G.R. No. 99395. June 29, 1993
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. RUBEN O. TORRES AND ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (“SLMCEA-AFW”), RESPONDENTS.
MELO, J.:
In response to the
mandate under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and amidst the labor controversy
between petitioner St. Luke’s Medical
Center and private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center Employees
Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (SLMCEA-AFW), then Secretary of Labor
Ruben D. Torres, issued the Order of January 28, 1991 requiring the parties to
execute and finalize their 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to
retroact to the expiration of the anterior CBA. The parties were also instructed to incorporate in the new CBA
the disposition on economic and non-economic issues spelled out in said
Order (p. 48, Rollo). Separate motions for re-evaluation from the
parties were to no avail; hence, the petition at bar premised on the following
ascriptions of error, to wit:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
HE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMPLETELY
IGNORED THE LATTER’S EVIDENCE AND ISSUED THE QUESTIONED AWARDS ON THE BASIS OF
ARBITRARY GUESSWORKS, CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE CURTAILED THE PARTIES’ RIGHT TO FREE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
AND WHEN HE GRANTED MONETARY AWARDS AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO THE EMPLOYEES
GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE OPERATING INCOME OF PETITIONER.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE ADOPTED/CONSIDERED THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE UNION THAT THE
HOSPITAL OFFERED SALARY AND MEAL ALLOWANCE INCREASES IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,140.00
FOR THE FIRST YEAR AND P700.00 ACROSS THE BOARD MONTHLY SALARY INCREASES FOR
THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE NEW CBA.
IV
FINALLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE GAVE HIS AWARD RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
When the collective
bargaining agreement for the period August 1, 1987 to July 30, 1990 was forged
between petitioner and private respondent, the incumbent national president of
AFW, the federation to which the local union SLMCEA is affiliated, was Gregorio
del Prado.
Before the expiration of the 1987-90 CBA, the AFW was plagued by
internal squabble splitting its leadership between Del Prado and Purita
Ramirez, resulting in the filing by AFW and Del Prado of a petition later
docketed before the Department of Labor as NCR-00-M-90-05-077, where a
declaration was sought on the legitimacy of Del Prado’s faction as bona fide
officers of the federation. Pending
resolution of said case, herein private respondent SLMCEA-AFW brought to the
attention of petitioner via a letter dated July 4, 1990 that the
1987-1990 was about to expire, and manifested in the process that private
respondent wanted to renew the CBA. This development triggered round-table talks on which occasions petitioner
proposed, among other items, a maximum across-the-board monthly salary increase
of P375.00 per employee, to which proposal private respondent demanded a
P1,500.00 hike or 50% increase based on the latest salary rate of each
employee, whichever is higher.
In the meantime, relative to the interpleader case
(NCR-00-M-90-05-070) initiated by petitioner to settle the question as to who
between Del Prado and Diwa was authorized to collect federation dues assessed
from hospital employees, the Med-Arbiter recognized Del Prado’s right (p. 423,
Rollo). This resolution of July 31,
1990 was elevated to the Labor Secretary.
The talks that then ensued between petitioner and private
respondent were disturbed anew when the other wing in the AFW headed by Purita
Ramirez, expressed its objections to the on-going negotiations, and when a
petition for certification election was filed by the Association of Democratic
Labor Organization of petitioner. However, private respondent emerged victorious after the elections and
was thus certified as the exclusive bargaining entity of petitioner’s rank and
file employees.
Following the decision dated September 14, 1990 in
NCR-00-M-90-05-077 (pp. 444-445, Rollo) which upheld the legitimacy of Del
Prado’s status including the other officers, Bayani Diwa of the Ramirez Wing
appealed; the two cases — NCR-00-M-90-05-070 for interpleader and NCR-00-M-90-05-077
— were consolidated.
On September 17, 1990, private respondent wrote petitioner for
the resumption of their negotiations concerning the union’s proposed CBA. Petitioner reacted by writing a letter on
September 20, 1990 expressing willingness to negotiate a new CBA for the rank
and file employees who are not occupying confidential positions. Negotiations thus resumed. However, a deadlock on issues, especially
that bearing on across-the-board monthly and meal allowances followed and to
pre-empt the impending strike as voted upon by a majority of private
respondent’s membership, petitioner lodged the petition below. The Secretary of Labor immediately assumed
jurisdiction and the parties submitted their respective pleadings.
On January 22, 1991, a resolution was issued in the consolidated
cases which eventually declared Gregorio del Prado and his group as the
legitimate officials of the AFW and the acknowledged group to represent AFW
(pp. 320-321, Rollo).
On January 28, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor issued
the Order now under challenge. Said
Order contained a disposition on both
the economic and non-economic issues raised in the petition. On the economic issues, he thus ruled:
First year – P1,140.00 broken down as follows: P510.00 in compliance with the government
mandated daily salary increase of P17.00; and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase.
Second year – P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase.
Third year – P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase.
It is understood that the second and third year salary increases
shall not be chargeable to future government mandated wage increases. (p. 47, Rollo.)
As earlier stated, both
parties moved for reconsideration of the above order, but both motions were
denied. Consequently, petitioner St.
Luke’s filed the instant petition, a special civil action on certiorari.
In assailing the Order of
January 28, 1991, petitioner St. Luke’s focuses on public respondent’s
disposition of the economic issues.
First, petitioner finds
highly questionable the very basis of public respondent’s decision to award
P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year and P700.00
across-the-board monthly salary increases for the succeeding second and third
years of the new CBA. According to
petitioner, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW misled public respondent into
believing that said amounts were the last offer of petitioner St. Luke’s
immediately prior to the deadlock. Petitioner vehemently denies having made such offer, claiming that its
only offer consists of the following:
Non-Economic Issues:
St. Luke’s submits that it is adopting the non-economic issues
proposed and agreed upon in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with SLMCEA-AFW
for the period covering 1987, 1990. Copy of the CBA is attached as Annex “F” hereof.
Economic Issue
St. Luke’s respectfully offers to give an increase to all its rank
and file employees computed as follows:
First Year – P900
(P700.00 basic + P200.00 food allowance) for an overall total food allowance
of P320.00.
Second Year – P400
Third Year – P400
plus the union will be allowed to operate
and manage one (1) canteen for free to augment their funds. Although the profit shall be divided equally
between union and SLMC, the operation of the canteen will generate for them a
monthly income of no less than P15,000.00, and likewise provide cheap and
subsidized food to Union members.
The wage increase as proposed shall be credited to whatever
increases in the minimum wage or to any across the board increases that may be
mandated by the government or the DOLE. (pp. 20-21-, Rollo.)
Petitioner charges that
public respondent, in making such award, erroneously relied on the extrapolated
figures provided by private respondent SLMCEA-AFW, which grossly inflated
petitioner St. Luke’s net income. Petitioner contends that if the disputed awards are sustained, the wage
increases and benefits shall total approximately P194,403,000.00 which it
claims is excessive and unreasonable, considering that said aggregate amount is
more than its projected income for the next three years. To illustrate its point, petitioner submits
the following computation:
YR I
A. P1,140 added to basic pay
a) P1,140 x 1,500 (no. of employees) x 12 (months) – P20,520,000
b) 13th month pay: P1,140 x 1,500 – 1,710,000
c) Overtime pay, 20% of payroll – 4,104,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay – 1,026,000
e) Sick leave – 855,000
f) Funeral, Paternity, Maternity leaves,
retirement pay – 820,000
B. P230 added to meal allowance
a) P230 x 1,500 x 12 – 4,140,000
C One day added to sick leave
a) (Ave. pay P3,000 + P1,140) divided by 30 x
1,500 – 222,000
D. Sick leave cash
conversion base reduced from 60 to 45 days
a) (P3,300 + P1,140)/30 x 1,200 – 2,664,000
E. Retirement benefits adjustment – 500,000
————————–
FIRST YEAR ADDITIONAL
COST – P36,561,000
YR II
A. Yr I increase except
sick leave cash conversion from 60 to 45 – P33,897,000
B. P700 added to monthly basic pay
a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 – 12,600,000
b) 13th month
pay: P700 x 1,500 – 1,050,000
c) Overtime pay, 20%
of P12.6M – 2,520,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay – 630,000
e) Sick leave: 15 days x 700/30 x 1,500 – 525,000
f) Funeral, paternity, maternity leaves,
retirement pay – 504,000
——————————
SECOND YEAR ADDITIONAL COST – P51,726,000
YR III
A. Yr I and Yr II increases –
P88,287,000
B. P700 added to basic pay
a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 – 12,600,000
b) 13th month
pay: P700 x 1,500 – 1,050,000
c) Overtime pay, 20% of P12.6M – 2,520,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay – 630,000
e) Sick leave – 525,000
f) Funeral, paternity, maternity leaves,
retirement pay – 504,000
——————————–
THIRD YEAR ADDITIONAL
COST – P106,116,000
TOTAL THREE-YEAR
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS/WAGES –
P194,403,000
(pp. 14-16, Rollo).
On the basis of the
foregoing, petitioner St. Luke’s concludes that it would be in a very poor
position to even produce the resources necessary to pay the wage increases of
its rank and file employees.
Petitioner also impugns
public respondent’s awards on grounds of prematurity, emphasizing that the
awards in question even preceded collective bargaining negotiations which have
to take place first between both litigants. It denies entering into a round of negotiations with private respondent SLMCEA-AFW on the theory that the
meetings referred to by the latter were merely informal ones, without any
binding effect on the parties because AFW is torn between two factions vying
for the right to represent it. Thus,
petitioner maintains that nothing conclusive on the terms and conditions of the
proposed CBA could be arrived at when the other party, private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW is confronted with an unresolved representation issue.
Petitioner argues further
that since no formal negotiations were conducted, it could not have possibly
made an offer of P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first
year and an increase of P700.00 across-the-board monthly salary for the second
and third years of the new CBA. It
raises doubts on the veracity of the minutes presented by private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW to prove that negotiations were held, particularly on October 26,
1990, when petitioner allegedly made said offer as its last ditch effort for a
compromise prior to the deadlock. According to petitioner, these minutes, unsigned by petitioner, were
merely concocted by private respondent SLMCEA-AFW.
Finally, petitioner
attacks the Order of January 28, 1991 for being violative of Article 253-A of
the Labor Code, particularly its provisions on retroactivity. Said Article pertinently provides:
x x x
x x x
x x x
Any agreement on such other provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the
term of such other provisions as fixed in the collective bargaining agreement,
shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond
six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof. In case of a deadlock in the
renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise
their rights under this Code.
Petitioner argues that in
granting retroactive effect to the enforceability of the CBA, public respondent
committed an act contrary to the above provision of law, pointing out that the
old CBA expired on July 30, 1990 and the questioned order was issued on January
28, 1991. Petitioner theorizes that
following Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides that there are 30 days in
one month, the questioned Order of January 28, 1991 was issued beyond the
six-month period, graphically shown thus:
July 30, 1990 Expiration
July 31 = 1
day
August 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
September 1-30, 1990 =
30 days
October 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
November 1-30, 1990 = 30 days
December 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
January 1-28, 1991 = 28 days
_____________________
TOTAL
———————— = 182 days (6
months and 2 days)
(p. 34, Rollo.)
Traversing petitioner’s
arguments, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW contends that the formulation of the
terms and conditions of the CBA awards is well supported by the factual
findings of public respondent which established that petitioner failed to
refute private respondent’s allegation that during their last meeting on
October 26, 1990, petitioner stood pat on its offer of P1,140.00 as salary and
meal allowance increases for the first year of the new CBA and P700.00
across-the-board salary increases for the second and third years thereof. Said awards, it said, are well within
the means of petitioner because its reported net income of P15 million, P11
million, and P13 million for 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively, have been
actually understated. Moreover, private
respondent claims that petitioner, in actual terms, does not have to pay the
alleged amount of P194,403,000.00 for wages and benefits in favor of its
employees. Such amount, according to
private respondent, is bloated and excessive. Private respondent in substantiating such claim made the following
analysis:
First, P1,140.00 total salary increase for the first year
(1990-1991) of the new CBA is divided into: P510.00 in compliance with the government mandated daily salary increase
of P17.00 and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase, thus, the
whole P1,140.00 salary increase is payable only beginning August 1, 1990
(reckoned from the CBA July 30, 1990 expiry date) up to October 31, 1990 only following
the November 1, 1990 effectivity of WAGE ORDER NO. NCR-01 which granted the
said P17.00 daily wage increase or P510.00 monthly of which herein petitioner
promptly complied with and paid to its employees and therefore deductible from
P1,140.00 total monthly salary increase (Annex “A” – Petition and
Annex “13” hereof);
Second, the remaining P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary
increase takes effect on November 1, 1990 up to January 7, 1991 only following
the January 8, 1991 effectivity of WAGE ORDER NO. NCR-02 which mandated P12.00
daily wage increase or P360.00 monthly, hence, reducing the P630.00 CBA monthly
salary increase to P270.00 CBA monthly salary increase effective January 8,
1991 and onwards till July 31, 1991 (Annexes “22” and “23”
hereof);
Third, that out of an estimated workforce of 1,264 regular
employees inclusive of about 209 supervisors, unit, junior area, division
department managers and top level executives, all occupying permanent
positions, and approximately 55 regular but highly confidential employees, only
1,000 rank?and-file regular/permanent employees (casuals, contractuals,
probies and security guards excluded) are entitled to the CBA benefits for
three (3) years (1990-1993) (as private respondent SLMCEA-AFW gathered and
analyzed from the petitioner’s Personnel Strength Report hereto attached as
Annex “28” hereof) vis-a-vis the generalized and inflated 1,500
employees as total workforce purportedly entitled to CBA benefits per its
self-serving and incredible computation;
Fourth, the petitioner’s computed 20% overtime pay of the basic
salary is unrealistic and overstated in view of its extreme
cost-cutting/savings measures on all expenditures, most specially, on overtime
work adopted since last year and a continuing management priority project up to
the present; and
Fifth, due to the above considerations, the total real award of
wages and fringe benefits is far less than the true annual hefty operating net
income of the petitioner.
The net result is that the first year award of P1,140.00 monthly
salary increase of which P510.00 monthly salary increase is made in compliance
with the P510.00 monthly wage increase at P17.00 daily wage increase effective
November 1, 1990 under Wage Order No. NCR-01 (Annex “13” hereof) or
with the intended P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase is further reduced by
P360.00 monthly wage increase at P12.00 daily wage increase effective January
8, 1991 under Wage Order No. NCR-02 (Annex “22” hereof), thereby
leaving a downgraded or watered down CBA monthly increase of P270.00 only.
Comparatively speaking, the 13% monthly salary increase of each
employee average basic monthly salary of P2,500.00 in 1987 or P325.00 monthly
salary increase granted by the petitioner under the first old CBA (1987-1990)
is better than the much diluted P270.00 CBA monthly salary increase (in lieu of
the awarded P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase for the first year of the new
CBA under Order, dated January 28, 1991, of public respondent). (Annexes “A” and “G”
Petition). (pp. 390-391, Rollo.)
Private respondent concludes that petitioner’s version that it
will have to pay P194,403,000.00 is not true because this will be drastically
reduced by 40% to 60% in real terms due to a smaller number of employees
covered. It is further explained that
the government-decreed wage increases abovementioned already form part of the
P1,140.00 wage and meal allowance increases, not to mention the strict
cost-cutting measures and practices on overtime and expense items adopted by
petitioner since 1990.
With respect to public respondent’s ruling that the CBA awards
should be given retroactive effect, private respondent agrees with the Labor
Secretary’s view that Article 253-A of the Labor Code does not apply to arbitral
awards such as those involved in the instant case. According to private respondent, Article 253-A of the Labor Code
is clear and plain on its face as referring only to collective bargaining
agreements entered into by management and the certified exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank-and-file employees therein within six (6) months from the
expiry of the old CBA.
These foregoing
contentions and arguments of private respondent have been similarly put forward
by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Consolidated Comment filed
on November 23, 1991. The Solicitor
General shares the views of private respondent SLMCEA-AFW.
We are now tasked to rule on the petition. Do petitioner’s evidence and arguments
provide adequate basis for the charge of alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by public respondent in his Order of January 28, 1991 as to warrant
its annulment by this Court? This is
the sole issue in the case at bar. Consequently, this Court would apply the following yardstick in
resolving the aforestated issue: that
public respondent, in the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction over
subject labor dispute, acted
whimsically, capriciously, or in an arbitrary, despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility which was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law (San Sebastian College vs. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 [1991]).
Subjected to and measured by this test, the challenged Order, we
believe, can withstand even the most rigorous scrutiny.
Petitioner assails the Order of January 28, 1991 on three
grounds: (a) unreasonableness and
baselessness; (b) prematurity; and (c) violation of Article 253-A of the Labor
Code.
We rule that the Order, particularly in its disposition on the
economic issues, was not arbitrarily imposed by public respondent. A perusal of the Order shows that public
respondent took into consideration the parties’ respective contentions, a clear indication that he was
keenly aware of their contrary positions. Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to present their
respective evidence. The due process
requirement was thus clearly observed. Considering public respondent’s expertise on the subject and his
observance of the cardinal principles of due process, the assailed Order
deserves to be accorded great respect by this Court.
Equally worth mentioning
is the fact that in resolving the economic issues, public respondent merely
adopted in toto petitioner’s proposals. Consequently, petitioner cannot now claim
that the awards are unreasonable and baseless. Neither can it deny having made such proposals, as it attempted to do in
its Motion for Reconsideration of the challenged Order before public respondent
and which it continues to pursue in the instant petition. It is too late in the day for such pretense,
especially so because petitioner failed to controvert private respondent’s
allegation contained in its Comment to the petition before the Labor Secretary
that petitioner had offered as its last proposal said salary and meal allowance
increases. As correctly pointed out by
public respondent, petitioner failed, when it had the chance, to rebut the same
in its Reply to said Comment, considering that the resolution of the labor dispute at that time was still
pending. Any objection on this point is
thus deemed waived.
We do not see merit in
petitioner’s theory that the awards were granted prematurely. In its effort to persuade this Court along
this point, petitioner denies having negotiated with private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW. Petitioner collectively
refers to all the talks conducted with private respondent as mere informal
negotiations due to the representation issue involving AFW. Petitioner thus argues that in the absence
of any formal negotiations, no collective bargaining could have taken
place. Public respondent, petitioner
avers, should have required the parties instead to negotiate rather than prematurely
issuing his order.
We cannot agree with this
line of reasoning. It is immaterial
whether the representation issue within AFW has been resolved with finality or
not. Said squabble could not possibly
serve as a bar to any collective bargaining since AFW is not the real
party-in-interest to the talks; rather, the negotiations were confined to
petitioner and the local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW. Only the collective bargaining agent, the
local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal standing to negotiate with
petitioner. A duly registered local
union affiliated with a national union or federation does not lose its legal
personality or independence (Adamson and Adamson, Inc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations and Adamson and Adamson Supervising Union (FFW), 127
SCRA 268 [1984]). In Elisco-Elirol
Labor Union (NAFLU) vs. Noriel (180 SCRA 681 [1977]), then Justice Teehankee re-echoed the words of Justice
Esguerra in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. (66 SCRA 512 [1975]),
thus:
(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to
secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and
their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint
productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals
into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are consensual entities
capable of entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of
the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the
common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve
their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the
affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which
brought it into existence. (at p.
688; italics in the original.)
Appending “AFW” to the local union’s name does not mean
that the federation absorbed the latter. No such merger can be construed. Rather, what is conveyed is the idea of affiliation with the local union
and the larger national federation retaining their separate personalities.
Petitioner cannot pretend to be unaware of these legal principles
since they enjoy the benefit of legal advice from their distinguished
counsel. Thus, we are constrained to
agree with the position of the Solicitor General that petitioner conveniently
used the representation issue within AFW to skirt entering into bargaining
negotiations with the private respondent.
Too, petitioner is in error in contending that the order was
prematurely issued. It must be recalled
that immediately after the deadlock in the talks, it was petitioner which filed
a petition with the Secretary of Labor
for the latter to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to
the public respondent’s authority and recognized the latter’s power to settle
the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code granting him the
power and authority to decide the dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said that public respondent’s decision
to grant the awards is premature and pre-emptive of the parties’ right to
collectively bargain, simply because the Order of January 28, 1991 was
unfavorable to one or the other party, for as we held in Saulog Transit,
Inc. vs. Lazaro, (128 SCRA 591[1984]):
It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke jurisdiction at one time
and reject it at another time in the same controversy to suit its interests and
convenience. The Court frowns upon and
does not tolerate the undesirable practice of some litigants who submit
voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when favorable to them and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. (Tajonera v. Lamaroxa, 110 SCRA 447, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 35). (at p. 601.)
Finally, the effectivity
of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration
of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article
253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of
April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration —
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions
awarded, we would stress that the provision of law invoked by the Hospital,
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and between the
parties, and not arbitral awards … (p. 818, Rollo.)
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law
prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein
involved, public respondent is deemed
vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, J., no part, related to
counsel.