ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCO…

In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus
proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo
de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students, to allow
petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to
continue her studies.^[1]
Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that
students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege,
to be admitted to the institution. Not
having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the
respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not prosper.

In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept
encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.

Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse
admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is
again challenged.

Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening
paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents
in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek
re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier
case, the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as
personality traits and character orientation, or even inability to meet the
institution’s academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior
in the classroom. The school pointedly
informed her that “x x x it would seem to be in your best interest to work
with a Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations.”

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission
into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of
the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. The case attracted
much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical
injuries inflicted on another.

Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension
to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this
time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.

The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel,
are as follows:

As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity
organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9
and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites,
Leonardo “Lennie” H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner
university, died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital
on February 10, 1991. He was not the
lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion.

In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty­-Student Investigating
Committee^[2]
which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their
written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy
of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension.^[3]
Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and
pertinent documents or affidavits.

In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses, found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled “Discipline.”^[4]

Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they
would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary
Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin,
Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the
charges against respondent students.

In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were
informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained
in the Law School Catalogue. Said
letter also states: “The
complaint/charge against you arose from participation in acts of hazing
committed during the Aquila Legis initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of
testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the
School regulations.” Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their
written answers to the above charge on or before February 22, 1991, otherwise
they would be deemed to have waived their defenses.^[5]

In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through
counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance,
pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them.^[6]

Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear
before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answers with
regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of
Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to
petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to
postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991.^[7]

Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on
March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions.^[8] They
were also informed that:

a)      The proceedings will
be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman
vs. National University;^[9]

b)      Petitioners have no
right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;

c)      Hazing which is not
defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the
proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;

d)      The Board will take
into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the
alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;

e)      The Decision of the
Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i.e. Respondent
Joaquin Bernas S. J.

On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean del Castillo that,
“in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the
penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the
penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law
School level but also on the University level.”^[10]

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students
acted as master auxiliaries or “auxies” during the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis, and exercised the “auxies privilege,” which allows
them to participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and
attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite
supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort
to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under
their care. The Board considered
respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced
respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through
acquiescence. However, in view of the
lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal,
the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.^[11]
Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of
the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether
to expel respondent students or not.

Consequently, in a resolution dated March
10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de
Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: “that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised
the ‘auxie’s privilege;’ that even assuming that they did not lay hands on the
neophytes,” respondent students are still guilty in accordance with the
principle that “where two or more persons act together in the commission
of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to
the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole.” Fr. Bernas, in describing
the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the
“offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious,
subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized
behavior.” Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students.^[12]

In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by
petitioner Fr. Bernas,^[13] the
Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the
resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was
promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of
the two students on March 21, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction^[14]
alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester
of schoolyear 1990-91. Unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking
their examinations. The petition
principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.

On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping
the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident.^[15]

Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary
restraining order were then held. On
April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order issued on March 18, 1991
lapsed. Consequently, a day after the
expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon
Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.

Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental
Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the
aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the
original petition.^[16]

Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental Petition arguing
that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by
the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental
petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the
supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will,
in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day
lifetime.^[17]
Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Capulong, granted respondent students’ prayer on April 10, 1991.^[18]

On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to
reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special
examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students
were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo
with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issues of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00.^[19]

On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating
petitioners Abas and Mendoza concluded its investigation. On May 20, 1991, it imposed the penalty of
dismissal on respondent students Adel
Abas and Zosimo Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from
its roll of students.^[20]

The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the
writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondent students of a bond
dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.

Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order questioning
the order of respondent judge reinstating respondent students dated May 17,
1991. On May 30, 1991, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17,
1991 order of respondent judge.^[21]

In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on
academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a
school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant
to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the
penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.

We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge
ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that
respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the
charges against them.

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the
decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo
de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them their
right to procedural due process. We are
constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been
violated. On the contrary, respondent
students’ rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the
cases of Guzman v. National University,^[22]
Alcuaz v PSBA, Q.C. Branch^[23] and Non
v. Dames II^[24] have
been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative
proceedings held before they were expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denial of due process is their
argument that it is the Ang Tibay case^[25]
and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to
the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

“(1) the students must
be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case.”^[26]

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were
not met. When, in view of the death of
Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,^[27]
the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges.^[28]
While some of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly
submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension
of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements.^[29]

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners’ notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.^[30] It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3
of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners’ notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20
clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very
start of the investigations before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in
its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were
not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural
due process.^[31]
Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students’ participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized
the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but
a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.^[32]

Respondent students’ contention that the investigating committee
failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February
14, 1992 order clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses.^[33]
Similarly, the Disciplinary Board’s resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were
summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault
petitioners for not explicitly defining the word “hazing” and allege
that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo
Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future
members of the Bar. It cannot be over-­emphasized
that the charge filed before the Joint Administration­-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject
to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect
to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases of a similar
nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice.^[34]
Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the
precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that
“hazing” which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be
defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the
investigation under scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the extent of
dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d’ etre in the
increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by
their insensate “masters.” Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school
authorities. Far from fostering
comradeship and esprit d’ corps, it has
merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual
leadership in our country.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position
to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file
a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby bypassing
the latter and the Court of Appeals.^[35]

It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,^[36]
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner
university.

Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable
damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and
found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university’s
disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we
would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner
university’s academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and
the present 1987 Constitutions.

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential
freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term “academic
freedom” cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,^[37]
thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may
be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted
to study.

Socrates, the “first of the great moralists of Greece,”
proud to claim the title “gadfly of the State,” has deservedly earned
for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause
of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato,
this great teacher of his was the “best, the most sensible, and the most
just man of his age.” In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of
hemlock as punishment for alleged “corruption” of the youth of
Athens. He describes in his own words
how this charge of “corruption,” the forerunner of the concept of
academic freedom, came about:

“Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do,
come about me of their own accord: they
like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine
others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon discover, who
think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then
those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are
angry with me. This confounded
Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what
evil does he practice or teach? they do
not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a
loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all
philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and
having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not
like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected — which is
the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in
battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their
loud and inveterate calumnies.”^[38]

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold
have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State,
Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their
ideas. Particularly odious were the
insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the
Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers
in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian
encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of
freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern
age. This was exemplified by the
professors of the new German Universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such
as the Universities of Leiden (1575), Helmstädt (1574) and Heidelberg
(1652). The movement back to freedom of
inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the
19th and 20th centuries. “Academic
freedom”, the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related
to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of
individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and
administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, “to follow the argument wherever it may lead,” free from
internal and external interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the
freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have
stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of
independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized
under the areas of: (1) who may
teach and (2) how to teach.

It is to be realized that
this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari
passu with its institutional
counterpart. As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with
the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by
external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter
formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who
may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of
sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the
rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of “academic freedom.”
This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the
term. It had to await the drafting of
the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.

The breakthrough for the
concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which
stated: “Universities established
by the State shall enjoy academic freedom.” The only State university at
that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was
perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the
expense of the rest.

In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973
Constitution provided in its Section 8 (2): “All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
freedom.” In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President
Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, declared that it “definitely grants the right of academic
freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor.”^[39]

Has the right been carried over to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition
with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 came up with this formulation: “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by
researchers.” After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final
version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the
previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2)
states: “Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” In anticipation of the
question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included
herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: “Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education,
therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom.”^[40]

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon
asked: “When we speak of the
sentence ‘academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning,’ do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution
itself?” Azcuna replied: “Not
only that, it also includes . . .” Gascon finished off the broken thought,
– “the faculty and the students.” Azcuna replied: “Yes.”

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of
Theology,^[41]
we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right “to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,”
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.^[42]

“For private schools have the right to establish reasonable
rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of
students. This right . . . extends as
well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal)
obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools.”^[43]

Such rules are “incident to the very object of incorporation
and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing
student discipline.”^[44]
Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of
militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and
plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights
encapsulized under the rubric of “right to education” forgetting
that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their
duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.

Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their
own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and
assiduously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and
integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St.
Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless
acts are the more reprehensible. It must
be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals
and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious – not in the
sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or
profess a religious ideology. Rather, a
religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said,
is “an education which inculcates duty and reverence.”^[45]
It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the
Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution
as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as
well as those who come after them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin
Fah v. Court of Appeals that: “The maintenance of a morally conducive
and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled if, under the
circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner’s
children and to reintegrate them to the student body.”^[46]
Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with
the gravity of their misdeeds. That
there must be such a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.^[47]

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed
by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on
the following undisputed facts: that on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing
activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries,
and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical
injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon those
whom ironically they would claim as “brothers” after the initiation
rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as
reprimand or even suspension? We,
therefore, affirm petitioners’ imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon
respondent students. This finds
authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools.^[48]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of
respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondent students into
petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of
Ateneo de Manila University dated March 10, 1991, is REINSTATED and the
decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and
ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., see separate
concurrence.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission’s Committee, Loyola School of Theology,
No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277-298.

^[2]
Composed of Faculty Members: Atty(s)
Jacinto Jimenez, Sedfrey Candelaria, Carlos Medina, Alternate: Dean Antonio Abad. Students: Mr.(s) Arthur
Yap, Reynaldo Dizon, Ms Patricia Ty Administration: Dean Cynthia del Castillo (Chairperson).

^[3]
Annex B, Rollo, p. 41.

^[4]                                                           “DISCIPLINE

Dedication to study, respect for authority, strict observance of the
rules and regulations of the University and the school and unfailing courtesy
are expected at all times of all Ateneo Students. The Administration reserves to itself the right to suspend,
dismiss from the School at any time, strike from the list of candidates for
graduation and/or withhold the Ateneo diploma from or expel any student whom it
may deem unworthy. Any of the following
acts shall constitute a ground for suspension, dismissal striking from the list
of candidates for graduation and/or withholding of the Ateneo diploma, or
expulsion, depending on the severity of the offense:

x x x                             x x x                             x x x

3. Hazing;
carrying deadly weapons; drunkeness, vandalism; “assaulting a professor
or any other school authority, including
members of the staff or employees of the School;” Petition, p. 8,
Underscoring supplied.

^[5]
Annex D, Rollo, p. 45.

^[6]
Annex E, Rollo, p. 46.

^[7]
Annex F, Rollo, p. 48.

^[8]
Annex G, Rollo, p. 49.

^[9]
L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699.

^[10]
Annex Q, Rollo, p. 88.

^[11]
Annex H, Rollo, p. 175.

^[12]
The dismissed students are: Ernest
Montecillo, E. Amado Sabban, Joseph Lledo, Santiago Ranada III, Jude Fernandez,
Dalmacio Lim, Adel Abas, Ronan de Guzman, Zosimo Mendoza and Manuel Escalona. Annex I, Rollo, p. 52.

^[13]
Annex J, Rollo, p. 54.

^[14]
Annex K, Rollo, p. 55.

^[15]
Annex L, Rollo, p. 67.

^[16]
Annex M, Rollo, pp. 68-73.

^[17]
Annex N, Rollo, pp. 76-81.

^[18]
Rollo, p. 84.

^[19]
Annex A, Rollo, p. 40.

^[20]
Annex M, Rollo, p. 189.

^[21]
Of the respondent students dismissed in the March 10, 1991 Resolution, Santiago
Ranada III and Ronan de Guzman are not named private respondents herein.

^[22]
L-68288, July 11, 1986 142 SCRA 699.

^[23]
L-76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA
7.

^[24]
G. R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990, 185 SCRA
523.

^[25]
69 Phil. 635 (1940).

^[26]
Supra, at 22.

^[27]
Annex B, Rollo p. 41.

^[28]
Order dated May 17, 1991, Annex A, p. 35.

^[29]
Annex C, Rollo, p. 43.

^[30]
See Annex B, Rollo, p. 41 and Annex D, Rollo, p. 44.

^[31]
Rollo, p. 115.

^[32]
Supra at 20.

^[33]
Annex C, Rollo, p. 43.

^[34]
Alcuaz v. PSBA, QC Branch,
supra at 20.

^[35]
Rollo, pp. 99-100.

^[36]
PALEA v. PAL, Inc., No. L-31396, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 215 and
Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, No. L-26971, April 11, 1972.

^[37]
354 U.S. 234 (1957).

^[38]
Riley, Woodbridge, STORY OF ETHICS, Men and Morals, Vol. II, p. 62, Doubleday,
Doran and Co., Inc., 1933.

^[39]
Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 489 (1962).

^[40]
4 ConCom Record, p. 439.

^[41]
No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277. See also the cases of Tangonan v. Pano, G. R. No. L-45157, June
27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245 and Magtibay v. Garcia, No. L-28971, January 28,
1983, 120 SCRA 370.

^[42]
Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, effective September 11, 1982.

^[43]
Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals [Resolution], G.R. No. 90063, December
12, 1989,

^[44]
Supra, at 22.

^[45]
In his article “The Aims of Education,” Alfred North Whitehead
explained: “A religious education
is an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of
events. Where attainable knowledge
could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this
perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence,
backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity.”
Fuess, Claude M. and Basford, Emory S., Editors, UNSEEN HARVESTS, A Treasury of
Teaching, p. 92, The Macmillan Company, 1947.

^[46]
Supra, at 43.

^[47]
G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.

^[48]
Ateneo de Manila v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56180, October 16, 1986, 145
SCRA 100.

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200

6 pt
6 pt
0
3