise.

Allegedly bothered by his conscience, Magallanes claims that he
voluntarily went to Camp Crame that very same day to shed light on the
ambuscade at R. Hidalgo Street, and, in an office there, he executed an
affidavit for that purpose.^[5] In
fact, he claims to have gone back to the camp many times thereafter, of his own
accord, to verify the status of the case and “to give justice to the victims.”^[6]

Hudjaima Uddin, spouse of the slain Mohammad Uddin, testified
that she was then in the house of a relative
at Gunaw Street, also in Quiapo and about three blocks away from the scene of
the crime, when she heard the staccato sound of gunfire. She had a feeling that her husband was
somehow involved in the firefight, prompting her to immediately run to the area
where the gun reports came from. When
she reached the place, she found her husband slumped dead on the steering wheel
of their patrol jeep. Hudjaima went on
to narrate before the trial court that she saw appellant Hadji Basser Maongco
running away from the scene of the ambuscade carrying a rifle.^[7]

On the other hand, appellants insisted, as they are now relying,
on their claim of innocence on both counts. Hadji Basser Maongco asserted before the trial court that on the day of
the ambuscade, specifically at three o’clock in the afternoon thereof, he left
for Lemery, Batangas where he had to attend to some business transactions. He stayed there for almost a week and it was
only on May 25, 1992, or six days after the slayings, that he went back to Manila.^[8] Zaldy Sakilan, who worked as a
cashier in a restaurant, likewise interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he was working all
throughout the day of the incident in a restaurant located at 819 Globo de Oro
Street in Quiapo.^[9]

On June 21, 1992, a number of high-powered firearms and rounds of
ammunition were seized at the residence of Maongco’s mother by elements of the
PNP Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) on the strength of a search warrant
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in the course of which appellant
Maongco was arrested. Zaldy Sakilan,
the other appellant, was likewise arrested on the same day at Aurelio’s
Restaurant in Quiapo while having a drinking bout with some friends.^[10]

At their arraignment on August 3, 1992 with the assistance of
counsel de parte, appellants entered pleas of not
guilty.^[11]
The court a quo
thereafter conducted a joint trial of said cases which culminated in judgments
promulgated on January 29, 1993 with the following dispositions:

“In Criminal Case No.
92-108125

The Court hereby finds accused, Hadji Basser Maongco y Jaiyairy and
Zaldy Sakilan y Hataine, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
of Magsaysay Uddin, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of
‘reclusion perpetua’ and all the accessory penalties provided for by law. They are further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P50,000.00 plus the amount of P53,998.00
for the burial and funeral expenses.

In Criminal Case No.
92-108126

The Court hereby finds accused, Hadji Basser Maongco y Jaiyairy and
Zaldy Sakilan y Hataine, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
of Mohammad Uddin, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of
‘reclusion perpetua’ and all the accessory penalties provided for by law. They are further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P50,000.00 plus the amount of P108,218.00
for the burial and funeral expenses.

In Criminal Case No.
92-108127

The Court hereby finds that the guilt of both accused, Hadji Basser
Maongco y Jaiyary and Zaldy Sakilan y Hataine for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
both accused, Hadji Basser Maongco y Jaiyairy and Zaldy Sakilan y Hataine, are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information in this case.”^[12]

As the instant appeal concerns only the verdicts handed down by
the trial court in the two murder charges, we shall deal only with the assigned
errors pertinent thereto. The six
imputed errors can be consolidated into and subsumed under appellants’ basic
contention that the court below erred in not acquitting them inasmuch as their
identification by and the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Rex Magallanes
and Hudjaima Uddin are full of inconsistencies and are consequently incredible.^[13]

The Court has, accordingly, undertaken a thorough review and
calibration of the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution before the court a quo. After
an assiduous evaluation, we are convinced that the prosecution has utterly
failed in its avowed task of establishing the guilt of appellants beyond
peradventure of a doubt.

It is a constitutionally consecrated rule that before an accused
may be convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and until thus proven guilty, he is presumed innocent.^[14]
Corollary to this presumption of innocence is the cardinal doctrine that in all
criminal convictions, the accused must have been pronounced guilty on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not by reason of the weakness
of the evidence proffered by the defense.^[15]

The instant cases present the familiar issue of whether or not
the trial court justly relied on the version proposed by the prosecution. The resolution of these cases hinge,
therefore, on the question of credibility. On this point, trial courts, pursuant to their unquestioned advantage of
directly observing at the trial the demeanor of witnesses, are generally
respected by appellate courts as regards
their factual findings thereon.^[16]

Only errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts, or
those that are unfounded and speculative, would call for corrective appellate
action on such erroneous findings.^[17] In
the cases at bar, not only did the trial court overlook significant
contrarieties in the testimony of prosecution witness Rex Magallanes, but it
likewise erred in not taking into account the colliding versions of the
incident by said witness in his testimony before the trial court and in his
sworn statement executed prior thereto.

Of particular concern is this
witness’ rather assertive claim before the lower court that a day after the
incident, he read newspaper accounts of the ambush of the previous night, from
where he then learned of the identities of the victims. Claiming that he was thereby driven by an
idealistic sense that justice must be applied in its full force against the
assailants of the Uddin brothers, Magallanes at once hied himself to Camp Crame
on that very same day where, according to him, he then executed an affidavit
regarding the ambush.^[18]

Were we to believe this account of Magallanes, his sworn
statement should then have been dated May 20, 1992, it being the day following
the ambush. On the face of the sworn
statement, however, it clearly appears that this affidavit, which Magallanes
categorically identified as the one which he made on May 20, 1992, was actually
executed by said witness on June 8, 1992, or a full eighteen days after he
supposedly went to and executed it at Camp Crame.^[19] No plausible explanation whatsoever
was presented by Magallanes, nor by the prosecution panel, as to this
mystifying circumstance of an indubitable discrepancy.

Furthermore, while Magallanes was quick to point out during the
direct examination that he made the affidavit on May 20, 1992, he wavered when
asked on cross-examination as to when he really read the newspaper account
regarding the ambush which caused him to report to Camp Crame. Thus, when asked by the defense counsel as
to the particular date when he went to Camp Crame, he irresolutely replied that
he proceeded to said camp maybe a day or two after the incident since he was
not aware of the date of the newspaper from where he learned of the identities
of the victims. In short, Magallanes
was not even sure as to when he really executed the affidavit in question.^[20]

What further undermines the stand of the prosecution is the fact
that Magallanes’ account of the slayings as detailed in his aforesaid affidavit
differs on material points with his testimony in court. It is true, and we have so held, that sworn
statements executed before police officers are usually incomplete and contain
data which are inconsistent with
the facts narrated by the witnesses to said officers. For this reason, courts have generally brushed aside, as
inconsequential, contradictions in the sworn statement of a witness and his
testimony as long as these dwell only on minor and reconcilable matters.^[21]

However, since every circumstance must be taken into
consideration in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, it becomes
crucial for his eventual acquittal when such discrepancies touch on substantial
and irreconcilable facts, as when the omission in the affidavit concerns an
important detail which the affiant would not have failed to mention, and which
omission could affect the credibility of the affiant.^[22]
Corollarily, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction.^[23]

As narrated in the affidavit of Magallanes, he and his cousin,
one Turku Nuñez, stayed outside the Bulaklak Restaurant after it had closed for
the night and chatted there for a few minutes. They then parted ways shortly thereafter, having agreed to meet again on
some other day. As Magallanes was on his way to Quezon Boulevard, he suddenly
heard gunfire. Forced to seek cover at
a nearby wall, he then saw herein appellants firing away at the occupants of a
jeep. After the assassins were through
with their ghastly deed, one of the assailants took the firearm of the other
assassin and then fled from the gory site. According to Magallanes, the one left behind was beyond himself with
glee.^[24]

On the witness stand, Magallanes’ version suffered a
transmogrification and was altogether different. Contrary to his claim in the affidavit that he and his cousin had
separated shortly after leaving the Bulaklak Restaurant, he testified that
after he and his cousin, Turku Nuñez, had finished eating at said restaurant,
they walked together along R. Hidalgo Street and it was then that they were
startled by bursts of gunfire. Together, they sought cover on a wall where, from that vantage point and
with his cousin beside him, Magallanes could clearly see appellants peppering
the victims with bullets.^[25] This
amended version may have been intended to lay the basis for a corroborating
witness, but it was all to no avail since, for unknown reasons, Nuñez was never
presented at the trial.

Magallanes again contradicted himself when he narrated before the
trial court that after the massacre, the two assailants immediately fled from
the locus criminis. In the
affidavit, however, he clearly and definitely stated that only one of the
assassins immediately departed after the attack, and that one of them was left
behind, apparently staying for a while to savor the grisly scene.^[26]

For evidentiary weight, it is required that the evidence must
conform to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.^[27] We have repeatedly stressed that
evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself.^[28] Although no ill motive may have
impelled an eyewitness to testify falsely against an accused as to make his
account deserving of belief, his credibility will nonetheless be greatly
affected by inexplicable contradictions in his narration of the facts before
the trial court^[29] or where, as is the situation in this
case, his testimony definitely and materially contradicts his sworn statement.^[30]

We are, furthermore, unable to agree with the findings of the
court below that Hudjaima Uddin positively identified herein appellant Hadji
Basser Maongco, for the very same reason that the identification of appellants
by Magallanes was rendered extremely dubious by his demonstrated inconsistencies
and contradictions. Testifying for the
prosecution, Hudjaima told the trial court that when she heard gunfire, she
instantly proceeded to where it came from as she somehow sensed that her
husband, who had just left her at Gunaw Street, was involved in the
firefight. It was then that, just as
she reached the area where the shooting took place, she saw appellant Maongco
running away clutching a rifle.^[31]

Surprisingly, in her statement which she had likewise executed
earlier before the police authorities in Camp Crame on June 8, 1992, this
witness never stated therein that she had heard the crack of gunfire which
caused her to immediately verify if her husband was a party thereto, nor did
she ever mention having seen appellant Maongco running away from the scene of
the crime. In truth, what she only
averred in that affidavit, and which she confirmed during the trial, is the
fact that she merely suspected herein appellants to be her husband’s assassins
because Maongco had earlier threatened the victim with bodily harm.^[32]

It is disturbing to further note Hudjaima Uddin’s admission
before the trial court that she did not bother to go to the aid of her husband
who was then either dead or dying in the jeep, although the assailants had
already fled from the crime scene. As
would have been natural under the circumstances, she should have rushed to her
stricken husband in his hour of extreme need but, incredibly, she did not. Instead, she just went home and did nothing
more. Additionally, this testimony of
hers is again contrary to her sworn statement wherein she narrated that after
the ambuscade, she proceeded to Camp Crame for her safety.^[33]

The performance of these two witnesses impel us to draw a
similitude. It is said that character,
as the sum total of what a person
really is, would inceptively appear to be unfathomable and undefinable. Yet, a psychological truth is that character
is often gauged through the medium of individual acts, if unguardedly and spontaneously performed. In like manner, there is no standard litmus
test to ascertain the truth of testimonial submissions, these being generally
prefabricated with the legal architecture of an advocate. But, again, it is an evidential rule that
the incredibility of a witness is often exposed by lapses on material details
which were not expected to be assayed in the crucible of judicial review. The verities in both situations apply in the
present cases to discredit the aforesaid prosecution witnesses.

As for the defense of alibi interposed by herein appellants,
despite its reputed weakness, there is likewise the accepted doctrine that such
defense should not readily be frowned upon as undeserving of credence by courts
since definitely there are occasions when the same is the plain and simple
truth.^[34]
Although alibi is inherently feeble by reason of its easy fabrication, it
acquires commensurate strength when the case for the prosecution is equally
infirm, as in this case where the identification of appellants as the
malefactors was demonstrably unreliable and questionable.^[35]
Courts must not lose sight of the fact that in every criminal prosecution, the
identity of the offender or offenders must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.^[36]

The records are devoid of evidence that appellants were motivated
by such malevolent intentions as to drive them to kill the victims. The bare suspicion of Mohammad Uddin’s wife,
Hudjaima Uddin, that appellants may have perpetrated the dastardly deed since
they had a score to settle against the victims on account of the dismissal of
the criminal cases filed by appellants against the Uddins, does not inspire
belief in the theory espoused by the prosecution. The fact that appellants preferred to go through the requirements
for judicial redress when they initiated criminal complaints against the
victims indicates prima facie that they respect the legal processes and,
thus, are not the kind of persons who would instead take the law into their own
hands. It certainly cannot be said that
just because appellants bore a grudge against the Uddins, they would readily
resort to an extrajudicial solution therefor. In any event, motive alone is not proof of crime.^[37]

Finally, it is markworthy that the unfortunate victims in this
case were police officers whose hazardous duties admittedly placed their lives
in danger at the hands of just about everyone, be they avengers from the
criminal underworld, drug-crazed killers, or just plain thrill-seekers. It is, in fact, of judicial knowledge that
persons have been gunned down for no apparent reason at all. To eliminate these alternative
possibilities, the identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the
crimes charged should have been categorical and unassailable.

Fortunately for appellants, mere speculations and probabilities
cannot substitute for the quantum of proof required by law to establish their
guilt since conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and
positive evidence.^[38]
Hence, the oft-invoked exhortation attributed to Alfonso El Sabio, “Mas vale que queden sin
castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente,”^[39]
this time calls for and finds favor and acceptance in the mind of the Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the impugned judgments of conviction in
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-108125 and 92-108126 of the court a quo are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellants Hadji Basser Maongco y Jaiyairy
and Zaldy Sakilan y Hataie are hereby ACQUITTED of the charges therein, with
costs de oficio. Their
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless there are other
lawful causes for their continued detention.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Puno, JJ., concur.

* The middle name of
accused-appellant Zaldy Sakilan y Hataie is also written as “Hataine” and
“Hatale” in some parts of the original record.

^[1]
Original Record, 1-3; 21-22; 25-26.

^[2]
Ibid., 296-298.

^[3]
Ibid., 296-297.

^[4]
TSN, August 17, 1992, 8-11.

^[5]
Ibid., id., 8-22.

^[6]
Ibid., id., 35, 44-46.

^[7]
Ibid., October 30, 1992, 7-10.

^[8]
Ibid., November 10, 1992, 7-9.

^[9]
Ibid., November 19, 1992, 7-8.

^[10]
Ibid., November 10, 1992, 10-13; November 19, 1992, 8-9.

^[11]
Original Record, 34.

^[12]
Ibid., 297-298; per Judge
Lorenzo B. Veneracion.

^[13]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 1-2; Rollo, 58-59.

^[14]
People vs. Deocariza, G.R. No. 103396, March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 488.

^[15]
People vs. Eslaban, G.R. Nos. 101211-12, February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 534.

^[16]
People vs. Salomon, et al., G.R. No. 96848, January 21, 1994.

^[17]
People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, 1994.

^[18]
TSN, August 17, 1992, 21-28.

^[19]
Original Record, 164-166; Exhibit A.

^[20]
TSN, August 17, 1992, 39-42.

^[21]
People vs. Ponferada, et al., G.R. No. 101004, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA
46.

^[22]
Id., loc. cit.

^[23]
People vs. Pacana, et al., 47
Phil. 48 (1924); People vs. Libag, G.R. No. 68997, August 17, 1990, 184
SCRA 707.

^[24]
Original Record, 164; Exhibit A.

^[25]
TSN, August 17, 1992, 8-9; Original Record, 164; Exhibit A.

^[26]
Original Record, 165; Exhibit A.

^[27]
People vs. Eslaban, supra. Fn. 15.

^[28]
People vs. Uson, G.R. No. 101313, July 5, 1993, and cases cited therein.

^[29]
People vs. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 670.

^[30]
People vs. Redulla, et al., G.R. No. 103395, November 22, 1993.

^[31]
TSN, October 30, 1992, 5-9.

^[32]
Original Record, 209-210; Exhibit P.

^[33]
Ibid., id.,; TSN, October
30, 1992, 13.

^[34]
People vs. Jalon, G.R. No. 93729, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 680.

^[35]
People vs. Monda, Jr., et al., G.R. Nos. 105000-01, November 22, 1993.

^[36]
People vs. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991, 194 SCRA 372.

^[37]
People vs. Ramirez, et al., G.
R. Nos. 65345-47, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 711.

^[38]
People vs. Ritter, G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991, 194 SCRA 690.

^[39]
People vs. Cunanan, G.R. No. L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769, citing
Frases, Ideas y Pensamientos de Varios Autores recopilados por Pablo Buill, 112.