MARIANO F. OCAMPO, IV, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, AND THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son, herein petitioner
Mariano F. Ocampo IV, were charged with violation of Sec. 3(h) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, in two (2) separate informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan, and docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos. 16801 and 16804, in
that on 1 September 1988 and 30 August 1988, the said Mariano Un Ocampo III,
being then the governor of the province of Tarlac and at the same time
President-Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation,
Inc. (LTFI), in connivance with his son, Mariano F. Ocampo IV, loaned the
amounts of P5,476,031.00 and P7,000,000.00 out of the National Aid for Local
Government Funds (NALGF) of the province of Tarlac to the IMCOR, now the New
Terri­tory Manufacturing, Inc., a private corporation, of which the said
Mariano F. Ocampo IV is an incorporator and stock­holder, under terms and
conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government the same being
interest-free, without collateral, and without a definite date of repayment.

On 28 June 1991, Mariano F. Ocampo IV filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation which was granted by the said court
on 8 August 1991.

After conducting the reinvestigation of the cases, Special
Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano, Sr. and Rodolfo F. Reynoso of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor found that Mariano F. Ocampo IV did not connive with his
father, Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III in the two loan transactions in ques­tion
between LTFI and IMCOR since “it was the responsible officers of IMCOR who
were more directly involved in the questioned loan transactions, namely,
Federico Reyes, Jr. and Honorio C. Bulos, Jr., the latter having been at one
time the Chairman of the Board of said corporation” and that there is a
very strong probability that herein petitioner (Ocampo IV) was “merely
being used by his father, Gov. Ocampo to complete the organizational set-up of
IMCOR for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.”

The special prosecutors recommended that the informa­tions filed
in Crim. Case Nos. 16801 and 16804 against Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III and his
son Mariano F. Ocampo IV be dismissed and that the corresponding motions to
withdraw them be filed with the Sandiganbayan.^[1]

But the Ombudsman, in a memorandum to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, dated 27 November 1991, disapproved the recommendation of the
special prosecutors.^[2] As a
result, Mariano F. Ocampo IV filed the present petition for certiorari
to annul and set aside the said memorandum on the ground that the same was
rendered with grave abuse of discre­tion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Required to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General
submitted a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that since “it will
be just a matter of determining whether the mere fact that the petitioner was
an incorpora­tor and stockholder of the firms with which his father tran­sacted
as Governor of Tarlac taints the act of the father, (t)he stockholder son in
person need not be impleaded” and “should not be made to suffer the
pain of going through a trial as it is already ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to his guilt.”^[3]

The respondent Ombudsman, upon the other hand, maintains that his
disapproval of the recommendation of the prosecu­ting officers cannot be
branded as an abuse of discretion, but an exercise of a prerogative expressly
conferred upon him by law since he found sufficient evidence to indict the
petitioner and his father.

Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of
prohibition, except in the following instances:

“(1) To afford adequate protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused;

(2) When necessary for the orderly
administra­tion of justice or to avoid oppression or multipli­city of actions;

(3) When there is a pre-judicial
question which is sub judice;

(4) When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority;

(5) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

(6) When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent;

(7) Where the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense;

(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;

(9) Where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance;

(10) When there
is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied;

(11)
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.”^[4]

Consistent with the foregoing is the rule that the courts cannot
interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the
specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he
finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation
if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.^[5]

Deliberating upon the issues raised in the present petition for certiorari,
the arguments in support thereof, as well as the comments of the respondents
thereon and the reply thereto, we find that the petition fails to show a grave
abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the respondent Ombudsman. The said
respondent’s act of disapproving the recommendation of the special prosecutors
to dismiss the informations filed in Crim. Case Nos. 16801 and 16804 against
Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son, Mariano F. Ocampo IV, is not whimsi­cal
nor capricious. Neither is it tainted
with vindictive­ness or arbitrariness. He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutors because he
sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict both
accused. This is an exercise of the
Ombudsman’s powers based upon consti­tutional mandate and the courts should not
interfere in such exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon prac­ticality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will
be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.^[6]

It should however be reiterated that, while it is the Ombudsman
who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it
is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of
the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without the
approval of the said court.^[7]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 27

^[2]
Ibid., p. 24

^[3]
Rollo, p. 137

^[4]
Brocka vs. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 183

^[5]
Tabujara vs. Office of the Special Prosecutor, G.R. No. 87912, January
18, 1990

^[6]
Sesbreno vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 92789, March 21, 1991

^[7]
Dungog vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 77850-51, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 145