PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGER PARANGAN @ “SEKO,”A ALBER­TO SEMIL,B LUCIANO JAMAROLIN,B SABINO ALABAN,B ZOSIMO PAGLINAWAN,C JAIME BENDANO,C AND FELIPE …

At around nine o’clock in the evening of April 26, 1985, in
Barangay Owaon, Dapitan City, Felicisimo Diniay and the rest of his household
were roused from their sleep by someone calling from outside their house,
urging Felicisimo to come down: “Naog diha, tiyo.” (Visayan
for “Come down, uncle.”) When the call was repeated, Felicisimo got
up, lighted a kerosene lamp and prepared to go downstairs to talk to the
callers.^[1]

Felicisimo Diniay’s son, Bienvenido, peering through a window,
saw seven (7) men in two groups. The
first group, numbering four, was positioned in front of the stairs of the
house. The second group, three in
number, stood about five meters away from the first. By the light of the moon, Bienvenido recognized the seven
persons. In the first group were Roger
Parangan, Zosimo Paglinawan, Jaime Bendano, and Felipe Ponggan; in the second,
Sabino Alaban, Alberto Semil and Luciano Jamarolin.^[2]

Leaving the lighted kerosene lamp behind, Felicisimo proceeded to
the stairs. As he emerged from the
house and stood at the top of the stairway, Roger Parangan and appellant Felipe
Ponggan suddenly began firing their guns at him. Felicisimo was hit in the forehead and in the right portion of
the stomach just below the breast (as revealed by the post-mortem examination
conducted later by the municipal health officer, Dr. Hannibal Adaza),^[3]
and died instantly.^[4]

Bienvenido immediately reported his father’s killing to the
police authorities and later executed an affidavit disclosing what he had seen
and heard at the time.^[5]

Roger Parangan, Alberto Semil, Luciano Jamarolin, Sabino Alaban,
Zosimo Paglinawan, Jaime Bendano, and Felipe Ponggan, were thereafter charged
with murder under an information reading as follows:^[6]

“That in the evening, on or about the 26th day of April, 1985,
in Barangay Owaon, City of Dapitan, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with handguns, conspiring together and
mutually assisting one another, with intent to kill by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter into the dwelling of FELICISIMO DINIAY two times hitting him on vital
parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.

That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of
the deceased suffered the following damages:

1. Moral
damages………………… P12,000.00

2. Loss of earning
capacity………   P10,000.00

3. Death
indemnity………………..   P30,000.00

_________________

Total……P52,000.00

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and nighttime which was purposely sought by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the offense.”

The case against accused Roger Parangan was dismissed on account
of his death after the filing of the information.^[7]
Three (3) of his co-accused — Luciano Jamarolin, Alberto Semil and Sabino
Alaban — were discharged to be state witnesses pursuant to Section 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court.^[8] Two
others, namely, Zosimo Paglinawan and Jaime Bendano, were never arrested and
remain at large to this day. Only
Felipe Ponggan thus stood trial, upon his plea of not guilty.

The Regional Trial Court^[9]
adjudged Ponggan guilty in a decision dated March 6, 1991,^[10]
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:^[11]

“WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Felipe Ponggan guilty of
murder with moral certainty, without mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending, and pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the 1987
Constitution (People vs. Andaya, 152 SCRA 570), he is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, including the accessory penalties, with credit of his detention to
such extent as determined, and to indemnify the heirs of Felicisimo Diniay the
total amount of P52,000, broken down as follows: P12,000 for moral damages; P12,000 for loss of earning capacity
and P30,000 for death indemnity and costs.

“IT IS SO ORDERED.”

Hence this appeal, brought to this Court by Felipe Ponggan, who
assigns one error to the Court a quo, viz.:

“THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[12]

A thoroughgoing evaluation of the briefs in relation to the evidence
on record convinces the Court that the trial court’s judgment is in accord with
the law and the proofs. The evidence of
the prosecution does indeed generate the requisite moral certainty of the
appellant’s guilt of the crime charged.

The main defense put up is alibi. Ponggan testified that on April 25, 1985, he was in his place of
residence in Canibungan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, and remained there until
two days later to do some farming work; and that while he used to live in
Owaon, he had moved to and established residence in Canibungan in 1980 when he
got married. He further declared that
since 1982, until his arrest in connection with this case in 1987, he was one
of the barangay councilmen of Canibungan.^[13]

Corroboration of Ponggan’s alibi was essayed by defense witness
Geronimo Arunda, barangay captain of Canibungan since 1987. Arunda testified that Ponggan was really in
Canibungan in the morning of April 26, 1985, supervising some barangay civic project,
and that he (Arunda) saw him (Ponggan) in the afternoon of the same day, as
well as two days afterward. Arunda
further deposed that he well remembered Ponggan’s participation in the civic
project because he kept a log book of those who participated therein, duly
signed by him.^[14]

Appellant’s defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
affirmations of no less than three prosecution witnesses, namely: Bienvenido Diniay, Ernesto Saguin and
Alberto Semil, all of whom pinpointed him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.^[15]

The Government’s principal witness, Bienvenido Diniay, the son of
the victim, Felicisimo, categorically stated that he saw appellant Felipe
Ponggan and Roger Parangan shoot and kill his father, with handguns.^[16]
He asserted that he was able to recognize his father’s assailants because it
was a moonlit night,^[17] and
he had known them long before the killing took place, they being all residents
of Owaon, Dapitan City, except for Jaime Bendano.^[18]

Appellant’s co-accused, Alberto Semil, who was discharged to be a
state witness, as above stated, also gave evidence directly linking Ponggan to
the murder and belying his alibi. His
testimony corroborated Bienvenido Diniay’s eyewitness declarations. He testified as regards details which could
have been known only to Ponggan and those actually present at the time of the
slaying of Felicisimo Diniay, i.e., that he and his companions were there in
the place of the incident because “they had a mission to execute;”^[19]
that it was Ponggan who had called out to Felicisimo, “Naog diha, tiyo”
(Come down, uncle), an invitation seconded by Parangan; that at that time only
Ponggan and Parangan were armed, having in their possession, respectively, a
.38 caliber revolver and a .22 local magnum;^[20] that
when Felicisimo started to go down the stairs, he was met by a gunshot followed
by another, the first being louder than the second; and that thereafter, the
three men composing the second group: Alaban, Jamarolin and he (witness Alberto Semil), ran away leaving Parangan,
Paglinawan, Bendano and appellant Ponggan behind.^[21]

Another prosecution witness, Ernesto Saguin, gave testimony
affirmatively establishing the presence of Ponggan in barangay Owaon, Dapitan
City, about two hours before the commission of the crime. Saguin, a resident of Owaon, declared that on
April 26, 1985, at around six o’clock in the evening, he saw Ponggan and Zosimo
Paglinawan pass by the front of his house; that later that evening he heard two
gunshots coming from the direction of the victim’s house, a kilometer away; and
that he subsequently learned that Felicisimo Diniay was killed that particular
night.^[22]

This Court thus sustains the following findings and conclusions
of the Trial Court rejecting appellant’s defense of alibi.

“The Court finds unimpressive accused’s defense of alibi:

1.       He claims he was in
Canibungan to do some farming work, but his supposed corroborating witness,
Geronimo Arunda declared he supervised and participated in the barangay civic
action.

2.       Arunda’s claim that
he kept a logbook with his signature authenticating it (in) which he listed the
participants in the civic action on April 26, 1985 is undeserving of belief
because at that time, he had no control, much less, power over barangay
activities, having assumed as barangay captain thereof only in 1987, which was
some two years later.

3.       Arunda, already the
barangay captain of Canibungan when he testified on December 14, 1988, declared
that the keeping of a logbook showing participants in the civic action,
strangers coming in, as well as barangay inhabitants who leave and return, is a
regular practice. He even said it is
Elisa Tobli who now takes charge of the logbook replacing Godofredo Mamanda as
barangay secretary. But the defense,
knowing fully well its shaky defense did not present the logbook as
demonstrative evidence (Rule 130, Sec. 1(4). It could not be existing after all.”

Alibi is indeed one of the weakest defense (sic) an accused can
invoke. Easily lending itself to
concoction it must invariably be viewed with suspicion, and may be considered
only when established by positive and clear satisfactory evidence (People vs.
Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178; People vs. Munoz, G.R. 61152, Jul. 29, 1988).”

The rule is that the defense of alibi, in order to be given full
faith and credit, must be clearly established and must not leave any room for
doubt as to its plausibility and verity.^[23]
Appellant Ponggan’s alibi, supported as it is by proof less than credible,
cannot overturn the prosecution’s positive evidence demonstrating beyond
reasonable doubt that he participated in the killing of Felicisimo Diniay.

With respect to Ponggan’s contention that it is the affidavit of
witness Bienvenido Diniay — containing the general and ambiguous statement
that it was the “group” who killed his father — that should be given
credence rather than his testimony in open court — mentioning for the first
time that, specifically, it was Felipe Ponggan and Roger Parangan who were his
father’s assailants — suffice it to say that affidavits taken ex-parte
are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably
incomplete and often inaccurate.^[24]

Ponggan’s contention that Alberto Semil is a perjured witness and
that his testimony was tailored to strengthen the weak case of the prosecution,
is not well taken. It will be noted
that Semil, appellant’s co-accused who was discharged to be a state witness,
not only withstood the test of cross-examination, but his testimony was also
substantially corroborated by those of the other two prosecution witnesses,
Diniay and Saguin.

Ponggan was positively identified by witnesses whose testimonies,
according the trial court,^[25] were
“natural and in accord with the normal course of events.”^[26]
No ill-motive has been shown for the prosecution witnesses to give false
evidence against appellant. The mere fact
that witness Bievenido Diniay is a relative of the victim is not sufficient
warrant to disregard his testimony nor does it render the same less worthy of
credit, it being important to stress that his identification of Ponggan as one
of the assailants was positive and reliable.^[27]

The Court likewise agrees with the lower court’s finding that the
killing of Felicisimo Diniay was attended by treachery and evident
premeditation.

There is treachery when the offender adopts means, methods or forms
in the execution of the felony which insure its commission without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.^[28]
In the present case, the victim, who was not armed, was shot and killed after
he opened the door of his house and was just about to descend the stairs,
without any inkling whatever that he was going to be met with bullets and in
all probability not yet fully awake. The mode of attack thus appears to have been deliberately adopted by his
assailants to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which Felicisimo might have offered. Clearly, treachery was present.

On the other hand, evident premeditation exists when the
execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.^[29]
Although there is no adequate showing of the source of the “mission”
note which Efren Saguin handed to Alberto Semil, there was no refutation of his
(Semil’s) testimony that when he and Sabino Alaban arrived at the house of
Albino Jamarolin — uncle of discharged co-accused Juciano Jamarolin –, Roger
Parangan, Zosimo Paglinawan, Jaime Bendano and appellant Felipe Ponggan, were
already there, and it was appellant Ponggan who led and directed them towards
the house of the victim. Thus, there is
persuasive showing of evident premeditation and Ponggan’s participation in the
criminal “mission” or design.

However, where treachery has already been taken into account to
qualify the crime as murder, evident premeditation should be considered only as
a generic aggravating circumstance.^[30]
There being therefore one attendant aggravating circumstance attending the
felony of murder, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty
is death, which should nonetheless be modified to reclusion perpetua by
virtue of the 1987 Constitution.^[31]

As regards the other aggravating circumstances of use of superior
strength and nighttime, the Court upholds the trial court’s conclusion that
these circumstances, although present, cannot be considered as separate
aggravating circumstances because they are absorbed in treachery.^[32]

Finally, the Court finds the trial court’s award of damages justified
by the facts proven by the evidence. However, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of civil
indemnity for death should be raised from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.^[33]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED, except as to the death indemnity which is hereby raised to
P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, and
Puno, JJ., concur.

a Deceased

b Discharged, to be state witness

b Do

b Do

c At large

c Do

^[1]
TSN, Sept. 7, 1987, p. 3

^[2]
TSN, September 7, 1987, pp. 3-4

^[3]
TSN, Oct. 28, 1987, pp. 3-6

^[4]
Id., pp. 4-6

^[5]
TSN, Sept. 7, 1987, pp. 8-12

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 17-18

^[7]
Order dated June 26, 1990

^[8]
Original Record, p. 146

^[9]
Presided over by Judge Jesus O. Angeles

^[10]
Rollo, pp. 17-27

^[11]
Id., p. 27

^[12]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1

^[13]
TSN, July 10, 1989, p. 2-7

^[14]
TSN, Dec. 14, 1988, pp. 2-12

^[15]
See People vs. Calicdan, 165 SCRA 225 [1988]; People vs. Pajarit,
214 SCRA 678 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992] and cases
cited therein

^[16]
TSN, September 7, 1987, pp. 4-6

^[17]
TSN, September 7, 1987, p. 4

^[18]
TSN, September 7, 1987, p. 11

^[19]
TSN, Sept. 15, 1988, p. 3

^[20]
TSN, Sept. 15, 1988, p. 6

^[21]
TSN, Sept. 15, 1988, p. 7

^[22]
TSN, Sept. 7, 1987, p. 16-17

^[23]
People vs. Maravilla, Jr., 167 SCRA 645 [1988]; People vs. Mangulabnan,
200 SCRA 611 [1991]; People vs. Lardizabal, 204 SCRA 320 [1991]; People vs.
Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992]); People vs. Peran, 215 SCRA 152 [1992];
People vs. Pasilao, 215 SCRA 163 [1992]

^[24]
People vs. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]

^[25]
RTC Decision, p. 9

^[26]
SEE People vs. Aguilus, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]; People vs. Danico,
208 SCRA 472 [1992]

^[27]
SEE People vs. Bocatcat, Jr., 188 SCRA 175 [1990] citing People vs.
Castillo, 171 SCRA 30 [1989], People vs. Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 [1988],
and People vs. Paras, 147 SCRA 594 [1987]

^[28]
Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code; SEE People vs. Cempron, 187 SCRA
248 [1990]; People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs.
Balatucan, 206 SCRA 81 [1992]; People vs. Camaddo, 217 SCRA 162 [1993]

^[29]
People vs. Maravilla, Jr. 167 SCRA 645 [1988]

^[30]
People vs. Fabros, 214 SCRA 694 [1992] citing People vs. Diaz, 55
SCRA 178 [1974]

^[31]
Article III, Sec. 19[1]

^[32]
People vs. Bardon, et al., 165 SCRA 416 [1988] citing People vs.
Ramillano, 133 SCRA 201 [1984]; People vs. Bechayda, 212 SCRA 336 [1992]

^[33]
People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 [1990] People vs. Lazo, 198 SCRA
274 [1991]; People vs. Arevalo, 466 [1992]; People vs. Briones,
219 SCRA 134 [1993]