NEMESIO C. VIDAD, EXUPERIO BANTOTO, CRISTITO TEVES AND LLOYD SIEGFRIED SIA, PETITIONERS, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 42, SOLICITOR GENERAL’S OFFICE, MARC…

A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held,
starting 19 September 1990 and
lasting until 21 September 1990, a mass action, or a strike from their school
classes, to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. The teachers also assailed alleged
corruption in the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).^[1]

A return-to work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional
Director Teofilo Gomez with a warning that if the “striking” school
teachers were not to resume their classes within twenty-four hours,
administrative charges would be filed.^[2] The
order not having been heeded, administrative complaints against the teachers
concerned were thereupon filed. The
teachers were each given five days from receipt of said complaints within which
to submit their respective answers and supporting documents. Constituted to look into the cases was an investigation panel composed of three
DECS lawyers, namely, Marcelo Baclaso, Nieva Montes and Generoso Capuyan.^[3]

On 13 November 1990, a group of school teachers, who were
administratively charged, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete a
complaint for injunction, prohibition and damages, with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, against the aforenamed DECS officials. A temporary restraining order, prohibiting
the defendants from continuing with the administrative investigation, was
forthwith granted by the court.^[4]

The defendants filed their answer, later followed by a motion to
dismiss. The school teachers, on their
part, moved to strike out the
appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and to accordingly declare
the defendants in default. Both motions
of the plaintiffs and the defendants were denied by the court in its Order of
10 April 1991, viz:

In the light of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion to declare
defendants in default, dated January 7, 1991, motion for reconsideration dated
February 18, 1991 and defendants’ motion to dismiss dated January 23, 1991, are
all denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[5]

From this denial, both parties filed with
this Court their respective petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The teachers’ petition, that likewise impleaded as respondent, along
with the DECS officials, the Office of the Solicitor General, was docketed as
G.R. No. 98084 and that of the DECS officials as G.R. No. 98922. These cases were consolidated in this
Court’s resolution of 28 May 1991.^[6]

Four other cases, raising like issues, were later also filed with
the court below by other public school teachers concerned. The DECS officials, again represented by the
Solicitor General, filed motions to dismiss, which the court similarly denied. A joint petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus was thence filed with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 100300-03. This Court later
resolved the petition to be likewise consolidated with G.R. No. 98084 and G.R.
No. 98922 in its Resolution of 04 July 1991.^[7]

The issues raised in these consolidated cases are?

(1) Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General may
properly represent the defendants in the Regional Trial Court cases;^[8]
and

(2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed
outright the said cases.^[9]

It should be conceded that the various complaints against the
DECS officials have prescinded from the administrative actions taken, and
contemplated to be yet taken, against the public school teachers, the
plaintiffs in the cases pending with the court a quo. The said complaints charge the defendants,
all government officials, with having illegally withheld their salaries, having
wrongfully filed administrative charges against the plaintiffs, having
unjustifiably refused to inform the latter of the nature and cause of
accusation upon which the charges were initiated, having inexcusably violated
elemental due process, and having erroneously applied the law. The school teachers pray for actual and
moral damages, plus attorney’s fees, as well as for an order restraining the
defendants from further proceeding with the administrative investigations.

The contention of the school teachers that the DECS officials are
being sued solely in their private capacity certainly is not borne out
by their above allegations and prayers. The root of the cases filed below deals, in fact, on the performance of
official functions by the DECS officials. Whether the actions they have taken were proper or improper, or whether
they have acted in good faith or bad faith, cannot, pending a full hearing that
would aptly afford all parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective
contentions, be yet determined. Until
then, we must presume that official duties have been regularly performed.^[10]

Presidential Decree 478, in part, provides:

“1) The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President of head of office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of
the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a
lawyer. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:

“a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party” (stress supplied).

x x x              x x x                 x
x x

The above provisions are basically reiterated
in the Administrative Code of 1987.^[11]

We accordingly hold that the Solicitor General did not act
improperly in deciding to represent the DECS officials in the above cases.

The defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaints have likewise
been precipitately sought, and we see no reversible error in the denial thereof
by the lower court. The various
complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part of
the DECS officials. It cannot be
pretended this early that the same could be impossible of proof. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are
able to establish their allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages can be
warranted. Public officials are
certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from
acts done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may
not be said to have acted within the scope of their official authority, and no
longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.^[12]

It was, nonetheless, inopportune for the lower court to issue the
restraining orders. The authority of
the DECS Regional Director to issue the return to work memorandum, to initiate
the administrative charges and to constitute the investigating panel can hardly
be disputed.^[13]

We see the court cases and the administrative matters to be
closely interrelated, if not, indeed, interlinked. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a
civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of
good order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it
pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. We see, in these petitions before us, no cogent reason to deviate from
the rule.

WHEREFORE –

(1) The Petition in G.R.
No. 98084 is DISMISSED;

(2) In G.R. No. 98922 (a)
the Order of 10 April 1991, appealed from is AFFIRMED; (b) the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is DISSOLVED; and (c) the
lower court is DIRECTED to suspend further hearings in its Civil Case No. 9789,
until after a final determination on the administrative proceedings would have
been made;

(3) In G.R. No. 100300-
No. 100303, inclusive, (a) the Joint Order of 28 May 1991, denying the motions
to dismiss Civil Case No. 9877, No. 9879, No. 9882 and No. 9883 is AFFIRMED; (b)
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court in said civil
cases is DISSOLVED; and (c) the lower court is DIRECTED to suspend further
hearings in the abovenumbered civil cases, until after a final determination
would have been made on the administrative proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, and
Puno, JJ., concur.

Padilla and
Griño-Aquino, JJ., on leave.

^[1]
G.R. No. 98084, Rollo 3, 81.

^[2]
G.R. No. 98084, Annex
“1” Comment, 82.

^[3]
Ibid., Memorandum for Petitioners in G.R. No. 98084 and Respondents in
G.R. No. 98912 and 100300-03, 146.

^[4]
G.R. No. 98084, Annex “3,” Comment, 96.

^[5]
Ibid., Annex “K,” Petition, 54-60.

^[6]
G.R. No. 98922, Rollo, 48.

^[7]
G.R. Nos. 100300-03, Rollo, 133.

^[8]
G.R. No. 98084.

^[9]
G.R. No. 98922 and G.R. No. 100300-03.

^[10]
Section 5 (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

^[11]
Section 35 (i), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, Executive Order No. 292, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6733.

^[12]
Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44484, 14 March 1987; Correa v.
GFI; L-46096, 30 July 1979.

^[13]
See Section 38, Presidential Decree No. 807.