G.R. Nos. 102949-51. May 28, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUS LAGNAS, AGUSTIN LAGNAS, CORITO ARRIESGADO AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED, JESUS LAGNAS, AGUSTIN LAGNAS AND CORITO ARRIESGADO, AC…
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Jesus Lagnas, Agustin Lagnas and Corito
Arriesgado were indicted on August 3, 1988 in Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-918,
TCS-919 and TCS-920 of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, of
three (3) crimes of murder, each of which was charged in a separate amended
information of the following substantially identical tenor:
(1) Amended Information in Crim. Case No. TCS-918
“The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
hereby accuses JESUS LAGNAS, AGUSTIN LAGNAS, CORITO ARRIESGADO, MARCIAL
ARRIESGADO, GODIE ARRIESGADO, ROMEO ARRIESGADO, HELEN
ARRIESGADO, MELANIA ARRIESGADO, AND JOHN DOES of the crime of
Murder, committed as follows:
That on the 3rd day of March, 1988 at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon
at Barangay Agbanga, Municipality of Asturias, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with the accused who are referred to herein as JOHN DOES, their names
and identities not being established, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, armed with (G)arands, carbines, shot gun (sic) and other
types of firearms, with intent to kill, did then and there, with treachery and
evident premeditation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously waylay, attack,
assault and shoot ALEJANDRO ARIAS, a member of the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Force (ICHDF), hitting said ALEJANDRO ARIAS on different parts of his
body, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[1]
(2) Amended information in Crim. Case No. TCS-919
“The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
hereby accuses JESUS LAGNAS, AGUSTIN LAGNAS, CORITO ARRIESGADO, GODIE
ARRIESGADO, MARCIAL ARRIESGADO, ROMEO ARRIESGADO, HELEN
ARRIESGADO, MELANIA ARRIESGADO, and JOHN DOES of the crime of
Murder, committed as follows:
That on the 3rd day of March, 1988, at 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon at Barangay Agbanga, Municipality of Asturias, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with the accused who are referred to herein as
JOHN DOES, their names and identities not being established, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with (G)arands, carbines,
shot guns (sic) and other types of firearms, with intent to kill, did then and
there, with treachery and evident premeditation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously waylay, attack, assault and shoot VENANCIO NARA, a member of the
Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF), hitting said VENANCIO NARA on
different parts of his body, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[2]
(3) Amended Information in Crim. Case No.
TCS-920
“The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
hereby accuses JESUS LAGNAS, AGUSTIN LAGNAS, CORITO ARRIESGADO, GODIE
ARRIESGADO, ROMEO ARRIESGADO, MARCIAL ARRIESGADO, HELEN
ARRIESGADO, MELANIA ARRIESGADO, and JOHN DOES of the crime of
Murder, committed as follows:
That on the 3rd day of March, 1988 at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon
at Barangay Agbanga, Municipality of Asturias, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with the accused who are referred to herein as John Does, their names
and identities not being established, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, armed with (G)arands, carbines, shot guns (sic) and other
types of firearms, with intent to kill, did then and there, with treachery and
evident premeditation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously waylay, attack,
assault and shoot VIVENCIO MADRID, a member of the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Force (ICHDF), hitting said Vivencio Madrid on different parts of his
body, thereby causing instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3]
Duly assisted by counsel, herein appellants pleaded not guilty at
the arraignment,[4]
while the rest of the accused who were not apprehended and are at large were
never arraigned. A joint trial was
thereafter conducted insofar as appellants were concerned.[5]
Incidentally, the records are not clear on why the five additional accused were
included in the amended informations, much less on their supposed complicity in
the incident. In fact, the sole witness
of the prosecution on this point, Renato Sevilla, testified that on that
occasion he never saw the accused Marcial, Dodie, Romeo, Helen and Melanie
Arriesgado.[6]
The Solicitor General summarizes the factual antecedents of these
cases as perceived by the prosecution, with page references to the transcripts
of the stenographic notes of the trial, as follows:
“x x x on March 3, 1988, at about, 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, prosecution eyewitness Renato Sevilla, a member of the Integrated
Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF) and residing at Old Bago, Asturias, Cebu,
was with his fellow ICHDF members Vivencio Madrid, Venancio Nara and Alejandro
Arias and civilians Wenceslao Ynoy and Madrid’s wife Flor(i)sita. Three of them were armed with firearms. They were on their way home and while
passing by a river and walking uphill, they were ambushed or gunshots were
fired towards their direction at Barangay Agbanga, Asturias, Cebu. Venancio Nara was hit immediately by bullets
fired from a (G)arand rifle and fell down the river. He was hit on the breast and his head was blown off and (he) died
instantaneously. Alejandro Arias was
also hit by bullets from a (G)arand rifle or rifles on the front and at the
back column of his body and likewise died immediately. Vivencio Madrid was also hit by bullets and
was brought to a hospital where he expired later. Wenceslao Ynoy was also hit by bullets on the arms but survived
and went or migrated to Mindanao (pp. 2-4, t.s.n., November 22, 1989).
“Because Sevilla was already alone and could not fire back, be
had to run away but before doing so he had to first advise and let Flor(i)sita
Madrid run away ahead of him and as he looked back at Flor(i)sita who was
behind him he saw and positively identified appellants Jesus Lagnas, Agustin
Lagnas and Corito Arriesgado from a distance of five (5) meters as among their
ambushers. He knew appellants for a
long time already because Jesus Lagnas and he are neighbors while Agustin
Lagnas resided in Barangay Baye and Corito Arriesgado lived in the adjacent
Barangay Bairan. Jesus and Agustin
Lagnas were armed with (G)arand rifles while Corito Arriesgado was armed with a
carbine rifle (sic) (pp. 4-7, t.s.n. November 22, 1989).
“The following day, or March 4, 1988, Sevilla and his
superior, Lt. Manuel, accompanied by their comrades, proceeded to the scene of
the incident, sought and found appellants at the house of Jesus Lagnas where
they were arrested and later brought to the police station at Lutopan. The relatives of the victims Venancio Nara,
Alejandro Arias and Vivencio Madrid and of the injured Wenceslao Ynoy were also
informed of what happened to their kins (pp. 8-9, t.s.n. November 22,
1989).”[7]
On the other hand, the defense presents the following statement
of facts, likewise with page references to the transcript of stenographic notes,
to wit:
“The accused are young, carefree, and typical farmhands of the
mountain barangays of Bairan, and Baye, Asturias, Cebu, Philippines. At the time of their arrest at dawn that
Sunday of 6 March 1988 (Q3, pp. 5, TSN-marilyn t. oliverio, 24 June 1991),
Agustin Lagnas was only seventeen (17) years old, Jesus Lagnas, twenty-three
(23) years old, and Cor(i)to Arriesgado, twenty-six (26) years old. The first two are brothers while the third
is the brother-in-law, the latter having married the sister of the Lagnas
brothers.
“As usual for the three (3) accused in their pursuit to earn a
living for their families, accused-appellant, Agustin Lagnas got himself hired
in the farm of Gregoria Limutin Trocio, in Bgy. Bairan, Asturias, Cebu, from 29
February 1988 up to, and including 4 March 1988 (Q4, pp. 3, TSN-M.D. Destura,
5 August 1991).
“From 29 February 1988 to 4 March 1988, Agustin Lagnas was
home in Bgy. Bairan not earlier than 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon (Q5, pp. 4,
TSN-M.D. Destura, 5 August 1991).
“Accused-appellant, Cor(i)to Arriesgado, was contracted by the
Bgy. Councilor of Bgy. Baye, Emiliano Casas, to cut fifty (50) bamboos in the
house of the latter the whole day of 3 March 1988 (Q1, pp. 4, TSN-marilyn t.
olivero, 24 June 1991). On this day of
3 March 1988, Cor(i)to Arriesgado, was in the house of Casas from 7:00 o’clock
in the morning, and went off only at past 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon (Q6,
pp. 3, TSN-marilyn t. oliverio, 24 June 1991).
“Similarly, Jesus Lagnas was also preoccupied with his
employment in the farm owned by Generoso Sevilla, the whole day of 3 March
1988, from 7:00 o’clock in the morning until 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon (Q3,
pp. 3, TSN-A.A. Delica, 24 April 1991). This farm is located in Bgy. Baye, Asturias, Cebu.
“Meanwhile, an ambush killing which resulted in the death of
three (3) ICHDF men, namely: Vivencio
Madrid, Venancio Nara, and Alejandro Arias, and the wounding of one civilian,
Wenceslao (Y)noy, occurred at Bgy. Agbanga, Asturias, Cebu, at 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon of 3 March 1988 (Q7, pp. 3, TSN a.g. mansueto, 22 November
1989). Barangay Agbanga is a two-hour
hilly walk from Bgy. Baye, and about the same hours of travel on foot from Bgy.
Bairan, with no transportation available.
“Said ambush involved the lone prosecution witness, Renato
Sevilla, a member of the ICHDF, Vivencio Madrid, Florisita Madrid (wife of
Vivencio), Venancio Nara, Wenceslao (Y)noy, and Alejandro Arias. Of the six, Renato Sevilla, Florisita Madrid,
and Wenceslao (Y)noy survived the ambush (Q13 & 15, pp. 4, TSN-a.g.
mansueto, 22 November 1989).
“On 6 March 1988, at 3:00 o’clock dawn on a Sunday, the three
(3) accused-appellants who passed the night at the house of accused-appellant,
Jesus Lagnas, in Bgy. Baye were arrested on suspicion of complicity in the
ambush?killing.”[8]
Reposing credence in the submissions of the prosecution, the
court below rendered judgment jointly in the three cases on October 18, 1991,[9]
disposing in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this
Court finds accused, Jesus Lagnas, Agustin Lagnas and Corito Arriesgado:
1. In Crim. Case No.
TCS-918 – guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentence(s) all the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to jointly and solidarily indemnify the Hrs. (sic) of
the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost;
2. In Crim. Case No.
TCS-919 – finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 RPC and hereby sentence(s) all the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to jointly and solidarily indemnify the Hrs. (sic) of
the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost;
3. In Crim. Case No.
TCS-920 – finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 RPC and hereby septence(s) all the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to jointly and solidarily indemnify the Hrs. of the
offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost;
However, they are given full credit of (sic) their preventive
imprisonment provided they complied with the rules and regulations of a
convicted prisoner (sic).
SO ORDERED.”[10]
In a bid to obtain the reversal of the lower court’s judgment,
appellants have come to us, faulting the court below with the following
errors: (1) The lower court erred in
outrightly disregarding accused’s defense of alibi and denial; and (2) The
lower court erred in convicting the accused upon the untruthful,
uncorroborated, and therefore incredible testimony of the lone prosecution
witness, where it appears that there are several witnesses to the commission of
the crime of murder.[11]
It is a cardinal rule in our criminal justice system that to
deprive a person of his precious life or liberty, the evidence against him must
stand the crucible test of reasonable doubt to overthrow the constitutionally
guaranteed presumption of innocence he has in his favor. This proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral
certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability.[12]
While it is a rule that the findings of the judge who tried the
case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal, this Court will
not hesitate to take exception to this rule on finality of the trial court’s
factual findings if there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case.[13]
In the cases at bar, the conviction of herein appellants was
predicated on the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Renato
Sevilla. We are, therefore, constrained
to put the latter’s alleged eyewitness testimony in the lower court under close
scrutiny and meticulous evaluation in order to determine whether or not the
evidence of the prosecution anchored on that sole evidentiary mooring is strong
enough to produce conviction under an impartial assessment.
Our review and calibration of the testimony of this witness
reveals that he is sorely lacking in that desirable and indispensable
consistency which would inspire belief in his credibility or even in the
accuracy of his vaunted observations both of the details of the incident and
the dramatis personae therein. We do not agree, as the prosecution expectedly argues, that the
conflicting statements of the witness pointed out by the defense[14]
are supposedly only minor or trivial in nature. On the contrary, we are convinced that the credibility of witness
Sevilla has been seriously eroded and gravely placed in dubiety by his very own
assertions on the witness stand and, as we have discerned, by his obvious
tendency to improvise upon being confronted with his errors and when he could
not credibly gloss over the same.
Firstly, when asked what he did during the attack on his group,
this was what he said:
“Q What did you do at that time?
A I ran, Sir, because I
was alone left (sic) and I could not fire back. I just ran away.[15]
x x x
Q Now, what did you do
after seeing and looking back (at) the three persons?
A I ran away.
Q Towards where?
A I ran towards another
barrio, Banban, sir.”[16]
On cross-examination, however, he admittedly injected a
completely new improvisation to his original story, thus:
“Q In
the actual shooting when you saw Venancio Nara was hit did you also see
Vivencio Madrid being hit?
A Yes, but before he was
hit the other group was hit so we were two who exchanged fires (sic) with the
armed men.
Q Now, you said that the two
of you exchanged fires (sic) with the armed men. Who were these two?
A V(i)vencio Madrid.
x x x
Q And who was the second
person who exchanged fires (sic) with the ambushers?
A I was the one who
exchanged fires (sic) also.
Q Now, you are now testifying
that you fired at the ambushers. Was it
not that you testified before this Honorable court on direct examination that
you were not able to fire your gun because it got stocked-up (sic)?
A Yes, when I crawled on
the ground my firearm was filled with sand or soil. That is why it got stocked up (sic).
x x x
Q And when you were asked
on the direct examination nothing was mentioned that you exchanged fires (sic)
with the armed men. It is only now that
you said that you exchanged fires (sic) with the armed men, is it correct?
A Yes,”[17]
If it were true that he did fire back at their attackers, he
could not have failed to mention this very significant detail in his sworn
statement which was executed on March 6, 1988, or three days after the ambush.[18]
It is evident that he was more likely to remember the details of the incident
at the time it happened, and forget them as the years pass by. In effect, this witness would want us to
subscribe to the idea that he could better remember the details of the event almost
three years later than when the same occurred and the facts were still fresh in
his mind.
Secondly, when he was made to realize that he had made several
contradictory statements in his affidavit vis-a-vis his testimony in open
court, he tried to cover up his tergiversation by blaming the one who prepared
his sworn statement. In the process,
however, the falsity of his subterfuge was readily exposed.
“Q x
x x why is it that in your direct examination you said that Agustin Lagnas
(was) armed with a (G)arand, and in your affidavit no. 23 you said that Agustin
Lagnas was armed with a shotgun, why is this so?
A The one who prepare(d)
the affidavit perhaps made an error.
x x x
Q Now, you signed your
sworn statement which is also marked as Exh. 1-A, and when you signed this
sworn statement, was it not read to you before you signed?
A No, it was not read, I
just signed it.
Q But it was given to you
to be read?
A No, it (was) just shown
to me.
Q Did you not insist in
reading it?
A No.
Q You did not also insist
(on) having it read before you?
A No, sir I (was) just
merely told that this is the affidavit.”[19]
Unfortunately for this witness, he had obviously forgotten that
he had previously given an altogether different story on this score:
“Q Now,
Mr. Sevilla, this sworn statement that you have executed on the 6th day of
March 1988 was prepared by Sgt. Carmelo V. Enriquez. Before you signed this, did you read the contents of this sworn
statement, or was this sworn statement read to you by Sgt. Carmelo Enriquez?
A It was read to me by
Carmelo Enriquez.
Q Now, after having read,
or after this sworn statement of yours ha(d) been read to you and having found
no objection therein, that was the time you signed your affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes.”[20]
It is a pity, but likewise a disgusting situation, that with the
hopes of the prosecution’s case having been pinned on the credible performance
of their star witness, the latter not only failed to deliver creditably but
actually revealed that the truth did not sit on his lips which, instead,
articulated the prevarications so often condemned but just as often perpetrated
in court.
Thirdly, when asked to identify the malefactors, which
identification is the testimonial linchpin of a criminal prosecution, Sevilla
this time crowned his nauseating travesty of the judicial process by committing
another irreversible blunder:
“Q Now,
how long have you known Jesus Lagnas?
A Since my boyhood until I
reached the age of reason.
Q Why, where is your house
located and the house of Jesus Lagnas?
A Just opposite each
other.
Q How long have you known
Agustin Lagnas?
A I do not know how many
years, but it is quite a long time ago.
Q Now, where is his house
and your house located?
A The house of Agustin
Lagnas is located at Bairan, Asturias, Cebu.
Q Why do you know Agustin
Lagnas?
A That Bairan and Baye are
just adjacent barangays, that is why I know Agustin Lagnas.
Q How about Corito
Arriesgado, how long have you known him?
A I do not know how many
years.
Q Would it be more then two
(2) years?
A More than two (2) years.
x x x
Q If they are in the
courtroom could you identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to
them.
A (Witness pointing to a
man wearing yellow T-shirt).
Atty. Kinaadman:
I would like to make it
of record that the witness was pointing to a person whom he called as Jesus
Lagnas, and the accused answered (by) the name Corito Arriesgado,
Your Honor.
Fiscal Truya:
Q The other accused, can
you point to him?
A (Witness pointing to the
accused).
Atty. Kinaadman:
We make it of record that the witness pointed
to a person whom he called as Jesus Lagnas, and yet the person answered
by the name of Agustin Lagnas, Your Honor.
Fiscal Truya:
Q You
made mention of Cor(i)to. Where is he
now?
Atty. Kinaadman:
Your Honor, I would like
to take note that Cor(i)to Arriesgado already answered his name when he
was referred to as Jesus Lagnas by the witness.”[21]
It is true that in People vs. Reception,[22]
we held that “(i)dentification of a person is not established solely
through knowledge of the name of that person. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face,
is actually the best way to identify the person.” Nevertheless,
considering the factual circumstances of these cases, the aforequoted ruling is
not adverse but even favorable to the prosecution. Renato Sevilla asserted that he knew the appellants very well, in
fact over a period of years and with proximity in their residences. It would, therefore, be unimaginable, if not
downright impossible, for him not to have properly identified them. Moreover, in the rural areas of the
provinces, people tend to be familiar with their neighbors names or identities,
and even the relatives, genealogical lineage and social antecedents of the
latter.
In view of the foregoing demonstrated facts, the consistent
ruling of this Court that where conditions of visibility are favorable and the
witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his other
assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted,[23]
is inapplicable to the cases at bar. Furthermore, witness Sevilla strongly appears to be biased against
appellants considering that the latter rejected his offer to join him in the
Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF).[24]
Contrary to the lower court’s observation,[25]
we find such rejection sufficient to provoke Sevilla to implicate herein
appellants since their refusal of ICHDF membership could have been construed by
him to mean, as he did repeatedly imply,[26]
that their sympathies were with the Communists whose rebellious activities the
ICHDF was created to suppress.
We also cannot but wonder why the two other victims, Wenceslao
Ynoy and Florisita Madrid, were not presented in court. With regard to the latter, her testimony was
ordered dispensed with when she failed to show up despite several routine
notices.[27]
We know that it is up for the prosecution to determine who to present as
witnesses.[28]
However, as in the instant case, when the lone prosecution witness committed
inexplicable testimonial lapses which virtually rendered unacceptable any
pretense as to his credibility, the prosecution’s passivity is significant and
revealing. Ynoy and Madrid, both
supposed eyewitnesses to the incident, should necessarily have been presented
to corroborate and bolster Sevilla’s testimony and it was definitely within the
capability and power of the State to arrange for or compel their presence in
court. For, it is the obligation of the
prosecution to prove its allegations, not of the defense to disprove them.[29]
Besides, since Florisita Madrid is the wife of the victim, Vivencio Madrid, it
is to be expected that she would normally be interested and more conscientious
in pursuing the case to demand and exact justice from the felons. The failure on the part of the prosecution
to produce these witnesses under the obtaining circumstances gives rise to the
presumption that, if produced, their testimony would be adverse to the case for
the prosecution.[30]
Now, it is true that appellants rely heavily on their defense of
alibi. While alibi is admittedly a weak
defense, this Court, however, does not at once look upon it with disfavor nor
does the Court have a mental prejudice against the accused who use it as their
defense, for the defense of alibi does not relieve the prosecution of the
required quantum of proof. Further, the
rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven has never been intended to shift
the burden of proof in criminal cases.[31]
It is also the rule that for alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of its
commission.[32]
In the instant cases, we believe that the defense has sufficiently established
that it was physically impossible or, at the least, highly improbable for
appellants to be at the scene of the incident at the time of the ambuscade.
Gregoria Limutin Trocio categorically established that appellant
Agustin Lagnas worked for her in her farm at Barangay Bairan up to 4:30 in the
afternoon of March 3, 1988.[33]
Generoso Sevilla was positive that at 4:30 P.M. on the same date, appellant
Jesus Lagnas was actually still working in his farm at Barangay Baye.[34]
As for Corito Arriesgado, he finished cutting bamboos for Emiliano Casas, at
5:00 P.M. at Barangay Baye.[35]
These witnesses, therefore, proved without contradiction that appellants worked
with them until at least 4:30 P.M. or even later, and that none of them had
left earlier.
The same witnesses, including herein appellants, likewise
sufficiently demonstrated that the distance between Barangays Baye and Bairan,
where the later were working, and Barangay Agbanga, where the ambush
transpired, and the nature or condition of the road between these places made
it virtually impossible for appellants to traverse the same and be at Barangay
Agbanga at 5:30 P.M. when the attack happened. Gregoria Limutin Trocio informed the trial court thereof, in answer to these
questions:
“Q Do
you know a barangay Agbanga?
A Yes.
Q How far is your place to
barangay Agbanga?
A If walking, it is around
3 hours walk. Maybe 5 to 7 kilometers.
Q Now, how do you go to
Agbanga riding a vehicle?
A By walking.
Q Could it not be passable
by a vehicle?
A No.”[36]
On his part, Emiliano Casas declared:
“Q What
is the means of transportation in going to Agbanga from Baye?
A No vehicle will go to
our place because there is no road.”[37]
which appellant Jesus Lagnas corroborated
from the aspect of travel time:
“Q How
far is that from Baye?
A Quite far. When a person will take a walk, it will
reach around two hours.”[38]
Appellant Corito Arriesgado explained the topographical problems
and difficulty of travel between the places involved:
“Q Do
you know how far is Agbanga to Baye?
A Quite far, if we have to
walk it could be reach(ed) more or less two (2) hours.
Q Could the place be
negotiated by a vehicle?
A If there is no flood the
vehicle can pass to that place because it can pass on the river, if there is
flood no vehicle can pass that place.”[39]
and this was confirmed by appellant
Agustin Lagnas without any countervailing reaction from the prosecution:
“Q How
far is the place (from) Agbanga to Bairan?
A In walking it took two
hours.
Q Could it be negotiated by
passenger bus?
A No, sir.”[40]
It is also worth mentioning that the
place where the ambush happened is a mountainous area.[41]
This and the aforestated facts were never refuted by the prosecution.
Besides, considering the nature of ambuscades, to be able to
participate therein appellants had necessarily to be at the scene of the
incident several minutes before the attack so as to insure its success. There should be sufficient time for the
attackers, even assuming that there had already been due pre-arrangement, but on
which not even a scintilla of evidence has been adduced, to position themselves
and lie in wait for their prey. On the
contrary, it was convincingly attested that appellants left their respective
places of work not earlier than 4:30 P.M. of that day. They, therefore, could not even have reached
the scene of the crime at 5:30 P.M., considering the distance and the nature of
the road to be travelled on, as earlier explained. It would then be impossible for them to have prepared themselves
in time for staging the ambush imputed to them.
Finally, it is also noteworthy that the aforementioned defense
witness Generoso Sevilla, who testified in favor of appellant Jesus Lagnas, is
the younger brother of the lone prosecution witness, Renato Sevilla.[42]
We are of the reasoned belief that what motivated the former to contradict his
brother’s testimony is none other than the sincere desire to divulge and stand
for the truth and do justice to the innocent appellants. There is no evidence to the contrary.
Implementing the Constitutional mandate, it is embodied in our
Rules of Court that “(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.”[43]
This principle of universal acceptance has led us to the oft-quoted ruling that
-?
“Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of
innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment.”[44]
It is likewise basic in our criminal laws that the prosecution
cannot draw its strength from the weakness of the defense. The evidence of the People must be strong
enough to stand on its own two feet instead of leaning on the crutches of the
evidence for the defense. It must be
strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock must be
punished, not because he cannot prove that he is innocent, but because it has proved
that he is guilty.[45]
Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative
consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the “equipoise”
rule finds application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.[46]
Indeed, the confluence of the proven circumstances against the cause championed
by the prosecution, especially the tenuous identification of appellants within
an ambience of mercurial testimony, of the lone eyewitness offered by the
prosecution, must ineluctably result in a favorable verdict for the defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment is
hereby REVERSED and another one is rendered ACQUITTING herein
accused-appellants Jesus Lagnas, Agustin Lagnas and Corito Arriesgado of the
crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-918, TCS-919 and TCS-920 of the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, with costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered, absent any lawful cause for their further detention.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
*
This enumeration of the names of the accused is taken from the caption of the
joint decision of the trial court in Crim. Cases Nos. TCS-918, 919 and 920
(Original Record, Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 265), rather than the enumeration of
the accused charged and named in the amended informations filed in said cases,
apparently because these three accused stood trial while the others were never
apprehended, arraigned or tried.
[1]
Original Record, Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 52-53.
[2]
Ibid., Crim. Case No. TCS-919, 21-22.
[3]
Ibid., Crim. Case No. TCS-920, 11-12.
[4]
Ibid., Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 119.
[5]
Ibid., 266.
[6]
TSN, April 10, 1990, 8-9.
[7]
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, 5-8.
[8]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 2-4.
[9]
Per Judge Gualberto P. Delgado.
[10]
Original Record, Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 272.
[11]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 1.
[12]
People vs. Bacus, 204 SCRA 81 (1991).
[13]
People vs. De la Torre, 198 SCRA 663 (1991); People vs. Yambao,
193 SCRA 571 (1991).
[14]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 7-12.
[15]
TSN, November 22, 1989, 4-5.
[16]
Ibid., id., 8.
[17]
TSN, January 8, 1990, 5-6.
[18]
Original Record, Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 24-26.
[19]
TSN, April 10, 1990, 3-4.
[20]
TSN, January 8, 1990, 7-8.
[21]
TSN, November 22, 1989, 5-7.
[22]
198 SCRA 670 (1991).
[23]
People vs. Alvarez, 169 SCRA 730 (1989).
[24]
TSN, Apri1 24, 1991, 2; TSN, June 24, 1991, 4-6.
[25]
Original Record, Crim. Case No. TCS-918, 271.
[26]
TSN, November 22, 1989, 2; January 8, 1990, 2.
[27]
Ibid., id., 187.
[28]
People vs. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553 (1991).
[29]
People vs. de Guzman, 194 SCRA 601 (1991).
[30]
Section 5(e), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[31]
People vs. Salguero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991).
[32]
People vs. Cinco, 194 SCRA 535 (1991).
[33]
TSN, January 28, 1991, 3-5.
[34]
TSN, January 29, 1991, 4.
[35]
TSN, April 19, 1991, 3.
[36]
TSN, January 28, 1991, 5.
[37]
TSN, April 19, 1991, 6.
[38]
TSN, April 24, 1991, 4.
[39]
TSN, June 24, 1991, 6-7.
[40]
TSN, August 5, 1991, 4-5.
[41]
TSN, January 8, 1990, 4.
[42]
TSN, April 19, 1991, 7.
[43]
Section 1(a), Rule 115, Rules of Court.
[44]
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60 (1971).
[45]
People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 601 (1991).
[46]
People vs. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 (1986).