THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GAUDENCIO SANIEL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

United States versus Saniel

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the Government of the United States, as plaintiff, prosecuted Gaudencio Saniel for the crime of assault against a person in authority, arising from a shove he delivered to Manuel Alburo, the justice of the peace of Argao, Cebu, in the railway station of that municipality. The case matters because it draws the boundary between the grave offense of assault against a person in authority, known in the old Penal Code as atentado, and the ordinary misdemeanor of assault and battery. The Supreme Court holds that the special crime is not made out unless the assault is committed while the official is actually performing his duties, or by reason of that performance. A private quarrel, even with a magistrate, is not atentado.

Procedural History

The provincial fiscal of Cebu filed a complaint dated January 26, 1914, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, charging Saniel with assault against a person in authority. On arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty. After trial, in which both the prosecution and the defense presented evidence, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 20, 1914, finding the defendant guilty of the crime charged. It sentenced him to four years and two months of imprisonment, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant appealed from that judgment, and the case came before the Supreme Court on that appeal.

Facts

Between eight and nine o'clock in the morning of January 26, 1914, Justice of the Peace Manuel Alburo and Gaudencio Saniel met at the railway station of Argao, Cebu, both on private business. Saniel approached the magistrate, embraced him, and said, "Two words with you, friend Maneng." They stepped aside, six or eight yards from the station scales, and spoke in low and natural tones. A charge of estafa was then pending against Saniel before this same justice of the peace, and he was due in court that very morning to furnish bail for his provisional release.

Their accounts of the conversation diverge. The justice of the peace testified that Saniel complained of being charged first with theft and then with estafa, blamed him personally for the rejection of his bondsmen, and, after the magistrate denied any revenge and said he had only done his duty, struck him with the words, "Ah, evil justice of the peace, servant of the fiscal and of the judge." Saniel testified that the magistrate reproached him over a remark allegedly made to the magistrate's aunt in Cebu, pressed him to say whether they were friends or enemies, and finally called him an embezzler, whereupon Saniel shoved him in the belly, saying, "Why do you slander me that way?" The magistrate's hat fell off; Saniel picked it up and handed it back. The two then left separately. At the Constabulary barracks, though no order of arrest had issued, Saniel asked to remain, fearing he might be mobbed at the municipal building.

The prosecution's two eyewitnesses saw the blow but heard no words. One of them, Silvestre Albina, testified that the two spoke in Spanish in a low and natural tone, without dispute and without raising their voices. The defense witness Filomeno Saniel, a cousin of the accused, testified that he heard the magistrate utter the word "estafador," meaning embezzler, and that the shove followed immediately. The trial court itself found that the defendant did not act with premeditation, and that when the magistrate ran off to call the police, the defendant did not repeat the assault and the affair ended without further incident.

Issues

• Whether or not the shove given by Gaudencio Saniel to Justice of the Peace Manuel Alburo constitutes the crime of assault against a person in authority under paragraph 2 of Article 249 of the Penal Code.
• Whether or not the essential element of that crime, that the assault be made while the official is performing his official duties or by reason of such performance, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the act proven constitutes only the lesser offense of simple assault and battery, a misdemeanor against the person under paragraph 1 of Article 689 of the Penal Code.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph 2 of Article 249 of the Penal Code, as discussed in the decision, defines the crime of assault upon a person in authority. The Court states its elements in these words:

The mere fact of defendant's having laid hands upon the justice of the peace, Manuel Alburo, and shoving him, on an occasion when defendant was on trial before this justice of the peace for estafa, and upon the two men accidentally meeting that morning in the Argao railway station and while they were conversing, cannot be held to constitute the crime of assault upon a person in authority defined and punished in paragraph 2 of article 249 of the Penal Code, unless it be proven that said justice of the peace was then and there engaged in the performance of official duties or that the assault was made by reason of such performance by the justice of the peace of the duties of his office.

This is the decisive rule: absent proof of that element, the special crime does not exist.

Paragraph 1 of Article 689 of the Penal Code, the provision on misdemeanors against the person, supplies the lesser offense and its penalty. The Court describes it as follows:

It is, therefore, evident that said offense does not constitute the crime of criminal attempt against a person in authority, but that it was a simple assault and battery, or a misdemeanor against the person provided for and punished in paragraph 1 of article 689 of the Penal Code with a penalty of from one to five days' arresto or a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas.

This provision bears on the case because it is the offense the Court ultimately holds the accused to have committed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the shove does not constitute assault against a person in authority. The crime requires that the assault be committed while the official is engaged in the performance of his official duties, or by reason of that performance. Here, the two men met by accident in a railway station on private business. The justice of the peace was not then and there discharging the duties of his office. The Court quotes the commentator Groizard on the reason for the law: what the framers wanted was to know the reason of the assault, and if the motives are the acts performed by the person in authority, whether immediately preceding the assault or some time prior, the crime is committed on the occasion of the performance of public duties. That reason is absent here.

On the second issue, the Court finds the element unproven. The relations between the two men had been friendly; the magistrate himself admitted they had never quarreled. It is true that Saniel had a pending estafa case before the magistrate, which might suggest resentment. But the Court reasons that Saniel, an intelligent man and a former procurador judicial, knew the consequences of assaulting a magistrate in a public place, and that he was assured his bail would be approved that very morning. It is not understood why he would forfeit his liberty and expose himself to a new prosecution. The Court concludes that something said in the heat of the conversation, perhaps the word "estafador," provoked the shove in a moment of excitement or anger. If the magistrate did utter that insult, he abused his authority and originated the provocation, and in any event he was not then performing official duties. The Court also notes that the magistrate showed poor prudence in discussing his rulings in a public place, and that the prompt return of the fallen hat divests the act of all criminal importance as atentado.

On the third issue, the Court holds that the act proven is simple assault and battery, a misdemeanor against the person under paragraph 1 of Article 689 of the Penal Code, punishable by one to five days of arresto or a fine of 15 to 125 pesetas.

Doctrine

For the crime of assault against a person in authority, the prosecution must prove that the assault was committed while the official was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties, or that it was made by reason of such performance. The motive, not merely the official status of the victim, supplies the essential element. An assault arising from a purely private quarrel, a personal insult, or a moment of anger, does not amount to atentado. It is only simple assault and battery, a misdemeanor against the person. The rule is tied to paragraph 2 of Article 249 of the Penal Code, as construed in the decision, and to paragraph 1 of Article 689, which supplies the lesser penalty.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from, ordered the dismissal of the proceedings for assault against a person in authority, and sentenced Gaudencio Saniel, as guilty of the misdemeanor of assault and battery, to five days of arresto menor and to pay the costs corresponding to a misdemeanor action, with the rest of the costs paid de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: there is no atentado unless the assault is made while the official is performing his duties or by reason of that performance. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between assault against a person in authority and simple assault and battery, and to test whether a candidate can identify the essential element of motive that separates the two.