PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG appeals from the judgment^[1]
of the court a quo finding her guilty of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor penalized under Art. 270 of The Revised Penal Code and imposing
upon her a prison term of reclusion perpetua.

The evidence for the government tends to establish that on 6
October 1989, at about four-thirty in the afternoon, complaining witness Lucita
Romero Corpuz went to the Manila City Jail to visit her husband, Antonio
Corpuz, who was detained therein. She
brought along with her Carla May, her daughter who was then only 1 year and 4
months old, because no one could take care of her at home. In her previous visits, she was able to
bring her inside but this time she was not allowed to do so. Appellant Cherry Bondoc who was then
standing in front of the gate of the jail approached her and volunteered to
take care of Carla May while she was visiting her husband. She asked appellant her name and why she was
offering to help as that was the first time they met. Appellant explained that she just pitied her. To convince Lucita, appellant even narrated
that she was there accompanying a friend who was also visiting someone, and in
fact had already watched over some six (6) children that morning whose parents
had to leave them in her custody so they could go inside the jail.

Apparently convinced that appellant had good intentions, Lucita
entrusted Carla May to her while she visited her husband. But when she came out after fifteen minutes,
her daughter and appellant were nowhere to be found. A woman who was also waiting in front of the jail told her that
appellant had left with Carla May. Fearing that her daughter was kidnapped, Lucita complained to the Warden
of the Manila City Jail and proceeded to the General Assignment Section of the
Western Police District (WPD) to report the kidnapping. Her complaint was accordingly recorded in
the police blotter and then published in the People’s Journal.

On 13 October 1989, the Barangay Chairman of Herbosa, Tondo, went
to the house of Lucita and informed the latter that the policemen of Herbosa
Detachment received a report that a woman had taken Carla May to Dagat-dagatan,
Navotas, and was now selling her in Herbosa, Tondo. The Barangay Chairman also reported that the woman was in fact
arrested by Pat. Flormata and Pat. Mauricio of the same detachment.

Accompanied by the Barangay Chairman, Lucita went to the Herbosa
Detachment and saw appellant. Then Pat.
Willy Capati arrived with Carla May who was then reunited with her mother.

On 15 October 1989, Lucita gave her sworn statement to Pat.
Efraim Tumaning of the General Assignment Section, WPD. Patrolman Tumaning prepared and signed a
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report which was signed by appellant who was then
placed under arrest for kidnapping.

On 16 October 1989, Pat. Tumaning prepared and signed a Crime
Report concerning his investigation. On
the same day, Capt. Crescencio Cabasal endorsed the case to the City Prosecutor
of Manila for appropriate action.

On 19 January 1990, an information for kidnapping for the purpose
of selling minor Carla May Corpuz was filed against appellant Cherry Bondoc y
Liwanag.

Appellant denied the charge. She alleged that on 6 October 1989, her aunt requested her to bring some
things to a cousin, Rolando Bondoc, who was detained at the Manila City Jail
for vagrancy. Since she had no
identification card, she was not allowed to enter the jail. However, she was able to hand over the
things to her cousin when the latter was called to the gate upon her request.

At around three o’clock in the afternoon, a certain Nerrie
approached her and asked her if she could take care of a young girl while she
went inside the jail to visit somebody. Appellant agreed but did not ask Nerrie about the child’s name. She waited for Nerrie outside but since the
latter failed to return, she went to a nearby store for a brief thirty-minute
snack, after which she went back to the gate to look for Nerrie.

After waiting up to five o’clock in the afternoon, appellant
decided to leave taking the child with her as the security guards refused to
keep her, and brought her to the house of appellant’s sister, Melissa Bondoc,
in Dagat-dagatan and asked her to take care of the child in the meantime. While appellant actually resided in
Velasquez St., Tondo, she had not thought of bringing Carla May to the police
station in Herbosa.

On 7 October 1989, at about seven o’clock in the morning,
appellant left for Angeles City where she worked as a cook. Three or four days later she read in the People’s
Journal that the child in her custody had been kidnapped by a
“dark-complexioned woman with short-cut hair.” Consequently, she went
to Police Station No. 1, WPD, and reported that the child was in her
custody. She then accompanied the
policemen to her sister’s house in Dagat-dagatan and after taking Carla May
they all returned to the police station where Lucita pointed to her as the
woman to whom she entrusted Carla May at the Manila City Jail. Her sister Melissa, who was also present at
the station when Carla May was returned to her mother, did not give any
statement or explanation to the police authorities as to how and why Carla May
happened to be in her house in Dagat-dagatan.

The trial court believed the story of the prosecution and
convicted appellant Cherry Bondoc of kidnapping defined and penalized under
Art. 270 of The Revised Penal Code on the basis of the testimony of witness
Lucita Romero Corpuz, mother of Carla May, that she entrusted the custody of
her daughter to appellant who took Carla May away without her (Lucita) consent
and deliberately failed to return her.

Appellant assails the trial court in this appeal (a) for giving
credence to incriminating evidence obtained while she was under custodial
interrogation without the benefit of counsel; and, (b) for convicting her of
the offense of kidnapping on the basis of insufficient evidence, thereby
denying her due process and equal protection of the law.

Appellant contends that the trial court gave weight to the theory
of the prosecution based on documentary and testimonial evidence obtained from
her while she was under custodial interrogation in violation of her
constitutional rights. She argues that
while she was under custodial investigation she was asked questions designed to
elicit incriminating evidence, i.e., the Crime Report^[2]
and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,^[3]
“without having been informed of her rights and without benefit of
counsel.” She also argues that the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution does not prove her guilt, and that there was no evidence of selling
the child which would have established criminal intent.

The police reports contain a statement that “when
investigated after being informed of her constitutional rights, she (appellant)
verbally admitted that she took herein victim but she refused to reduce her
statements into writing without the presence of her own counsel.”

A person under custodial investigation is entitled to the
following rights: (a) right to remain
silent; (b) right to counsel; and, (c) right to be informed of these rights.^[4]
The accused should be assisted by counsel the moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time.^[5]

We agree with appellant. The verbal admission she made without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence. However, even
without her admission, the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to
support the finding of guilt against her.

The rule is settled that the testimony of a single credible
witness is sufficient to convict.^[6]
Even in the absence of documentary evidence, the clear and positive
identification of the accused by a witness regarding the former’s active
participation in the crime is enough to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Thus testified Lucita, mother of Carla May who was kidnapped by
appellant –

Q         Madam
witness, where were you on October 6, 1989 at around 4:30 o’clock in the
afternoon?

A          I
was at the City Jail visiting my husband, sir x x x x I was with my child,
Carla May, sir,

x x x x

Q         What
did you do with your child when she was not allowed to see your husband?

A          I
was told by Cherry Bondoc that she would take care of my child because that day
she had already took (sic) care of six children and Carla was the 7th child,
sir x x x x I was asking who was she, (sic) and why she was interested in
taking care of my child, and she answered that she pitied me. sir x x x x She told me to trust her because
according to her she had already took (sic) care of many children and that
those children did not get lost, sir.

Q         What
happened after telling you that?

A          I
had her watch over my child for a short time, sir x x x x Only fifteen minutes,
sir.

Q         After
talking with your husband for fifteen minutes, what did you do next?

A          I
immediately went back (to) get my child but I was told by a woman that my child
was brought away by Cherry Bondoc, sir, together with Baby Tipuz.^[7]

The trial court observed that Lucita, testifying before the court
in a spontaneous, straightforward and candid manner, pointed to and identified
appellant as the person to whom she entrusted Carla May and who later absconded
with her child; that prior to Lucita’s identification in court she had
immediately pointed to the appellant as the kidnapper of her child on the day
she saw appellant at the Herbosa police station when Carla May was presented.

We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court. The issue involved in this
appeal is one of credibility, and this Court has invariably ruled that the
matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by
the trial courts because they, unlike appellate courts, can weigh the testimony
of witnesses in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial, except when circumstances of weight or influence were
ignored or disregarded by them which does not obtain in the present case.^[8]

Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that would have
affected the result of the case, this Court will not disturb factual findings
of the lower court. Having had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while
testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to
gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the
often conflicting evidence for both parties.^[9]
When the issue is one of credibility, the trial court’s findings are given
great weight on appeal.

The bare denial of appellant that Lucita was not the one who
entrusted Carla May to her constitutes self-serving negative evidence which is
not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of Lucita. As the denial of appellant was weak,
uncorroborated and inherently improbable, the clear and straightforward
testimony of the prosecution witnesses should prevail. Even if there is no evidence to show
appellant’s intention to sell the young girl for profit, the two elements of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of The Revised Penal
Code are already present, namely: (a)
The offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and (b) The
offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardian.^[10]

With the positive testimony of Lucita, the prosecution has proved
the presence of the above elements to establish the criminal liability of
appellant. Moreover, appellant has
admitted the existence of the two elements by testifying that after having been
given custody of the child, she kept the latter in her sister’s house for three
(3) or four (4) days without seeking any assistance from the police authorities
so that the child could be immediately returned to her mother. This admission shows the falsity of her claim
of innocence. Instead, it affirms her
deliberate refusal to return the child to her mother.

We also take note of the failure of appellant to present as
defense witnesses the guards at the city jail whom she allegedly requested to
take Carla May in their custody when that Nerrie did not return to get the
child. If indeed this claim of
appellant is true, its confirmation by those guards could have probably helped
establish her innocence. But there was
not even any effort to produce them.

The records do not also show any known motive why the prosecution
witnesses would testify against appellant. In the absence thereof, it is hardly incredible that they would pervert
the truth, testify to a falsehood and cause the punishment of one who had
neither brought them harm nor injury.^[11]
In fact, upon discovery that her daughter was missing, Lucita immediately
reported the incident to the Warden of the Manila City Jail as well as to the
local police authorities. In the
absence of delay in reporting the crime to the authorities, the testimony of
the complaining witness should be credible.^[12]

For kidnapping and failure to return minor Carla May to her
mother from whom the former was taken by appellant, the trial court correctly
sentenced her to reclusion perpetua conformably with Art. 270 of The
Revised Penal Code. This Court also
finds appropriate to award moral damages to complaining witness Lucita Romero
Corpuz and the amount of P10,000.00 is considered reasonable as reparation for
the mental anguish and serious anxiety she suffered before Carla May was returned
to her.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding
the accused-appellant CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor penalized under Art. 270 of The
Revised Penal Code and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the amount of P10,000.00 in moral
damages is also awarded to Lucita Romero Corpuz.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49.

^[2]
Exh. “B,” p. 1.

^[3]
Exh. “C,” p. 1.

^[4]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 73603, 22 June 1988, 162 SCRA 422.

^[5]
Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. 56291, 27 June 1988, 162 SCRA 642.

^[6]
People v. Tan, G.R. No. 53834, 24 November 1986, 145 SCRA 614.

^[7]
TSN, 17 May 1990, pp. 2-4.

^[8]
People v. Mendoza, No. L-39335, 25 March 1983, 121 SCRA 149; See also People
v. Bernal, No. L-30483, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 1.

^[9]
People v. Bernal, supra.

^[10]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 81020, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 569.

^[11]
See Note 8.

^[12]
People v. Maala, No. L-37792, 24 June 1983, 122 SCRA 812.