BLOOMFIELD ACADEMY AND RODOLFO J. LAGERA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BLOOMFIELD ACADEMY PARENTS ADVISORY ASSOCIATION, INC. (BAPAA), REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE…

This petition for review on certiorari seeks
to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing, in CA-G.R. SP. No.
20846, the special civil action for certiorari that has assailed a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the court a quo.

We adopt, for purposes of this review, the case and factual
settings recited by the appellate court in its decision. We quote:

“The petition originated in a complaint for injunction filed
on April 6, 1990 by private respondent, the association of parents and
guardians of students enrolled in petitioner. One of the defendants in the said case is petitioner which is a
non-stock, non-profit educational institution. What is being disputed before respondent court is the increase in
tuition fee. More particularly, the
complaint alleged, among other things, that:

“‘x x x

‘4.   On the pretext that the operation, much more
the survival of defendant educational institution is in danger due to the
mandatory increase of the minimum wage under R.A. 6727, which the former is to
comply, the defendant Corporation decided to increase its aforesaid tuition
fees under the following rates:

‘5. The amount of
the increase constitutes a whopping 21.22% average increase of the 89-90
tuition fees and that the said increase was made without prior consultation to
the parents which is a requirement before any such increase should be made
effective;

‘6. The aforesaid
increase was not approved and vigorously objected to by the plaintiff as
contained in its letters to defendant Rodolfo J. Lagera x x x Honorable Isidro
Cariño in his capacity as the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports x x x
These two letters brought to the attention of the defendants that the tuition
fees presently being charged by defendants Bloomfield Academy are already among
the highest in the community, even if compared to Dela Salle Ayala and
Elizabeth Seton which have much better school and library facilities than the
defendant, and that the proposed increase is not only untimely but grossly
inappropriate, and, worse, without any valid basis already, after both parties
agreed on 50% of the increase which was implemented and paid by the students
during the school year with the clear understanding that the other 50% is waived
by the defendant;

‘7. In spite of the
clear sharing by the plaintiff through the aforesaid letters of the gross
inappropriateness of the aforesaid proposal increase in tuition fees,
defendants Honorable Isidro Cariño, blindly approved such proposal in its
letter addressed to defendant Rodolfo S. Lagera dated March 27, 1990 x x x;

‘8. Subsequently
plaintiff received from the defendant Bloomfield Academy through defendant
Rodolfo S. Lagera a letter x x x demanding full payment of the approved tuition
fee increase on or before April 6, 1990 in blatant isolation of the agreement
with the plaintiff that only 50% of the increase will be collected. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff has
already paid the said 50% of the increase;

‘9. The
implementation of the aforesaid approval to increase tuition fees, if not
retained by this Honorable Court, would work injustice to the herein plaintiff
x x x while incorporators keep huge profits, by siphoning them to another
corporation, Rudlin International, Inc. while they also owned and is now asking
for increase in the rentals of the buildings retroactively for three (3)
years.’

“On the date the complaint was filed, respondent court issued
an order enjoining petitioners and Secretary Cariño and/or their agents,
representatives or persons acting in their behalf from implementing their
aforesaid increase in tuition fees, and not withholding their release of the
report cards and/or other papers necessary for the students desiring to
transfer to other schools until further orders from respondent court. The application for injunction was set for
hearing on April 19, 1990 at 2:00 p.m.

“Answer to the complaint was filed by petitioners on April 19,
1990. On the same date, respondent
court conducted the first hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction which hearing was followed by settings on April 25, 26 and 27, 1990.

“After petitioners submitted their complete set of exhibits
and memorandum in opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, respondent court issued the disputed order. x x x”^[1]

The order of the court a quo, dated 30 April 1990,
referred to by the appellate court read:

“WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
ordering the defendants, their agents, their representatives, and all persons
acting under them from collecting the second P675.00 from the enrollees,
limiting themselves only to the first P675.00 and/or from withholding or
refusing the release of the report cards and other papers necessary for
students transferring to other school, until further order from this court,
upon the posting by the plaintiff of a bond in the sum of P200,000.00
conditioned to the payment in favor of the defendants of whatever damages they
may suffer by virtue of this injunction should it appear that the plaintiff is
not entitled thereto.”^[2]

In holding to be without merit the petition for certiorari
attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the aforequoted order, the appellate court ratiocinated thusly:

“It is a well established rule that the grant or denial of an
injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of
which appellate courts will not interfere except on a case of a clear abuse
(Belisle Investment and Finance Co., Inc. W. State Investment House; Rodolfo
vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). And to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari it must be shown that the
abuse of discretion was grave and patent and that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically (Soriano, et al., vs. Atienza, et al., 171 SCRA
284).

“x x x   x x x                x x x

“Rightly or wrongly, respondent judge’s conclusion, which
served as basis in issuing the questioned writ, was reached only after
considering the facts bared in the course of the hearing. In other words, respondent judge was merely
exercising his judgment. Errors of
judgment are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari
(Purefoods Corporation vs. NLRC, 174 SCRA 415).

“One thing we noticed about this petition is that the issues
raised are factual involving as they do errors of judgment on the part of
respondent judge. Invariably, we
encounter the following arguments:

“‘x x public respondent Judge de Guzman appears to have been
mislead by the private respondent BAPAA’s claim that petitioner Bloomfield
Academy did not conduct the requisite consultation before implementing the
tuition fee increase.

‘x x public respondent Judge de Guzman appears to have been mislead
by the private respondent’s untruthful claim.’

“It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often it is
overlooked, the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Consequently, an error of jurisdiction is
not controvertible through the original civil action of certiorari
(Purefoods Corporation vs. NLRC, 171 SCRA 418).

“Anent the allegation that respondent judge disregarded the
fact that the private respondent failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies in assailing the decision of the Department of Education Culture and
Sports approving the tuition fee increase suffice it to state that the
principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable when the respondent is a department secretary whose act as an
alter-ego of the President beers the implied or assumed approval of the latter
(Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214).”^[3]

In the herein petition for review on certiorari
before this Court, petitioners formulate the sole issue of whether or not the
court a quo has acted within its jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned order and, in the affirmative, whether or not it has
committed grave abuse of discretion specifically in granting private
respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

We see merit in the petition.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6728, also commonly
known as “An Act Providing Government Assistance to Students and Teachers
in Private Education, And Appropriating Funds Therefor,” provide:

“Sec. 9. Further
Assistance To Students in Private Colleges and Universities. – x x x.

“(b) For students enrolled in
schools charging above one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) per year in
tuition and other fees during the school year 1988-1989 or such amount in
subsequent years as may be determined from time to time by the State Assistance
Council, no assistance for tuition fees shall be granted by the Government: Provided,
however, That the schools concerned may
raise their tuition fees subject to Section
10 hereof.

“x x x   x x x                    x x x

“Section 10. Consultation. – In any proposed increase in the rate of
tuition fee, there shall be appropriate consultations conducted by the school
administration with the duly organized parents and teachers associations and
faculty associations with respect to secondary schools, and with students
governments or councils, alumni and faculty associations with respect to
colleges. For this purpose, audited
financial statements shall be made available to authorized representatives of
these sectors. Every effort
shall be exerted to reconcile possible
differences. In case
of disagreement, the alumni association of
the school or any other impartial body
of their choosing shall act as arbitrator.

“x x x   x x x                  x x x

“SEC. 14. Program
Administration/Rules and Regulations. –
The State Assistance Council shall be responsible for policy guidance and direction,
monitoring and evaluation of new and existing programs, and the promulgation of
rules and regulations, while the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports shall be responsible
for the day to day administration and
program implementation. Likewise, it may engage the services and support of any qualified
government or private entity for its implementation.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

Private respondent filed with the court a quo an
action, entitled “Injunction with Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order” (docketed Civil Case No. 90-971),
against petitioners and the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
(“DECS”) seeking to stop the implementation of the increase in
tuition fees by petitioner school. Private
respondent asserted that the increase was adopted without the prior
consultation required by law and
that, in any case, the approved increase was exorbitant (at 21.22%). Petitioners, on their part, contended that
the parties did, in fact, hold consultations at which the wage increase for
teachers mandated by Republic Act 6727 and the resulting increase in tuition
fees allowed by Republic Act No. 6728 were discussed at length. The Solicitor General, answering the
complaint for and in behalf of the DECS Secretary,
attested to the approval by DECS of
a fifty percent (50%) tuition fee increase for the school year 1989-1990.

The judicial action initiated by private respondent before the
court a quo appears to us to be an inappropriate
recourse. It remains undisputed that
the DECS Secretary has, in fact,
taken cognizance of the case for the tuition fee increase and has accordingly
acted thereon. We can only assume that
in so doing the DECS Secretary
has duly passed upon the relevant legal and factual issues dealing on the
propriety of the matter. In the
decision process, the DECS Secretary
has verily acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. The remedy from that decision is an appeal. Conformably with Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to question that administrative action lies with the Court of
Appeals, not with the court a quo. If we were to consider, upon the other hand, the case for
injunction filed with the court a quo to be an ordinary action
solely against herein petitioners (with DECS being then deemed to be merely a
nominal party), it would have meant the court’s taking cognizance over the case
in disregard of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.^[4]

Neither can we treat the case as a special civil action for certiorari
or prohibition as the complaint filed by private respondent with the court a
quo, contains no allegation of lack, or grave abuse in the exercise, of
jurisdiction on the part of DECS nor has there been any finding made to that
effect by either the court a quo or the appellate court that could
warrant the extraordinary remedy. A
special civil action, either for certiorari or prohibition, can be
grounded only on either lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.^[5]

In passing, we also observe that the parties have both remained
silent on the provisions of Republic Act No. 6728 to the effect that in case of
disagreement on tuition fee increases (in this instance by herein private
parties), the issue should be resolved through arbitration. Although the matter has not been raised by
the parties, it is an aspect, nevertheless, in our view, that could have well
been explored by them instead of immediately invoking, such as they apparently
did, the administrative and judicial relief to resolve the controversy.

All told, we hold that the court a quo has been
bereft of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of private respondent’s
complaint. We see no real
justification, on the basis of the factual and case settings here obtaining, to
permit a deviation from the long standing rule that the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at any time even on appeal.

WHEREFORE, conformably with our above opinion, the instant
petition is GRANTED and the questioned order of the court a quo
and the decision of the appellate court are SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 40-43.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 39-40.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 44-47.

^[4]
See Quintos, Jr. vs. National Stud Farm, 54 SCRA 210; See also Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426.

^[5]
Zagada vs. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114; National Congress of
Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines vs. Trajano, 208 SCRA
18; Calagui vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564; Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. vs. Enage, 152 SCRA 80; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil. 609; Abad
Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480.