MA. LOURDES VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLUE CROSS INSURANCE, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on
certiorari seeks the nullification of
the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1991,
reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 24120, entitled “Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross Insurance,
Inc.”

Petitioner’s plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October 12,
1989, she filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission alleging,
inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of P7,535.00,
private respondent executed a policy of sickness and accident insurance;
that on August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted to a hospital where
she was diagnosed and operated on for cholecystitis; that petitioner
paid the hospital and doctor’s bills in the aggregate sum of P48,934.05,
the same being the actual hospital and professional fees charged to
her; and that private respondent wrongfully refused to pay petitioner
the said amount which she is entitled to recover under the policy.

Private respondent’s answer raised the special and affirmative defenses
that under the insurance policy, definitions and exclusions were clearly
specified and among the exclusions are conditions which pre-existed
before the effective date of the insurance of which the insured was
aware or should reasonably be aware; and that cholecystitis was a
pre-existing condition, hence petitioner’s sickness is non-compensable.

On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its decision in
I.C. Case No. 3277 in favor of petitioner ordering private respondent
to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied, plus
P5,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs. In the main, the Insurance
Commission, after a review of them evidence presented, concluded that
petitioner’s illness, contrary to private respondent’s defenses, was not
a pre-existing disease and, therefore, is fully compensable.^[1]

According to respondent court, a copy of said decision was received by
private respondent on September 27, 1990. On October 15, 1990, or more
than the fifteen (15) days allowed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 5434,
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which petitioner
opposed. On December 13, 1990, the Insurance Commission denied said
motion for reconsideration.^[2] On December 17, 1990, private respondent filed a
notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission.^[3]

On March 15, 1991, the Third Division of respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time and
that private respondent did not duly file a copy of its notice of appeal
with respondent Court as mandated by Republic Act No. 5434.^[4]

Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 5434, private respondent had ten (10) days from its receipt on
December 14, 1990 of the aforesaid order denying its motion for
reconsi­deration within which to appeal. While respondent court, in its
resolution of May 8, 1991, subsequently agreed that private respondent
filed its notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission within the said
10 day period, no such notice was filed with respondent court as
required by Section 3, Republic Act No. 5434.

Private respondent then moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal
of its appeal. On May 8, 1991, the Special Third Division of respondent
court resolved to reconsider its original resolution and ordered the
reinstatement of the appeal “in keeping with the ends of substantial
justice.”^[5]

Hence, the petition at bar with the following assignment of errors:

1. The respondent court committed an error in reinstating the appeal when
   it has no jurisdiction to do so, no notice of appeal having been filed
   with it.

2. The manner of appeal from quasi-judicial bodies has been fixed with the
   solemnity of a statute; the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring
   it.^[6]

We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in
reconsidering its previous resolution dismissing herein private
respondent’s appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120. The dismissal of said
appeal is proper and fully justified by private respondent’s failure to
file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as required by
Republic Act No. 5434 for the perfection of its appeal from the decision
of the Insurance Commission.

The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During the period relevant to and
involved in the appeal from the Insurance Commission to respondent court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120, subject of the present review, the appeal to
the Court of Appeals from said quasi-judicial body was governed by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same are not
inconsistent with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.^[7]

As restated and clarified in the Lacsamana case, to perfect an appeal
under Republic Act No. 5434, the following rules must be observed:

“In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of
Appeals
under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, the
appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of
Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days from notice
of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment; or in case a motion
for reconsideration is filed within said period, then within ten days
from notice of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
(Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434). No extension of time to file such a
notice of appeal is needed, much less allowed.”^[8]

It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be
filed both with the Court of Appeals and with the board, commission or
agency that made or rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a notice
of appeal was seasonably filed with the Insurance Commission, no such
notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. The said failure
of petitioner to comply with the requirements of law for the perfection
of its appeal is fatal to its present remedial attempt. It renders the
decision of the Insurance Commission final and executory and the same
can no longer be a subject of review.^[9]

This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional.^[10] The
failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of
defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.^[11]

The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.^[12]
The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
lost.^[13]

It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when
it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
the court’s equity jurisdiction.^[14]
In the case at bar, however, the interests of justice would not be
served by a policy of liberality, nor has the private respondent
advanced any compelling reason to warrant the same. In fact, in its
original resolution,^[15]
respondent court itself expounded at length on the very same doctrines
enjoining strict compliance with the rules governing appeals which we
have set out herein and, on such considerations, dismissed the appeal
therein.

Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues
raised are mainly factual. The decision of the Insurance Commission was
based on its findings that the illness of private respondent,
cholecystitis, was not a pre-existing ailment and is, therefore, fully
compensable. It further specifically found that private respondent
failed to prove petitioner’s awareness of that pre-existing condition
which is excluded under the insurance policy. We find no reason to
disturb the said findings which are supported by the evidence on record
and the conclusions of experts.

Settled is the that factual findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but finality, because of the special knowledge
and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals from handling
specific matters falling under their jurisdiction.^[16] Courts cannot take cognizance of
such factual issues.^[17]
In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot
re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence. The findings of fact must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.^[18]

It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the
orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.^[19]
For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with
the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling
reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave
miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court’s
suspension of the rules.^[20] Otherwise, the rules must strictly apply, as
in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The challenged
resolution of respondent court dated May 8, 1991 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and its
resolution of March 15, 1991 is REINSTATED. The
decision of the Insurance Commission in I.C. Case No. 3277, dated
September 21, 1990, is hereby declared FINAL and
EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Original
Record, 374-377.

^[2] Ibid., 400.

^[3] Ibid., 401.

^[4] Rollo, 20-21.
The
resolution of dismissal was penned by Justice Luis L. Victor, with the
concurrence of Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Segundino G. Chua.

^[5] Ibid., 24-25.
The second
resolution was likewise penned by Justice Victor but with the
concurrence of Justices Santiago Kapunan and Fortunato A. Vailoces.

^[6] Ibid., 6.

^[7] Sec. 9, B.P.
Blg. 129; Pars. 16 and 22(c), Interim and Transitional Rules and
Guidelines.

^[8] Lacsamana, et
al. vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 143 SCRA 643 (1986).

^[9] Quiqui, et
al. vs. Boncaros, etc., et al., 151 SCRA 416 (1987); Medina, Sr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 181 SCRA 837 (1990).

^[10] Reyes vs.
Carrasco, 38
SCRA 296 (1971); Republic, et al. vs. Reyes, etc., et al., 71 SCRA 450
(1976); Borre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 158 SCRA 560 (1988).

^[11] Martha
Lumber Mill, Inc.
vs. Lagradante, et al., 99 Phil. 434 (1956); Pabores vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, et al., 104 Phil. 505 (1958); A. L. Ammen
Transportation, Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,
12 SCRA 508 (1964).

^[12] Tropical
Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 152 SCRA 540 (1987);
Borre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

^[13] Ozaeta vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 179 SCRA 800 (1989).

^[14] Toledo, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 579 (1987).

^[15] Rollo, 21.

^[16] Mapa vs.
Arroyo, et al.,
175 SCRA 76 (1989); A.M. Oreta & Co., Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., 176 SCRA 218 (1989).

^[17] Rizal
Memorial Colleges
Faculty Union-Davao Workers Union, et al. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., 178 SCRA 439 (1989).

^[18] Baliwag
Transit, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 82 (1987).

^[19] Alvero vs.
De la Rosa, etc., et al., 76 Phil. 428 (1946).

^[20] Ronquillo
vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304 (1962); Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Augusto, et al., 40 SCRA 123 (1971).