TAN CHIN HIN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

It appears from the record that Tan Seng, a Chinese boy of about 17 years of
age, claiming to be the son of Tan Chin Hin, a resident merchant of the city of
Manila, arrived at the port of Manila from China on the steamship Chinhita, on
the 13th day of February, 1914. The customs authorities refused Tan Seng the
right to enter the Philippine Islands. The question was referred to the board of
special inquiry and an investigation was held, in which several witnesses
testified. After hearing the. evidence, two of the three members of the board of
special inquiry found that the said Tan Seng was not, in their opinion, the
legitimate son of the said Tan Chin Hin, and denied to Tan Seng the right to
enter the Philippine Islands.The third member of the board, while he admitted
that there were some discrepancies in the proof adduced before the board, held
that the same were not of sufficient importance to refuse the said Tan Seng the
right to land in the Philippine Islands.

From the decision of the board of special inquiry an appeal was taken to the
Collector of Customs, the Honorable B. Herstein, who, upon an examination of the
record sent to him, found that the said Tan Seng was not entitled to enter the
Philippine Islands, and held as follows:

“It is claimed on behalf of this immigrant (Tan Seng) that he is the
legitimate minor son of Tan Chin Hin, a resident Chinese merchant. He states
that he is 17 years of age and that he has two younger brothers, aged 13 and 9,
respectively. The witnesses presented on his behalf testified that they are
acquainted with the father of this immigrant and his family and that the
immigrant is such legitimate son, as claimed, but there appear to be
discrepancies in their evidence as to the ages of the other children in
the family. The board of (special) inquiry found that the applicant has the
appearance of being considerably younger than seventeen and considering
further the nature of the testimony of the witnesses as to the age of the other
members of the (Tan Chin Hin’s) family, concluded that the applicant is not the
son of Tan Chin Hin, as claimed.

“From a careful review of the record in the case, the conclusions of the
board of special inquiry appear to be reasonable and just and no reason is seen
for reversing the decision made.

“The said Tan Seng is therefore refused landing, and it is hereby ordered
that he be returned to his port of embarkation at the expense of the vessel
bringing him, on the next sailing of any vessel of the same
line.”

Upon being informed of the foregoing decision of the Collector of Customs,
the said Tan Chin Hin, on behalf of his alleged son, Tan Seng, presented a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance in the city
of Manila. Upon a consideration of said petition, the judge of the Court of
First Instance issued an order requiring the Collector of Customs to show cause
why the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted as prayed for. In response
to said order the Collector of Customs made a full and complete statement of the
proceedings had before him in the department of customs, accompanying said
report by a certified copy of all the proceedings, including the evidence taken
before the board of special inquiry.

Upon the issue presented by said petition and return, the judge of the Court
of First Instance, apparently without first determining that there had been an
abuse of authority on the part of the customs department, proceeded to
take testimony upon the question whether or not the said Tan Seng was entitled
to enter the Philippine Islands. The right to determine, in the first instance,
whether or not a Chinese alien has a right to enter the United States or the
territories thereof to which the Chinese Immigration Laws have been extended,
has been conferred by law upon a branch of the executive department of the
Government, The judicial department of the Government has no authority or right
to intervene in determining the right of aliens to enter the Philippine Islands,
except and until it has been, proven and shown clearly that that branch of the
executive department of the Government upon which the power to determine that
question has been conferred by law, has abused its authority. In other
words, until it is shown that the customs authorities have abused their
authority in refusing Chinese aliens the right to land in the Philippine
Islands, the courts are without authority to intervene. The decision of the
customs authorities is final, unless it is shown that they have abused their
authority. An abuse of authority exists when there is no proof presented to
support the conclusions of the customs authorities or when they have misapplied
a clear provision of the law. The customs authorities act more or less as a jury
in determining the facts in the first instance. They have an opportunity to see
and hear the witnesses and they are under no obligation to believe the
declarations of a witness if his manner or conduct during the examination is
such as to cause them to disbelieve him, even though his declarations are not
disputed by any other witness. (Ekiu vs. United States, 142 U. S., 651;
Yamataya vs. Fisher, 189 U. S., 86; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U.
S., 253; Lem Moon Sing vs. United States, 158 U. S., 538; Chin Low
vs. United States, 208 U. S., 8; Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil.
Rep., 343; Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep., 448; U. S. vs.
Williams, 190 Fed. Rep., 6860 The admission of aliens into the United States is
regulated by Acts of Congress. The supervision is confined to the department of
immigration charged with the enforcement of laws regulating the admission. The
final determination of all facts with relation to the qualification of aliens to
enter the United States or their deportation is intrusted to the proper
immigration officers, “whose decision is final, unless reversed on appeal to the
Secretary of Labor” (in the Philippine Islands the Collector of Customs). By the
Act of Congress these officers are made the sole and exclusive judges of the
existence of the facts establishing qualification, and no other
tribunal is vested with authority or power by Congress to reexamine and
consider the sufficiency of the evidence on which these officers acted, until it
is shown that such officers abused the authority conferred upon them by law. So
long as the officers clothed with this authority act within the limits placed by
Congress, courts have no right to interfere. The authority of the
immigration officers and the jurisdiction of the courts depend upon the power
conferred by Congress. It is a matter of legislation. No discretion is vested in
the courts. Congress has the right to legislate upon the subject, prescribe
rules, fix limits, and confer authority where it deems wise in legislating upon
the subject at hand. Under the present law, the final authority, unless an
abuse of authority is shown, is conferred upon the immigration officers. The
only right of the courts to intervene is when and after it has been shown that
such officers have abused their authority and that the parties have not been
given a full, fair, and free hearing. (Ekiu vs. U. S., 142 U. S., 651;
Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil. Rep., 343; Ex Parte Petkos, 212 Fed., Rep.,
275; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S., 253; Ex Parte Joyce, 212 Fed., Rep.,
282.)

A mere refusal by the proper authorities to allow an alien to enter
the territory of the United States is not an abuse of authority. The law permits
the examining officer or board to examine the applicant for admission, and such
other witnesses as may be presented, to hear their testimony and to decide upon
such testimony whether or not the applicant is entitled to enter. The authority
to examine into the facts relating to the right of the applicant to enter
implies the discretion to decide upon such evidence, and unless it is clearly
proved that this discretion was abused, the courts will refuse to take
jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the questions of the right of the
alien to enter. (Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil. Rep., 343.)

The attorney for the appellee in the present case asserts that there was no
proof adduced against the right of the said Tan Seng to land in the Philippine
Islands. The burden is not upon the executive department of the Government to
show that an alien immigrant has not a right to land in the territory of the
United States. The burden is upon the alien seeking to land to show that he has
a right to enter. Upon this branch of the case, therefore, it is our conclusion,
there being some proof to support the conclusions of the customs authorities,
that there was no abuse of authority and that the judge of the Court of First
Instance was without authority in the present case to admit proof upon the right
of Tan Seng to land in the Philippine Islands. The Court of First Instance had
no jurisdiction even to consider the case in the first instance, further than to
determine whether or not there had been an abuse of authority on the part of the
customs authorities.

The attorney for the petitioner in his brief attempts to show that the
Customs authorities of the Philippine Islands are without right to examine into
the question of the right of Chinese aliens to land in the Philippine Islands.
That question has been presented to this court in numerous instances and in each
instance has been decided against his contention. (In re Allen, 2 Phil.
Rep., 630; Ngo-Ti vs. Shuster, 7 Phil. Rep., 355; Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep., 448; Juan Co vs. Rafferty, 14 Phil. Rep., 235.)

After fully considering all of the questions presented by the appellant as
well as the appellee, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of
First Instance should be reversed and that the judgment of the Collector of
Customs should be affirmed. It is, therefore, hereby ordered and decreed that
the judgment of this court be entered reversing the judgment of the Court of
First Instance and affirming the judgment of the Collector of Customs, and that
the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance from whence it came and that
a judgment be entered therein in accordance with the foregoing.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.

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MORELAND, J.

I agree to the result in this case.

I think, however, that, in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding,
attention should be directed to the fact that the present case reverses, or at
least modifies, the rule laid down with respect to what constitutes an abuse of
authority in the case of Ang Eng Chong vs. The Insular Collector of Customs (23
Phil. Rep., 614). In that case it was stated:

“An abuse of authority certainly exists:

” (a) When a person has been denied admission into the territory of
the United States who does not belong to any of the excluded classes. For
example: A citizen of the United States or any other person who has acquired a
right to be in and to remain in territory of the United States. (U. S.
vs. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. Rep., 490; Muñoz vs. Collector of
Customs, 20 Phil. Rep., 494; U. S. vs. Yu Kiao, 20 Phil. Rep.,307; U.
S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S., 459; 83 Fed. Rep., 136.)

” (b) When a person seeking admission has not been given a full,
fair, and free hearing. For example, when he has not been given an opportunity
to present all the material proof which he desires to present. (Ngo-Ti
vs. Shuster, 7 Phil. Rep., 355; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S.,
253; Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil. Rep., 343.)

“(c) When there is no proof at all presented against the right of the
applicant seeking admission. (U. S. vs. Williams, 189 Fed. Rep.,
915.)”

I declined to concur in the decision upon the ground that the statements in
paragraphs (b) and (c) were not correct statements of the
rules governing the respective cases.

First, with reference to (c):

As was observed by the court in the case of United States vs.
Williams (203 Fed., 155, 158), the Chinese Immigration Acts put the burden of
proof expressly upon the Chinaman, and contain no restriction whatsoever as to
the kind of proof upon which the immigration authorities are to act. In the case
of Fong Yue Ting vs. The United States (149 U. S., 698), the court
said:

“If no evidence is offered by the Chinaman, the judge makes the order of
deportation, as upon a default. If he produces competent evidence to explain the
fact of his not having a certificate, it must be considered by the judge; and if
he thereupon appears to be entitled to a certificate, it is to be granted to
him.”

This rule (c) is now modified by the present decision and the
correct rule on the subject stated to be:

“The burden is not upon the executive department of the Government to show
that an alien immigrant has not a right to land in the territory of the United
States. The burden is upon the alien seeking to land to show that he has a right
to enter.”

Second, as to (b):

I am constrained to believe that the case cited does not correctly state the
rule relative to the kind of hearing that must be given’ to the alien, and that
that error is carried into the present decision. It says: “The only right of the
courts to intervene is when and after it has been shown that such officers have
abused their authority and that the parties have not been given a full, fair,
and free hearing.”

As I understand the rule, it does not require a full or a “free” hearing. All
that is required is a hearing. It does not have to have the elements of
a formal trial and no formal complaint or pleadings are required and the want of
them does not affect the authority of the judge, or the validity of the statute.
(Fong Yue Ting vs. The United States, 149 U. S.,698, 729.)

In the Japanese Immigrant Case (189 U. S., 86) the kind of hearing which was
accorded the immigrant is stated by the court as follows:

“Besides, the record now before us shows that the appellant had notice,
although not a formal one, of the investigation instituted for the purpose of
ascertaining whether she was illegally in this country. The traverse to the
return made by the Immigration Inspector shows upon its face that she was before
that officer pending the investigation of her right to be in the United States,
and made answers to questions propounded to her. It is true that she pleads a
want of knowledge of our language; that she did not understand the nature and
import of the questions propounded to her; that the investigation made was a
“pretended” one; and that she did not, at the time, know that the investigation
had reference to her being deported from the country. These considerations
cannot justify the intervention of the courts. * * * Suffice it to say, it does
not appear that appellant was denied an opportunity to be heard. And as no
appeal was taken to the Secretary from the decision of the immigration
inspector, that decision was final and conclusive. If the appellant’s want of
knowledge of the English language put her at some disadvantage in the
investigation conducted by that officer, that was her misfortune, and
constitutes no reason, under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for
the intervention of the court by habeas corpus. We perceive no ground for such
intervention— none for the contention that due process of law was denied to
appellant.”

Can such a hearing as this be held to be a “full, fair, and free hearing?”
Nevertheless the court said it was sufficient, saying that while no person shall
be deprived of liberty without an opportunity to be heard in respect of matters
upon which that liberty depends, that does not necessarily mean “an opportunity
upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the, forms of judicial procedure,
but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress,
and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such
officers are required to act.” (Id.)

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the rule as to a hearing stated
in the decision of the court in this case is not the correct one.