PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL BAGARES Y MENDOZA AND IMELDA SANTOS Y LOPEZ, DEFENDANTS, RAFAEL BAGARES Y MENDOZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 164, Pasig, in Criminal Case No. 1106-D, finding appellant RAFAEL
BAGARES y MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425, as amended).

In said criminal case, RAFAEL BAGARES y MENDOZA and IMELDA SANTOS
y LOPEZ were accused of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, committed as
follows:

“That on or about the 15th day of January, 1990, in the
Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and they mutually helping and aiding one
another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to poseur buyer 0.06 grams of white crystalline
substance wrapped in a piece of aluminum foil; 0.10 grams of white crystalline
substance placed in four (4) transparent plastic bags and in consideration of
P400.00, positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which
are regulated drugs, in violation of the above-cited law” (Records, p.
10).

Both accused pleaded not guilty to the information (Records, p.
24).

On February 7, 1991, the trial court rendered its judgment,
acquitting Imelda Santos but convicting Rafael Bagares of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the judgment reads as
follows:

“In view of all the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds
the accused Rafael Bagares y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
illegally selling and/or dispensing shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, as
regulated drugs, in violation of Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act as
amended as charged and therefore, hereby imposes upon him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, as well as to pay the
costs.

On the other hand, the Court finds the accused Imelda Santos y
Lopez NOT GUILTY of the present charge in conspiracy of (sic) the other accused
Rafael Bagares and therefore, hereby acquits her of the same.

The Branch Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to forward the
subject shabu as soon as practicable (sic) to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for whatever proper disposition that Board may take under the premises”
(Rollo, p. 19).

I

On January 12, 1990, a telephone call from an unidentified party
was received by P/Sgt. Jimmy Navarro, Officer-in-charge of the Marikina Police
Station (TSN, March 28, 1990, p. 14), regarding a shabu pusher operating
at Sixto De la Paz St., Sta. Elena, Marikina, Metro Manila (TSN, ibid., p. 3).

At about 9:30 A.M. of said date (TSN, ibid., p. 26), a team,
composed of Pvt. Harrison Amanon as team leader, Pvt. Melanio Valeroso, and
Pats. Victor Azurin, Ruel Cenesa, and Herminio Caligagan as members, was formed
to conduct a surveillance at said place (TSN, ibid., pp. 3, 14-15).

The surveillance on January 12 lasted from 4:00 P.M. until about
10:00 P.M. In this span of time, they
discovered the identity of the person selling shabu in that
vicinity. The surveillance continued
for three days. They observed that
appellant regularly came out to do business in the street at about 8:00 P.M.
(TSN, ibid., p. 17).

On January 15, at around 9:30 P.M., the police team conducted a
buy-bust operation with Pvt. Valeroso acting as poseur-buyer (TSN, ibid., p.
4). He approached appellant and
pretended to be a buyer of shabu. At the same time, he handed to appellant the marked four
one-hundred-peso bills (TSN, ibid., p. 3). Appellant entered an alley and after a few minutes returned and handed to
Pvt. Valeroso two packets of shabu – one wrapped in an aluminum foil and
the other one in a plastic bag. After
appellant handed over the shabu, Pvt. Valeroso arrested and frisked
him. Pvt. Valeroso was able to
confiscate the four one-hundred-peso bills from appellant (TSN, ibid., p. 4).

After apprehending appellant, the members of the team brought him
to the police headquarters for investigation and in the course thereof, he
named accused Imelda Santos y Lopez as his source of the shabu (TSN,
ibid., p. 10).

The police team, together with appellant, proceeded to the residence
of accused Santos, who surrendered to them four plastic bags of shabu
(Exhs. “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and “F­-3”). They then arrested her (TSN, ibid., pp.
10-11).

The Certification of Laboratory Result (Exh. “D”) and
the Chemical Report (Exhs. “C”, “C-1” to “C-3”)
prepared by P/Cap. Julita T. De Villa of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp
Crame, Quezon City showed that the specimens submitted for analysis were found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (TSN, February 28,
1990, pp. 3-4).

Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that at around 9:00 P.M. of
January 15, 1990, he was with friends drinking beer in front of his house (TSN,
December 5, 1990, p. 2). Suddenly, two
policemen arrived and arrested him. He
was brought to the town hall where he was interrogated regarding his source of shabu. He saw the shabu and four
one-hundred-peso bills on top of the table. He was asked to shell out P30,000.00 so that the case could be settled
but he had no money to comply with the demand. So he was placed behind bars (TSN, December 5, 1990, p. 5). No investigation was conducted by the
Marikina Police in connection with his arrest (TSN, December 5, 1990, p. 4).

Appellant denied having sold shabu, claiming that what he
delivered for his employer, accused Santos, were ordinary beans (TSN, December
5, 1990, p. 6).

II

In his appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred: (1) in giving full credence to the testimony
of Pvt. Valeroso; (2) in not acquitting him after the court acquitted his co-accused
on the same evidence presented against him; and (3) in admitting illegally
obtained evidence.

Appellant’s defense consisted merely of denials and his claim
that the shabu presented by the prosecution as evidence against him was
planted by the police.

The issue raised in appellant’s first assignment of error is
reduced to the credibility of the witnesses. We have no grounds to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court
(People v. Bautista, 142 SCRA 649 [1986]).

Denials by the accused are as weak as the defense of alibi. They are self-serving evidence and unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be given weight over the
positive assertions of credible witnesses (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64
[1993]).

As to the claim that appellant was the victim of a
“frame-up,” we agree with the observation of the trial court that if
the police merely concocted trumped-up charges against him, they would not have
planted a “comparatively sizeable amount of shabu.” Moreover,
such defense can easily be fabricated and is commonly used by persons accused
of drug pushing (People v. Agapito, 154 SCRA 694 [1987]).

There is the presumption that police officers in the performance
of their official duties do so in a regular manner and the evidence to overturn
such a presumption must be sufficient and convincing (People v. Marcos, 185
SCRA 154 [1990]). Appellant has not
shown any ill-motive on the part of the lone prosecution witness that may cast
doubt on his testimony (People v. Villa, 221 SCRA 661 [1993]).

Appellant’s claim that he was entertaining several visitors when
the police arrived to arrest him was intended to blunt the prosecution’s
evidence that the “buy-bust” operation took place about ten meters
from his house. The thrust of the contention was that appellant never left the place where he was
drinking with his friends in order to transact business with the poseur-buyer.

This contention would not prosper. In the first place, appellant never presented any of his numerous
guests, who could have testified that appellant never left the party to go out
in the street to transact a business deal with the poseur-buyer. In the second place, it was so easy for
appellant to slip away from his guests to sell shabu about ten meters
from his house without his absence being noticed.

In the second assignment of error, appellant claims that the
trial court erred in not acquitting him of the crime charged despite its
acquittal of his co-accused Imelda Santos because “the evidence of the
prosecution is common against both and is based on the same factual setting,
arising from the same single incident.” Suffice it to say that appellant
and accused Santos were not prosecuted on the basis of the same evidence and
that they were arrested under different circumstances. Appellant was prosecuted for selling
prohibited drugs while accused Santos was prosecuted for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.

Appellant was arrested when caught selling shabu in
flagrante while accused Santos was arrested after a warrantless search
on information furnished by appellant himself after his arrest.

The acquittal of accused Santos was based mainly on the grounds
of constitutional infirmity and the unreasonableness of the warrantless search
and seizure of the evidence against her.

Finally, appellant urges that the court a quo erred
in admitting the prosecution evidence against him, particularly Exhibits
“D”, “D-1”, “E-1” and “F” to
“F-3”, which were seized without any search warrant in violation of
his constitutional rights.

Exhibits “D” to “D-1” refer to the shabu
contained in the aluminum foil while Exhibits “E” to “E-1”,
“F” to “F-3” refer to the plastic tea bags. These incriminating evidence were seized as
an incident and in connection with the arrest in flagrante of
appellant.

Under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
police officer may arrest a person even without a warrant, when the person
arrested has committed or is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in his presence. Under Section
12, Rule 126 of the same Code, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search
warrant.

The provisions on penalties under the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, R.A. No. 6425, were amended by R.A. No. 7659 as follows:

“SEC. 20. Application
of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Instrument of the
Crime. The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of
opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of
indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or

8. In the case of other
dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
administration, delivery, transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the
cultivation of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs and the possession
of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with
it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the
proceeds of the crime including but not limited to money and others obtained
thereby and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, unless they
are property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those which are
not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such
drugs as well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government shall be turned over to the Board for
proper disposal without delay.

Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or
misapplies or fails to account for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or
plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as
herein defined shall after conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos.”

The above provision of R.A. No. 7659 can be applied in the
instant case, pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt
amplianda, adiosa restrigenda (Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect). This principle is embodied in Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

“Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5
of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same.”

The provisions of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code are
applicable even to special laws (U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5 [1917]).

According to the trial court, appellant was caught selling 0.16 grams
of shabu. We impose the penalty of prision
correccional considering the small quantity of shabu (0.16 grams)
confiscated from the accused. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by Section 1 of R.A. No. 7659.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in all respects except as to the penalty, which is MODIFIED to SIX (6)
months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional to TWO (2) years
and ONE (1) day of prision correccional. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.