LUCINO DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Lucino Diaz was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela, Br. XVI, of the crime of
murder, penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information
filed by the Provincial Fiscal as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of February, 1978 in the
municipality of Ilagan, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Lucino Diaz alias Boy Diaz,
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
criminally assault, attack and shoot one Julius Claraval, with a firearm,
hitting him and inflicting a gunshot wound four (4) cm. above the left Cantuss
of the upper left passing through the medulla oblongata with three (3) degrees
elevation of the trajectory, through and through, which directly caused the
death of the said Julius Claraval due to massive hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 27, Rollo)

Upon arraignment, Lucino Diaz (hereafter “Diaz”)
pleaded not guilty. After trial on the
merits, he was convicted on April 12, 1989,
premised on the testimony of Romeo Ramos (hereafter “Ramos”)
positively identifying Diaz as the assailant. The dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the accused Lucino Diaz is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and shall suffer an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum, and shall
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Julius Claravall, in the amount of
P30,000.00, with costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 36, Rollo)

On October 31, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the trial court’s decision, with costs against petitioner.

On April 4, 1991, the appellate court denied Diaz’ motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition assailing the appellate court’s decision on
the following grounds:

“THE CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE RESPONDENT
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND FAILED
TO CONSIDER MATERIAL FACTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION LEGALLY
ENTITLING THE PETITIONER TO AN ACQUITTAL.

“THUS, PETITIONER INVOKES THE CASE OF MEDINA VS. HON. ASISTIO,
G.R. NO. 75450, NOVEMBER 8, 1990 WHEN FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE REVIEWABLE.

“FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT APPEALS CANNOT BE PASSED UPON AND REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT
IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, EXCEPT IN 10 INSTANCES, SUCH AS WHEN SAID
FINDINGS ARE: (a) CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT; (b) CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT
CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED; (c) PREMISED ON THE SUPPOSED
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.” (p.
10, Rollo)

and further amplified as follows:

“1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE VACILLATING STATEMENTS OF ROMEO RAMOS, ALLEGED LONE
EYEWITNESS TO THE SHOOTING OF THE VICTIM WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ISSUE AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD SEEN THE PETITIONER SHOOT THE VICTIM (People vs. Peralta,
67 Phil. 293)

“2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS REJECTED WITHOUT REASON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE JURISPRUDENCE LAID
DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF PEOPLE V. DELMENDO, 196
PHIL. 121 AND ALLIED CASES TO THAT (sic) CASE AT BAR THAT THE UNREASONABLE
DELAY OR FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY CANNOT BE
THE BASIS FOR CONVICTION.

“3. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT ALTHOUGH ALIBI IS A WEAK DEFENSE,
STILL IT SHOULD EXAMINE IT WITH THE SAME CARE GIVEN OTHER DEFENSES FOR COURTS
SHOULD NOT HARBOR AT ONCE A MENTAL
PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WHO INVOKES THE DEFENSE (People v. Villacorte,
L-21860, February 28, 1974).

“4. RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. BELTRAN AND PEOPLE V.
LOPEZ.”

“5.     RESPONDENT COURT (sic)
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER HAD GONE INTO HIDING IS INCORRECT.

“6. RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.” (pp. 64-65, Rollo)

The facts of the case, as narrated in the Court of Appeals’
decision, are as follows:

“On February 14, 1978, at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Romeo
Ramos saw Julius Claravall in his house at Rizal Street, poblacion of Ilagan,
Isabela. Julius Claravall invited him
to the birthday celebration of Boy Acena in front of the Ilagan Theater,
Ilagan, Isabela (Tsn., July 24, 1984, pp. 5-6). At 10:00 o’clock in the evening, they proceeded to the Isabela
High School, where a Junior-Senior Promenade was in progress. Romeo Ramos stayed at the gate of the school
because his clothes were dirty. After
thirty (30) minutes, Julius Claravall emerged from the dance hall and again
invited him to watch a dance being held at St. Ferdinand College at Rizal
Street (Tsn., August 12, 1984), pp. 8, 37, 41). When they reached the intersection leading to Bagumbayan and St.
Ferdinand College, they stopped, stood and watched the people that were passing
by. The junction was brightly
illuminated from the light coming from a lamp post and a nearby warehouse of
Atty. Juanito Chy (Ibid, p. 16, Tsn., October 9, 1984, p. 31). Just
then, Fe Diaz, her brother, appellant herein, and another male companion,
passed by. Appellant was in Khaki
uniform, his shirt displaying an embroidered breastinsignia – ‘CIC DIAZ’
opposite which was the word ‘CONSTABULARY’ (Ibid, pp. 12-15, 29). He used to ride on Romeo Ramos’ tricycle
(Ibid, p. 30). Julius Claravall asked
Fe Dias; ‘Puede ba ang sumabay?’ (Ibid, p. 10; Tsn., September 20, 1984, pp.
33-35). Fe Diaz did not say anything,
but appellant came near Julius Claravall and said: ‘Dahan-dahan ka sa
pananalita mo’ (Ibid, p. 12). Julius
remarked that he did not say anything bad and further said: ‘Even if you have a
gun, do not brag about it.’ To this remark, appellant retorted: ‘You are very
proud, vulva of your mother, ‘pulled out his .45 caliber pistol and, at one (1)
meter away, shot Julius Claravall, hitting his mouth. Julius Claravall fell forward towards appellant but appellant
pushed him, thereby causing him to hit the ground face upwards. Romeo Ramos, who was three (3) meters away
from Julius Claravall, tried to help him, but was stopped by appellant (Tsn.,
July 24, 1984, pp. 12-15). After
appellant warned ‘not to meddle or interfere’,
Romeo fled to the place of one of his friends, Henry Santiago, in Baculod, also
a tricycle driver, where he spent the night (Ibid, pp. 20-21).

“At about 11:00 o’clock that evening, Julius Claravall’s
mother, Carmelita Claravall, was awakened by Dominga Pagalilauan. She informed that her son was fatally
shot. Carmelita, together with her
husband, Enrique Claravall, rushed to the scene of the shooting, where she
found her son with a wound in the face, eyes closed, and without pulse; she
concluded that he was dead. Shortly,
Ben Ramos, a security guard of the St. Ferdinand College, came up to her and
told her that Boy Diaz a PC soldier had shot her son (Ibid, pp. 61-64; Tsn.,
October 9, 1984, p. 32). The Claravall
couple and their nephews, Pablo Claravall and Ernesto Lumabao, placed the
cadaver in a butaca and took it home in a push cart (Tsn., October 9,
1984, pp. 32-34). At 7:00 o’clock in
the following morning, Romeo Ramos went to the house of Julius Claravall, who
was already dead.

“On February 17, 1978 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, Romeo
Ramos gave his statement in writing to the police authorities of Ilagan,
Isabela (Ibid., p. 22). On June 12,
1978, he was also investigated by the Philippine Constabulary (Ibid., p. 24),
during which investigation he gave a written statement (Exhibits ’B’, ‘B-1’ and
‘B-2’; Tsn., July 24, 1984, pp. 24-27).

“Atty. Oscar  Abad, NBI Agent 3, responding to a written
request dated February 15, 1978 of Emerenciana Claravall, sister of Julius
Claravall, for investigative assistance relative to the February 14, 1978
shooting as well as for
exhumation and autopsy of her brother’s remains, made inquiries with several
people in Ilagan, Isabela (Exhibit ‘C’); another request, also contained in
Exhibit ‘C,’ caused Dr. Virgilio Germale, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, to
exhume and autopsy the (remains) (Tsn., October 9, 1984, pp. 77-82). The NBI physician found out that Julius
Claravall suffered a gunshot wound in the left side of the face and an exit
wound in the back of the head, probably caused by a .38 caliber gun (Exhibit
‘A-1′; Tsn., April 2, 1984, p. 12). On
the basis of the interviews and exhumation findings, the NBI referred the case
to the then Provincial Fiscal of Isabela for the re-investigation with the end
in view of prosecuting appellant. The
NBI requested re­-investigation because it learned from the local police
authorities that a case of murder was filed against Romeo Ramos with the
Municipal Court of Ilagan, Isabela. The
NBI ‘found out Romeo Ramos was not the culprit and that it was this PC soldier
Boy Diaz who was the perpetrator’ (Ibid., pp. 85-86). The NBI wanted to bring in appellant Lucino Diaz, alias ‘Boy
Diaz’, but despite inquiries made re his whereabouts, he could not be located
(Ibid., p. 87).” (pp. 37-39, Rollo)

Diaz disputes his conviction premised solely on Ramos’ testimony
positively identifying him. He argues
that Ramos had earlier admitted at the PC investigation that he was not present
at the time the victim, Julius Claravall, was shot (p. 11, Rollo). After the lapse of almost four months from
February 14, 1978 or in June, 1978, however, Ramos changed his testimony and
informed the authorities that Diaz was the one who had shot Claravall. Diaz, thus, insists that the appellate court
should have examined more closely his defense of alibi, and because of his
inconsistency, inquired further into Ramos’ motive.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, seeks the outright
denial of the petition since Diaz, in effect, seeks a review of the appellate
court’s findings of facts which is legally possible only in instances where the
findings of facts of the appellate court are: a) contrary to those of the trial
court; b) conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; and c) premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record (Medina, et al. and Asistio, et al., G.R. No. 75450,
November 8, 190, 191 SCRA 218).

The Solicitor General contends that the present petition does not
fall under any of the foregoing instances.

Firstly, the appellate court adopted the same findings of fact as
that of the trial court, upholding Ramos’ positive identification of Diaz, whom
Ramos’ recognized as a frequent passenger on his tricycle. The appellate court also disregarded Diaz’
defense of alibi.

Diaz had claimed that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime since he was in Santiago, Isabela from 5 p.m. of
February 14, 1978, the day of the shooting, up to the following morning, to
provide security for the Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,
during the latter’s campaign in the Interim Batasan elections. The appellate court, however, adopted the
trial court’s conclusion that, assuming Diaz’ presence in Santiago, it was
still possible for him to go to Ilagan between 5-8 p.m., since the distance
between Santiago and Ilagan can be negotiated in one hour or even less. Also, both courts found that Ramos had no
motive for falsely testifying against Diaz. Hence, both courts overruled Diaz’ defense of alibi and convicted him
based, on his positive identification by Ramos.

In anticipation of a denial of this petition for raising purely questions of fact,
Diaz now seeks to convince Us that his petition raises a question of law to
merit a review. He disputes Ramos’
identification of him by pointing out Ramos’ initial admission before the PC
investigators that he was not present at the scene of the crime. Then, after the lapse of 117 days or on,
June 12, 1978, he revealed the identity of the assailant, in effect, reflecting
a flaw in his identification.

We however note
with approval the appellate court’s acceptance of the explanation for the
delay:

“x x x. The heinous
shooting of his friend, Julius Claravall, left a deep lasting etch in Romeo
Ramos’ mind. In the words of the
Solicitor General, this eyewitness Romeo Ramos had no more father, mother,
brother and sister to confide to. Added
to this, the man responsible for this haunting traumatic experience was a PC
Soldier and a body guard of a town mayor (People
vs. Salcedo, G.R. No. 37080, May
3, 1983; People vs. Malibiran, L-4192,
February 27, 1959 and People vs. Santos,
L-4189, May 21, 1952).” (p. 40, Rollo)

Ramos’ delay, therefore, or hesitancy (which is the more
appropriate term) in informing authorities about Diaz as Claravall’s assailant
does not affect his testimony and his positive identification of Diaz is a
valid basis for Diaz’ conviction.

We also agree that
Diaz’ flight has been incontrovertibly established and is therefore evidence of
Diaz’ guilt. The Solicitor General also
stated in this regard:

“As early as October 16, 1978, an order for appellant’s arrest
was issued (Records, p. 7). On November
16, 1978, the PC/INP of Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela made a return with the
warrant unserved because appellant could not be located at his given address
(Records, p. 10). Thus on October 14, 1979, the trial
court archived the case since appellant had not yet been arrested (Records, p.
16).

“On November 23, 1983, an alias writ of arrest was issued, and
appellant was arrested only sometime in January, 1984 (Records, pp. 18 and 19).

“Thus, respondent Court aptly observed:

‘IT is elemental principle of law that flight is evidence of
guilt. This was held on one case where
the accused surrendered himself only after two years (People
vs. Hector L-52787, February 28, 1985; 135 SCRA 113). In the case at bar, the accused-appellant
who was a PC soldier could not be arrested or located from as early as October
16, 1978 up, to January 1984 (Records, pp. 18-91). For almost six (6) years, accused-appellant was in hiding. The PC could not serve the warrant of
arrest. This is incontrovertible
evidence.’ “ (pp. 146-147, Rollo)

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Grino-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.