HON. PETE NICOMEDES PRADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN­-CHARGE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ATTY. JUAN C. STA. ANA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGER OF TH…

On the basis of an unverified motion, may a court validly issue ex-parte a so-called “status quo order” which could operate either as a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction?

This is the main issue in this case which the following factual
and procedural antecedents have generated:

On 11 September 1920, the Smith Bell and Company leased from the
Government, through the Bureau of Lands, Blocks 144 and 145, containing an area
of 9,023.36 square meters, located at the Port Area, Manila.  The lessee transferred all its leasehold
rights to the Philippine Building Corporation on 27 May 1946, which the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved.  The assignee was able to renew the lease
contract, but transferred in 1952 all its rights under the lease agreement to
S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc. (SVEI), which secured on 1 September 1969 a
renewal of the contract for another 25 years. 
On 26 November 1986, the then Minister of General Services ordered the
cancellation of the contract for violation by SVEI of its provisions.  SVEI appealed the order to the Office of the
President which affirmed it in its Order of 29 September 1987.  SVEI’s several
motions for reconsideration were denied. 
The last denial, which affirmed with finality the 29 September 1987
Order, was issued on 29 January 1990.

Earlier, on 17 March
1988, the President issued Executive Order No. 321 expanding the territorial
area of the South Harbor Zone of the Port of Manila and placing the whole area
under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).

On 16 March 1989, the PPA wrote SVEI informing the latter of PPA’s intention to take possession of the leased premises
and demanding payment of P728,861.38 representing accrued rentals and
interests.  On 30 June 1989, SVEI offered
to restructure its obligations provided that the PPA assured it in writing that
the contract of lease will not be terminated. 
In its letter of 22 August 1989, the PPA rejected the proposal and
instead demanded that SVEI vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the letter.

Thereafter, the PPA caused to be published a notice of bidding of
Blocks 144 and 145 to be held on 28 November 1989.  SVEI, however, filed on 23 November 1989 a
complaint for Specific Performance, with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order against the PPA with Branch 38 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.  The complaint sought to
enjoin the PPA from conducting the scheduled bidding.  The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
89-51192.  SVEI invoked its right to
remain in the premises until 1994 by virtue of its 25-year renewed contract of
lease.  The court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the PPA from proceeding with the bidding.

In the meantime, on 22 March 1990, the PPA filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila an ejectment case
against SVEI.  The case was docketed
as Special Civil Action 131889-CV and was assigned to Branch 5 of said court.^[1]

Upon the PPA’s motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 89-51192, on the
ground that the lease contract had already been cancelled, and such
cancellation was affirmed by the Office of the President, and that there is a
pending ejectment case, Branch 38 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, through Judge Arturo Barias,
Jr., issued on 30 August 1990 an Order dismissing the case.  It held that the Government had sufficient
ground to cancel the contract of lease in view of the violations of its terms
by SVEI and that:

“Secondly, the
mere fact that there is an ejectment case filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that all the issues raised
herein, more specifically that of possession, should better be threshed out in
the metropolitan trial court involving as they do (sic) the same parties and
the same subject matter.“^[2]

SVEI
appealed the order to the Court
of Appeals where it is still pending resolution.

In line with its plan to
fully maximize the utility of Block 145, the PPA decided to improve and
renovate it.  Pursuant thereto, it caused
to be published in the issues of the Manila
Bulletin of 17, 22 and 29 October 1990 an Invitation to Prequalify
and Bid for the lease and
rehabilitation-development of Block 145. 
Per the published notice, the opening of sealed bids was set for 28
November 1990 at 2:00 P.M.

On 27 November 1990,
herein private respondents Port Area Realty, Inc., Everett Steamship Corporation,
Harbor Import Shopping Center, Oriental Media, Inc., and Ester Caling Lim, on her behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated, claiming to be actual occupants of the building located in Block 145,
filed a petition^[3] with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
Specific Performance with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the Philippine Ports Authority, the Department of
Transportation and Communication, Atty. Juan C. Sta. Ana, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Bidding Committee and the members thereof.  They claim to be sublessees
of Block 145, which is now a commercial complex.  Private respondents Port Area Realty,
Inc. and Harbor Import Shopping Center allege that they developed their
respective areas into shopping stalls which they leased to interested
parties.  Private respondent Oriental
Media alleges that it is using a portion of its premises for its printing
machines but had the rest developed into stalls which are leased to other parties.  Private respondent Everett Steamship claims
that it is using the premises for its offices while private respondent Lim
avers that she is one of the stallholders.

They attached to the
petition a copy of the Order of Judge Barias.

The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-55248 and was
assigned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which is presided
over by respondent Judge.

As their cause of action, private respondents allege in their
petition that the offer to bid Block 145 is patently discriminatory and
deprives them of their property rights without due process of law as there was
no notice to them, much less a call for
a meeting, despite the knowledge of the PPA-Port District of Manila that they
developed, improved and spent for the establishment of the complex.  They are “small-time” and
struggling businessmen who “could not afford and easily win in such
bidding,” and that in order to prevent such discrimination and deprivation
of their property rights, they should be allowed to negotiate with the
Government on such terms and conditions that are appropriate, reasonable and
just.  They then pray that the court
issue an order restraining the defendants from continuing with the bidding of
Block 145 and that if it is already auctioned off, to annul the sale and direct the defendants to negotiate with them for
a contract of lease, rehabilitate,
operate and/or manage Block 145 under such terms as are reasonable, just and
proper and that after trial, render judgment making the preliminary injunction permanent.

The respondent Judge
issued on 28 November 1990 a temporary restraining order (TRO) which was,
however, served only after the bidding; the bidding itself was declared a
failure because only two (2) bidders participated.

Defendants, petitioners
herein, filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction.  This was later followed by their Answer
wherein they plead the following special and affirmative defenses:

“1)  Plaintiffs, are mere sublessees
of S. Villanueva Enterprises Inc. (SVEI); the contract in favor of the latter
was cancelled, the validity of which cancellation was upheld in the Order of 30
August 1990 in Civil Case No. 89-51192.

2)   An ejectment case
against SVEI is pending; considering that a judgment in an ejectment
case is binding not only upon the defendant but also against the latter’s sublessees, privies, agents and/or successors-in-interest,
then the complaint should be dismissed on ground (sic) of litis
pendencia; moreover, plaintiffs are guilty
of forum-shopping.

3)   Plaintiffs do not have better rights than
SVEI; are bidders and/or possessors in bad faith; their possession of Block 145
does not create any vested right; have not availed of appropriate
administrative remedies.

4)   A negotiated contract, as suggested by
plaintiffs, is never a mode to ensure any party the award of a contract.”

and
interpose a counterclaim for temperate and exemplary damages.^[4]

The application for injunction was heard on 7 January 1991 with
the private respondents presenting their first witness, Mr. Catalino
Luzano, president of the port Area Realty, Inc.  The hearing was ordered set for continuation on 15, 17 and 22 January 1991.  On
15 January 1991, counsel for private respondents moved for postponement and the
hearing was reset for 29 January 1991. 
On said date, the parties manifested to the court that they had agreed
to consider the injunction incident moot and
academic because the act sought to be enjoined had already been
accomplished. Respondent Judge dictated in open court an order declaring the
application for injunction as “deemed abandoned.” By agreement of the
parties, the pre-trial conference was set for 28 February 1991.

Thereafter, the PPA caused to be published in the 7, 14 and 21 February
1991 issues of the Manila Bulletin another Invitation to Prequalify
and Bid for the “lease, renovation and operations of Block 145,”
setting the pre-bid conference on 16 April 1991 and the submission and opening of sealed bids on 25 April 1991.

On 28 February 1991, private respondents moved for the
postponement of the pre-trial on the ground that they had not yet received the
notice of pre-trial.  The pre-trial was
reset for 16 April 1991.

On 15 April 1991, a day before the pre-trial conference, private
respondents filed in Civil Case No. 90-55248 an unverified Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order,^[5] alleging therein as follows:

“1.  That the Restraining Order issued by this
Honorable Court has already lapsed;

2.   That the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was then in progress before it
was abandoned because of Defendants’ assurance that there would be no public
bidding to be conducted during the pendency of this
case;

3.   That Defendants, in violation of this
agreement, are intending and threatening to conduct as in fact, a public
bidding of the premises was (sic) scheduled to be conducted on April 25, 1991
which, if completed, would render the issues in this case moot and academic.”

and
praying that “a status quo order be issued enjoining the Defendants and their
agents from continuing the scheduled public bidding on April 25, 1991 until
after the issues shall have been resolved by the Honorable Court.”^[6]

This motion does not
contain any notice of hearing to counsel for the defendants (petitioners
herein).  There is a notice of hearing
but it is addressed to the Clerk of Court and reads:

“The Clerk of Court

RTC-Manila

Branch 31

Greetings:

Kindly set the afore-stated Motion for
resolution and approval of the Honorable Court on April 15, 1991 at 9:00 A.M.
or as soon thereafter at the convenience of the Court.”

Above this notice is an
entry reading:

“Copy Furnished:

Solicitor Roman G. Del Rosario

Office of the Solicitor General

Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village

Makati, Metro Manila”

Acting on the aforesaid
urgent motion on the day it was filed, the respondent Judge dictated in open
court an Order wherein he stated that:

“x x x The
motion alleges among other things the Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was abandoned because of Defendants’ assurance that there would be no public
bidding to be conducted during the pendency of this
case.

The movants pointed that in violation of
this agreement, the defendants are intending to conduct a public bidding on
April 25, 1991 which will render the issues in this case moot and academic.

It is the observation of this court that plaintiffs have insisted
in this action their vested rights to enter into negotiations in lieu of public
bidding, and in order that the issues will not become moot and academic, the
Motion is hereby granted.”

and ruled as follows:

“WHEREFORE, both parties are hereby ordered to maintain a status
quo condition, that is defendants and their agents are enjoined from
continuing the public bidding on April 25, 1991 or any bidding thereafter until
the issues shall have been resolved by this Court.”^[7]

When the case was called
for pre-trial on 16 April 1991, as earlier agreed upon by the parties, counsel
for private respondents asked for a postponement on the ground that one of them, Atty. Bandayrel,
had not yet prepared his Pre-Trial Brief, while the other, Atty. Jurade, claimed that his client, Oriental Media, Inc., had
not received its notice of hearing. 
Despite the objection by counsel for herein petitioners, respondent
Judge reset the pre-trial for 16, 23 and, 30 May 1991.

Petitioners then filed on
22 April 1991 the instant petition without even moving for a reconsideration of
the status quo order in view of the urgent necessity for relief pleaded by the
government^[8] and because such a move would be inadequate.

In Our Resolution of 24
April 1991, We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent Judge, his agents,
representatives and/or any person acting upon his orders or in his place or
stead from enforcing and/or carrying out the above Order of 15 April
1991.”

Petitioners herein assert
that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
challenged status quo
order since private respondents’ unverified urgent motion for its issuance does not allege any fact or show any
clear legal right to justify it and that it was heard without notice to
petitioners; additionally, it was issued without requiring private respondents
to put up a bond.

In their Comment filed on 6
May 1991, respondents allege that they did not pursue their prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction because of the assurance of petitioners that
the public bidding shall not be held while the resolution of the issues in the case remain
pending.  However, since petitioners
disregarded that commitment, private respondents had to rush to the court a
quo for the issuance of a restraining order.  The latter argue, inter alia, that what the respondent judge issued was not a preliminary injunction but
“merely a temporary restraining order, which, as mandated by law, lapses ipso vigore after twenty (20) days from its
issuance.  Hence, the legal basis for its
issuance, that is, without hearing and without requiring the putting up of a
bond, should not be under question.”^[9]

In their Reply filed on
26 June 1991, petitioners insist that the status quo
order of 15 April 1991 is a “writ of preliminary injunction, but whether
it is a temporary restraining order or a “writ of preliminary injunction, the
same was issued despotically and without the least legal basis.”  If it is to be considered a temporary
restraining order, it is, in effect, an extension of the 28 November 1990 TRO,
which would be irregular and unlawful per Defalobos vs. Aquilizan.^[10] Moreover,
private respondents are not entitled to the writ since the complaint fails to
show a cause of action.  Finally, there
was no agreement whatsoever that no
bidding would be conducted; the
claim is a blatant lie, for, at the hearing on 7 January, when Atty. Bandayrel for the private respondents sought to make a
misrepresentation on this point, his
scheme was immediately aborted,
thus:

“Atty. Bandayrel:

But there is already an
admission of the defendant that there will be no more bidding with respect to
the Block 145, Your Honor.

Solicitor Del Rosario:

There was no admission,
Your Honor.  There was merely a bidding
which was declared a failure.  As to
whether we will hold another bidding, Your Honor, that depends upon the
discretion of the management of the Philippine Ports Authority.

Atty. Bandayrel:

I withdraw that
manifestation, Your Honor.”^[11]

In the Resolution of 3
July 1991, this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties
to file their respective memoranda, which petitioners complied with on 14
August 1991 and the respondents on 6 November 1991.  In their Memorandum, respondents come forward
with a new theory, namely:  The
questioned status quo order “was (sic) a mere reinstatement of the previous temporary
restraining order already issued which was recalled because of Petitioner’s
assurance.”^[12]

We do not hesitate to grant the petition.  It is impressed with merit.  There is no doubt at all that respondent
Judge had acted with palpable abuse of
discretion, so grave that it amounts to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the status quo order of 15 April 1991.  His
conduct can vividly be described as despotic, arbitrary and capricious.  The following suffice to support this conclusion:

1.  Respondent Judge knew, or
should have known because it was his duty to read the pleading, that the urgent
motion for the issuance of a status quo
order does not contain a notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of the
adverse parties (defendants, herein petitioners).  The notice incorporated therein is a notice
addressed to the Clerk of Court.  This
does not comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which
explicitly provide that the notice shall be served by the applicant to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof and
“shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and
place for the hearing of the motion.” A notice of hearing addressed to the
Clerk of Court and not to the parties is no notice at all.

In Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla,^[13] this
Court, citing prior relevant cases, held:

“Finally, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides
that notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof; together with a copy of the motion, and of any
affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and Section 5 of the same Rule
requires the notice to be directed to the parties concerned and to state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion. 
A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is nothing but a
useless piece of paper [Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction Company, et al., L-16636, June 24,
1965, 14 SCRA 435, 437, citing PNB v. Donasco,
L-18638, February 28, 1963; Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan,
44 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117.  Sebastian v. Cabal, etc., et al.,
L-25699, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 453, 454-55. Cledera,
etc., et al., v. Sarmiento, etc., et al., L-32450-51,
June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 552, 562-576].  In
the instant case, there was, according
to the trial court in its Order of April 7, 1969, ‘no proof that plaintiff was
duly served with a copy of the motion for reconsideration.’  Moreover, the motion did not
contain a notice of hearing directed to
petitioner stating the time and place of the hearing.  The notice was addressed the Clerk of Court requesting the
latter to ‘set the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval
of this Honorable Court immediately upon
receipt hereof.’ The notice of hearing caused to be issued
by the trial court did not cure the defect of lack of notice, for the duty to give such notice devolves upon the movant, not upon the court [Magno
v. Ortiz, etc., et al., L-22670, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 692, 695, citing
Fulton Insurance Company v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., L-24263, Nov. 18,
1967, 21 SCRA 974.  Cledera,
etc., et al. v. Sarmiento, etc., et al.,
ibid.].” (underscoring supplied).

We reiterated the above
rule in Sacdalan vs. Bautista et al.,^[14] and, recently, in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Far
East Molasses Corp..^[15]

A motion that does not
contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper; it presents no
question which merits the attention and consideration of the
Court.  It is not even a motion for it
does not comply with the rules and, hence, the clerk has no right to receive it.^[16] In Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Magsino, et al.,^[17] this
Court was more emphatic:

“x x x  a motion without notice of hearing is nothing
but a piece of paper filed in court, which should he disregarded and ignored.  x x x” (underscoring supplied).

The motion in question
does not also show that a copy thereof was actually served on counsel for the
defendants (petitioners herein).  It
merely states, copy furnished:  without
indicating how a copy was so furnished.  The respondent Judge could not have failed to
notice that the motion was filed only on 15 April 1991 and that there was no
sufficient proof of service thereof to counsel for the adverse parties.  Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
provides that “no motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof
of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the
rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.”
Respondent Judge knew very well that Government rights and interests were
involved and that its appropriate agencies have been resisting not only the
claims of private respondents as sublessees but also
those of the lessee (SVEI) whose contract of lease had in fact been cancelled
and against whom an ejectment suit is presently
pending.

No compelling reason
existed for acting on the motion on shorter notice.  It sought to restrain the holding of a public
bidding scheduled on 25 April 1991, a full ten (10) days from its filing.  The pre-trial conference had earlier been
reset to 16 April 1991.  If private
respondents had some respect for fairness and were motivated by good faith,
they could have very well set the hearing of the motion on 16 April 1991.  That there was in fact an absence of urgency
is best borne out by the date the motion was prepared.  It is dated APRIL 10, 1991.^[18] If the movants had
actually intended to have had it heard on 15 April, they clearly had sufficient
time to comply with the rules without using the cover of
“Urgency.” Besides, the notice of bidding was last published in the
21 February 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin. 
There is no indication at all that private respondents came to know of the
publication only on or shortly before 10 April to justify their sense of
urgency in preparing the said motion.

Obviously, respondent Judge deliberately defied and ignored the
above solemn pronouncements of this Court and disregarded the basic rules on notice
if only to grant special favor to movants.  To quote a line from Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction
Co., et al., supra, what he
did is “intolerable in a well-ordered judicial system.”

What We stated in Cledera vs.
Sarmiento, supra., bears repeating if
only to express the Court’s condemnation of callous and defiant disregard of
simple rules and settled doctrines:

“To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule
37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court are as
mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non-compliance therewith is fatal
to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing
of the motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing,
does not toll the running of the period for appeal.  Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party
with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his
objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which to
file his reply or opposition.  The rules
commanding the movant to serve on the adverse party a
written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of
hearing ‘shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
and place for the hearing of the motion’ (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide
for any qualifications, much less exceptions. 
To deviate from the peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the latest cases aforecited
in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case
at bar would be one step in the
emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of
the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons
as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an
irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rules and when
their requirements may be ignored.  We
had to draw a line somewhere and WE did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964
the Revised Rules of Court, wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in
simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to
eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.”

2.  The urgent motion for a status quo order is
unverified.  Whether it be considered as
one for a temporary restraining order or for a preliminary injunction, it is
still patently insufficient in form and in substance.  What is sought to be enjoined is “the
scheduled public bidding on April 25, 1991,” an event which is not pleaded
in or covered by the original petition in Civil Case No. 90-55248 filed on 27
November 1990.  It is, therefore, a
subsequent event or occurrence which could properly be the subject of a
supplemental pleading pursuant to Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.  But even conceding for the moment that a
motion may be allowed for the purpose, such must be verified.  This is the logical conclusion which
necessarily flows from the mandatory preconditions for the issuance of either a
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order.  Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides
that a preliminary injunction may be granted only if:  (a) the complaint is verified and (b) the plaintiff files with the clerk of
court in which the action is pending the requisite bond; and the pertinent
portion of Section 5 thereof, as amended by B.P. Blg.
224, reads:

“Section 5.  Preliminary
injunction not granted without notice:  issuance of restraining order. – No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without notice to the defendant. 
If it shall appear from the
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice, the
judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date
of its issuance.  Within the said twenty-day period, the judge
must cause an order to be served on the defendant requiring him to show cause,
at a specified time and place, why
the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted and shall accordingly issue the corresponding
order.  In the event that the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated.  x x x” (underscoring supplied).

Thus, if in a pending
case, a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order may be allowed in connection with a supervening act, event or occurrence, the motion must also be verified. 
That said motion is only an incident to a verified petition does not provide an
exception to what is stated above since the event against which it
is directed is not covered by or within the contemplation of
the petition.

In an apparent attempt to
be clever, respondent Judge sought to circumvent the above
rule by carefully avoiding the
use of the term preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order.  He
just directed the parties to maintain a status quo condition.  Unfortunately, such move displayed neither wisdom nor wit, but rather defiance of the rule.

3.  The status quo order is in fact a preliminary injunction
which enjoins the defendants (petitioner) and their agents from continuing not only the public bidding on 25 April
1991, but also “any bidding thereafter
until the issues shall have been resolved
by the court a quo. 
Even if We set aside the requirement of verification for the motion,
respondent court cannot validly and lawfully issue it without notice to the
defendants and without the compliance of the bond requirement, which is
mandatory.^[19]

Worse, considering the allegations in the motion and the petition
itself, to which is attached as Annex “A” the Order of Judge Barias
of 30 August 1990, it is obvious that private respondents have not shown any
clear and positive right to be entitled to the protection by the ancillary
relief of preliminary injunction.  They
are mere sublessees. 
As indisputably shown in the Order of Judge Barias,
which dismissed Civil Case No. 89-51192 filed by SVEI, the contract of lease
over Blocks 144 and 145 in favor of SVEI had been cancelled and such
cancellation was affirmed with finality by the Office of the President on 29
January 1990.  Respondent Judge is
presumed to have read the petition and
this Annex “A”, as well as the Answer of the defendants which makes
reference to it and attaches as part thereof a copy of the complaint for ejectment against SVEI. 
Such admissions and pleadings provide enough basis for a denial of the
application for preliminary injunction since, in the absence of any further
evidence, it is quite obvious that the applicants had failed to show any clear
and positive right to the premises.  As mere sublessees,
they cannot invoke any right superior to that of the lessee, their sublessor.  The
moment the sublessor. 
(SVEI in this case) is ousted
from the premises, the sublessees would have no legs
to stand on.^[20] In an ejectment
case, sublessees need not even be impleaded
as co-defendants with the lessee (sublessor) and a
judgment of eviction against the lessee binds the sublessees.^[21] As such, they cannot likewise claim any
right to a negotiated contract, especially one on their terms because,
according to them, they are merely “small-time” or
“struggling” businessmen.  This
would clearly, be against public policy and public interest.

For a writ of injunction
to issue, the existence of a clear and positive right especially calling for
judicial protection must be shown;
injunction is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce
an abstract right.^[22] An injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse and which may never arise or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action.  There
must exist an actual right.^[23]

4.  Finally, respondents
submit that the status quo order
“was a mere reiteration of the previous temporary restraining order
already issued which was recalled because of petitioners’ assurance.”  This compounds the arbitrariness of
respondent Judge’s action and his inexplicable propensity to disregard
doctrines laid down by this Court.  We
ruled in Dionisio, et al. vs.
CFI of South Cotabato^[24]
that if before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would thereby
be deemed automatically vacated.  But if
no action is taken by the judge on the application within said 20-day period,
the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by
the sheer force of law.^[25]
By the terms of B.P. Blg. 224, a temporary
restraining order can no longer exist indefinitely.  This rule was reiterated in Board Transportation vs. Castro;^[26]
however, to emphasize the automatic expiration, this Court further stated that
no judicial declaration to that effect is necessary.  In the recent case of Aquino, et
al. vs. Luntok,
et al.,^[27]
We further made the following pronouncement:

“The 20-day period of effectivity of
a TRO is non-extendible; the
restraining order automatically terminates at the end of such period without the need of any judicial
declaration to that effect.  [Golden Gate
Realty Corp. vs. IAC, 152 SCRA
684].  Any extension would,
therefore, ordinarily, be disallowed. 
But, when injunction is subsequently granted, as in the case at bar, any
defect in the order brought about by the extension of its enforceability is
deemed cured [Footnote, Banque De L’Indochine
Et De Suez, et al. vs. Torres, et al., G.R. Nos. 82405-06, July 10,
1989].”

By no stretch of the imagination then may the earlier TRO, issued on 28 November 1990,
be deemed to have been reinstated, revived or resurrected.

Finally, We find to
be unsubstantiated the claim of private respondents that petitioners violated
the “gentleman”s agreement” that no
bidding shall be conducted until the issues are resolved.  On the contrary, as shown above, the crude
attempt of Atty. Bandayrel in the court below to hold
the petitioners to an alleged admission was immediately rebuffed by Solicitor
Del Rosario and Atty. Bandayrel was compelled to
withdraw his manifestation.

WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is
GRANTED.  The challenged status
a quo order dated 15 April 1991 issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 90-55248 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL AND VOID.

Costs against private respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Rollo, 58-63.

^[2]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 34-40.

^[3]
Annex “C” of Petition; Id.,
41-48.

^[4]
Annex “D” of Petition; Rollo, 49-57.

^[5]
Annex “E” of Petition.

^[6]
Id.

^[7]
Annex “A ” of Petition.

^[8]
Citing NEA vs. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 399.

^[9]
Rollo, 55.

^[10]
150 SCRA 55.

^[11]
Rollo, 68.

^[12]
Id., 151.

^[13]
52 SCRA 246.

^[14]
56 SCRA 175.

^[15]
G.R. No. 89125, 2 July 1991.

^[16]
Firme, et al. vs. Reyes, et
al. 92 SCRA 713, citing Manakil, et al. vs. Revilla, et al., 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan,
44 Phil. 866; Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117.

^[17]
157 SCRA 469.

^[18]
Rollo, 76.

^[19]
Siva vs. Reyes, 83 Phil. 416; Villadores vs.
Encarnacion, 95 Phil. 913.

^[20]
Sipin, et al. vs. CFI of Manila,
et al., 74 Phil. 649.

^[21]
Go King, et al. vs. Geronimo, et al., 81 Phil. 445; Guevara Realty, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 160 SCRA 478.

^[22]
Yaptinchay vs. Torres, 28 SCRA 489.

^[23]
Angela Estate, Inc. vs. CFI of Negros
Occidental, 24 SCRA 500; Bua???an Cattle Co. vs.
Quintillan, et al., 128 SCRA 276; Talisay
Siilay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of First
Instance, 42 SCRA 577; Integrated Construction Services, Inc. vs. Relova,
65 SCRA 638.

^[24]
124 SCRA 222.

^[25]
Section 5, Rule 58, as amended by B.P. Blg. 224.

^[26]
125 SCRA 410.

^[27]
184 SCRA 177 (1990).