CLARITA V. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDU…

Clarita V. Cruz* went
abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her
future. Although a high school
graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in consideration of
an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn
in this country. But her foreign
adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18, 1988, after completing her two-year engagement, she
was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry grievance.

On March 23, 1988, she filed a complaint
against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal,
Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her
vacation leave. She also claimed that
she was charged a placement fee of P7,000.00 instead of the legal maximum of
only P5,000.00. She alleged that her
foreign employer treated her as a slave and required her to work 18 hours a
day. She was beaten up and suffered
facial deformity, head trauma and decreased sensation in the right portion of
her body. On top of all this, she was
paid only $120 per month and her total salaries were given to her only three
hours before her flight back to Manila. This was after the plane she was supposed to take had left and she had
to stay in the airport for 24 hours before her employer finally heard her pleas
and delivered her passport and ticket to her.

In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised
the principal defense of settlement as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the complainant on June 21, 1988. In this document, she declared inter alia that –

x                x                     x

2. Thereafter going thoroughly over the facts
of the case by reconciling our records, we came to discover that it was only a
plain case of misunderstanding on our part, and that we have already settled
our differences;

3. That I am no longer interested in further
continuance of the above case against EMS Manpower & Placement Services
either criminal, civil or administrative or whatever nature as I hereby desist
now and hereafter;

4. That I am executing this affidavit of
desistance to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and circumstances and
for the purpose of asking the dismissal of my said complaint against EMS
Manpower & Placement Services.

On the basis of this affidavit, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed her complaint in a decision dated
May 16, 1989. This was affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its resolution dated December 28,
1990, reconsideration of which was denied on February 21, 1991.

The petition now before us faults the POEA and the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion for having upheld the Affidavit of Desistance. Cruz rejects the settlement as having been
obtained from her under duress and false pretenses and insists on her original
claim for the balance of her salaries and vacation-leave pay at the agreed rate
of $250.00 per month.

Her contention is that she was inveigled into signing the
Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of counsel. The “Attorney” Alvarado who
assisted her was not really a lawyer but only a helper in the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration. Atty. Biolena,
on the other hand, merely acknowledged the document. Moreover, when she signed the affidavit, she was under the
impression that she was agreeing to settle only her claim for one month unpaid
vacation leave, as the wording of the receipt she issued on the same date
showed, to wit:

June 21, 1988

Receipt

This is to certify that I received the amount of P2,400.00 from EMS
Manpower & Placement Services in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation
leave.

(Sgd.) CLARITA V. CRUZ

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(Sgd.) O.G. ALVARADO

OWWA
Legal Dept.

For its part, the private respondent argues that the petitioner is
bound by her Affidavit of Desistance, which she freely and knowingly
executed. After all, she was not an
ignorant and illiterate person but a high school graduate who understood what
she was signing. The due execution of
the instrument must also be sustained on the basis of the presumptions of
regularity of official functions and of good faith.

Significantly, neither the private respondent nor the Solicitor
General refuted the petitioner’s submission that the person who allegedly
assisted her in the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance and explained to
her its content and meaning was not a lawyer but a mere employee in the
OWWA. His status was merely assumed but
not established by the respondents although it was directly questioned. The comments of the public and private
respondents did not meet this challenge squarely.

It is no less noteworthy that the receipt the petitioner issued
on the same day was only for “P2,400.00 x x x in settlement of 1 month
unpaid vacation.” This clearly shows that she was not waiving the rest of
her demands in exchange for that measly amount (which did not even really
represent the commutable value of the 1 month vacation leave at the rate of
$250.00). In fact, the total claim of
the petitioner is for P88,840.00, itemized as follows:

a)                  
P84,240.00, representing the salary differentials of $130 for
24 months (US $3,120.00 x P27.00).

b)                  
P2,600.00, representing the balance of her vacation leave pay.

c)                   
P2,000.00, representing her excess placement fee.

In Principe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Service, Inc.,^[1]
this Court held:

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had
foreclosed petitioner’s right over the death benefits of her husband, the
fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much less than
the amount petitioner is claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being
contrary to public policy. The
State must be firm in affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and
inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner’s pursuing her legitimate
claim. Equity dictates that the
compromise agreement should be voided in this instance. (Emphasis supplied.)

The following guidelines were likewise set in Periquet v. NLRC^[2]:

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public
policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding
on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of
mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or
the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of
the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed
it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the disputable presumptions invoked by the private
respondent, such assistance has not been established against the petitioner’s
allegation that the “Attorney” Alvarado who supposedly counseled her
was not even a lawyer. Indeed, even
assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the question
of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity
between the amount of the settlement and the petitioner’s original claim. It is difficult to believe that the
petitioner would agree to waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly
settlement of only P2,400.00. And even
if she did, the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public
policy.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the
private respondent in the proceedings below that it has no privity of contract
with the petitioner, we have held in a long line of cases that the local
recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all damages
sustained by the overseas worker in connection with his contract of
employment. Such liability is provided
for in Section 1, Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations, which we
have consistently sustained.

This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court
toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his
employer. The protection of our
overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even
risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land
away from their loved ones and their own government.

The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because
she usually works only by herself in a private household unlike other workers
employed in an open business concern who are able to share and discuss their
problems and bear or solve them together. The domestic helper is denied that comfort. She has no companions in her misery. She usually broods alone. There is no one to turn to for help. That is why we must carefully listen to her when she is finally able to
complain against those who would rob her of her just rewards and even of her
dignity as a human being.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated December 28,
1990, and February 21, 1991, are SET ASIDE, and the Affidavit of Desistance is
DECLARED null and void. POEA Case No.
88-03-255 is REMANDED to the POEA for further proceedings and expeditious
resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

* Not related to the ponente.

^[1]
176 SCRA 514.

^[2]
186 SCRA 724.