NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUAN B. SANTOS, ROBERT GRITCHTING, EMETERIO L. ASINAS, JR., JACK CHIO-VINI, HONORATO T. SABLON, FRANCISCO G. SANTOS, RA­NULFO M. RELLITA, MARIO D. FONA…

The main issue in this special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is whether or not the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners’ appeal from an Order Of the
Labor Arbiter denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

The pleadings of the parties disclose the following facts:

Prior to 30 June 1987, private respondent Union of Filipro
Employees (UFE-DFA) had four (4) Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) with
petitioner Nestlé Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Nestlé)
covering four (4) bargaining units of the latter, namely: (1) Makati, (2) Alabang/Cabuyao, (3)
Cebu/Davao and (4) Cagayan de Oro. These CBAs were to expire on 30 June 1987. Prior to such expiration, both UFE-DFA and Nestlé negotiating
panels met to draft the ground rules for the negotiation of new CBAs; the
agreement on the said rules was eventually signed on 27 July 1987. On 2 September 1987, after sixteen (16)
negotiation meetings, the UFE-DFA panel declared a deadlock. On 8 September 1987, then Secretary Franklin
Drilon of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order enjoining the
UFE-DFA from resorting to any strike and directing the parties to cease and
desist from committing any and all acts that would aggravate the situation. This notwithstanding, UFE-DFA, on 11
September 1987, declared and staged a strike at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao
and Cagayan de Oro work locations of Nestlé. Nestlé deemed the strike illegal and terminated from employment all the
union officers for allegedly instigating the same and knowingly participating
in it. On 21 September 1987, UFE-DFA
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.^[1]
On 17 December 1987, even before the case was decided, the striking officers
and members of UFE-DFA voluntarily and unconditionally offered to return to
work. Nestlé admitted all the striking
employees, except eighty-three (83) officers and thirty-three (33) members;
included in this number are the twenty-eight (28) individual private respondents. The said employees were issued separate
letters of termination by Nestlé dated 5 or 11 February 1988 with the following
tenor:

“This will confirm that you have lost your employment status
for having participated in an illegal strike and committed illegal acts and for
other just causes recognized by law. As
a matter of fact, there is/are cases pending against you. x x x.”^[2]

On 19 February 1990, the UFE-DFA and the herein 28 individual
private respondents, filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC,
National Capital Region, at Manila, a complaint for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal, reinstatement to former or substantially equivalent
positions and damages against the herein petitioners. The case was docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-03-01270-90. Of the 28 individual complainants, six (6)
have their workplaces in the National Capital Region; thirteen (13) at Cagayan
de Oro; and nine (9) at Cabuyao, Laguna.

Petitioners, as respondents therein, were served with
Notification and Summons. The case
having been set for hearing on 23 March 1990, the parties appeared on said date
and were required to submit their respective Position Papers. UFE DFA and the individual complainants
(herein private respondents) submitted their Position Paper, dated 16 April
1990, on 17 May 1990^[3]
while Nestlé and the other petitioners herein filed theirs on 8 April 1990.^[4]

One of the issues raised by herein petitioners in their Position
Paper is improper venue.^[5]
They allege that under Section 1, Rule V of the new Rules of the NLRC, all
cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in
the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) having jurisdiction over the workplace of
the complainant. Since 13 of the 28
individual complainants were employed in the Cagayan de Oro plant and 9 were employed
in the Cabuyao plant of Nestlé, venue then was improperly laid insofar as they
are concerned.^[6]
The complaints should have been filed in the RAB in Cagayan de Oro City and in
the RAB in Region IV (either in Quezon City or San Pablo City, respectively).^[7]

After the submission of the Position Papers, a hearing on the
merits was conducted by Executive Labor Arbiter Valentin Guanio. As observed by the public respondent NLRC,
petitioners herein “participated, without reservation, in the hearings on
the merit of this case before the ELA, where no less than three of the
complainants-witnesses (Calapang Maglipon, and Paglinawan) had already given
their testimonies, and they (respondents) even reserved their right to
cross-examine later said witnesses.”^[8]

On 15 August 1990, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the
aforementioned case on the ground that venue is improperly laid,^[9]
to which herein private respondents filed an Opposition. Petitioners filed a Reply^[10]
to the Opposition and the private respondents filed a Rejoinder^[11]
thereto.

On 8 October 1990, Executive Labor Arbiter Guanio handed down an
Order denying the motion to dismiss.^[12]
In support thereof, he stated:

“The records of the case disclose that there are twenty-eight
(28) individual complainants, thirteen (13) with (sic) workplace at Cagayan de
Oro City, nine (9) in Cabuyao, Laguna while the rest have their place of work
within the National Capital Region. Also a complainant is the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) with
offices at Makati, Metro Manila. All
the complainants have identical causes of action against the respondents
brought about by their alleged illegal dismissal from work on December 17,
1987. It is also of record that both
parties have already filed their respective position papers and at this stage
this Regional Arbitration Branch had already commenced to try this case on the
merits.

In view of the foregoing, this Office therefore holds that it would
be in keeping with the orderly and expeditious administration of justice to
have the case at bar tried and litigated in one forum rather than in three
different arbitration branches. Aside
from the additional costs which would be shouldered no only by the parties but
also by the government should these cases be tried separately, the possibility
that three Labor Arbiters to whom the cases may be assigned might reach three
varying conclusions, although from the same set of facts and identical issues,
would not be in consonance with sound procedure and should therefore be
avoided.”

Petitioners appealed this order to the public respondent.

On 14 March 1991, public respondent promulgated a resolution
dismissing the appeal^[13]
on the ground that petitioners had waived the defense of improper venue. It found and ruled thus:

“There is no doubt that insofar as the twenty-two (22)
complainants who had their workplace in Laguna and Cagayan de Oro are
concerned, their complaint filed with the National Capital Region (NCR) suffers
from the legal infirmity of ‘improperly laid venue’.

However, while the respondents were able to seasonably challenged
(sic) said procedural flaw the moment it became apparent from the complainants’
position paper, they nonethe­less, displayed thereafter unmistakeable signs of
waiving such defense when:

(a) they submitted
their position paper with annexes evidently designed to firm up their stand on
the merit of the case; and

(b) participated,
without reserva­tion, in the hearings on the merit of this case before the ELA,
where no less than three of the complainants-witnesses (Calapang, Maglipon, and
Paglinawan) had already given their testimonies, and they (respondents) even
reserved their right to cross-examine later said witnesses.

To us, such participation by the respondents in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter has effectively cured the legal infirmity of the
complainants’ complaint vis-à-vis, the issue on wrong venue.

Moreover, it must be noted that one of the principal complainants
herein is the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) which has its principal
office in the National Capital Region and that it is representing all the
complainants herein with a common cause of action against the same
respondent. So therefore, we reiterate
the ruling of the Executive Labor Arbiter a quo that in keeping
with the orderly and expeditious administration of justice, this case should be
tried and litigated in the NCR arbitration branch rather than in three
different arbitration branches.”

Their motion for the reconsideration of the resolution having
been denied in the public respondent’s Resolution of 19 April 1991,^[14]
petitioners filed the instant petition wherein they reiterate and amplify on
the arguments they raised before both the Labor Arbiter and the public
respondent in support of their claim that venue is improperly laid.

We required the respondents to Comment on the petition;^[15]
private respondents submitted their Comment on 5 August 1991^[16]
while the public respondent submitted its own the following day.^[17]
Petitioners filed a Consolidated Reply on 4 October 1991.

In the Resolution of 21 October 1991,^[18]
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda which petitioners complied with on 25 November 1991,^[19]
private respondents on 7 January 1992^[20]
and the public respondent on 8 January 1992.^[21]

A thorough and meticulous review of the pleadings leads Us to the
inevitable conclusion that this petition is not impressed with merit. Accordingly, the “due course”
resolution is withdrawn and the petition is denied.

We agree with the public respondent that petitioners waived the
defense of improper venue. Although
petitioners invoked the said ground in their Position Paper which was filed on
18 April 1990, they did not pursue it with the diligence of a party
confidently, if not absolutely, certain of the indubitability of his
defense. One who is so would incur no
delay in pursuing the defense to end the litigation and prevent further waste
of precious time and expense. In this
case, it was only on 18 August 1990 — four (4) months later — and after they
had participated, with neither qualification nor condition, in the hearing on
the merits of the case, and more specifically in the reception of the
testimonies of three (3) witnesses for the herein private respondents, that
they belatedly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It is settled that objections to the venue
are deemed waived if a defendant, inter alia submits through
conduct manifesting satisfaction with the same until after the trial or abides
by it until the matter has proceeded to a hearing.^[22]
This belated awakening from deep slumber and deafening silence deserves no
sympathy but, rather, condemnation as it is a crude legal maneuver, grounded on
pure technicality and unfavorable to labor, designed to delay the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter. The rule on
the construction of labor laws abhors it. Article 4 of the Labor Code^[23]
provides that, “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor.” Section 2, Rule I of the Revised
Rules of the NLRC provides: “These
Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution
and the Labor Code of the Philippines and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.”

Our reading of the Revised Rules of the NLRC further reveals that
no motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue may be allowed to
interrupt or delay the proceedings. Thus, Section 14, Rule VII of said Rules expressly provides that:

“SECTION 14. Motion to dismiss. — Any motion to dismiss a complaint or
petition on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction, or that the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment or by prescription, shall be
immediately acted upon by the Labor Arbiter if the facts strongly indicate
dismissal. Any motion to dismiss with
no such indication shall be disposed of only in the final determination of the
case and shall not be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceedings.”

When juxtaposed with paragraph (c), Section 1, Rule V,
????inafter quoted and which speaks merely of improper venue not objected to
before or at the time of the filing of the position paper, the intention of the
Rules to exclude improper venue as a ground for a motion to dismiss and to
consider it as a mere formal procedural defect appears indubitable.

Independently of the foregoing, We also find the reliance by
petitioners on paragraph (a), Section 1, Rule V of the NLRC Rules to be
untenable and unpersuasive. The whole
section reads:

“SECTION 1. Venue. — (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters
have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration
Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner.

(b) Where two or more Regional Arbitration
Branches have jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner,
the Branch that shall first acquire jurisdiction over the case shall exclude
the others.

(c) When improper venue is not objected to
before or at the time of the filing of position papers, such question shall be
deemed waived.

(d) The venue of an
action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional Arbitration Branch
other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the parties or
when the Commission so orders upon motion by the proper party in meritorious
cases.”

We agree with private respondents^[24]
that since paragraph (a) of the abovequoted Section speaks of the complainant/petitioner’s
workplace; it is evident that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of
the worker. The reason for this is not
only convenience; it is economic as well. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party — whether as complainant/petitioner
or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to
settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and his adverse
party must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency
sitting in another place to overburden the former. This being the case, the worker may waive the benefit. It must be stressed, however, that this
section does not constitute a complete rule on venue in cases cognizable by
Labor Arbiters. For one, it cannot
apply to instances where the complainants are labor unions or where a single
act of an employer gives rise to a common cause of action to many of its
employees working in different branches or workplaces of the former. In such instances, recourse should be made
to the Rules of Court which, pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the Revised Rules
of the NLRC, has suppletory application; the said section reads as follows:

“SECTION 3. Suppletory
Application of Rules of Court and jurisprudence. — In the absence of any applicable provision in these Rules, and
in order to effectuate the objectives of this Code, the pertinent provisions of
the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and prevailing jurisprudence may,
in the interest of expeditious labor justice and whenever practicable and
convenient, be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character and
effect.”

The more appropriate rule on venue under the Rules of Court is
paragraph (b), Section 2, Rule 4 thereof, which reads:

“SECTION 2. Venue
in Courts of First Instance. — x x
x

(b) Personal
actions. — All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.

x x x”

It is not denied that Nestlé has its principal office in the
National Capital Region. It is likewise
admitted that the UFE-DFA and six (6) of the individual complainants are
residents in areas within the National Capital Region. All of the individual private respondents
are members of the UFE-DFA. All are
aggrieved by the decision of Nestlé to dismiss them. Under the aforequoted rule, the case may be filed with the RAB,
NCR or with the RAB of either Cagayan de Oro City (Region X) or the RAB of Region
IV. The application of this rule in
this case would be the most logical step to take to prevent multiplicity of
suits which would only delay and render expensive the settlement of the dispute
in violation of the basic rules of construction set forth in Section 2, Rule I
of the Revised Rules of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 81.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 158.

^[3]
Annex “C” of Petition; Id., 34-76.

^[4]
Annex “D” of Petition; Id., 77-101.

^[5]
Rollo, 84; 94.

^[6]
Id., 95.

^[7]
Id., 14.

^[8]
Id., 30.

^[9]
Annex “E” of Petition; Id., 102-104.

^[10]
Annex “F” of Petition; Rollo, 106-107.

^[11]
Annex “G” of Petition; Id., 110-113.

^[12]
Id., 115-117.

^[13]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 25-32.

^[14]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 33.

^[15]
Id., 128.

^[16]
Id., 147, et seq.

^[17]
Id., 157, et seq.

^[18]
Id., 187.

^[19]
Id., 192, et seq.

^[20]
Id., 220, et seq.

^[21]
Id., 231, et seq.

^[22]
92 C.J.S. 774-775.

^[23]
P.D. No. 442, as amended.

^[24]
Rollo, 150.