PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAUL ROLDAN Y SAMSON, LAURO SANTIAGO Y CRUZ AND LITO DE LA CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

In Criminal Case No. 9648-MN,
the accused Raul Roldan y Samson, Lauro Santiago y Cruz and Joselito de la Cruz
y Sebastian were charged with the violation of Section 4,^[1] Article II of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The information,^[2] dated
23 October 1990, against the accused reads as follows:

“That on or about the 22nd day of October 1990, in Navotas,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a private person and without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute, deliver
to Pat. Nemesio L. Ira in a buy-bust operation, twenty (20) tea bags of
marijuana leaves, which is a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.”

Upon arraignment on 7 November 1990, the three (3) accused
assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.^[3]

On Motion for Reinvestigation^[4] dated
28 November 1990, the charge against Joselito de la Cruz was dismissed by the
trial court in a Resolution^[5] dated
3 January 1991.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision^[6]
dated 8 April 1991, the dispositive portion^[7] of
which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused Raul Roldan y Samson and Lauro Santiago y Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425
and sentencing each one of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the cost of this suit.

The confiscated tea bags of marijuana (Exhs. ‘G’ to ‘G-17’; ‘H-1’
to ‘H-3’) are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is directed to turn over the same, upon the finality of this decision, to
the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.”

The present appeal assigns a lone error^[8]
allegedly committed by the trial court:

“The lower court seriously erred in giving credence to the
prosecution as against the defense when it should have done the other way
around (sic); hence, it erred when it convicted the accused.”

The relevant facts as found by the trial court are the following:^[9]

“x x x the Intelligence Special Operations Groups of the
Navotas Police Station had been receiving telephone calls from concerned
citizens complaining about the rampant selling of marijuana somewhere in a
basketball court at Kapalaran St., San Roque, Navotas, Metro Manila. On October 20, 1990, Pat. Nemesio Ira, a
member of said unit, received a similar complaint from a caller, who did not
identify himself, naming the persons allegedly selling marijuana near said
basketball court as alias ‘Larry’ and alias ‘Raul long hair’ and have the
description of said persons. Pat. Ira
then reported the said complaint to Cpl. Roland Mabbun of the same unit. In order to check the veracity of the said
complaint, Cpl. Mabbun contacted his civilian informer, gave him P100.00 and
instructed the latter to buy marijuana near the basketball court at Kapalaran
Street from alias Raul and Larry, after giving the description of the two suspects. After thirty minutes, the civilian informer
reported to Cpl. Mabbun that he was able to buy three (3) tea bags of
marijuana. At about noontime of the
same day, Cpl. Mabbun again instructed the said civilian informer to buy
marijuana to check of Raul and Larry were still at said place, and said
civilian informer returned at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon with two tea
bags of marijuana allegedly bought from Raul and Larry. As only Cpl. Mabbun and Pat. Ira were at the
police station then, they waited for Pat. Lauro Santos and Pfc. Victor Luya,
who arrived at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon and they organized
themselves into a team for the purposes of conducting a buy-bust operation,
with Cpl. Mabbun as team leader and Pat. Ira as poseur-buyer. At about 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the
same day, the team, accompanied by the civilian informer, proceeded to
Kapalaran St. and positioned themselves in an alley near the basketball court
where they were met along the way by Raul and Larry. The civilian informer introduced Pat. Ira to Raul and Larry as a person who wanted to buy
marijuana. Raul then asked Pat. Ira how
much he wanted to buy and the latter replied that he would buy P30.00 worth of
marijuana. Raul asked for the money and
Pat. Ira gave him the marked money consisting of one ten peso bill and one
twenty peso bill, on which he and Cpl. Mabbun had earlier placed their initials
(Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’). Raul and Larry
then went to the basketball court and took something from beneath the pile of
wood at the side of the basketball court. Raul and Larry then returned to where they left Pat. Ira and was joined
on the way by Joselito de la Cruz. Larry handed three tea bags of marijuana wrapped in newsprint to Pat.
Ira who, thereupon, gave the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the
team, who ran towards them and helped him in arresting the three suspects. The team members then asked Raul as to where
the other stocks of marijuana were and the latter accompanied them to the side
of the basketball court where there was a pile of pieces of wood. Raul took a nestogen milk can under the pile
of wood and gave it to the police officers. The can contained seventeen (17) tea bags of marijuana which were
individually wrapped in newsprint. The
police officers likewise recovered the marked money from Raul and they brought
the three suspects to the Navotas Police Station.

At the Navotas Police Station, Pat. Ira and Cpl. Mabbun placed
their initials and the words ‘buy bust’ on the newsprint wrapper of the three
(3) tea bags of marijuana bought by Pat. Ira from the accused (Exhs. ‘H-1’ to
‘H-3’; ‘H-1-A’ to ‘H-3-A’; ‘H-1-B’ to ‘H-3-B’). They likewise placed their initials on the nestogen can (Exh.
‘G’) and on the newsprint wrapper of the seventeen (17) tea bags of marijuana
contained in said can (Exh. ‘G-1’ to ‘G-17’). All the marijuana confiscated were thereafter turned over to the
National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination. The certification and report subsequently
issued by the National Bureau of Investigation, which were admitted by the
defense counsel, show that the examination of the specimen submitted gave
positive results for marijuana (Exhs. ‘E’ to ‘F’).”

These facts were testified to by Pat. Nemesio Ira^[10]
and Cpl. Roland Mabbun,^[11]
agents of the Intelligence Special Operations Group of the Navotas Police
Station who had posed as buyer-poseur and team leader, respectively, of the
buy-bust operation. The testimony of
the forensic chemist of the Forensic Chemistry Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (“NBI”) was not ?????fered by the prosecution, since
the defense admitted^[12] the former’s Certification dated 22
October 1990 (Exhibit “E”) and Report dated 23 October 1990 (Exhibit
“F”); both documents concluded that the specimens delivered to the
NBI for forensic chemistry examination, weighing approximately 34 grams, proved
positive for marijuana.

Appellants presented a different version of the facts. The trial court summed up appellants’ story
as follows:^[13]

“On the other hand, both accused denied the charge against
them. They claim that between 4:00 to
4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of October 22, 1990, they were sitting on a bench
near the basketball court at Kapalaran St., together with Joselito de la Cruz,
watching five persons playing basketball. Three policemen, whom they later came to know as Pat. Ira, Pat. Luya and
a certain Baba suddenly alighted from a motorized tricycle which stopped in
front of them. The said policemen
arrested them and brought them to the Navotas Municipal Building. During the investigation, Cpl. Mabbun was
forcing them to admit ownership of the marijuana which was shown to them but
they refused to do so.

Anna Rose Rafael tried to corroborate the claim of the
accused. She testified that at about 4:00
to 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of October 22, 1990, she was at the door of
her house at Kapalaran St., about six (6) meters away from the basketball court
when a motorized tricycle stopped in front of Raul Roldan, Larry Santiago and
another person who were then sitting on a bench near the wall of the basketball
court; that three policemen alighted from said motorized tricycle, drew their
guns and poked the same at Raul Roldan and Larry Santiago; and that the
policemen thereafter brought Raul Roldan and Larry Santiago with them.”

As noted, appellants’ brief assigns a solitary error, cast in
very general terms, allegedly committed by the trial court. Close study of appellants’ brief reveals an
enumeration of seven (7) instances where the trial court arrived at conclusions
adverse to the defense because, according to appellants, the former
“misread certain pieces of evidence [or] it overlooked certain material
circumstances.”^[14] In
other words, appellants actually submit sevens
(7) assignments of error.

These assignments of error, however, have a common element: the trial court’s ascribing credibility to
prosecution witnesses which the defense contends to be misplaced. Hence, the ultimate issue posed in this case
is whether the trial court erred (1) in giving credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses tending to show that they had succeeded in entrapping
appellants in a buy-bust operation as peddlers of marijuana on the afternoon of
22 October 1990; and (2) in not believing the claims of the defense that (a) no
buy-bust operation actually occurred and (b) that the accused were merely being
forced to admit ownership of, and to
implicate a certain Jojo Florendo as the source of, the marijuana.

The fundamental issue obviously involves the credibility of
witnesses. There is no paucity of
jurisprudence relating to the Court’s role in respect of issues of this nature.

The Court accords great
respect to the factual conclusions drawn by trial courts, particularly on the
matter of credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity
of observing the deportment and demeanor of witnesses while listening to them
speak, enabling him to form at first hand a judgment as to whether witnesses
were telling the truth or not.^[15] When the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, the Court has almost invariably accorded the highest degree of
respect to the findings of the trial court.^[16]

Appellate courts will not
disturb the credence (or lack of it) accorded by the trial court to the
testimony of witnesses unless it be clearly shown that the trial court had
overlooked certain facts of substance which, if considered, would affect the
result of the case^[17] or arbitrarily disregarded facts and
circumstrances of significance in its appraisal.^[18]

Appellants here have failed to show any reason why the Court
should depart from the general rule.

Appellants allege that the court a quo erred in its
finding that the prosecution’s witnesses had no ill motive which would have
moved them to testify falsely against the accused.^[19]
On the contrary, appellants contend, they had established ill motive on the
part of Cpl. Roland Mabbun as he was forcing appellant Raul Roldan to implicate
one Jojo Florendo as the source of the marijuana. This fact was allegedly revealed in the cross-examination^[20]
of Roldan to wit–

“Cross examination by Fiscal
Estacio

Q: That time when Mabbun was asking you to
admit the ownership of this “damo”, you were mentioning that you were
then being investigated, is it not?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:    By the way, how did Mabbun force you to
admit ownership of this ‘damo’?

A:     We were asked if
we own it and they told us to
cooperate with them as to the source
of marijuana by the name Jojo Florendo,
sir.”^[21]

The assertion that an evil
motive tainted the actions of law enforcement officers conducting buy-bust
operations and testifying against the accused thereafter, runs counter to the
legal presumption that law enforcers have regularly performed their duties. The general rule is set out in, e.g., People
v. Sanchez^[22] in these terms:

“Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the
principal witness for the prosecution was [moved] by improper motives the
presumption is that he was not so [moved] and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.”^[23]

In
the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption must be
upheld.^[24]

The Court has carefully
examined the record of the case and except for the above-quoted testimony of
appellant Roldan on cross-examination, the allegation that the law enforcement
officers sought to implicate a supposed third person named Jojo Florendo is
bereft of basis. The Court is unable to understand why so important an affirmative defense (if true) was left so patently lacking in
specification and development. The
quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty was not attained nor were efforts exercised to
obtain such proof. The testimony of
Roldan is totally uncorroborated and self-serving.

The second assignment of
error^[25] is that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Pat. Nemesio Ira who had
stated on cross-examination that the accused “got the marijuana [from]
beneath the pile of wood at the side of the basketball
court”^[26] despite Pat. Ira’s failure to state such
fact in his sworn affidavit.^[27] The defense claims that the omission had
adversely affected the witness’ credibility and bolstered its claim that no
buy-bust operation had actually taken place and that the accused were arrested
merely to pressure them to testify against a certain Jojo Florendo.^[28]

In People v.
Alcantara,^[29] the
Court addressed this issue of discrepancy between an ex parte affidavit
and the affiant’s testimony in open court when it observed that “an
affidavit being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to
recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
that belongs to the subject.”^[30] This
point was elaborated upon in People v. Villanueva^[31] in the following terms:

“x x x Moreover, affidavits are frequently not complete
reproductions of what the declarants had in mind, considering the affidavit are
frequently prepared by the administering officer and cast in the latter’s
language or the latter’s understanding of what the affiant had said, while the affiant frequently simply
signs the affidavit after the same has been read to him. The statements made by witness Atienza
during the preliminary investigation of the criminal case were merely
reiterations of what Atienza’s affidavit had set out and it may be recalled
that preliminary investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated in
nature, being designed simply for the determination (not guilt beyond
reasonable doubt) of probable cause prior to the filing of an information in
court. It is the statements in open
court during trial which deserve careful consideration.”^[32]

We consider that the omission does not warrant a reversal of the
trial court’s decision. Certainly, the
omission does not detract from the fact that the accused were caught in flagrante
delicto in the sale of marijuana.

In their third and seventh assignment of errors,^[33]
appellants complain that the trial court had taken into account inconsistencies
in the testimonies of appellants and their witness but had disregarded
inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses.

In its decision, the trial court observed:

“x x x, while both accused claimed that Joselito de la Cruz
was seated with them on the bench when the policemen arrived and arrested them,
their witness, Anna Rose Rafael, stated that she [did] not know the third
person seated with the two accused, although she admitted that she knows
Joselito de la Cruz, who is her neighbor. Likewise, while Anna Rose Rafael testified that the policemen drew and
poked their guns at the accused the latter, however, made no mention of such
fact, even admitting that they voluntarily went with the policemen.”^[34]

Considering the testimony of defense witness Rafael that she was
approximately only six (6) meters away from the basketball court when the
accused were arrested;^[35] that
the basketball court was a small one
consisting of only a single court;^[36] that only five (5) children were playing at the time^[37] and that the accused and another person
were the only spectators of the game,^[38] the trial court was justified in not giving credence to her testimony. For the foregoing circumstances show that
Anna Rose Rafael was in a position to clearly identify the third person seated
beside the accused Raul and Larry. Instead, Anna Rose chose to contradict the testimonies of the accused
themselves that Joselito de la Cruz was the third person with them and that no guns had been drawn during the
entire incident.

The inconsistencies^[39] attributed to the prosecution witness which, according to the defense, the trial court
disregarded, relate to alleged discrepancies between (a) the direct and
cross-examination of Pat. Ira as to who had transacted with the accused in the
purchase of marijuana, and (b) photographs submitted by the defense showing a
basketball goal attached to a wall^[40] and Cpl. Mabbun’s testimony that appellants
took out the rest of the marijuana from underneath a pile of pieces of wood
near the “pole” of the basketball goal.

Appellants point out that
while in his direct testimony, Pat. Ira said that:

“it was their civilian informer who
told the accused that he [the civilian informer] wanted to buy marijuana”,^[41]

in
his cross-examination, Pat. Ira claimed that he was the one who had told appellant
Roldan “that he wanted to buy marijuana.”^[42]

A review of the
transcripts, in particular the citations of appellants, does not support
appellants’ contention. The transcripts
show that Pat. Ira never wavered in his testimony that he himself had informed
the appellants that he wanted to buy marijuana. Nowhere in the transcript does it appear that the civilian
informer had informed appellants that he wanted to buy the marijuana during the
buy-bust operation. To the contrary,
the direct testimony of Pat. Ira states:

“Fiscal Estacio (witness):

x x x                          x x x                             x
x x

Q:   What
happened when you were accompanied by the civilian informer to that person
allegedly selling marijuana?

A:    [Pat.
Ira] The civilian informer told that person that I wanted to buy from him,
sir.

x x x x x x                             x
x x”^[43]

(Emphasis supplied)

The transcripts clearly show the roles of
the civilian informer and Pat. Ira during the buy-bust operation: the former introduced the latter to
appellants and thereafter Pat. Ira effected the purchase of the marijuana.

Appellants also claim a discrepancy between Cpl. Mabbun’s
testimony to the effect that they recovered the rest of the marijuana from
underneath the “piled pieces of wood near the pole of the
basketball goal”^[44] and
the documentary evidence offered by appellants, photographs (Exhs. ‘2’ and ‘3’)
allegedly of the basketball court where the arrest had been made, showing no pole
but rather a basketball ring and board attached to a wall. Appellants conclude that Cpl. Mabbun was in
fact not with the group who arrested the appellants as claimed by the latter,^[45]
and that the trial court had arbitrarily disregarded those photographs which,
appellants insists, show the exact condition of the basketball court when
appellants were arrested.^[46]

In declining to ascribe weight to the photographs which Anna Rose
Rafael had identified, the trial court noted that the “pictures were taken
only on February 11, 1991, whereas the buy bust operation occurred on October
22, 1990;”^[47]
and that accordingly, the possibility that the pile of wood had been taken away
during the intervening four (4) month period was great. Those photographs had been taken, not by
Anna Rose, but by an unnamed photographer who was not presented in court at all.^[48]

Appellants assert finally that it is “highly
inconceivable” that they would have sold marijuana at the basketball court
where the prosecution witnesses claimed they did,^[49]
considering that the basketball court was the center of the community of San
Roque Navotas.^[50]

The argument does not persuade. As pointed out by this Court in People v. Paco:^[51]

“Drug pushing when done on a
small level as in this case belongs
to that class of crimes that may
be committed at anytime and at any
place. After the offer to buy is
accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a
few minutes. The fact that
the parties are in a public place
and in the presence of other people
may not always discourage them from pursuing
their illegal trade as these factors may
even serve to camouflage the same,
hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling
illegal drugs in a billiard hall. (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141; January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store
(People v. Khan, supra), along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA
259) and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February
23, 1988).”^[52]
(Underscoring supplied)

It does not appear far-fetched at all that marijuana and other
drugs would be bought and sold by spectators at a municipal or barangay
basketball court.

Finally, appellants argue that it is “against reason”
that law enforcers engaged in a “buy-bust” operation would expose
their civilian informant as the police did in the case at bar.^[53]
Suffice it to say that this Court will not pretend to establish on an a priori
basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry
out in entrapment operations.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, Metropolitan Manila in Criminal
Case No. 9648-MN dated 8 April 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
“Section 4. Sale, Administration,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any transactions, x x x. (as amended by P.D. No. 1675).”

^[2]
Records, pp. 1-2.

^[3]
Id., p. 11.

^[4]
Id., pp. 16-17.

^[5]
Id., pp. 18-20.

^[6]
Penned by Judge Marina L. Buzon.

^[7]
Trial Court Decision, Rollo, p. 19.

^[8]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 38.

^[9]
Trial Court Decision, Rollo,
pp. 15-17.

^[10]
TSN, 8 January and 22 January 1991, pp. 1-8 and 1­-22; Records, pp. 122-151.

^[11]
TSN, 29 January 1991, pp. 1-15; Records, pp.152­-166.

^[12]
TSN, 22 January 1991, pp. 1-3; Records, pp. 130-132.

^[13]
Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 17-18.

^[14]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 40.

^[15]
People v. Naguita, 208 SCRA 207 (1992); People v. Li Wai Cheung,
214 SCRA 504 (1992); People v. Bolosa, 209 SCRA 476 (1992); People v.
Ocampo, 206 SCRA 223 (1992); People v. Magaluna, 205 SCRA 266 (1992);
People v. Fabian, 204 SCRA 730 (1991); Eduardo Arroyo v. Court of
Appeals and Ruby Vera-Neri v. People, 204 SCRA 750 (1991); People v.
Toribio, 198 SCRA 529 (1991); People v. Catubig, 195 SCRA 505 (1991);
People v. Flores, 185 SCRA 366 (1990); People v. Caringal, 176
SCRA 404 (1989); People v. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989); People v.
Valdez and Orodio, 159 SCRA 152 (1988); People v. Cayago, 158 SCRA 586
(1988).

^[16]
People v. Patog, citing People v. Jones, People v. Egas
and People v. Rosario, 144 SCRA 429 (1986).

^[17]
People v. Patog, supra.

^[18]
People v. Bolosa, supra, note 15.

^[19]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 40.

^[20]
TSN, 19 February 1991, pp. 6-9; Records, pp. 184­-187.

^[21]
Id., p. 6; Records, p. 184.

^[22]
173 SCRA 305 (1989), citing People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 (1986).

^[23]
173 SCRA at 312.

^[24]
People v. Segwaben, 194 SCRA 239 (1991).

^[25]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 41.

^[26]
id.

^[27]
Records, pp. 73-74.

^[28]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 42.

^[29]
151 SCRA 326 (1987).

^[30]
151 SCRA 326 at 330.

^[31]
G.R. No. 96469, 21 October 1992.

^[32]
G.R. No. 96469, 21 October 1992, pp. 6-7.

^[33]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, pp. 43 and 45-47.

^[34]
Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 18-19.

^[35]
TSN, 12 February 1991, p. 3; Records, p. 169.

^[36]
Id., p. 7; Records, p. 173.

^[37]
Id., p. 12; Records, p. 178.

^[38]
Id.

^[39]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, pp. 45-57.

^[40]
Id., pp. 43-44.

^[41]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 45.

^[42]
Id., p. 46.

^[43]
TSN, 8 January 1991, p. 3; Records, p. 124.

^[44]
TSN, 29 January 1991, p. 14.

^[45]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p. 47.

^[46]
Id., pp. 43-44.

^[47]
Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 43-44.

^[48]
TSN, 12 February 1991, p. 10; Records, p. 176.

^[49]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, pp. 44-45.

^[50]
Id.

^[51]
170 SCRA 681 (1989).

^[52]
170 SCRA at 689.

^[53]
Appellants’ Brief, Rollo, p.45.