PRIMA K. GOBANTES, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. PA­TRICIA STO. TOMAS, HON. SAMILO BARLO­NGAY, AND HON. MARIO D. YANGO, RESPONDENTS.

The certiorari action at bar concerns the right of an
employee under Section 11 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146 — ­who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years but has not completed
at least fifteen years of service — to continue in the service for such time
as may be necessary to complete said fifteen years of service and thus qualify
for full retirement benefits. The legal
provision reads as follows:^[1]

“ * * Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,
retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five years of age with
at least fifteen years of service; Provided, that if he had less than
fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to
complete the fifteen years.”

The government employee affected is Prima Gobantes, the
petitioner in this case. She “entered
the government service as public school teacher on October 19, 1975 at the age
of fifty-five (55),^[2] and (more or less) continuously served
the government up to ** July, 1990 ** (at which time she) was verbally advised
to retire as she had been long due for retirement since June 9, 1985, her 65th
birthday. On July 31, 1990 she
contested such advice and sought extension of her service, citing Section 11
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146.”^[3] Her
request for extension was predicated on the fact that before her appointment on
June 14, 1979 as permanent public school teacher, or more precisely from
October 19, 1975 to March 31, 1979 — during which period she served as
Provisional Substitute Teacher — her service was not continuous but broken,
serving sometimes for a month only, sometimes two months, the longest
continuous period of service being nine (9) months, the shortest, seven (7)
days; hence, the total duration of her service, as of her 65th birthday, June
9, 1985, was less than fifteen (15) years, short by one (1) year and one (1)
month at the very least.^[4] “In a
letter dated July 16, 1990, Assistant School Division Superintendent Leonora O.
Basalo informed Gobantes to file her request for extension of service with the
Civil Service Commission Regional Office, which she did. The said request, however, was denied by the
CSC Regional Director as embodied in her indorsement dated August 21, 1990.”^[5]

Gobantes appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated November 15, 1990 (No.
90-1035),^[6]
the Commission dismissed her appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the decision
of the CSC Regional Office. The
Resolution’s dispositive portion reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved
to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Prima K. Gobantes for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the decision of CSC
Regional Director Benita O. Santos as embodied in her endorsement dated August
21, 1990 is affirmed. However,
Gobantes’ services actually rendered from June 9, 1985 to August 21, 1990, the
date her request for extension was officially denied, shall be credited for
purposes of her retirement.”

The Resolution was made to rest on Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, otherwise
known as the “Policy on the Extension of Services of Compulsory Retirees to
Complete Fifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes,” issued by
the Commission, construing P.D. 1146 as being limited in its application to
permanent employees and the allowable extension of service as being restricted
to not more than a year. Said
memorandum pertinently provides as follows:^[7]

“Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees
to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted
for a period not exceeding one (1) year.”

Gobantes then filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines an “Appeal or Petition for Review” dated December 7, 1990,
furnishing copy thereof to the Commission.^[8] She
also filed an action for “Declaratory Relief, Quo Warranto, and Damages **”
with the Regional Trial Court at Dumaguete City, Branch 36.^[9]

Acting on Gobantes’ appeal, the Office of the President, thru
then Executive Secretary Oscar M. Orbos, addressed a letter to the Civil
Service Commission, dated March 6, 1991, expressing the view inter alia
that rights granted by statute (PD 1146) “cannot be taken away or diminished by
administrative fiat” (such as CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27). According to Gobantes, the copy of her
appeal petition to the Office of the President, which she furnished the Civil
Service Commission, was treated by the latter as a motion for reconsideration
of its Resolution of November 15, 1990 (No. 90-1035), and denied through
another Resolution dated February 20, 1991 (No. 91-239).^[10]

The special civil action of certiorari at bar was initiated
by Gobantes in accordance with Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution. She
seeks nullification of both said Commission’s Resolutions of November 15, 1990
and February 20, 1991. Her basic thesis
is that the above mentioned Memorandum Circular No. 27 (“Policy on the
Extension of Services of Compulsory Retirees to Complete Fifteen Years Service
Requirement for Retirement Purposes)” is invalid, being contrary to Section 11
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146, also above quoted, supra.^[11]
To support that thesis, she quite understandably quoted from the
afaorementioned letter of the Executive Secretary of March 6, 1991, to wit:^[12]

“‘The Resolution and
Circular (CSC), among other things, impose a one-year limit on extension in the
service to complete the service requirement; prescribe the requirement of
3-year advance filing of request for such extension; and exclude those who
entered the service at age 57 or over from among those whose requests for
extension may be granted.’ (Par. 2, * *).

‘Applicable laws on retirement (CA 186, as amended, and PD 1146)
impose no such restrictions/limitations. These laws mandate the continuance in the service of those who lack the
minimum service requirement for retirement purposes until such time as they
shall have filled the deficiency barring, of course, disability or other causes
of forced separation from the service as prescribed by law. This statutory right to continue in office
cannot be taken away or diminished by administrative fiat. The mandatory extension or continuance in
the service of this class of employees is different from the cases of those
who, upon attainment of age 65 years, have already completed the service
requirement but are nevertheless allowed to stay on in office in view of the
exigencies of the service. It is in the
cases of the latter class of employees where administrative restrictions may
come in, their extension being merely discretionary on the part of the
approving authority. In the case of the
former, the only administrative regulation we could think of would be in the
area of providing safeguards against possible abuse in availment of the right
to continue in the service.’ (par. 3, supra).”

On that chief issue, the Solicitor General has expressed
agreement with petitioner’s position and recommended “that Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, be declared null and void, the questioned Resolutions
No. 90-1035 and 91-239 be reversed, and petitioner be allowed to continue in
the service to complete the 15-year service requirement.”^[13]

There is no need to belabor the issue in the present
proceeding. It has already been
squarely passed upon and resolved in G.R. No. 97419 (Gaudencio T. Cena vs. Civil Service Commission and the Hon.
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, etc.), judgment in which was promulgated on
July 3, 1992. In Cena, Memorandum Circular No. 27 of the Civil Service Commission was
declared invalid because it is not in harmony with and has in fact gone beyond
the terms of the law. Cena contains the following relevant pronouncements:

“While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given
the Civil Service Commission the authority ‘to take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of service beyond retirement age,’ the said provision cannot be
extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority
referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special
law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law
being invoked, provides. It cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in
the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions
(People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;
Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusto Toledo vs.
Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991,
squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old
persons from employment, reinstatement, or re­employment in the government
service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity because it
is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis In the law itself which it was meant
to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision
of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated thus:

‘The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement
the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect
or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. “By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an
act of Congress.” (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine
Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419 [1960]; see also Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174
SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).

The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of
the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old
persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision
of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect.’ (Emphasis supplied)

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146
otherwise known as the ‘Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.’ The
rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but has less than 15
years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990 cannot
likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with
any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of
the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to
supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.”

Conformably with Cena, therefore, Gobantes’ petition should
be granted, and she should be allowed to continue in the service as public school teacher until she
completes fifteen (15) years of service and thereby qualifies for retirement
with full benefits unless, of course, she becomes incapacitated or is sooner
dismissed for cause in accordance with law.

The respondent Commission’s claim that Gobantes’ resort to this
Court was made out of time cannot be sustained. Notice of the Commission’s Resolution No. 90-1035 dated November
15, 1990, denying Gobantes’ petition for extension of her service as public
school teacher, was served on Gobantes on December 7, 1990. On that very same day, December 7, 1990,
Gobantes filed with the Office of the President an “Appeal or Petition for
Review’ anent said Resolution No. 90-1035, and served copy thereof on the Civil
Service Commission also on the same day, December 7, 1990. The Commission opted to treat the copy of
the “Appeal or Petition for Review” served on it as a motion filed with it for
reconsideration of its Resolution No. 90-1035, and denied it by Resolution
promulgated on February 7, 1991 (numbered 91-239).^[14]
Notice of this Resolution No. 91-239 was served on Gobantes on March 7, 1991.^[15]
Since the Commission itself considered that a “motion for reconsideration” of
its Resolution of November 15, 1990 (No. 90-­1035) had been filed with it on
December 7, 1990, the time that that motion was pending may not properly be
deducted from the 30-day period prescribed by Section 7, Article IX of the
Constitution within which the ruling of the Commission “may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.” So, on March 7, 1991, when she was served with notice of the
Commission’s Resolution denying her “motion for reconsideration,” Gobantes had
the full 30-day period to bring her case to this Court, since, as just stated,
she had prevented that period from beginning to run on December 7, 1990, when
she was served with notice of the Commission’s first resolution (denying her
petition for extension of service) by filing a motion for reconsideration on
that very same day. On April 5, 1991,
she filed with this Court a “Motion for Extension [up to April 18, 1991] to
File the Petition” (for review of the resolutions in question); and on April
18, 1991, she did file the petition for certiorari which initiated the
review proceedings at bar. Her appeal
to this Court was therefore seasonably taken.

Equally untenable is the respondent Commission’s argument that
Gobantes had engaged in forum shopping. What happened was that while Gobantes’ motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 90-1035 was yet pending — and therefore before said Resolution
could attain finality — Gobantes’ supervisor, Leonora Basalo, declared her
employment already terminated and appointed Jaena Visitacion in her place as
public school teacher. Wishing to
prevent the enforcement of Basalo’s directive through an injunction or
restraining order, believing that it was futile to ask the Civil Service
Commission for relief in view of its aforesaid Resolution No. 90-1035 and that
her only recourse was an action for declaratory relief or quo warranto
with application for injunction or restraining order; and realizing that this
Court does not take cognizance of declaratory action’s, she filed an action for
declaratory relief (and quo warranto) with the Regional Trial Court at Dumaguete
City (Branch 36), and succeeded in obtaining from that Court the injunctive
relief she desired. Then, when she was
served with notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration of the
Commission’s aforesaid judgment, she timely elevated the case to this Court for
review. Under these circumstances, the
Court is not prepared to say that there has been a culpable violation by
Gobantes of the doctrine against forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, Resolution No. 90-1035
of the respondent Civil Service Commission is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and
petitioner Prima Gobantes is hereby DECLARED to be entitled to continue in the
service in her present position as public school teacher for such time as may
be necessary to complete fifteen years of government service and thereby
qualify for retirement with full benefits, unless she hereafter otherwise
becomes incapacitated or is dismissed for just cause in accordance with
law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., in her
dissent.

Melo and Campos, Jr.,
JJ., no
part.

^[1]
Id., p. 8; emphasis, petitioner’s

^[2]
She was born on June 9, 1920.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 35. The statement of
facts is taken from CSC Resolution No. 90-1035 dated November 15, 1990, infra.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 16, 31-33. There is
no denial of this factual assertion by the respondents.

^[5]
SEE footnote 3, supra (Rollo, p. 35. The statement of facts is taken from Resolution No. 90-1035, dated
November 15, 1990, infra)

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 35-36

^[7]
Id., p. 35; emphasis supplied by Commission in text quoted in Resolution
No. 90-1035

^[8]
Id., pp. 9-10

^[9]
Id., p. 10

^[10]
Id., pp. 54-56

^[11]
Id., p. 8; emphasis,
petitioner’s (SEE footnote 1, supra)

^[12] Id., pp. 13-14, emphasis,
petitioner’s

^[13]
Id., pp. 130-141 (“Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,” Oct. 15,
1991 [at p. 140])

^[14]
SEE footnotes 8 and 10, supra

^[15]
Rollo, p. 10; Annexes H to H-3, petition