CHUA YENG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The facts in the present case, from an examination of the record, appear to
be as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of June, 1913, Chua Tan Ching, a person of
Chinese race, arrived at the port of Manila from the port of Amoy, China, on the
steamship Taisang, and sought admission into the” Philippine Islands as
the legitimate minor son of-Chua-Yeng, a resident Chinese merchant, in the city
of Manila; that his right to land was inquired into on the 17th day of June,
1913, by the board of special inquiry; that after hearing the testimony of the
witnesses presented, the said board rendered its decision denying him the right
to enter the Philippine Islands, on the ground that they did not believe him to
be the legitimate son of the said Chua Yeng; that an appeal was had to the
Collector of Customs of the port of Manila; that a rehearing was granted; that
the rehearing took place on the 25th day of June, 1913, and said board again
refused the said Chua Tan Ching the right to land, basing its decision upon the
same ground as its first decision; that a second appeal was taken to the
Collector of Customs and a third hearing was ordered before said board; that on
the 5th day of March, 1914, a third hearing took place before said board and the
said Chua Tan Ching was again refused the right to land; that a third appeal was
taken to the Collector of Customs and he again affirmed the decision of said
board on the 11th day of March, 1914.

On the 14th day of March, 1914, the said Chua Yeng, on behalf of the said
Chua Tan Ching, presented a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila. Attached to said petition was a copy of
all the proceedings had in the department of customs.

To the said petition the Honorable Ramon Avancena, Attorney-General,
presented an answer, in which he said, in part: “That the right of the said Chua
Tan Ching to land, was inquired into by the duly authorized board of special
inquiry, which board, after hearing the testimony and considering the evidence
submitted by the applicant, rendered its decision refusing him the right to land
on the ground that it did not believe him to be the son of Chua Yeng, as
claimed; that he was a person of Chinese race who presented none of the required
statutory evidence of his right to enter the Philippine Islands.”

Upon the issue presented by said petition and answer, the lower court,
without first determining whether or not there had been an abuse of authority by
the department of Customs, proceeded to take testimony upon the right of the
said Chua Tan Ching to land and after hearing said testimony, found that the
said Chua Tan Ching was the legitimate minor son of Chua Yeng and entered an
order discharging him from the custody of the law and allowed him to enter the
Philippine Islands. Prom that decision the Attorney-General appealed to this
court.

It has been repeatedly decided that the right to determine, in the first
instance, whether or not a Chinese alien has a right to enter the United States
or territories thereof to which the Chinese immigration laws have been extended,
has been conferred by law upon a branch of the executive department of the
Government. The judicial department of the Government has no authority or right
to intervene in determining the right of aliens to enter the Philippine Islands,
except and until it has been proven and shown clearly that that branch of the
executive department of the Government upon which the power to determine that
question has been conferred by law, has abused its authority; in other words,
until it is shown .that the customs authorities have abused their authority in
refusing Chinese aliens the right to land in the Philippine Islands, the courts
are without authority to intervene. The decision of the customs authorities is
final, unless it is shown that they have abused their authority. (Tan Chin Hin
vs. Collector of Customs, 27 Phil. Rep., 521.) It has been frequently
held that if there is some proof supporting the conclusions of the department of
customs denying a Chinese alien the right to enter, there has been no abuse of
authority. (U. S. vs. Williams, 189 Fed. Rep., 915; Tan Chin Hin
vs. Collector of Customs, supra.) It has also been decided that the
customs authorities act more or less as a jury in determining the facts in the
First instance; that they have an opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, and
that they are under no obligation to believe the declarations of a witness, if
his manner or conduct during the examination is such as to cause them to
disbelieve him, even though his declarations are not disputed by any other
witness. , (Ekiu vs. U. S., 142 U. S., 651; Tan Chin Hin vs.
Collector of Customs, supra.)

In the present case we find a very marked conflict between the declarations
made by the said Chua Tan Chin and the declarations of his alleged father and
his alleged brother.

Said conflict, in our opinion, was sufficient to justify the board of special
inquiry and the Insular Collector of Customs as well, in disregarding their
testimony and disbelieving the same. The board of special inquiry in its first
decision said, among other things:

“The alleged father, brother, and Chua Yan, a relative appeared in his
behalf. Their stories were so conflicting and the lie was passed so often, that
the board hardly knows whether to believe any of the testimony or disbelieve all
of it. * * *

“The alleged father and both of the witnesses contradicted themselves so many
times, especially the second witness, and both of the witnesses have admitted to
having falsely testified under oath, and the discrepancies are so many and so
plainly false, that the board believes it to be a fraudulent case to the core.”

The board of special inquiry stated that there was no resemblance between the
alleged son and, the alleged father. It has been decided that a physical
comparison may be made between a minor Chinese, an applicant for admission into
the territory of the United States, with his alleged father, and that said
comparison constitutes competent and material evidence, providing the fact of
such comparison is made a part of the record. (Ex parte Choey Dee Ying,
214 Fed. Rep., 873; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sees. 1150-1154; In re
Jessup, 81 Cal., 408; 6 L. R. A., 594; Gilmanton vs. Ham, 38 N. H.,
108,113; Tan Beko vs. Collector of Customs, 26 Phil. Rep., 254; De la
Cruz vs. Collector of Customs, 26 Phil. Rep., 270.)

It certainly can not be contended, however, under such comparison, that if
there is no resemblance between the alleged son and the alleged father, that
that fact alone would constitute sufficient proof to show that the alleged
parentage did not exist. The mere absence of parental resemblance, in the face
of other proof, would not be sufficient to declare that the parentage did not
exist. If the courts should decide that lineage and legitimacy depended upon
parental physiognomy or bodily marks of similarity, a great many people might be
deprived of their legal inheritance. Legitimacy can not depend wholly upon the
presence or absence of parental similarity of physical appearance. Neither was
it made the basis of the decision of the board of special inquiry.

The record contains a number of exhibits. It does not appear Of record just
how said exhibits were made a part of the record. Exhibit A is a letter written
by H. B. Mc-Coy, Insular Collector of Customs, on July 22,1913, directed to Mr.
Petronilo Valenzuela, immigration broker, which letter was accompanied by ail
alleged decision, signed with a rubber stamp by the name “H. B. McCoy, Insular
Collector of Customs,” by which decision it appears that the Insular Collector
of Customs had overruled the decision of the board of special inquiry and had
permitted the said Chua Tan Ching to land, as the legitimate minor son of Chua
Yeng. It is neither alleged nor proved that said alleged decision had ever been
rendered by the Insular Collector of Customs, in fact, the record shows that no
such decision had been rendered. We find in the petition presented by the
plaintiff a statement made by the plaintiff himself, that an appeal was duly
taken to the Insular Collector of Customs, who affirmed the decision of the said
board of special inquiry, constituted as above stated. No pretension was made in
the court below that the Insular Collector of Customs had reversed the decision
of the board of special inquiry and had permitted the said Chua Tan Ching to
land. In view of the fact that the plaintiff admits that the Insular Collector
of Customs affirmed the decision of the board of special inquiry and denied the
applicant the right to land, we are not disposed to discuss that question
further.

While the record contains much proof supporting the contention of the
appellee, yet there was sufficient proof, or rather conflicting of proof, in our
opinion, to justify the conclusions of the department of customs. That being
true, there was no abuse of authority and the Court of First Instance was
without jurisdiction to hear proof upon the question presented by the petition
for the writ of habeas corpus.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is
hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that Chua Tan Ching be
remanded to the Insular Collector of Customs to be dealt with in accordance with
his decision of the 11th day. of March, 1914. And without any finding as to
costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.

Trent, J., concurs in the result.