PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE MONDA, JR. Y SAMPER AND NESTOR BALBALOSA Y RIVERA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

For the killing of eight government personnel and a civilian in
an ambuscade on April 9, 1987 at Sitio Tastas, Bgy. Labawon, Buhi, Camarines
Sur, accused-appellants Jose Monda, Jr. and Nestor Balbalosa, supposedly in
conspiracy with one Avelino Carusa and sixty others who were identified with
fictitious names under the surname of “Doe,” allegedly armed with
high-powered firearms and acting with treachery and evident premeditation, were
charged with multiple murder in an information dated August 4, 1987 and filed
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, at Iriga City.^[1]

The victims in said case were P/Sgt. Victor W. Haber, Pfc.
Francisco D. Lleno, Pfc. Mariano A. Noblefranca, Pfc. Jose A. Temperante, Pfc.
Stephen Facistol, Pat. Oscar D.
Benedicto, Firemen Federico P. Mendoza and Marvin Marchan, all members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) at Buhi, Camarines Sur, and Bonifacio
Fabillar, a civilian.

Seriously wounded in the same incident were Patrolmen Gil Eusebio
and Pelagio Oatemar, Jr.. As a
consequence, accused-appellants were further charged with frustrated murder in
another information, under the same circumstances aforementioned but with the
exception of treachery and evident premeditation.^[2]

Duly assisted by counsel de oficio, appellants pleaded not
guilty at the arraignment.^[3]
A joint trial was thereafter conducted for the two cases of multiple murder and
frustrated murder, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. IR-2306 and IR-2307,
respectively.^[4]
Accused Avelino Carusa, however, was dropped from the information,^[5]
while all the other accused have not yet been sufficiently identified and are
still at large.^[6]

Ultimately, the lower court acquitted appellants of the charge of
frustrated murder for insufficiency of evidence,^[7]
but convicted them of multiple murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each of the deaths of the victims and to pay the
heirs of each of the latter P30,000.00 as compensatory damages, and for the
heirs of Pfc. Stephen Facistol, P27,000.00 as consequential damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.^[8]

In a bid to obtain the reversal of the trial court’s judgment,
appellants interposed the present appeal, alleging that the court a quo
erred in (1) giving weight to their identification by the prosecution witnesses
despite the inherent improbability thereof; (2) not giving exculpatory weight
to their defense of alibi; and (3) not acquitting them on the ground of
reasonable doubt.^[9]

It is beyond cavil that the victims died of gunshot wounds
inflicted on different parts of their bodies as a consequence of the
ambush-slaying by approximately sixty heavily armed men at Sitio Tastas,
Barangay Labawon, Buhi, Camarines Sur.^[10]
Patrolmen Jose M. Merilles, Gil Eusebio and Pelagic Oatemar, Jr. survived the
carnage and, as eyewitnesses, related the chronology of events which culminated
in the conviction of herein appellants.

Pat. Merilles of the INP, Buhi, Camaraines Sur, testified that at
about 9:50 A.M. on April 9, 1987, he was assigned as desk officer under Pfc.
Mariano Noblefranca, when Avelino Carusa, Bgy. Captain of Macaangay, Buhi,
Camarines Sur, reported to the station that a shooting incident had transpired
at his barangay. Merilles then referred
the matter to the station commander, Pfc. Stephen Facistol, who, without losing
time and in order to retrieve the cadavers at Bgy. Macaangay, formed a team
composed of P/Sgt. Haber, Pfc. Francisco D. Lleno, Pfc. Mariano Noblefranca,
Pfc. Jose Temperante, Pat. Eusebio, Pat. Oatemar, Firemen Marvin Marchan and
Federico Mendoza, a civilian photographer named Bonifacio Fabillar, and
Merilles himself.^[11]

As earlier narrated, at around 11:30 A.M. while the team was on
its way to Bgy. Macaangay, they were ambushed by around sixty heavily armed men
at Sitio Tastas, Bgy. Labawon, Buhi, Camarines Sur, resulting in the death of
some of its members. Patrolmen Eusebio
and Oatemar were wounded, while Merilles escaped unhurt. After less than five minutes of the assault,
Merilles, who had taken cover in a canal, ran away from the ambush scene. About twenty-five minutes later, he met the
first group of reinforcements from the San Vicente Assistance Center composed
of around ten soldiers who, upon arriving at the area, realized that they were
insufficient in number, whereupon five of them withdrew to seek more
assistance.

With this group, Merilles went back to the place of the ambush
where they engaged the ambushers in a gunfight. Shortly after the arrival of the second batch of reinforcement,
the ambushers a withdrew and escaped. A
government helicopter then arrived and the area was cordoned off and
cleared. Upon the arrival of the second
reinforcements, the dead were collected and, with the assistance of civilians,
the wounded were brought to the hospital.^[12]

C2C Job Oaferina, a member of the Philippine Constabulary (PC),
testified that on April 9, 1987, he was assigned at the San Vicente Assistance
Center at Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur under the 247th PC Company when at
about 9:15 A.M., Bgy. Capt. Avelino Carusa informed them of a tragedy that
befell two persons in his barangay. Oaferina immediately informed his detachment commander, Sgt. Mamerto
Castroverde, and an eight-man team, including himself, was organized. The team proceeded to Bgy. Macaangay on foot
and reached the place an hour thereafter.^[13]
At around 11:00 A.M., after conducting a partial investigation of the killing
incident thereat and while resting at the house of Carusa, they heard
successive gunshots. They then went to
the place where the shots came from. Upon reaching Buhi, Oaferina saw several persons who were already dead
and two others wounded. After his team
identified themselves as members of the 247th PC Company, the ambushers fired
at them and an exchange of gunfire ensued before the assailants withdrew.

Three days later, while Oaferina, C1C Juan P. Iglopas and Sgt.
Castroverde were manning a checkpoint at the San Vicente Assistance Center,
they arrested two persons whom they suspected to be two of the ambushers and
they brought them to the Buhi Police Station for investigation.^[14]
These were the herein appellants.

Pat. Gil Eusebio, on his part, attested that on that fateful day
of April 9, 1987, at around 9:00 A.M., he was summoned by P/Sgt. Haber to the
Buhi Police Station in order to recover two dead persons at Macaangay. On their way to said barangay, a group of
heavily armed men opened fire at them and a firefight followed. He was hit on the left shoulder and fell
unconscious for approximately five minutes. A reinforcing group then arrived and, with the assistance of civilians,
he and Pat. Oatemar were brought to the Regional Hospital of Naga City.^[15]

Appellants, on the other hand, rely
heavily on their defense of alibi, claiming that on the day in question, Monda
was constructing a fence at the dancing hall located at Bgy. Amoguis, Polangui,
Albay together with Bgy. Capt. Rogelio Casococ from 9:00 to 11:30 A.M., then
again from 1:00 to 3:00 P.M., for purposes of a dance to be held therein at
9:00 o’clock that evening. Balbalosa
was just in the vicinity, sitting in front of their house, unable to help them
because he was then very sick.^[16]
Segunda Casais, appellants’ neighbor, unequivocally corroborated this defense,
she being an eyewitness herself of the fact that Monda and Balbalosa did not
leave that place the whole morning.^[17]
This was further supported by the testimony of Casococ himself^[18]
and Balbalosa’s mother, Rosita, who stayed in her house the whole day with her
son.^[19]

The instant appeal hinges on the positive identification of
appellants herein as two of the ambushers, which issue boils down to an
appraisal and determination of the credibility of witnesses, especially of the
three prosecution witnesses who pinpointed appellants as two of the felons who
participated in the ambush-slayings.

While it is a judicial dictum that the Court will accord great
respect, if not finality, to the trial court’s appreciation of the credibility
of witnesses, the same holds true only if there had been no misapprehension of
facts and only if the court a quo did not overlook certain points of
substance which, if considered, could alter the result arrived at.^[20]
The Court will not hesitate, on justifiable grounds, to take exception to the
rule on finality of the trial court’s factual findings in order to keep faith
with the immutable principle that every criminal conviction must be supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.^[21]

After a meticulous review and scrupulous evaluation of the entire
records of this case, the mind and conscience of the Court cannot rest easy on
the identification of appellants as among the slayers of the victims of the
ambuscade. A searching scrutiny of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses will expose the badges of
unreliability therein which correspondingly create the element of reasonable
doubt that, in turn, dictates a verdict of acquittal.

Merilles could not have accurately ascertained the identity of
the assailants since he himself admitted that, after the first barrage of
gunshots, some of his companions were instantly killed and he immediately hid
himself by taking cover in a nearby canal. Not long thereafter, he ran away from the scene of the ambush until he
met the first group of reinforcements. Together with this batch, he went back and a continuous exchange of
gunfire transpired until, one by one, the ambushers fled and made it difficult
for the reinforcers to overtake them.

Merilles was so preoccupied in scampering for his safety while
they were being sprayed with bullets from high-powered firearms that it was
virtually impossible for him to be really spending his time scrutinizing and
trying to recognize his attackers. He
claimed that he was able to identify appellants because, in the exchange of
gunfire, these two were facing them.^[22]
A punctilious review of his testimony reveals, however, that assuming arguendo
that two of the ambushers were indeed facing him, they were then firing at him
from a distance of thirty meters.^[23]
As he was busy evading their shots and seeking cover therefrom, he could not
have had the opportunity to view and perceive his attackers with exactitude,
free from any error or inaccuracy, more so at a distance of thirty meters.
Furthermore, the attackers were then on an elevated place overlooking the
witness and his companions,^[24]
which made it all the more difficult for him to have a reasonably reliable view
of them.

We likewise have to reject his supposed identification of
appellants at the time of the latter’s arrest, despite his claim that he could
easily identify them because of their distinguishing marks, that is, Monda’s
one big eyeball and Balbalosa’s small arms.^[25]
We consider these individual bases of recognition grossly insufficient to prove
that appellants were indeed the very same persons he allegedly saw at a
distance during the incident. The
danger of error of identification is highly probable, especially when we
consider the admission of the witness that he only saw the appellants twice,
the first time allegedly during the ambush and then at the time of their
arrest.^[26]

On the other hand, C2C Job Oaferina was a member of the first
reinforcement who, upon reaching the ambush scene, saw some of his comrades
already killed, with two others wounded. Several factors render it doubtful as to whether Oaferina was able to
correctly identify herein appellants, to wit: he only had the opportunity of having a glance at the ambushers when the
latter fired at them at a distance of twenty to twenty-five yards before he
fled;^[27]
the killing zone was surrounded by grass, coconut trees and corn plants;^[28]
some of the attackers were either standing, crawling^[29]
or squatting;^[30]
and these ambushers were positioned at an elevated place,^[31]
dressed in fatigue clothes^[32]
similar to those worn by the government forces. In fact, it was by reason of these circumstances that the latter
committed the error of identifying themselves as members of the 247th PC
Company when they met the former whom they thought to be some of their
companions.^[33]

He likewise could not have identified appellants at the time of
the ambush since the latter were then taking cover under the shadow of trees
and hiding behind the coconut trunks, exerting every effort to show as little
of their bodies as possible, so as not to expose themselves and their
identities to their opponents.^[34]
These are protective human reactions normally resorted to and which ordinary
experience will confirm.

It bears stressing that when the ambush was just a few minutes
old, Pat. Eusebio was hit on the left hand and left shoulder and he fell
unconscious.^[35] When he came to, it was not shown whether he
had the opportunity to have a second look at his assailants. What was clear, though, was that the
ambushers fled when the reinforcements came.^[36]
Moreover, the attackers were on a higher part of the terrain, six to seven feet
above the government forces, and were thereafter able to position themselves
around the hapless victims.^[37]
These events took place in rapid succession and, just like Merilles, Eusebio
was too absorbed in taking cover and running for his safety to be able to
carefully observe and scrutinize their adversaries, much less the individual
members thereof.

Moreover, it is a matter of judicial cognizance that in
ambuscades, not even a man with the quickest reflexes will tarry and bother to know
who and where the sources of the danger were, except to respond to the instinct
of self-preservation in the fastest manner possible, to secure one’s life by
seeking cover or running for safety.^[38]

Without the positive identification of appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crimes charged, the constitutional presumption of innocence
in their favor stands unrebutted.^[39]
Moreover, with the failure and absence of their positive identification by the
prosecution, appellants’ motive, if any, to commit the crimes assumes
significant importance. Motive becomes
essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailants.^[40]
In the case now before us, the People miserably failed to adduce evidence as to
appellants’ possible evil motives against the victims which could provide the
reason for their slaying of the latter. In fact, not even the prosecution’s claim that appellants were members
of the New People’s Army^[41]
was proven during the trial.

Appellants’ defense is alibi. Although this is considered the weakest of defenses, the Court cannot
totally discard it in the face of the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution in this case. This is
especially true where such defense of herein appellants does not appear to have
been concocted but finds ample support in the testimony of disinterested
witnesses. The defense of alibi does
not relieve the prosecution of the required quantum of proof. The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily
proven has never been intended to shift the burden of proof in criminal cases,^[42]
otherwise we would have the absurd situation wherein the accused would be in a
more difficult situation where the prosecution’s evidence is vague and weak
than where it is strong.^[43]

Of course, for alibi to prosper, appellants must prove physical
impossibility, that is, that they could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission.^[44]
In the instant case, the defense has established to the satisfaction of the
Court that it was physically impossible or, at the very least, highly
improbable for appellants to be at the scene of the incident at the time of the
ambuscade. They likewise sufficiently demonstrated that the distance between
Bgy. Amogis in Polangui, Albay, where appellants were, and Sitio Tastas in Bgy.
Labawon, Buhi, Camarines Sur, where the ambush transpired, is about twenty-five
kilometers, and the travel time between these places is three hours by foot,^[45]
with no vehicle plying that route,^[46]
making it impossible for appellants to be there at 11:30 A.M., the time of the
surprise attack. The testimonies of
Rogelio Casococ,*
Segunda Casais, and Rosaita Balbalosa categorically established that appellant
Monda was constructing a fence at the dancing hall located at Polangui, Albay
from 9:00 to 11:30 A.M., then again from 1:00 to 3:00 P.M. on April 9, 1987,
while appellant Balbalosa who was sick that day merely rested within the
vicinity.

Besides, considering the nature of ambuscades, to be able to
participate therein appellants had necessarily to be at the scene of the
incident several minutes before the attack so as to insure its success. There should be sufficient time for the
attackers, even assuming that there had already been due prearrangement but on
which not even a scintilla of evidence has been adduced, to position themselves
and lie in wait for their prey. Given
the factual backdrop mentioned earlier, it would be impossible for appellants
to have prepared themselves in time for staging the ambush imputed to them.^[47]

The fact that appellant Balbalosa stayed at home the whole day at
Polangui, Albay was sufficiently established by his mother. It is of no moment that his mother was his
main witness to his defense of alibi as, in fact, it would have been strange if
she did not attend to him while he was ill. Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of
ulterior motive and neither does it ipso facto impair the credibility or
tarnish the testimony of a witness. Nor
should we lose sight of the fact that where the accused puts up the defense of
alibi, the court should not have a mental prejudice against him, for taken in
light of all the evidence of record it may be sufficient to acquit him since
every circumstance must be considered in favor of the presumption of innocence.^[48]
It is judicially recognized that there are situations where an accused can have
no possible defense but alibi, as that could really be the truth as to his
whereabouts at the time in question.^[49]

Finally, it is interesting to note that appellants were arrested
without a warrant^[50]
despite the fact that three days had elapsed, from the date of the ambush to
their arrest.^[51]
Their apprehension may accordingly not be considered as justified by Section
5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests only “when an offense
has in fact just been committed” and connotes an immediacy in point of
time, thereby excluding situations under the old rule which only provided that
an offense “has in fact been committed” no matter how long ago. If it were true that the prosecution
witnesses were able to identify appellants during the ambush due to their
distinguishing marks as they claimed,^[52]
it would have been easy for them to secure a John Doe warrant using appellants’
alleged “distinguishing marks” as their descriptio personae
which would enable the arresting officer to serve the same infallibly.^[53]

It is true that appellants’ warrantless arrest is not in issue in
this case. Nevertheless, we deem it
necessary to dwell on that fact to further show the unreliability and
incredibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants’ warrantless arrest only magnify
the fact that the prosecution witnesses were not at all that certain as to the
identities of the real assailants, and consequently lend credence to the
postulate that appellants were summarily taken into custody on mere suspicion
and without regard to their constitutionally guaranteed right against illegal
arrest.

We do not here, for lack of clear showing, wish to categorically
impute bad faith on the part of the authorities involved for the evidential
gaucherie in this case. It may well be
possible that the prosecution witnesses were misled by physical resemblances or
were emotionally inclined to draw improvident conclusions in their resentment
over the loss of their comrades. We
nonetheless take this opportunity to condemn the practice of law enforcers who,
failing in their mission to identify and apprehend the real malefactors, are
not beyond picking on innocent parties as helpless scapegoats for their
inefficiency and incompetence. The
annals of criminal prosecutions in this and foreign jurisdictions are replete
with miscarriages of justice due to erroneous identification of suspected
offenders. It is the nadir of injustice where such miscarriage was not a
product of honest error but of downright negligence or deliberate intent.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another one is rendered ACQUITTING accused-appellants Jose Monda,
Jr. and Nestor Balbalosa of the crime of multiple murder charged in Criminal
Case No. IR-2306 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, with costs de
oficio. Their immediate release
from confinement is hereby ordered, absent any lawful cause for their further
detention.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Record, 6-7.

^[2]
Ibid., 1-2.

^[3]
Ibid., 72.

^[4]
TSN, May 11, 1988, 26.

^[5]
Original Record, 93.

^[6]
Ibid., 268.

^[7]
Ibid. , 278.

^[8]
Ibid., 274; penned by Judge Ulysses V. Salvador.

^[9]
Rollo, 44; Brief for the Appellants, 1.

^[10]
Original Record, 180-189.

^[11]
TSN, May 11, 1988, 3-6.

^[12]
Ibid., id., 6-10, 13-16, 18-20.

^[13]
Ibid., October 17, 1988, 2, 10-13.

^[14]
Ibid., August 18, 1988, 2-10.

^[15]
Ibid., July 11, 1989, 2-7.

^[16]
Ibid., September 6, 1990, 16-18.

^[17]
Ibid., February 27, 1990, 3-6.

^[18]
Ibid., August 31, 1990, 2-6.

^[19]
Ibid., September 6, 1990, 3-4.

^[20]
People vs. Martinez, et al., 205 SCRA 666 (1992).

^[21]
People vs. Viray, et al., 202 SCRA 320 (1991).

^[22]
TSN, May 11, 1988, 10.

^[23]
Ibid., id., 11.

^[24]
Ibid., id., 12.

^[25]
Ibid., id., 25.

^[26]
Ibid., id., 24.

^[27]
Ibid., October 17, 1988, 18.

^[28]
Ibid., January 20, 1989, 8.

^[29]
Ibid., October 17, 1988, 19.

^[30]
Ibid., January 20, 1989, 11.

^[31]
Ibid., October 17, 1988, 20.

^[32]
Ibid., id., 18.

^[33]
Ibid., January 20, 1989, 8-9.

^[34]
Ibid., id., 11.

^[35]
Ibid., July 11, 1989, 4.

^[36]
Ibid., id., 6.

^[37]
Ibid., id., 13

^[38]
People vs. Somontao, 128 SCRA 415 (1984).

^[39]
People vs. de la Cruz, et al., 200 SCRA 379 (1991).

^[40]
People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211 (1991).

^[41]
TSN, August 18, 1988, 7; September 6, 1990, 19.

^[42]
People vs. Salguero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991).

^[43]
People vs. Fraga, et al., 109 Phil. 241 (1960); People vs. Dilao,
et al., 100 SCRA 358 (1980).

^[44]
People vs. Cinco, et al., 194 SCRA 535 (1991).

^[45]
TSN, August 31, 1990, 6; September 6, 1990, 13.

^[46]
Ibid., id., 10.

* This witness is also referred to in other parts of
the record under the surnames of “Casugoc,” “Casuco” and
“Casoco.”

^[47]
People vs. Lagnas, et al., G.R. Nos.102949-51, May 28, 1993.

^[48]
People vs. Castelo, et al., 133 SCRA 667 (1984); People vs.
Martinez, 144 SCRA 303 (1986).

^[49]
People vs. Gerones, et al., L-6595, October 29, (1954); Olandriz, Jr.,
et al. vs. People, et al., 152 SCRA 65 (1987).

^[50]
TSN, September 6, 1990, 20.

^[51]
Ibid., id., 19-20.

^[52]
Ibid., May 11, 1988, 25; January 20, 1989, 16.

^[53]
See People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925).