THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR RIVERA Y MENDOZA ALIAS “OSCAR” AND DANILO ALBELDA Y MENDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Oscar Rivera and Danilo Albelda were convicted of violating
Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act 6425, and each sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and a P20,000.00 fine.^[1] This
was a mistake; it should have been life imprisonment plus fine. But did the trial court commit a worse
mistake in convicting them at all in the
first place? The appellants vigorously
say so and ask for the reversal of their conviction. The People say nay.

The principal witness for the prosecution was Pat. Jose Fernandez
of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Quezon City Police Force, who led the
buy-bust operation that resulted in the arrest of the appellants.^[2]
On September 25, 1989, at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, his team proceeded
to the squatters’ area near the Nepa Q-Mart in Quezon City where an informer
said drug-pushing activities were rampant. As the other team members deployed themselves unobtrusively, the
informer took Fernandez with him and introduced him to Oscar Rivera, who was standing
on the street. Fernandez said he was
interested in buying P200.00 worth of marijuana. Rivera said he had the marijuana and told Danilo Albelda, who was
waiting nearby, to get it. Albelda went
into an alley and returned a few minutes later with a bundle wrapped in a piece
of newspaper.^[3]
Fernandez unwrapped the package and, apparently satisfied with the contents,
handed Rivera two P100.00 bills he had previously marked with his initials.^[4]
Fernandez then gave the secret signal and the other team members closed in and
identified themselves as anti-narcotics agents. They retrieved the marked money from Rivera and arrested him and
Albelda. At police headquarters, the
bundle was delivered to the desk sergeant, who thereafter sent it to the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory for examination. The
contents were later found by Leslie Chamber, a forensic chemist of the
laboratory, to be positive for marijuana.^[5] After
preliminary investigation, Rivera and Albelda were formally charged with drug
pushing before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.^[6]

The two accused had a different story to tell. They said that in the afternoon in question,
they were on their way to a drinking party to be hosted by Sony Abang, whose
father had just returned from Saudi Arabia. While walking along Ermin Garcia street, they were blocked by a blue
car. Four men stepped out to frisk them
for marijuana but found nothing. Nevertheless, the men, who said they were policemen although they were
wearing civilian clothes, arrested them and took them to police
headquarters. There they were beaten up
to make them confess that they were drug pushers.^[7]

Leonardo Quilim corroborated his two friends. He said that he was walking with them along
Ermin Garcia street but fell behind briefly to urinate when the blue car
blocked Rivera and Albelda. The four
men who came out placed them under arrest after frisking them and finding no
marijuana on them.^[8]

After evaluating the evidence of the parties, Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr., decided in favor of the People. The trial judge found the testimony of Fernandez more credible and
supported by the physical evidence of the marijuana and the marked money. He rejected the averment of the defense that
the accused had been framed, noting that there was no showing of any improper
motive that could have urged Fernandez to perjure himself and send two innocent
men to prison for the rest of their lives. The trial court also refused to believe that the blue car just
“popped out” in the busy street and the four men simply arrested the
two accused without any reason and in the presence of many people.

The decision is now questioned in the appellants’ brief on the
main ground that it should not have given credence to the testimony of
Fernandez, the lone alleged eyewitness of the prosecution. The defense argues that, assuming they were
really drug dealers, the appellants would not have sold marijuana to Fernandez,
whom they had never met before, and in a busy street at that. The marijuana had not been sufficiently
identified and could have been merely planted. The marked money was not properly marked and should have been dusted
instead with fluorescent powder to make it more credible evidence. Moreover, the informer should have been
presented in court to corroborate the account of the alleged buy-bust
operation, on which Fernandez alone testified.

We have said time and again that questions of fact are best
resolved by the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe the witnesses
on the stand and determine from their demeanor if they are testifying
truthfully or falsely. The findings of
the trial court on these questions are conclusive on this Court unless it
appears that they were reached arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record. The defense faults the trial
judge for noting the discourteous demeanor of Albelda and suggests he became
biased because of it, but we see no reason why that behavior should have been
disregarded. Albelda’s arrogance was an
indication of his credibility or lack of it. Timidity, forthrightness, surliness, belligerence, indignation,
embarrassment, hesitancy, glibness, evasiveness, insolence – these and many
other indicia define the credibility of the witness on the stand. The opportunity of the trial judge to
observe all these characteristics places him in a better position than the
appellate court in resolving controverted issues of fact. This is the reason why his findings thereon
are received on appeal with great respect, if not indeed as conclusive on the
higher court.

The other issues raised in the appellants’ brief are also
untenable. It is for the party to plan
its own strategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to
submit to support its own cause. If the
accused felt that the prosecution did not present the informer because he would
testify against it, they should themselves have called him to the stand to
testify for the defense. It was also
the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to
be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent
powder did not render the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the
buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases.^[9]
The testimony that the marijuana was duly turned over to the desk sergeant and
later sent to the laboratory has not been refuted. Finally, the circumstances of the sale, while indeed curious, are
nevertheless believable. We have
observed in a significant number of decisions that drug pushers have become so
reckless that they have not hesitated to sell their wares even to total
strangers and in the most public of places, like pool halls, busy streets,
markets and schools.^[10]

As we observed in People v. Bagawe:^[11]

Drug pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to
that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and at any place. After the offer is accepted and the exchange
is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public
place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from
pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the
same. Hence, the Court has sustained
the conviction of drug-pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall
(People v. Rubio, 142, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252); in
front of a store (People v. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m.
(People v. Toledo, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v.
Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85).

We are convinced with the trial court that the guilt of the two
appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence in their favor has been overcome by
the overwhelming evidence against them. However, as remarked at the beginning of this opinion, the imposable
penalty against them is life imprisonment, not reclusion perpetua, which
carries accessory penalties not attached to life imprisonment. We emphasized this distinction in
Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 dated June 21, 1993, and have repeated it in
a growing number of cases^[12] to
correct this common mistake of trial courts.

Oscar Rivera is only 34 years old. Danilo Albelda is only 31. Both must now spend the rest of their lives in the gray precincts of a
prison cell. The Court fervently hopes
that their case will serve as a deterrent to other young men and women like
them who might be tempted as they were to poison our people with the venom of
the dangerous drug. Is this a forlorn
hope?

WHEREFORE, the appeals are DISMISSED. The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
except for the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is corrected to life
imprisonment. The fines are
retained. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.

^[1]
Decision penned by RTC Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., Branch CIII, Quezon City,
dated July 18, 1990.

^[2]
TSN, January 24, 1990, p. 20.

^[3]
Ibid., pp. 16-19.

^[4]
Id., pp. 19-20; pp. 22-23.

^[5]
Exhibit A, Records, p. 60.

^[6]
Information, Records, p. 1.

^[7]
TSN, July 10, 1990, pp. 4-33.

^[8]
TSN, June 1, 1990, pp. 4-11.

^[9]
People v. de Guzman, 188 SCRA 407; People v. Mendoza, 216 SCRA
715; People v. Alaban, 214 SCRA 301; People v. Li Wai Chung, 214
SCRA 504; People v. Naro, G.R. No. 94863 – July 19, 1993; People v.
Madrid, 210 SCRA 196; People v. Abelita, 210 SCRA 497; People v.
Honrada, 204 SCRA 858.

^[10]
People v. Alaban, 214 SCRA 301; People v. Simbulan 214, SCRA 537;
People v. Maugaw, 207 SCRA 732; People v. Madrid, 210 SCRA 196;
People v. Arceo, 202 SCRA 170; People v. Hilario, 196 SCRA 716;
People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644; People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28;
People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681.

^[11]
207 SCRA 761.

^[12]
People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546; People v. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459;
People v. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58; People v. Ramos, 203 SCRA 237;
People v. Madriaga, 211 SCRA 698; People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1.