PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GODOFREDO SAYAT, ALIAS “BOBBY” OR “BUBOY,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The conventional attribution is that lust is the motivating cause
for rape, although a view is held that this crime is actually a misguided and
blatant mode of domination by one gender over the other. Regardless of the sociological cause, the
law considers rape as one of the most odious offenses. It becomes more abominable where the rape
victim is a minor whose innocent world is suddenly shattered, leaving her with
the psychological wounds from her traumatic experience as she faces an
uncertain future. The unkindest cut, so
to speak, is when the transgressor is the victim’s own kin. The confluence of such detestable
circumstances in what is by itself already a heinous crime against chastity is
exemplified by the present case.

Accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat, alias “Bobby” or
“Buboy,” was charged with five crimes of rape in five separate
criminal complaints subscribed by eight-year old Marites Sayat and docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 85574, 85575, 85576, 85577 and 85578 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156. Except for the dates of commission of each felony, which is August 28,
1990 in Criminal Case No. 85578, August 29, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85574,
August 30, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85575, August 31, 1990 in Criminal Case
No. 85576 and September 1, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85577, said complaints
were identically formulated, to wit:

“That on or about x x x in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of threat, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant, Maritess (sic) P. Sayat, a minor of eight years old, (sic) against
her will and consent.”^[1]

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges when
arraigned. After a consolidated trial
of said cases, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 15, 1991
disposing as follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused
GODOFREDO SAYAT alias ‘BOBBY’ or ‘BUBOY’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of RAPE, defined and penalized under Article 335(3) of the Revised
Penal Code, and with the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, on five (5) counts, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of five (5) reclusion perpetua with all the corresponding
accessory penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua in each of the five
(5) criminal cases — ­Crim. Case No. 85574, Crim. Case No. 85575, Crim. Case
No. 85576, Crim. Case No. 85577, and Crim. Case No. 85578, to indemnify the
victim, Marites P. Sayat in the amount of P30,000.00 in compliance with the
mandate of Articles 100, 104(3), 107 and 345 of the Revised Penal
Code and to pay the costs.

“In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited
in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment and in any event not to
exceed forty (40) years in line with the Three-Fold Rule.”^[2]

Dissatisfied with the decision, appellant interposed the instant
appeal, faulting the court below with a lone assigned error, that is, in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.^[3]

We find the synthesis made by the Solicitor General of the
antecedent material facts of this case to be accurate and supported by the
records, hence we adopt and reproduce the same:

“The prosecution’s version of the incident is anchored
principally on the testimony of the offended party Marites Sayat. Born on January 28, 1982, she was only nine
years old when she was made to recount at the witness stand on May 2,1991 the
sordid details on how at age eight she was sexually violated five times by
appellant, her half-brother (‘kapatid sa ama’) 18 years her senior. They, along with Maribel Halino, a relative,
were then the only occupants of their house at No. 12 Camia Street, Marville
Subdivision, Barangay de la Paz, Pasig, Metro Manila. Their father was abroad working as a seaman, while Marites’
mother, Elisa Palicdon, was also abroad, in Hongkong, working as a domestic
helper. On August 28, 1990, appellant
ordered Marites, who was in
skirt and t-shirt to go to the second floor of their newly constructed house
just behind their old house. There,
appellant instructed Marites to lie down and to remove her panty. Also removing his shortpants and his
underwear, appellant then proceeded to rape Marites. He inserted his penis into the vagina of Marites. Marites felt pain. After achieving full penetration, appellant pulled out his penis
and then dressed up. He warned Marites
not to tell anyone about the incident (tsn., May 28, 1991, pp. 2-3).

“The following day, August 29, 1990, Marites was playing with
the family computer in the living room when appellant came out of his room and
again ordered her to go to the second floor of the newly constructed
house. Although aware that appellant
would rape her again, she nonetheless meekly obeyed as ordered because
appellant threatened to squeeze her neck and kill her. At the second floor of the newly constructed
house, appellant had sexual intercourse with Marites a second time (tsn., May
2, 1991, pp. 3-4).

“Then, on August 30, 1990, at about 6:00 o’clock in the
evening, appellant ordered Marites into his room. There, appellant removed his shorts and underwear and Marites’ panty. He switched off the light, got into his bed
and ordered Marites to mount him, threatening to kill her if she disobeys. Out of fear, Marites did as told and placed
herself on top (of the) appellant who inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant let his penis stay inside the
vagina for about two minutes, after which he pulled it out. He then switched on the light, dressed up
and told Marites to leave the room. (tsn., May 28, 1991, p. 4).

“In the afternoon of the following day, August 31, 1990, appellant
again ordered Marites to go to the second floor of the newly constructed
house. Thereat, appellant had sexual
intercourse with Marites for the fourth time that lasted for about four minutes
(tsn., May 28, 1991, pp. 4-5).

“On September 1, 1990, appellant again ordered Marites to go
to the second floor of the newly constructed house. However, while having sexual intercourse with Marites, appellant
heard Maribel Halino calling for Marites. Whereupon, appellant hurriedly dressed up and went downstairs (tsn., May
28, 1991, p. 5).

“Earlier that day, appellant and Marites were watching
television at the living room when Maribel Halino went to the bathroom to take
a bath. However, when Maribel Halino
went out of the the bathroom ten minutes later, she observed appellant and
Marites already gone. She then started
looking for them, calling out Marites’ name. Then she saw appellant and Marites coming down the stairs of the newly
constructed house. As she observed that
Marites was trembling and looking very much afraid, she asked appellant what he
had done to her. But appellant replied
that he had done nothing (Exhibit ‘D’). When Maribel Halino asked Marites what appellant had done to her,
Marites too answered none. Marites was
afraid that if she would tell what really had transpired, appellant would kill
her (tsn., May 28, 1991).

“On November 22, 1990, when Elisa Palicdon, Marites’ mother,
arrived home from Hongkong, Maribel Halino informed her of the incident of
September 1, 1990. Forthwith, Elisa Palicdon
asked Marites who divulged all that appellant had done to her. Elisa Palicdon then brought her daughter to
the PC Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where the latter
was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas (tsn., June 19, 1991, pp. 2-3). x x x.”^[4]

On November 23, 1990, Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas conducted a physical
examination of the complainant and found that the complainant’s hymen was
congested with a healed laceration at 3:00 o’clock. He concluded that complainant was no longer a virgin and said
laceration could have been sustained on the dates the five acts of rape took
place.^[5]

In his defense, appellant alleged that during the dates Marites
was reportedly raped, he stayed with his common-law wife in a house in Altura,
Sampaloc, Manila and did not return to their house at Marville Subdivision,
Pasig until two weeks later.^[6]

It is a fundamental evidentiary rule that the prosecution has the
onus probandi of establishing the
guilt of the accused, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probatio non qui negat, that
is, he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. This is specially significant in rape cases for, generally, in
the prosecution thereof the only two parties who can testify as to the
occurrence are the complainant and the accused. More often than not, their respective testimonies are
diametrically contradictory as to what really happened. ^[7]

Aware of the caveat that the testimony of a woman crying
rape must be scrutinized with extreme caution, the Court has painstakingly assessed
the records of the case and is convinced that appellant’s guilt has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence with the requisite quantum under the law.

Marites Sayat, at the time of the commission of the crimes, was
only eight years of age. Under
paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, statutory rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age. In this specie of rape, neither force by the
man nor resistance from the woman forms an element of the crime and apparent
consent thereto will be of no avail, any more than in the case of a child who
may actually consent but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal
consent.^[8]
The law presumes that the victim on account of her tender years, does not and cannot
have a will of her own.^[9] The
heart of the matter is the violation of a child’s incapacity to discern evil
from good.^[10]

The simplicity and spontaneity of the testimony of Marites
convinces us that she was telling the truth about her being sexually abused. Marites was able to categorically narrate in
simple terms, without vacillation and in a straightforward manner, how
appellant successively violated her and threatened her against revealing what
happened.

It bears stressing that the credibility given by the trial court
to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence.^[11]
For having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses while testifying, the trial court, more than the reviewing tribunal,
is in a better position to gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the
relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties.^[12]

However, appellant puts emphasis on the following testimony of
the offended party as proof of her alleged lack of credibilty:

“Q:  During the first
incident, you looked at the clock in order for you to compute the time?

A:   When I heard that he was opening his door, I immediately looked at
the watch because I knew that he would do something to me.”^[13]

Appellant asserts that the offended party
could not possibly have suspected his sinister motives before the alleged
incident happened. Such statement,
appellant argues, reveals that the charge of rape was a prevarication. We do not agree.

As aptly and correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the
offended party misunderstood the question. In her answer she speaks of hearing a door opened. The first time she was raped, appellant
merely asked her to go to the second floor of the newly constructed house. Obviously, her answer does not refer to this
occasion as it cannot be related to any door being heard to have been
opened. However, the second time she
was raped, she was playing with the family computer in the living room when
appellant came out of his room. Here,
she speaks of appellant coming out of the room. The opening of the door which she heard can be related to this
statement. Clearly, herein complainant
must have been referring to this occasion when she answered the question.^[14]

In any event, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of a humiliating experience which are painful to
recall. The victim was testifying in
open court in the presence of strangers, about an extremely intimate matter not
normally talked about in public. Such
circumstances may be expected to cause the witness’ narration to be less than
letter-perfect.^[15]
Considering the courtroom atmosphere and her very tender age, Marites must be
lauded, for having recounted in a forthright manner an obviously harrowing
ordeal. A rape victim relives the
excruciating sexual assault everytime she is made to retell the story,
particulary if done in a public setting.

Marites testified that the first three sexual assaults lasted
three minutes each; the fourth, four minutes; and the last, two minutes.^[16]
Appellant advances the theory that the victim’s ability to recount in a precise
manner the duration of each sexual assault somehow diminishes the witness’
credibility. The Court believes
otherwise. These are merely
calculations or estimates of the periods involved in the commission of the
crime. What is controlling is the
complainant’s positive identification of appellant as the malefactor. Considering the tender age of Marites,
latitude must be granted in the appreciation of her testimony, particularly
where it refers to peripheral and minor details.

The testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is credible
where she has no motive to testify falsely against the accused.^[17]
Appellant, however, postulates that the instant rape cases were fabricated
because of a grudge against him by his stepmother, Elisa Palicdon, who is the
natural mother of victim Marites Sayat. Appellant contends that his father had a house built for him and his
common-law wife, but Palicdon wanted the house for herself, so the latter
instigated the charges against him.^[18]

The Court considers such attempted dialectics as constitutive of
a desperate proposition by one who feels that the hands of retributive justice
are closing in on him. It is highly
unlikely for a mother to concoct a fabricated charge of rape and thereby expose
her own child and family to disgrace and scandal. No mother in her right mind would ruin her daughter’s future by
subjecting her to ridicule and the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts merely for material gain. On the other hand, no other motive can be ascribed to complainant in
filing the rape charge, except her desire for justice and redress for the
despicable wrongs inflicted by appellant.^[19]

The Court notes that Elisa Palicdon was working as a domestic
helper in Hongkong during the period when the five acts of rape happened.^[20]
It is safe to surmise that her primary purpose in working abroad, like many
other overseas contract workers, is to provide a good life for her child. Her financial status was not so desperate
that she would willingly barter her daughter’s reputation and future for a
house. Hence, appellant’s assertion
that Elisa Palicdon’s ulterior motive in falsely charging him with rape is
merely due to monetary consideration does not merit any consideration.

Appellant further contends that complainant’s failure to inform
anyone about the repeated sexual assaults against her person undermines her
credibility. We reject this sub­mission. Delay in reporting the incident is not an
indication of a fabricated charge.^[21] En
contra, we have repeatedly held, and this is a matter of common
observation and knowledge, that the reactions or behavior of persons when confronted
with a shocking incident vary.^[22] Some
may immediately notify their trusted friend or relatives. Others prefer or feel compelled to suffer in
silence.

Complainant testified that appellant threatened to kill her. Evidently, a threat made to a young girl
would have a greater effective result than one made to an adult. Also, considering her immature mental state
and emotional development, said threat sufficed to cause her to conceal her
tribulations until she was interrogated by her mother. It is not uncommon for young girls to
conceal for some time the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist’s
threat on their lives.^[23]
Marites could have sincerely believed that appellant would carry out his
threats of death, thus intimidating her from divulging the incidents.

Appellant further insists that the failure of Maribel Halino to
take any concrete steps against him, despite her suspicion that something
questionable happened between appellant and Marites, meant that in reality
nothing actually happened. The records
show otherwise. It appears that on
September 1, 1990, Maribel Halino noticed that Marites was missing, so she
called for the latter. She then saw
appellant coming down the stairs with Marites following him. Marites appeared to be trembling and she
looked afraid of something. Maribel
immediately asked appellant what he did to Marites. Having gotten a negative response from appellant, Maribel
confronted Marites but the child was too afraid to talk. Sensing that something wrong had taken place
but having no evidence to back up such suspicion, she wrote to the child’s
mother who at that time was working in Hongkong, prompting the latter to return
to the Philippines.^[24]

In his bid for a reversal, appellant raised the discredited
defense of alibi. He testified that at
five o’clock in the afternoon of August 28, 1990, he was at Altura, Sampaloc,
Manila, having followed his common-law wife there after a quarrel. He supposedly stayed there for two
weeks. However, it must be noted that
complainant declared that in the afternoon of that date, she was raped for the
first time by appellant, without specifically mentioning the time of said
incident. It was then completely
possible for the first rape to have been committed prior to five o’clock that
afternoon. Appellant, however, made no
explanation whatsoever as to where he was that afternoon, aside from his
supposedly being with his common-law wife at a later hour thereof.

At any rate, suffice it to state that Altura, Sampaloc, Manila,
where he claims to have been at the time the five acts of rape were committed,
is not so far away from Marville Subdivision, Pasig where the incidents
happened. Alibi, as we have
interminably declared from time to time, is inherently a weak defense and, to
be given credence, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission.^[25]
Significantly, appellant failed to present his common-law wife to bolster or
even to just corroborate his defense of alibi. As we have held, such failure to present witnesses to sustain his alibi
is fatal for appellant.^[26]

Appellant asserts that the alternative circumstance of
relationship was never proven, hence it could not be considered as an aggravating
circumstance in the case at bar. It
appears that the certificate of live birth of Marites Sayat, although marked as
Exhibit “F” was not formally offered in evidence. Said document, therefore, cannot be taken
into account by the Court.

The identification of documentary evidence is different from its
formal offer. The first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit; the second is made when the party rests his case. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as exhibit does not mean that it will be or has been
offered as part of the evidence of the party.^[27] The
party may decide to formally offer it if he believes this will advance his
cause, but then, again, he may decide not to do so at all.^[28]
Appellant, therefore, is correct in his assertion that the alternative
circumstance of relationship between him and the victim can not be proved by
said document which was not submitted in court.

Unfortunately for said appellant, however, the victim
unequivocally testified that he is actually her half-brother (‘kapatid sa
ama’,)^[29]
and said declaration was never successfully refuted. Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. The word
“pedigree” includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives.^[30]

Declarations as to pedigree may not ordinarily be proved by
hearsay evidence or by affidavit; but except for evidence of reputation which
usually is limited to members of the family, any competent witness, including
the person to whom the declaration relates, may testify thereto. It has been held proper for one to testify
to facts of family history which relate to him, such as the identity of his
parents or other relatives or the place of his birth or his age.^[31]
Parenthetically, it will be observed that Marites and appellant bear the same
family name “Sayat.”

In sum, we find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings
and adjudicative conclusion of the trial court. However, in line with the present jurisprudential policy whenever
the crime of rape is attended by circum­stances which indicate greater
perversity on the part of the offender, the Court hereby increases the award of
moral damages to P50,000.00 for the complainant and her family.^[32]

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, except for the aforestated
increased award of P50,000.00 which accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat is
ordered to pay, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Record, 106-107.

^[2]
Ibid., 114.

^[3]
Appellant’s Brief, 1; Rollo,
34.

^[4]
Appellee’s Brief, 3-8; Rollo, 70-75.

^[5]
TSN, August 12, 1991, 2-3.

^[6]
Ibid., September 6, 1991, 26.

^[7]
People vs. Pizarro, 211 SCRA 325 (1992).

^[8]
People vs. Race, Jr., 212 SCRA 90 (1992).

^[9]
People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393 (1990).

^[10]
People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329 (1990).

^[11]
People vs. Abuyan, 211 SCRA 662 (1992).

^[12]
People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 (1991).

^[13]
TSN, May 28, 1991, 7.

^[14]
Appellee’s Brief, 11-12; Rollo, 78-79.

^[15]
People vs. Magaluna, 205 SCRA 266 (1992).

^[16]
TSN, May 28, 1991, 4-5, 7.

^[17]
People vs. Barcelona, 191 SCRA 100 (1990).

^[18]
TSN, September 6, 1991, 26.

^[19]
People vs. Dolores, 188 SCRA 660 (1990).

^[20]
TSN, June 19, 1991, 15.

^[21]
People vs. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 (1991).

^[22]
People vs. Yagong, 181 SCRA 479 (1990); People vs. Arroyo, et
al., 201 SCRA 616 (1991).

^[23]
People vs. Raptus, 198 SCRA 425 (1991).

^[24]
TSN, June 19, 1990, 15-16.

^[25]
People vs. Madrid, 210 SCRA 196 (1992).

^[26]
People vs. Paciente, 210 SCRA 86 (1992).

^[27]
People vs. Santito, Jr., et al., 201 SCRA 87 (1991).

^[28]
Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990).

^[29]
TSN, May 28, 1991, 2.

^[30]
Sec. 39, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

^[31]
31A C.J.S., Evidence, 226.

^[32]
People vs. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991); People vs. Guibao, G.R.
No. 93517, January 15, 1993.