LUIS R. YANGCO, PETITIONER, VS. WILLIAM J. ROHDE, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
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Yangco versus Rohde
The Case
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Luis R. Yangco against Judge William J. Rohde of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Yangco asks the Supreme Court to stop the judge from compelling him to pay monthly alimony to Victorina Obin, a woman who claims to be his wife and who has sued him for divorce. The case matters because it draws the line between a judge's jurisdiction over a divorce suit and his power to grant provisional alimony, and because it explains when the extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies against an interlocutory order that causes irreparable damage.
Procedural History
Victorina Obin filed a complaint before Judge Rohde of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that she be declared the lawful wife of Yangco and that she be granted a divorce, alimony, and attorney's fees. Yangco filed a demurrer, which the judge overruled, expressing the opinion that the alleged marriage was valid although the question was not clear nor free from doubt. Yangco then answered, denying the principal allegation of fact, namely the mutual agreement to be husband and wife entered into before witnesses. While the case stood in that condition, Obin moved for a monthly allowance as alimony, costs, and attorney's fees. The judge granted the motion and ordered Yangco to pay a monthly allowance in advance. Yangco then filed this original petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court. The respondent judge filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the petition stated no cause of action. The Court overruled the demurrer and motion to dismiss.
Facts
Victorina Obin alleged that she and Luis R. Yangco had mutually agreed to be husband and wife before witnesses. She brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking to be declared Yangco's lawful wife and seeking a divorce, alimony, and attorney's fees. Yangco denied the principal allegation of fact, that is, the mutual agreement to be husband and wife.
While the case was pending, Obin moved for a monthly allowance as alimony, costs, and attorney's fees. On the twenty-second of July, Judge Rohde ordered Yangco to pay her, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the eleventh of March past, and to pay on the first day of August following all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for that month, amounting to 1,500 pesos.
Obin owned no property, and the judge did not require any security from her. Yangco therefore alleged that if judgment should be rendered in his favor, he would be unable to recover the sums the judge might compel him to disburse. He also alleged that he had no right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy against the ruling. The respondent did not deny these allegations; on the contrary, he affirmed that in his ruling on the demurrer he had expressed the opinion that the question of the alleged marriage was not clear nor free from doubt.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in ordering Yangco to pay alimony pendente lite to a woman whose civil status of marriage was denied and still in litigation.
- Whether or not the remedy of prohibition is proper against an interlocutory order granting alimony, given that no appeal lies from such an order during the trial.
Applicable Provisions
Article 143 of the Civil Code provides:
The right to support is granted (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters.
This article is the basis of the action for support, and the Court reads it to mean that a civil status or juridical relation, such as the civil status of marriage, is the foundation of the right to alimony.
Article 53 of the Civil Code provides:
Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means established by the former laws.
This provision governs how the alleged marriage must be proven, and the Court notes that the required evidence was lacking.
Article 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in relation with article 226, provides the remedy of prohibition:
Prohibition arrests the proceedings of an inferior judicial tribunal or officer when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal or officer, and the writ issues in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
This is the remedy Yangco invoked, and it is the standard the Court applies to test whether the writ should issue.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the Civil Code. The Code grants the right to alimony only to a wife. That status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter. The Court explained that the action for support is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife, so it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse, that is, a marriage, without which one has no right to the title of husband or wife. The civil status of marriage being denied and in issue, nothing can be taken for granted upon the point. A simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. Any other view would render useless all the legal effects which flow from the authority of res judicata, that is, the finality of a judgment.
On the second issue, the Court held that prohibition is the proper remedy. It is true that an interlocutory order such as that rendered by the respondent judge is not appealable during the course of the trial, but it cannot be the intention of the law, when prohibiting an appeal against interlocutory orders, to give executory force to all kinds of interlocutory orders which the judge may see fit to make in the course of a trial, and still less when the effect would be to cause irreparable damage, such as that alleged by the petitioner by reason of the insolvency of the person in whose favor the alimony was ordered, an allegation not objected to or denied by the respondent. The Court adopted the doctrine of the California decisions, that prohibition lies where the proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court also noted that it was not necessary to decide whether an exception could be made where the fact of the marriage is admitted of record by the defendant, because in this case the fact was denied.
Doctrine
A court has jurisdiction over a divorce suit but has no jurisdiction to grant alimony pendente lite when the right to alimony has not accrued under the Civil Code, because that right belongs only to a wife whose status is established. A mere allegation of marriage, denied and still in litigation, is a fact in issue and not an established right; it cannot be confounded with a status recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. Where an interlocutory order is not appealable and causes irreparable damage, the aggrieved party is not without remedy, and the writ of prohibition lies to arrest proceedings conducted without or in excess of jurisdiction, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Disposition
The Court overruled the demurrer and motion to dismiss, sustained the petition, and held that prohibition is the proper remedy, authorizing the defendant to answer the complaint within twenty days from the date of the decision.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a court has jurisdiction over the divorce suit but no jurisdiction to grant alimony until the wife's status is established, and prohibition lies against such an interlocutory order when no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a fact in issue and an established civil status, and the requisites for the writ of prohibition against interlocutory orders causing irreparable damage.