HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, IN HER CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, AND BENNETT LL. THELMO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANI…

The main issue for resolution in this petition is whe­ther
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the
quashal of three (3) separate informa­tions for libel against private
respondents on the grounds of prescription and violation of their right to
speedy trial.

Petitioners assail the orders of respondent judge (Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 162), dated 30 August 1991 and 16 December 1991,
rendered in Criminal Case Nos. 73490-92 which are criminal complaints for libel
against herein three (3) private respondents, namely, Salvador Lacson, Raul
Locsin and Leticia Locsin. The orders
granted private respondents’ motion to quash the informations in said criminal
cases.

The records of this case show the following antecedents:

1. Respondent Raul Locsin was the editor and
publisher of the newspaper, Business Day. Other respondents, Leticia Locsin and Salvador Lacson, were the
managing editor and columnist, respectively, of said newspaper. On 7 April 1987, Salvador Lacson published in
Business Day an article entitled “Insurance Monopoly”, which
allegedly contained defamatory statements against petitioner Bennett LL.
Thelmo, and maliciously tried to make it appear that Thelmo was a grafter and
bribe-giver.^[1]

On 10 April 1987, Thelmo filed an affidavit-complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prose­cutor of Rizal, and the case was
assigned to Assistant Prosecutor Celestino Simon, Jr. for preliminary
investigation.^[2]

2. On 8 February 1988, the Prosecutor
issued a resolution recommending the filing of three (3) separate criminal
cases for libel against the three private respondents. On 23 May 1988, the corresponding
informations were filed and assigned to respondent trial court. On 18 October 1988, respondent
Salvador Lacson filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription. Then trial fiscal (Simeon, Jr.) was
furnished copy of said motion. On 19
October 1988, the said motion was set for hearing where public prosecutor was
given 15 days within which to file an opposition.^[3]
However, the prosecution after several extensions of time to submit its comment
or opposition to the motion, failed to comply therewith.^[4]

3. Hence, on 03
January 1991, respondent court issued an order granting the motion to quash
the informations, on the ground of prescription. In said order,^[5] the
court held that considering that libel cases prescribe within one year; that
the article “Insurance Monopoly” was published on 7 April 1987;
and that the informations were filed only in May 1988 – the case had
already prescribed, notwithstanding the fact that the affidavit-complaint for
libel was filed with the prosecutor’s office on 10 April 1987. The respondent court ruled that the filing
of the affidavit-complaint with the office of the prosecutor did not stop the
running of the one-year prescriptive period; that the last day for filing the
criminal information was 7 April 1988 or at the latest 10 April 1988
(that is one year from 7 April 1987 when the said article was published.)
Petitioner-private complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of 03 January 1991, which motion the private respondents opposed on the ground,
among others, that failure of the prosecution to file comment on the motion,
despite due notice and order of the respondent court, was tantamount to lack of
interest on the part of the fiscal to prosecute the offense charged.^[6]

4. Acting on the
motion for reconsideration, on 3 May 1991, respondent court rendered an order,
granting the motion of petitioner-complainant, for reconsideration of the order
dated 03 January 1991, thereby reinstating the three (3) criminal informations.

In the said order of 3 May 1991, respondent court ruled as
follows: that in the Olarte
case, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), it was held that the filing of complaint in the
municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
investigation/examination, interrupts the period of prescription, pursuant to
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code; that the case of Francisco v. CA,
122 SCRA 538 (1983) ruled that the filing of complaints for libel with the
fiscal’s office interrupts the period of prescription.^[7]

5. But, respondent court issued another order
dated 30 August 1991 (now assailed), granting the motion for
reconsideration of the order of 03 May 1991, filed by respondents, thereby
dismissing the informations, on the ground of prescription and violation of
private respondents’ constitutional right to speedy trial. In the order of 30 August 1991, respondent
court reiterated its ruling in the order of 03 January 1991.^[8]

6. On 16 December
1991, respondent court denied petitioner-complainant’s motion for reconsi­deration
of the order dated 30 August 1991.^[9]

In the now assailed order of 30 August 1991, respondent court
granted private respondents’ motion to quash on the principal ground that the
prosecution’s delay in prosecuting the criminal cases violated the accused’s
constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent court said:

“Moreover, even by a stretch of imagination the Court cannot
comprehend why these cases have been dragged or pending for four (4) years now
since the filing of the informations in 1988. Not only that the preliminary investigation took more than one (1) year
to terminate. Such long delay in the preliminary
investigation alone is already violative of the accused’s constitutional rights
to due process and speedy disposition of their cases and even worse, after the
informations were filed, the prosecution continued with the delay. This Court waited for two (2) years for
the prosecution’s comment (on the motion to quash) but to no avail.”^[10]
(Underscoring supplied)

Private prosecutor, for petitioner-complainant, in an effort to
explain the failure to file comment on the motion to quash, argues that such
failure was due to the fact that no copy of said motion to quash was furnished
petitioner-complainant Thelmo; that a copy thereof was given only to the public
prosecutor who originally handled the case; and that the respondent court could
have resolved the motion even without waiting for the comment of the
prosecution and could have declared that the prosecution had waived the right
to file comment on the motion to quash.

On the other hand, the respondent court, in rejecting the
prosecution’s (private prosecutor’s) explanation for failure to file comment on
the motion to quash, held as follows:

“Further, this Court cannot buy the argument of the private
prosecutor that they were not furnished a copy of the Motion to Quash. It is too elementary in our operating table
of justice that notice to the fiscal who has the direct control and supervision
of the case is also notice to the private prosecutor. Nowhere in our law and jurisprudence (sic) that as a matter of
course, counsel for the private complainant is entitled to a copy of the said
Motion to Quash. Suffice it to state
that a copy to the fiscal is already enough. Furthermore, the record will bear that the then trial fiscal (Fiscal
Simon, Jr.) in charge of this case was furnished a copy of it. Now, the
burden lies on the counsel for the private prosecutor to follow-up the status
of the case and see to it whether the wheel of justice grinds. xxx “^[11]

We rule for the respondents.

Clearly, the prosecution failed to file comment on the accused’s
motion to quash, despite the admitted service of a copy thereof on the then
trial fiscal handling the case (Fiscal Simon, Jr.), and despite order of
respondent court directing comment on said motion to quash. Moreover, the prosecution failed to file
said comment after asking for several extensions of time to file it. It will be noted that the motion to quash
was filed on 18 October 1988, and on 19 October 1988, the public prosecutor was
given fifteen (15) days within which to file comment/opposition thereto.

When the respondent court issued the order of 03 January 1991,
granting accused’s motion to quash, more than two (2) years had lapsed, without
public prosecutor having filed any comment despite, we repeat, several
extensions of time granted to the prosecution, within which to file
comment. This failure of the
prosecution to file said comment is a
clear defiance of, or at least a non-compliance with the order of 19
October 1988 of the respondent court. And such non-filing of the comment, on the part of the prosecution for
more than two (2) years, is undoubtedly an unreasonable failure or delay.

In civil cases, Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides
as follows:

“If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order
of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court’s own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise provided by court.” (Underscoring supplied)

In criminal cases, the rules are quite similar. Under Section 1(h), Rule 115, Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the rights of the accused is the right “to
have a speedy, impartial and public trial.” A denial of this right entitles the accused to a dismissal of
the case, upon filing the appropriate motion to dismiss; and the dismissal
operates as an acquittal.^[12]

In the cited Quizada case, the Court held:

“There are only two occasions when double jeopardy will attach
even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is when the
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a
speedy trial.”

In Bermisa vs. Court of Appeals,^[13]
it was held that the right to a speedy trial is denied the accused “where
through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, the
accused is forced to wait many months or years for trial.” And in Domingo
vs. Minister of National Defense,^[14] we
said that “there is no disputing the proposition that the non- observance
of the constitutional mandate that the accused in all criminal prosecutions
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial can result in the loss of the
right of the government to prosecute him for the crime of which he is charged,
and the accused is entitled to be released on habeas corpus; and that the
dismissal of the case based on that ground would amount to an acquittal.”

In the criminal cases at bench, it is clear that the prosecution
failed to prosecute them for an unreasonable length of time. The fiscal (assistant provincial prosecutor)
who was handling the subject cases and who under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is responsible for their direction and
control, failed in this task.

As correctly pointed out by respondent court, it is not a
sufficient excuse to say that the delay in the prosecution of the cases at
bench was due to the fact that private prose­cutor was not furnished a copy of
the motion to quash, upon which motion respondent court ordered the prosecution
to com­ment. We agree with the
respondent court that it is enough that the trial fiscal was furnished a copy
of the motion to quash and the prosecution ordered to comment thereon.

Moreover, since there was non-compliance for an unreason­able
length of time with the order of the respondent court to file comment on the
aforecited motion to quash – which constituted a failure to prosecute the cases
– they were properly dismissable. However, the motion to quash the informations was not strictly the
proper remedy, because a denial of the right to speedy trial is not one of the
grounds (Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure) upon
which a motion to quash a complaint or information may be grounded. The denial of the accused’s right to speedy
trial as a consequence of the prosecution’s failure to prosecute for over two
(2) years gave rise to a motion to dismiss. The cases were properly dismissable on this score.

It will also be noted that the respondent court in its order of
30 August 1991 granted the motion to quash on the additional ground of
prescription. It ruled that since the
offense of libel prescribes within one (1) year (in accordance with Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code), and further considering that the informations at
bench were filed only in May 1988, or more than one (1) year after the alleged
libelous article was published, the crimes charged had already prescribed when
the informations were filed.

While it may be true that prescription of offenses is a ground
upon which a motion to quash may
be anchored – on the theory that criminal liability has, in effect, been
extinguished – we do not again agree with the respondent court that the libel,
if any, had prescribed when the informations were filed.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

“ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. – The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, x x x and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.” (underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the criminal complaint was filed with the
office of the prosecutor on 10 April 1987. The alleged libelous article was published on 07 April 1987. Hence, the complaint was filed with the
prosecutor’s office three (3) days after the publication of the alleged
libelous article. Thus, the running of
the prescriptive period was interrupted on 10 April 1987.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
filing of a complaint in the fiscal’s office interrupts the period of
prescription.^[15]

All told, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal cases at
bench is proper on the ground of the prosecution’s failure to prosecute the
cases which, as a consequence, denied the private respondents their right to a
speedy trial.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed orders of respondent court,
dated 30 August 1991 and 16 December 1991, rendered in Criminal Case Nos.
73490-92 are SET ASIDE. But the res­pondent
court is ordered to DISMISS said criminal cases against private respondents,
with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Nocon, and
Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-5

^[2]
Ibid, p. 5

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 5 and 31

^[4]
Ibid, p. 20

^[5]
Ibid, pp. 20-22

^[6]
Rollo, p.23

^[7]
Ibid, pp. 23-26

^[8]
Ibid, p. 27-32

^[9]
Ibid, p. 3

^[10]
Rollo, p. 31

^[11]
Rollo, p. 31

^[12]
People vs. Baladjay, G.R. Nos. L-26915-18, 30 March 1982, 113 SCRA 284;
Esmena vs. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, 20 February 1981, 102 SCRA 861; and
People vs. Quizada, G.R. Nos. 61079-81, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 516.

^[13]
G.R. No. L-32506, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 136

^[14]
G.R. No. 55212, 02 September 1983, En Banc 124 SCRA 529

^[15]
G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538